
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THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

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M,DCC,LXXXIII.



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THE firſt four books of this volume, which contain the progreſs of the war in the Netherlands, the eſtabliſhment of the truce with the Dutch, and the expulſion of the Moreſcoes from Spain, are printed literally from the manuſcript of Dr. Watſon: nor has the ſmalleſt alteration been made, either in the arrangement of his matter, or in his ſtyle. It is, however, but juſtice to the memory of that author, as well as to the public, to acknowledge, that, in the two laſt, he had not the leaſt participation. Theſe were written by the editor of Dr. Watſon's manuſcript, at the deſire of the guardians of his children. This was deemed an attention due to the curioſity of the reader; a curioſity which, in the preſent important æra, may be ſuppoſed to be ſomewhat enlivened by the great events which have lately happened in the world.

IT is evident that Dr. Watſon has exerted in this work all that care to diſcover the truth, which diſtinguiſhes his Hiſtory of Philip II. He has conſulted the moſt approved writers on this ſubject: and by that reſpectable friend to literature, the Earl of HARDWICKE, he was favoured with manuſcripts of equal authority and importance.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE continuator of Dr. Watſon's narrative has not thought it proper to give a detail of thoſe hoſtile operations at ſea, which were continued, beyond the line, even after the pacification of Antwerp. Theſe operations, in his opinion, enter into the Spaniſh Hiſtory, by the moſt natural connection, at the expiration of the truce; when the Spaniſh miniſters compared the advantages and diſadvantages that had reſulted from that agreement, and deliberated whether they ſhould prolong the peace, or renew the war.

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THE

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE THIRD,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK I.

PHILIP the Third, King of Spain, ſon of Philip the Second, and of Anne of Auſtria, daughter of Maximilian II. Emperor of Germany, was in the 21ſt year of his age at his acceſſion to the throne. He was a prince of a character extremely oppoſite to that of the late king, although no pains had been ſpared to form him to a ſimilarity of manners. From the inſtructions delivered to thoſe who had the charge of his education, it appears (*a*) to have been a principal object of his father's attention to inſpire him with the ſame bigotted attachment to the ſuperſtition of the church of Rome, by which he himſelf had been actuated; and the means which he employed for this end, were attended with the deſired ſucceſs. But he was not equally ſucceſsful in his endeavours to overcome that averſion which his ſon, from the natural indolence of his temper, early diſcovered to almoſt every ſpecies of manly exertion and activity (*b*). Book I. 1598.

(*a*) Hiſtoria de la vida y hechos, del inclito monarcha D. Felippe tercero. Por Gil Gonſalez Davila, Croniſta de los Sennores Reyes D. Felippe III. y IVto. lib. 1. cap. 6.

(*b*) Addiciones a la Hiſtoria del Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi, Yanez Memorias, p. 136.

Book I. 1598.

WITH this part of the young prince's character, Philip was well acquainted; and foreſaw, with much anxiety, the unhappy conſequences which it was likely to produce in his future reign. In order to introduce and habituate him to the management of public affairs, he formed a council of his ableſt and moſt experienced miniſters, who, in the preſence of the prince, debated three times a week, concerning various important matters relating to the adminiſtration of the kingdom; and the prince was required to preſide in this council, and to report the opinion of the majority to the king (*c*). But neither his, nor any other expedient which Loaiſa, the prince's faithful preceptor, could deviſe, proved effectual for the purpoſe for which it was intended. Inactivity or indolence ſtill remained the moſt conſpicuous feature in his character; and it early excited in the king, a ſtrong and well grounded apprehenſion that his ſon, unable or unwilling himſelf to hold the reins of government, would ſurrender them into the hands of the marquis of Denia, or of ſome other favourite. Againſt this conduct, which is ſo commonly attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences, Philip had often put the young prince upon his guard; and it was his laſt advice to him, which he delivered with great earneſtneſs, a few hours before his death, that he ſhould govern his kingdom by himſelf. He had likewiſe requeſted of him to employ, as his principal counſellors, Don Chriſtopher de Moura, marquis of Caſtel Rodrigo, and Don John Idiaquez; from whoſe experience, fidelity, and great abilities, he might derive the higheſt advantages, eſpecially in the beginning of his reign (*d*).

THE

(*c*) Davila, lib. i. cap. x.

(*d*) Gon. Davila, lib. i. cap. 12. Porreno Dichos y Hechos, paſſim. It was a ſaying of Philip's concerning his ſon, Que era mas para ſer mandado, que mandar. Addiciones di Malvezzi.

THE ſoft and gentle temper of the prince had hitherto rendered him extremely obſequious to his father's will (*e*): but, conſcious of his incapacity, and prompted by his indolence, he no ſooner mounted the throne, than, diſregarding the counſels which had been given him, he reſolved to avoid the perplexity which might attend his having recourſe, on any occaſion, to different counſellors, and therefore committed the whole adminiſtration of affairs to his favourite the marquis of Denia. 1598.

THE marquis del Caſtel Rodrigo, in whom Philip II. had long repoſed the moſt perfect confidence, was honourably diſmiſſed from court, and appointed viceroy of Portugal (*f*). Idiaquez had the preſidency of the military orders conferred upon him; and being of a leſs ambitious, and more complying temper than Caſtel Rodrigo, and willing to act in an inferior or ſubordinate capacity, he was ſuffered to remain, and occaſionally conſulted, on account of his long experience and the high character which he held for prudence and ſagacity (*g*). But all power was lodged

(*e*) The author of "Addiciones a la Hiſtoria de Marquis Virgilio Malvezzi," gives the following ſingular inſtance of the truth of this aſſertion. Philip II. intending that his ſon ſhould marry one of the daughters of Charles, archduke of Auſtria, and having ſent for the pictures of theſe princeſſes, he one day, in preſence of his daughter Iſabella, and ſeveral of his miniſters, deſired the young prince to examine the pictures, and make his choice of the princeſs, whom he would prefer for his wife. Philip, with his uſual deference and humility, ſubmitted his choice to the king. The king remonſtrated with him on the impropriety of requeſting any other perſon to judge for him, in this matter, in which his own taſte alone ought to be conſulted, and deſired him to carry the pictures to his own apartment, where he might carefully examine them and fix his choice. I have no choice, replied the prince, but your majeſty's pleaſure, and I am certain that that princeſs will appear to me the beſt and the moſt beautiful whom your majeſty ſhall prefer. p. 137.

(*f*) Davila, p. 36. (*g*) Davila, p. 37.

BOOK I. 1598. in the hands of the favourite, who, having been chief equerry to the king, before his acceſſion to the throne, and having in that ſtation had frequent acceſs to his perſon, had gained his affections, and acquired an entire aſcendant over him.

HE was inſtantly created duke of Lerma, and admitted into the council of ſtate: after which, the king tranſmitted edicts to all the councils in the kingdom, requiring obedience to whatever orders ſhould be communicated to them in his name by the duke (*b*).

THIS determined partiality, which Philip was at no pains to conceal, occaſioned a general diſcontent. The grandees of the firſt rank were filled with indignation, when they beheld one whom they had been accuſtomed to regard as their inferior, inveſted with ſuch unlimited authority; and all ranks of men, judging from former inſtances of the ſame nature, dreaded an unproſperous and unquiet reign. Their complaints were the louder and the more generally diffuſed, as the duke of Lerma was utterly unpractiſed in the affairs of government, and had not yet given any proof of merit or abilities. It was a demonſtration, they thought, of extreme weakneſs in the character of the king, ſo avowedly, and in contradiction to the advice and example of his father, whoſe memory they revered, to declare his choice of a favourite; and they apprehended that, on trial, the character of this favourite would be found, in this reſpect, too nearly ſimilar to his own (*i*). Their apprehenſions were not without foundation. By his courteouſneſs and affability, the duke impoſed on the penetration of many of thoſe

(*b*) Davila, p. 41.
(*i*) Vide Addiciones to Malvezzi, p. 144.

thoſe who approached him; and, by diſcovering on all occaſions the moſt devoted attachment to the church, he conciliated the favour of the eccleſiaſtics, but it ſoon appeared that his views and abilities were extremely limited; and that he neither poſſeſſed the œconomy, the firmneſs, or the capacity requiſite for the difficult and important charge with which he was intruſted (*k*).

IT was peculiarly unfortunate for the Spaniſh monarchy to have the helm of government committed to ſuch weak hands, at the preſent period. The late king indeed had foreſeen, and, in ſome meaſure, provided for this event, by the peace which he had concluded with France, and the reſignation of his ſovereignty in the Netherlands; which he hoped would put an end to the war in that country, and prove the means of recovering the revolted provinces. He had likewiſe left all his other dominions, not only in Spain, but in Italy, and in the new world, in the enjoyment of peace, and Portugal, now accuſtomed to the yoke, yielded a ready obedience to his authority.

BUT although Philip II. through the vigilance and vigour of his adminiſtration, had left his dominions every where, except the Netherlands, in the enjoyment of internal tranquillity, he had not left them in a flouriſhing condition. On the contrary, Spain, his place of reſidence, and his ſeat of empire, was greatly exhauſted, and ſome of the principal ſources of her opulence and proſperity were dried up.

BY the war in which he had made ſo many great exertions, both by ſea and land, and, ſtill more, perhaps, by the migration of the people to the new world, the inhabitants of Spain were

(*k*) Mayerne Turquet, p. 1295.

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greatly reduced in number. All emoluments and honors which the ſovereign could beſtow, had, for ages paſt, been divided between the military and the eccleſiaſtical profeſſions. By this means, the mechanic arts and agriculture, having come to be regarded as comparatively mean and deſpicable, were alike abandoned by the indolent or inactive, and by thoſe who were endued with a ſpirit of ambition and enterpriſe. This contempt, and the conſequent neglect of the more uſeful arts, the profits ariſing from which, though ſure, are always moderate, was heightened by the frequent inſtances of enormous fortunes, ſuddenly acquired by the adventurers in America. That proportion of the riches ariſing from the American mines, which the ſovereign received, was ſpent either in thoſe countries in which his wars were carried on, or in purchaſing naval and military ſtores from other nations. The greater part of what was imported by merchants and other individuals was laid out in England, Italy, and the Netherlands, for manufactures, which the colonies required, but which Spain was become unable to ſupply; and the remainder was drained off by taxes which the king had, from time to time, been neceſſitated to impoſe. From this ſcarcity of money; from the want of manufactures; from the neglect of agriculture, joined to the numberleſs loſſes ſuſtained at ſea, where Philip had been almoſt always foiled by his enemies, trade of every kind was reduced to the loweſt ebb; and ſo great was the conſequent diſorder in the finances, that, beſides a debt of 140 millions of ducats which he left upon the crown, he had been obliged to have recourſe to the diſgraceful expedient of employing eccleſiaſtics to go from houſe to houſe, to receive from his ſubjects in Spain ſuch aſſiſtance as they were willing to afford; a meaſure which was not attended with the advantages

advantages which he had expected to derive from it, while it contributed to ſink his reputation in Spain, as his refuſal to pay the intereſt of his foreign debt, before related, had already done in the reſt of Europe (*l*).

The danger to which the Spaniſh monarchy was expoſed, from that debility to which it was reduced at the preſent period, was the more to be dreaded, becauſe many parts of this widely extended empire were removed to ſo great a diſtance from the ſeat of government; and nothing, there was ground to believe, could avert the impending ruin, but a vigorous exertion of the higheſt abilities, joined to the moſt rigid and judicious œconomy. It was likewiſe obviouſly neceſſary that peace ſhould inſtantly have been eſtabliſhed with the maritime powers; who, having for ſeveral years paſt, held the ſovereignty of the ſeas, ſeemed to poſſeſs ſufficient naval force entirely to deſtroy the Spaniſh trade, and to cut off all communication between the mother country and her colonies.

But the duke of Lerma was equally incapable of diſcerning this danger, and of providing againſt it. As he had ſeen the difficulties in which the late king was involved, through the diſorder of his finances, and could not be ignorant of the exhauſted condition of the kingdom, it might have been expected, that one of the firſt objects of his attention would have been to retrench the unneceſſary expences of the court, by attempting, if practicable, to reduce the number of ſuperfluous offices, to which, in times of greater proſperity, the vanity of former kings had given birth. But inſtead of this, he greatly multiplied ſuch ſort

(*l*) Gon. Davila, p. 25.

Book I. 1598. ſort of offices (*m*); and, in the very infancy of his adminiſtration, gave other ſignal proofs of the degree of profuſion which would have been unjuſtifiable, had the kingdom been in the moſt flouriſhing condition.

One of the firſt events of this reign was the marriage of the king with Margaret of Auſtria (*n*), whom the archduke Albert had conducted into Spain. He had gone, for this purpoſe, from the Netherlands to Germany, about the time of the late king's death; and had ſoon afterwards ſet out with her from Gratz, by the way of Italy: but ſo great were the preparations made for her reception in Spain, and, agreeably to the character of the nation, ſo ſlowly were they carried on, that the fleet ſent to bring her thither did not arrive at Genoa till ſeveral months after. In the marriage ſolemnity, in the city of Valentia, above a million of ducats were expended, beſides a great number of rich preſents, which were made to foreign princes and to the church (*o*). By the eccleſiaſtics, who on this, as on many other occaſions, ſhared amply of the duke of Lerma's munificence, his conduct was extolled as highly liberal and magnificent, but filled the minds of the more impartial and diſcerning part of men, who were concerned for the true glory and intereſt of the nation and of the crown, with indignation, mingled with contempt (*p*).

April 1599. About the ſame time with the royal nuptials, thoſe of the archduke with the infanta were ſo-
End of May lemnized (*q*); but not long after, they ſet out together

(*m*) Gon. Davila, p. 45.
(*n*) Daughter of Charles, archduke of Auſtria.
(*o*) Gon. Davila, lib. ii.
(*p*) Addiciones a la Hiſtoria de Malvezzi, p. 152.
(*q*) Albert had before-hand reſigned his dignity of cardinal into the hands of the pope.

gether for the Netherlands, having received full aſſurance from the king and his miniſter, that no aſſiſtance in money or in troops, which Spain could afford, ſhould be wanting to ſupport them in their new ſovereignty, and to enable them to accompliſh the reduction of the revolted provinces.

In forming this reſolution, there was no room for heſitation. From the conditions upon which the late king had transferred the ſovereignty of the Netherlands to his daughter, joined to the age of that princeſs, there was little ground to doubt that it would ere long revert to the Spaniſh monarchy. It could not be conſidered, even during the life of the infanta, in any other light, but as a fief of Spain: for ſhe and her ſucceſſors were expreſly required to take an oath of fidelity to the kings of Spain, and, in order to inſure the faithful obſervance of this oath, the liberty was reſerved of putting garriſons of Spaniſh troops into Antwerp, Ghent, Cambray, and other places; beſides which, both parties had ſolemnly engaged to regard the ſame powers as enemies, or as friends, and promiſed mutually to aſſiſt and defend each other againſt all the world beſides (*r*).

It would probably have ſaved the Spaniſh monarchy from the extreme debility into which it fell in the preſent and in the following reign, and would have highly contributed to leſſen thoſe difficulties which, in his future adminiſtration, the duke of Lerma was about to encounter, had the ſovereignty yielded been enjoyed, free and independent, by the infanta, and Spain been delivered from the burthen of the war with the United Provinces. But Iſabella could not, in this caſe, have

(*r*) Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 2.

BOOK I. 1599.

have accepted of the ſovereignty conferred on her. Without the aſſiſtance of Spain, ſhe muſt have ſunk under her unequal conteſt with the Dutch, ſupported by the queen of England; or ſhe muſt inſtantly have made peace with theſe powers, on whatever terms they ſhould be pleaſed to preſcribe. The ſovereignty of the United Provinces would thus have been eſtabliſhed, and both their religious and civil liberty have been recogniſed.

To embrace a meaſure which would be attended with ſo diſagreeable a conſequence, Philip was hardly leſs averſe than his father had ever been. With a temper gentle and obſequious to exceſs, he was devoted with the moſt bigotted attachment to the Popiſh faith; and being entirely governed by his miniſter, who, on all occaſions, aſſiduouſly courted the favour of the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, and the ſovereign pontiff, he would have believed himſelf highly criminal in the ſight of God, had he not reſolved to employ his utmoſt power to reduce the revolted provinces under obedience to the holy ſee. He had beſides, before his father's death, formally given his conſent to the deed of transference, with all the conditions that were annexed to it; and, as he could not, conſiſtently with honour, ſo, from his affection to the infanta, he was not inclined to retract.

PROMPTED by theſe motives, which were not likely ever to loſe their force, he reſolved to conſider his ſiſter's, and her huſband's intereſt as his own, and to take the ſame concern in all the affairs of the Netherlands, as if the ſovereignty of that country had never been transferred. Conformably to this reſolution, both the money and the troops of Spain continued to be employed in the Low Countries, as in the preceding reign. All the affairs of theſe provinces were directed as formerly

merly by Spaniſh councils. The intereſt of the Spaniſh monarch was affected as much as ever by what happened there; and, for theſe reaſons, almoſt all the important tranſactions which paſſed in the provinces, for ſeveral years after the preſent period, make an eſſential part of the Spaniſh hiſtory. BOOK I. 1599.

THE archduke having, during his abſence, committed the government of the Netherlands to his couſin, cardinal Andrew of Auſtria, biſhop of Conſtance, and the command of the forces to Mendoza, marquis of Gaudalette, and admiral of Arragon, had inſtructed the latter to ſecure ſome convenient paſſage over the Rhine, which might open an entrance into the northern provinces, and enable him either to ſupport the army at the expence of the enemy, or, if that ſhould be found impracticable, to quarter them in the country of Cleves, and the other neutral adjoining ſtates. Albert gave Mendoza inſtructions, at the ſame time, to avoid expoſing the army to any unneceſſary riſk, before his return; and therefore there is little room for doubt that his principal intention, in ordering him to croſs the Rhine, was to furniſh the troops with free quarters, in compenſation for their pay. To form this extraordinary reſolution, it is ſaid, he was determined by neceſſity; the ſouthern provinces of the Netherlands having been greatly exhauſted by the depradations of the Spaniſh troops, which had ſo often mutinied, and his exchequer drained, partly by the ſums lately advanced in payment of their arrears, and partly by the preparations for his journey to Spain, which, in honour of the young queen, had been performed with unuſual magnificence (*s*).

BUT

(*s*) Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. p. 473.

Book I. 1599.

But whatever were Albert's motives for having recourſe to ſo unjuſtifiable an expedient, it ſhould ſeem that he could not have made choice of a perſon better qualified by the native temper of his mind for carrying his plan into execution. Imediately after the archduke's departure, Mendoza, having collected together all the troops which could be ſpared from the neceſſary defence of the country, paſſed over the Maeſe near Ruremonde, and directed his march, at the head of twenty thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe (*t*) towards Orſoy, a town on the weſt ſide of the Rhine, belonging to the duchy of Cleves. The garriſon of this place, being utterly unprepared for defence, were eaſily induced by promiſes mingled with threats, to open their gates and receive him. He then applied himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the town and citadel, and at the ſame time employed a great part of his forces for ſeveral weeks in fortifying Waſſum, a ſmall town on the eaſt ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to Orſoy.

September.

Although his communication with the country beyond the Rhine was thus ſecured, he judged it to be of great importance to get poſſeſſion of ſome other town upon the Rhine, at a ſmaller diſtance from the enemy, and therefore he marched down the river, with all his forces, and laid ſiege to Rhinberg. This place, belonging to the biſhopric of Cologne, was, as above related, in the hands of the United Provinces. It was deemed a place of conſiderable ſtrength, and was defended by a ſufficient garriſon. The Spaniards, after battering the walls, attempted to take the town by ſtorm, and were repulſed with great ſlaughter.

But

(*t*). This army conſiſted of ſeven thouſand Spaniards, three thouſand Italians, two thouſand Burgundians, a thouſand Iriſh, and ſeven thouſand Germans and Walloons, beſides the cavalry.

1599.

BUT the ſiege was much ſooner brought to a concluſion than the beſiegers had reaſon to expect, through one of thoſe fatal accidents which have often happened ſince the invention of gun-powder, when the utmoſt precaution is not employed in preſerving it. Having caught fire, from a ſpark occaſioned by the ſtroke of a cannon-ball againſt the tower where the magazine was kept, and which the ball had entered by a window, not only the tower, but a great part of the wall of the town was thrown down. Several veſſels in the river were, by the violent agitation of the water, overwhelmed and ſunk, and the governor, his wife and family, with a conſiderable number of the inhabitants, were buried in the ruins. The garriſon ſtood aghaſt at this unforeſeen diſaſter; and, dreading that the town muſt now be taken by aſſault, they reſolved, without further reſiſtance, to capitulate on terms, to which Mendoza, in order to ſave time, immediately agreed (*u*).

October 15.

BY the ſucceſs which had attended the Spaniſh arms in the reduction of Orſoy and Rhinberg, all the other towns in that quarter were filled with anxiety and terror. Burick, a town on the weſt ſide of the Rhine, in the duchy of Cleves, having, without heſitation, admitted a Spaniſh garriſon, Mendoza began to make preparations for employing force againſt Weſel, one of the moſt flouriſhing places in the circle of Weſtphalia, and which had lately received a conſiderable augmentation of Proteſtant inhabitants from the neighbouring provinces. Having aboliſhed the exerciſe of the Catholic religion, and eſtabliſhed the Reformed, as taught by Calvin, in its ſtead, they knew how guilty they muſt appear in the eyes of a Spaniard, and were at the ſame time conſcious

(*u*) Thuanus, lib. cxxi. cap. 9. Grotius, lib. vii. Bentivoglio, p. 474.

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conſcious of being unable to defend themſelves againſt ſo great a force. They attempted, by ſending the general an embaſſy with preſents for himſelf, to divert him from his purpoſe. But Mendoza, laying hold of this opportunity to colour his preſent expedition with the pretext of zeal for the Popiſh faith, peremptorily required they ſhould immediately reſtore the exerciſe of the Catholic religion. With this condition the inhabitants, in order to avoid a ſiege, were obliged, though extremely reluctant, to comply (*w*). After which, though he had before rejected their preſents, he demanded a large ſupply of proviſions, and of money for his troops; and having obtained his demands, he continued his march down the river, and took poſſeſſion of the towns of Rees and Emerick.

THE inhabitants of the latter of theſe places, having been long diſtinguiſhed by their attachment to Popery, had, from ſome intereſted motive, invited the Spaniſh army to come into that quarter, and had received a promiſe in writing from Mendoza, that neither their town nor territory ſhould ſuffer any inconvenience from the neighbourhood of his troops. He inſiſted however upon their admitting a Spaniſh garriſon; and when they reminded him of his promiſe, by one of their principal eccleſiaſtics, he replied, that the ſervice of the king and the intereſt of religion made it neceſſary for him to change his views and meaſures. The prieſt aſked him if, after ſuch a declaration, it was ſurpriſing that the revolted provinces ſhould refuſe to put truſt in the faith of the king of Spain, or of his generals; and warned him of the vengeance threatened by heaven againſt

(*w*) The Spaniſh army had no ſooner left Germany than the prieſts were again expelled, and Calviniſm re-eſtabliſhed.

gainſt deceit and falſhood. But Mendoza, unmoved by this remonſtrance, gave orders for the immediate admiſſion of his troops (x). In order however to appeaſe the people of Emerick, he readily promiſed that only four hundred ſhould be ſent, and he even required the German officer who commanded them to ſwear that he would not admit a greater number. Notwithſtanding which, ſo little regard did he pay either to his character or his faith, that he afterwards attempted to introduce another cohort, under Barlotta, an Italian; to whom the German refuſed admittance, ſaying openly, that though the general had ſet the example, he would not violate his faith. 1599.

AFTER getting poſſeſſion of Emerick, the Spaniſh army was at the diſtance only of a few miles from the fort of Schenck, and other places belonging to the United Provinces; nor had the ſtates been inattentive to the danger which ſo nearly threatened them. Having, from the commencement of Mendoza's expedition, ſuſpected that his deſign muſt be to make an attack upon their eaſtern frontier, prince Maurice had haſtily aſſembled together at Arnheim a body of troops, amounting to ſix thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred horſe, and had ventured to croſs the Iſſel, and advanced towards the enemy as far as Zevenaer, which lies at little more than a day's march from Emerick.

WITH ſuch unequal forces he could not pretend to cope with the enemy in the open field; but on no occaſion had he ever exhibited greater military ſkill and conduct. By making choice of the moſt proper ſtations, which the nature of the country could afford, and the prudence and vigilance

(x) Grotius, lib. vii. p. 351.

Book I. 1599. lance which he diſplayed in ſtrengthening all the approaches to his camp, he rendered it impoſſible for the Spaniſh general to attack him with any probability of ſucceſs; while, at the ſame time, he prevented him from advancing any farther, or undertaking the ſiege of any of the frontier towns upon the Iſſel. The two armies, between which there was ſo great a diſparity of numbers, lay for a conſiderable time almoſt in ſight of each other; and, from the anxiety which Mendoza diſcovered on that occaſion, it ſhould ſeem he was deeply impreſſed with a ſenſe of his inferiority to prince Maurice, in reſpect of military knowledge and capacity. For ten days and nights, without intermiſſion, his whole army, horſe and foot, ſtood under their arms; and were permitted to take no other reſt, though it was the middle of winter, but in their ranks in the open air. It was neceſſary, mean while, to ſend out his cavalry, and the retainers of his camp, in ſearch of forage and proviſions; and between them and detachments of the prince's army various rencounters happened, in which they were always worſted, and conſiderable numbers taken priſoners.

Both the Spaniſh infantry and cavalry had begun to ſuffer ſo much from the cold, joined to a ſcarcity of proviſions, and were at the ſame time ſo much diſheartened by that anxiety and dread of which their general's conduct was ſo expreſſive, that there was ground to believe, that if Maurice had thought himſelf at liberty to attack them, he would have acquired a cheap and eaſy victory.

Finding it at length impoſſible, on account of the want of proviſions, to remain any longer in their preſent ſituation, they directed their march towards Doeſburg, which commands an important paſſage over the Iſſel, into the territory of Velue.

Velue. But Maurice, who lay nearer to that place, eaſily reached it in time to be fully prepared for their approach. They ſtopt ſhort therefore at Dotechem, a town on their road to Doeſburg; and there deliberated what courſe they ſhould next purſue. BOOK I. 1599. November.

To a general of ſuch mean capacity as Mendoza, and ſo little endued with the ſpirit of laudable ambition or enterprize, there appeared to be no room for heſitation. By the ſeverity of the ſeaſon, by the ſword of the enemy, and by deſertion, his army had ſuffered conſiderable diminution; and, having been long permitted to plunder the country through which they paſſed, and to live in the moſt licentious manner, they were become reluctant to ſubmit to the controul of military diſcipline. He dreaded, beſides, the great abilities of Maurice, and thought it doubtful whether, in caſe he ſhould ſucceed in effecting his paſſage over the Iſſel, he would find it practicable to ſupport his army during the winter ſeaſon in the territories of the ſtates, where almoſt all the towns were fortified, and prepared for their defence. Determined by theſe conſiderations, he reſolved to turn back, and to take up his winter quarters in the duchy of Cleves, and other neutral ſtates in the territory of Weſtphalia. He accordingly retired with precipitation, leaving behind him many of his ſick and wounded, expoſed to the mercy of the inhabitants of the country, who were highly exaſperated by the injury and outrage they had received. Maurice purſued him for ſeveral miles, and cut off or took priſoners ſo great a number of his troops, that, including thoſe who had deſerted, and thoſe who had fallen or were taken priſoners in former rencounters, it was computed that he had loſt above ſeven thouſand men. Bad conduct of Mendoza.

BOOK I. 1599.

HE fixed his head-quarters at Rees, having left a ſtrong garriſon in Emerick, which lay nearer to the enemy, under the command of the count de Boucquoi, one of his ableſt officers. But the count, having ſoon after being taken priſoner in a ſkirmiſh with count Lewis of Naſſau, Maurice conceived the deſign of making himſelf maſter of the town. For this purpoſe he ordered count Hohenloe to inveſt it; and, in order to prevent Mendoza from returning to its relief, he cut the dyke of the Rhine, and laid all the country between Rees and Emerick under water. By this device the garriſon, having no proſpect of aſſiſtance from their friends, were intimidated, and, after a feeble reſiſtance, laid down their arms. Maurice was equally ſucceſsful againſt the garriſon of Zevenaer: but being well pleaſed with an opportunity of ſhowing his condemnation of the conduct of the Spaniſh general, who, with ſo great a contempt of the eſtabliſhed laws of nations, had ſeized on the towns of neutral powers, he retained poſſeſſion of neither of theſe places, but delivered Emerick to the citizens, and Zevenaer to the duke of Cleves (*y*.) After which he put his troops into winter quarters, and went himſelf to the Hague, where he was employed during the remaining part of the winter in making preparations for the next campaign.

Magnanimous policy of Maurice.

IN the mean time Mendoza, equally inattentive to his character and to the laws of humanity, permitted his troops to exerciſe the moſt cruel oppreſſion over the people of Weſtphalia, from whom he could not pretend that either the king of Spain or the archduke had received the ſmalleſt injury. After plundering the inhabitants of the open country, and leaving them neither corn

The licentiouſneſs of the Spaniards.

(*y*) Grotius, p. 353, &c.

corn nor cattle for their ſupport, he allowed his ſoldiers to employ force againſt ſuch of the towns as refuſed them admittance; and the towns being generally unprepared for defence, they got poſſeſſion of many of them, where they not only lived at free quarters on the citizens, but robbed them of their moſt valuable effects, which they ſold at Cologne, and, by the merchants there, tranſmitted the price, amounting to very great ſums, to Antwerp or other places in the Netherlands. Nor were they ſatisfied with pillage or plunder, but indulged themſelves in every ſpecies of licentiouſneſs; and treated the inhabitants, on innumerable occaſions, with a degree of barbarous cruelty and outrage, of which the troops under Frederick de Toledo had, in their treatment of the people of Zutphen and Naarden, furniſhed the only inſtance which occurs in the annals of Europe for many years (z). 1599.

Their barbarity.

In order to compel ſuch of the people as they ſuſpected of being rich, to reveal their treaſures, they wounded ſome, they mutilated others, and, under the pretext of their being heretics, they committed others to the flames. Count Falcoſtein, lord of Bruck, a Proteſtant, having refuſed them admittance into his caſtle, which for ſome time he defended againſt them with great reſolution, at length ſurrendered on condition that he and his domeſtics ſhould be allowed to depart in ſafety; but he was no ſooner in their power, than they firſt butchered his domeſtics before his eyes, and afterwards himſelf. Mendoza had the effrontery to avow and vindicate ſome inſtances of this kind, by alledging, that thoſe who had ſuffered were heretics; but it was not the Proteſtants only, but great numbers likewiſe of the Catholics, who

(z) Grotius, lib. vii.

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experienced the barbarity of his troops; and even many of thoſe who had diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their attachment to the Spaniſh intereſt in the Netherlands; among whom were the ſubjects of the biſhops of Munſter, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne, as well as the duchies of Cleves and Juliers, who were all treated with the ſame violence and inhumanity (*a*).

State of Germany.

By theſe enormities the German princes were affected in the manner which it was natural to expect. They were fired with indignation againſt their barbarous oppreſſors, and had early deliberated concerning the meaſures proper to be purſued. No European nation had been more diſtinguiſhed than the Germans by their warlike diſpoſition, and their military proweſs, as no nation had exerted greater intrepidity and vigour in the defence of their property and liberty when attacked. But, having enjoyed profound tranquillity for near half a century, and all of them, but a few who had entered into the ſervice of foreign ſtates, having been diſuſed to war, their tameneſs and timidity invited the injuries of the Spaniſh ſoldiers; who found not only the inhabitants of the open country, but thoſe likewiſe of moſt of the towns, utterly defenceleſs and unarmed. It was probably Albert's knowledge of this, joined to the conſideration of the character of Rodolph, the preſent emperor, a prince of a tame and indolent diſpoſition, that had induced him to reſolve to ſupport his army at the expence of the Germans; and what they ſuffered affords a ſtriking proof how neceſſary it is that every people, expoſed by their ſituation to be invaded, ſhould, inſtead of truſting to their neutrality, or to the faith

(*a*) Grotius, lib. vii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi. Piaſecii Chronica, anno 1598. Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium.

faith of treaties, ſtand, on all occaſions, in a poſture of defence. BOOK I. 1599

THE people who ſuffered moſt from the depredations of the Spaniards were the ſubjects of the duke of Cleves, and of Erneſt of Bavaria, who held, at the preſent period, the four biſhoprics of Munſter, Paderborn, Liege, and Cologne. Erneſt, who had formerly been much indebted to the court of Spain, and was extremely deſirous of avoiding a rupture with the archduke, in order to obtain redreſs, reſolved to content himſelf with making remonſtrances and complaints.

Confederacy of German princes againſt Mendoza.

THE duke of Cleves was a weak prince, and, being at times diſordered in his judgment, was incapable of holding the reins of government. But his place was well ſupplied, on the preſent occaſion, by his ſiſter, Sibylla, a princeſs of a maſculine ſpirit, who exerted great activity in rouſing the indignation of the neighbouring ſtates and princes, and laboured to convince them of the neceſſity of uniting together, in order to drive the Spaniards out of Germany. The elector Palatine, the landgrave of Heſſe, ſeveral imperial cities on the banks of the Rhine, and a great number of counts, and other ſovereign princes in Weſtphalia, readily entered into Sibylla's views, and endeavoured to intereſt the reſt of the empire, or at leaſt the neighbouring circles, in their cauſe.

THEY began with remonſtrating to the archduke againſt the iniquity of his conduct; and they were ſeconded by an ambaſſador, ſent for that purpoſe by the emperor, who likewiſe publiſhed a reſcript, commanding Mendoza immediately to evacuate the towns and territories of which he had taken poſſeſſion. But, finding that no regard was paid by Mendoza to the emperor's reſcript; and that,

BOOK I. 1599.

that, instead of complying with their requests, Albert only lamented that the necessity of his situation had obliged him to adopt a measure which he said was equally disagreeable to himself as to them, they assembled together at Munster, and resolved all of them, but the bishop, or elector of Cologne, to have recourse to arms. It was agreed that a numerous army should be raised with the utmost expedition. The proportion of money and troops which each prince or state should furnish was ascertained; and the count de La Lippe, lieutenant-general of the circle of Westphalia, was appointed to be commander in chief. From the unanimity, alacrity, and ardour which appeared in this assembly, there was ground to hope for the utmost dispatch and vigour in carrying the plan adopted into execution; yet from the slowness incident to the motions of a league, in which no one member possesses authority sufficient to control the rest, the season, as will be seen in the sequel, was far advanced before the count de la Lippe was in a condition to take the field (*b*).

THE Spanish army, in the mean time, kept possession of all the towns into which they had entered; and, without restraint from their general, continued to exercise over the people the same oppression as before; till the season arrived when the cardinal governor of the Netherlands judged it proper to begin the operations of a new campaign. They were then withdrawn from all the towns in which they were quartered, except Orsoy, Rhinberg, Rees, and Emerick; the last of which places they had again obliged the inhabitants to surrender, after prince Maurice had retired.

THE

(*b*) Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. ab. initio. Grotius, lib. vii, & viii. Thuanus, lib. cxxi, &c.

THE cardinal, having come to Rees, where he held a council of war, to deliberate concerning an expedition againſt ſome of the frontier towns of the United Provinces, it was determined to undertake the ſiege of Bommel, the conqueſt of which would open an entrance into Holland: but, in order to conceal this intention from the ſtates, and to facilitate the landing of the troops on the iſle of Bommel, it was agreed to ſend a detachment of the army to make a feigned attack on the fort of Schenck, which, as formerly deſcribed, is ſituated on the upper extremity of the Betuwe. This detachment was ſent down along the right or north ſide of the Rhine, while Mendoza, with the main army, marched down on the other; and both diviſions began about the ſame time to play off their batteries againſt the fort; the former from the banks of the Rhine, and the latter from thoſe of the Waal.

1599. Siege of Bommel.

PRINCE Maurice's head-quarters were at Arnheim, only a few leagues diſtant from Schenck. He had never before experienced ſo great anxiety or fatigue. Almoſt all the officers, on whom he chiefly depended for the execution of his orders, were abſent: count Hohenloe was in Germany, employed in exciting the princes of the league of Munſter to take the field againſt the Spaniards; colonel Vere was not returned from England, whither he had gone to haſten a body of freſh troops, which had been promiſed by Elizabeth; and the younger la Noue had not finiſhed ſome levies which, with the connivance of the king, he had been making among the Proteſtants in France. All the troops therefore which Maurice had been able to muſter, after leaving ſufficient garriſons in the fortified towns, amounted only at this time to four thouſand men. With this little army he croſſed over to the Betuwe; and having reinforced

April.

Beginning of May.

Book I. reinforced the garriſon of Schenck, and ſtrengthened the banks oppoſite to Mendoza, where only he had occaſion to ſuſpect that an attack might be deſigned, he lay prepared to oppoſe him in caſe he ſhould attempt to land on the iſland.

1599.

The Spaniards, having the river between them and the fort, were at too great a diſtance to do execution with their artillery; and, as this attack was only a feint to amuſe prince Maurice, for this reaſon they had not taken time to employ the uſual precautions for their ſhelter from the enemy's fire, they loſt upwards of four hundred men. This expence of blood, which the prince could eaſily obſerve from the ramparts, contributed to confirm his belief that their deſign againſt the fort was ſerious, and his attention was therefore wholly engroſſed with providing for its defence. In the mean time the count of Berg, with a body of troops, under the command of the colonels Stanley, Zapeau, and Barlotta, was ordered to march down along the left or ſouth ſide of the Waal; and, in order to cover his intention, a great number of boats had been tranſported to this river over land from the Maeſe, on board of which he embarked his troops, and ſeemed to intend paſſing over to the Betuwe. Prince Maurice could hardly doubt that this was his deſign; and, to prevent him from accompliſhing it, he carefully watched his motions with a part of his forces, which being put on board of boats collected together at Nimeguen, kept directly oppoſite to the Spaniards in their progreſs down the river. In this manner both parties continued to advance, ſometimes approaching within reach of each other's fire, and the Spaniards ſeemingly intending on ſome occaſions to effect a landing on the Betuwe, till they both arrived in the neighbourhood of the Voorn; when the count de Berg, having

having diſembarked his troops, drew all his boats on ſhore, and having put them into carriages which had been prepared for that purpoſe, he marched with great expedition acroſs the country, from the Waal to the Maeſe, where having again launched his boats, he ſailed down the river till he arrived at Empel, and thus ſecured a paſſage into the iſle of Bommel.

THE fortifications of the town of that name, which ſtands on the other ſide of the iſland, though, on account of its ſituation, deemed a place of great importance, had, amidſt the multiplicity of objects which required the attention of Maurice and the ſtates, been extremely neglected; the old fortifications were ruinous, and new ones, which had been begun, were yet unfiniſhed.

HAD the troops therefore under the count de Berg been ſufficiently numerous, or had Mendoza advanced in time to his ſupport, he might without much difficulty have accompliſhed the object of his expedition. But the army having been detained longer than it ought to have been in the fictitious attack on the fort of Schenck, the count was obliged to reſt ſatisfied with ſecuring his ſtation at Empel, or with making ſhort excurſions into the country. Prince Maurice was, in the mean time, every day receiving freſh ſupplies of troops from France, England, and other places; and his army amounted now to ſo great a number, that he could afford to leave a part of it for the defence of the Betuwe, and lead the reſt to Bommel.

HE accordingly no ſooner received information of the count of Berg's invaſion of that iſland than he ſet out with the greater part of his army, and arrived there in time to prevent the inhabitants from

Book I. 1599. from abandoning the town, which they were preparing to do, from their deſpair of being able to defend it. Mendoza left his camp oppoſite to the Schenck about the ſame time, and, having in his march reduced the fort of Creveceur, which would have interrupted his communication with Bois le Duc, he tranſported his forces into the iſle of Bommel, and began to lead them towards the town. He firſt attempted to make himſelf maſter of the dyke of Waal, on which he intended to have erected batteries, in order to ſtraiten the navigation of the river, but was prevented by an inceſſant fire from a great number of armed veſſels, which Maurice had prepared for that purpoſe. From the delay occaſioned by this unneceſſary enterprize, and the reduction of Creveceur, a general of ſo great activity as Maurice had leiſure to put the town of Bommel into a proper poſture of defence.

His army, at this time, was not inferior to that of the enemy, and amounted to eighteen thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe. Having pitched his camp on the right ſide of the Waal, oppoſite to Bommel, and conſtructed two bridges (*c*) formed of barks covered with planks, one above and the other below the town, he committed the defence of the place to a ſelect body of four thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe.

Bommel was too ſmall a place to admit of ſo numerous a garriſon; but, in order that he might avail himſelf of the great number of his troops, his firſt care had been to give the town an artificial magnitude, by drawing round it at a little diſtance from the walls, an intrenchment, ſtrengthened with a ditch, and with redoubts at proper diſtances;

(*c*) Each four hundred and fifty paces in length.

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diſtances; to which he added a covered way; a new ſpecies of fortification, of which he himſelf was the inventor, and which he firſt put in practice on the preſent occaſion.

Maurice invents a new ſpecies of fortification.

Mendoza was greatly diſconcerted by the celerity and diſpatch with which theſe works were executed: and as not only the cannon planted upon them, but a ſtrong battery which Maurice had raiſed on the dyke of the river, was ready to be played off upon the Spaniards, as ſoon as they approached, they ſuffered a conſiderable loſs of men, before they could cover themſelves with their trenches. Mendoza might now have ſeen his error in not advancing ſooner to the ſiege: and, if he reflected on the ſtrength of the place, and the number of the garriſon, or on the neighbourhood of the prince's army, and the facility with which, as he was maſter of the river, he could, at all times, introduce ſupplies, or reinforcements into the town, it muſt appear ſurpriſing that he did not perceive the impoſſibility of ſucceeding in his attempt.

Prince Maurice, on the other hand, was blamed by many of his countrymen for reſting ſatisfied with defending a town againſt an enemy, whom it was alledged, as he was ſuperior to them in numbers, he might have ſucceſsfully encountered in the open field. It began to be ſurmiſed that Maurice did not wiſh to bring the war to a concluſion; and the ſtates ſent deputies, to repreſent to him, that, as they could never expect to aſſemble a more flouriſhing army than was at preſent under his command, and the expence which their late preparations had coſt them was enormous (*d*), they could not help expreſſing their deſire

Suſpicions concerning prince Maurice.

(*d*) Twelve thouſand gilders. See Reidan. quoted by Le Clerc, p. 197.

Book I. 1599. ſire that he would ſhorten the campaign as much as poſſible, and muſt therefore recommend to him, if he could do it with ſafety, to try the fortune of a general engagement.

Maurice was the more ſurpriſed at this remonſtrance of the ſtates, as they had hitherto been extremely averſe to all adventurous meaſures; and, on many occaſions, had diſcovered a degree of caution bordering on timidity. He could not account for it, but on the ſuppoſition that they had liſtened to the inſinuations of his enemies, who accuſed him of protracting the war, with the view of perpetuating his own authority: and, in order to wipe off this groundleſs aſperſion, he would not have declined the riſk of a battle, in caſe a favourable opportunity had offered. "But, in the preſent ſituation of the Spaniſh army, in a country ſo narrow and confined, where his cavalry, in which only he was ſuperior, could be of little uſe, no ſuch opportunity could reaſonably be expected. Should he attempt to tranſport his army over the Maeſe into Brabant, Bommel muſt thereby fall into the hands of the Spaniards; and, although, after the reduction of that place, they ſhould be induced to follow him, and to offer battle, yet, without the greateſt probability of ſucceſs, he ſhould doubt whether it would be expedient to accept; as the fate of battles often depended on accidents, which no human prudence could foreſee; and the king of Spain, with ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, could much more eaſily ſuſtain the loſs of an army than the ſtates. It was for theſe reaſons, not only his opinion, but that of his moſt experienced officers, that the enemy ſhould be permitted to ſpend their ſtrength in the ſiege of Bommel, which, ſhould they perſiſt in it, he was confident would prove their ruin." The ſtates, convinced by theſe conſiderations, entered without

without much difficulty into the prince's views, and left him at liberty to purſue the plan of operations which he had laid before them. The cardinal Andrew, in the mean time, having with great activity formed at Bois le Duc, the moſt ample magazines of every thing neceſſary for the ſiege, Mendoza was enabled to make his approaches to the town, with greater expedition than there was reaſon to expect. His troops were now, in a good meaſure, covered from the enemy's fire; and he had begun to play off his batteries. But it ſoon appeared how little reaſon he had to flatter himſelf with the hopes of ſucceſs in his enterprize. The garriſon, ſupported by freſh troops, ſent to their aſſiſtance by the prince, could not only prevent them from making farther progreſs in the ſiege, but ſallied out againſt them, ſometimes by day, and ſometimes by night, demoliſhing their works, and putting a conſiderable number to the ſword. The Spaniſh troops diſplayed, on every occaſion, the moſt determined intrepidity; and thereby fully juſtified the caution of prince Maurice, in declining to reduce them to the neceſſity of a general engagement. They gave the moſt ſtriking proofs likewiſe of the excellence of their military diſcipline, by recovering themſelves with a facility which aſtoniſhed the enemy, from the confuſion into which they were ſometimes thrown; and they were every where ſucceſsful in repreſſing the ſallies of the garriſon, although theſe ſallies were performed by numerous bodies, amounting to five or ſix thouſand men, of the beſt of the French and Engliſh forces, conducted by la Noue, colonel Vere, and other officers of the moſt unqueſtionable bravery. They ſuffered, however, conſiderable loſs. In the ſpace of three weeks, upwards of two thouſand periſhed; and the cardinal governor, being at laſt convinced of the abſurdity of perſiſting in his enterprize,

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Invention of the hiſtorian Colonna.

He was determined, however, by the advice of Colonna, the hiſtorian, who was, at this time, an officer in the Spaniſh army, to attempt accompliſhing, in another way, the object of the preſent expedition, by erecting a fort in another part of the iſland, from which the ſame advantage might be derived as from the poſſeſſion of Bommel: and, for this purpoſe, agreeably to the counſel that was given him, he made choice of a narrow neck of land which unites the upper with the lower part of the iſland, intending to occupy, with a fortification of the ſtrongeſt kind, the whole ſpace between the Maeſe and the Waal; and thus, not only to facilitate an invaſion of the United Provinces, but to check the enemy's navigation in both rivers.

Beginning of June.

The conſtruction of this fort was committed to Velaſco, general of the artillery. A thouſand ſoldiers, and two thouſand pioneers, were employed in the work; and the army was poſted about the neighbouring villages of Herwyn and Roſſem, to prevent the approach of the enemy.

Maurice having penetrated this deſign, led up his troops along the north ſide of the Waal, and took his ſtation directly oppoſite to the Spaniards; where, having planted batteries of his largeſt cannon, he greatly annoyed the workmen, and, though not without ſome loſs, did conſiderable execution. Velaſco, however perſevered, and was at length able to cover his men from the enemy's fire.

The prince finding then that all his efforts in this quarter muſt be ineffectual, tranſported his army

army into the adjoining iſle of Voorn; and, from thence, ſent over a detachment of three thouſand men, to the upper part of the iſle of Bommel; giving them inſtructions to entrench themſelves at the village of Hervorden, which lies at a little diſtance from the place where the Spaniards were employed in making the new fort. His orders were executed with the greateſt expedition, and the entrenchments almoſt completed before the Spaniards got notice that the troops had landed on the iſland. Book I. 1599.

Mendoza, ſenſible of the danger and inconveniencies to which he was expoſed, from having the enemy ſo near him, immediately diſpatched the count de Berg, to attack their lines, with a numerous body of choſen troops. The count was repulſed with the loſs of more than five hundred men, among whom were many officers of diſtinguiſhed merit: but having ſtationed the greater part of his army on that ſide of the fort which lay next to the enemy, he kept the prince at bay, and enabled Velaſco, without interruption, to carry on his operations in the conſtruction of the fort.

The Spaniſh cavalry, in the mean time, which could neither have proper accommodation, nor be ſupplied with forage in the iſle of Bommel, were quartered in Brabant, in the neighbourhood of Megen. Their communication with the main army was kept open by a bridge over the Maeſe; but as they lay at the diſtance of ſeveral miles, a fort, called Durango, from the name of the engineer employed in conſtructing it, and ſeveral redoubts, had been erected on that part of the dyke of the river by which the enemy might approach. Notwithſtanding theſe prudent precautions, prince Maurice ſtill reſolved to attack the Spaniſh

BOOK I. Spaniſh cavalry, and, with this view, having thrown a bridge over the Maeſe from the iſle of
1599. Voorn, he kept his own cavalry in readineſs to march as ſoon as orders ſhould be given them. But judging it neceſſary before-hand to diſlodge the Spaniards from their fortifications on the dyke of the river, he ſent the ſieur de la Noue, and colonel Vere, with a ſelect body of troops, chiefly Engliſh and French, to make an attack on fort Durango. Nothing could ſurpaſs the ſpirit and intrepidity which theſe troops, animated by the example of their leaders, diſplayed in his attack. Having thrown down their pikes and muſkets, they ſcaled the ramparts in ſeveral places, and attacked the garriſon, with extraordinary fury, ſword in hand. But this garriſon, conſiſting of Spaniards and Walloons, though amounting only to five hundred men, commanded by Ladeiano, an officer of diſtinguiſhed bravery, in their defence diſcovered a degree of intrepidity not inferior to that of the aſſailants. The ſmallneſs of their number was compenſated by the advantages of their ſituation; and the combat was thus prolonged for ſeveral hours, with mutual ſlaughter,
July. till la Noue and Vere, being informed that Mendoza was approaching towards them with ſuperior forces, judged it prudent to retire.

No other memorable tranſactions happened between the contending parties during this campaign. Maurice could not venture now to attack the Spaniſh cavalry with ſafety; and, from the precautions which had been taken to cover the workmen employed in erecting the fort in Bommel, joined to the advantageous ſituation of the Spaniſh army, he found it impoſſible to prevent them from carrying that deſign into execution.

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THE fort was accordingly finiſhed in the moſt regular manner: the ramparts, flanked with baſtions, and inſtantly planted with cannon, in a great meaſure commanded the navigation of the Maeſe, on the ſouth, and of the Waal, on the north. On the eaſt and weſt, they were ſecured with ditches of extraordinary breadth and depth, which being at all times filled with water from the rivers, ſerved as harbours for twelve armed veſſels, ſtationed in them to cruiſe againſt the enemy. And, in imitation of the example which Maurice had exhibited in the fortifications of Bommel, the whole was ſtrengthened with a covered way, which was ſtrongly fortified with redoubts.

A fort erected in the iſle of Bommel.

THE cardinal came himſelf to viſit this fort as ſoon as it was finiſhed; and having marked out a place for a church, of which he laid the firſt ſtone with his own hand, he gave both to the church, and to the fort, the name of Saint Andrew. He had been extremely deſirous to diſtinguiſh his adminiſtration by ſome remarkable atchievement; and he was overjoyed to have been able to finiſh ſo great a work, which he hoped would be found of great importance towards the reduction of the revolted provinces.

PRINCE Maurice, on the other hand, notwithſtanding his ſucceſsful defence of Bommel, could not fail to be ſeverely mortified; although, as will appear in the ſequel, this fort, the erecting of which he had exerted his utmoſt ſkill and vigour to prevent, ſerved only to furniſh him with one opportunity more than would otherwiſe have occurred to diſplay his wonted activity and enterprize. In the mean time, he built another fort directly oppoſite to Saint Andrew, on the right ſide of the Waal, which rendered

Book I. 1599. the country of Betewe ſecure againſt the excurſions of the enemy. (*e*).

Tranſactions in Germany.

During the courſe of theſe tranſactions in the Netherlands, the Germans in the circle of Weſtphalia had begun their operations againſt the Spaniſh garriſons in Rhinberg, and the other towns upon the Rhine. But as neither the emperor, nor the electors of Cologne, Mentz, and Treves, beſides ſeveral other Popiſh princes, were willing to come to an open rupture with the court of Spain, their preparations for war had not been carried on with that alacrity which might have been expected from the ſtrong and juſt reſentment with which they were inflamed; and the ſeaſon of action was far ſpent before they were ready to open the campaign. The elector Palatine had withdrawn his contingent of troops, under the pretext that the league had been violated by the other electors; and the biſhop of Cologne, though his ſubjects had ſuffered greatly from the depredations of the Spaniards, had carried his complaiſance to them to ſo great a length, as to permit them to make levies in his dominions, and to furniſh them with proviſions and military ſtores. It was therefore with the utmoſt difficulty that the count de la Lippe could muſter twelve thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe (*f*), and the greateſt part of theſe were raw troops, entirely unaccuſtomed to military diſcipline.

With ſuch an army it is probable that no general could have fullfiled the expectations of thoſe by whom it had been aſſembled, and the count de la Lippe poſſeſſed neither experience nor capacity ſufficient to entitle him to the ſupreme command. The counts Hohenloe and Solmes had been

(*e*) Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part iii. lib. v. Thuanus, lib. cxxii. (*f*) Grotius.

been ſent to his aſſiſtance by the United States; and theſe men were neither deficient in courage nor in activity and enterprize; but they diſcovered a jealouſy of each other, which proved pernicious to the cauſe in which they were engaged, and when they differed in their opinions, the general was incapable of determining aright to which of their counſels the preference was due. 1599.

The firſt enterprize in which he was engaged was the ſiege of Rhinberg; but having no part of the apparatus neceſſary for carrying it on, except what he received from Holland, and the inhabitants of the adjacent country, whoſe reſentment the governor of the Netherlands had found means to appeaſe, being unwilling to ſupply his troops with proviſions, he ſoon abandoned his attempt, and directed his march towards Rees, where he expected the Dutch could more eaſily convey to him ſuch aſſiſtance as his exigencies ſhould require. Auguſt.

The garriſon of Rees was ill prepared for their defence, and if la Lippe had liſtened to the counſel of count Hohenloe, who adviſed him to ſtation a part of his army on the other ſide of the river, to prevent them from receiving any reinforcement or ſupplies, they would ſoon have found it neceſſary to lay down their arms: but he neglected this neceſſary precaution. The garriſon were ſeveral times reinforced by detachments from the army in Bommel; and at length, finding themſelves poſſeſſed of ſufficient ſtrength, and obſerving that the ſiege was carried on in the moſt remiſs and negligent manner, they made a vigorous attack upon his trenches, put a great number of his men to the ſword, nailed up ſeveral of his cannon, and even carried off ſome of them in triumph to the town. September. Siege of Rees.

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THIS diſaſter increaſed the diviſion which from the beginning had ſubſiſted among the leaders. The troops were diſheartened, and became more diſobedient and refractory than ever; and in two days after the count gave orders to raiſe the ſiege.

THE retreat of this army was ſtill more diſgraceful than their conduct during the ſiege. Dreading that the garriſon would renew their attack upon the trenches, they fled in the moſt precipitate manner, leaving behind them a great part of their baggage and proviſions. The Spaniards hung in their rear for ſeveral miles, put many to the ſword, and threw the whole army into confuſion. Not long after, a party of them mutinied againſt their officers, left their ſtandards, and, in their way home, indulged themſelves in the ſame rapine and depredation againſt their countrymen, as had formerly been exerciſed by the Spaniſh troops.

THE Dutch had, in the beginning, entertained the hopes of finding uſeful allies in the Germans. With this view they had exerted all their influence in rouſing them to arms, and had ſeveral times ſupplied them with ſtores and proviſions. On the preſent occaſion they ſent William de Naſſau, a near relation of prince Maurice, an experienced officer, and a perſon of diſtinguiſhed prudence, to attempt to re-eſtabliſh diſcipline among the troops, and a good underſtanding among the leaders; but all his endeavours having proved ineffectual for theſe ends, and the winter ſeaſon approaching, it was judged neceſſary to diſband the army, and put an end to this inglorious campaign.

November. German army diſbanded.

SUCH is frequently the fate of confederacies formed by the union of independent princes, even

even when there is one common intereſt to unite them, unleſs the ſupreme command be devolved on ſome perſon of extraordinary abilities, whoſe want of power may be ſupplied by the confidence inſpired by his ſuperior merit.

NOTWITHSTANDING the feeble efforts of this confederacy, the archduke having only intended, by ſeizing the German towns, to accommodate his troops for a ſeaſon, ordered moſt of them to be evacuated. He likewiſe promiſed to indemnify the ſeveral ſtates for the injuries and damages which they had ſuſtained; and two commiſſioners were appointed by the emperor to eſtimate their loſſes; but it does not appear that any thing effectual was ever done in conſequence of this appointment *(g)*.

IN Spain the duke of Lerma, deſirous to give ſome proof of vigour in the beginning of his adminiſtration, fitted out a fleet of fifty ſhips of war, which he put under the command of Don Martin de Padilla, and ſent to cruiſe againſt the Engliſh; but this enterprize proved equally unfortunate as moſt of the former ones which the Spaniards had undertaken againſt their northern enemies. Padilla had not been many days at ſea when a violent ſtorm aroſe, which obliged him, without having ſeen the Engliſh fleet, to return to Spain.

A fleet ſent to cruiſe againſt the Engliſh.

THE duke of Lerma was more ſucceſsful in the meaſure which at this time he ſuggeſted to the king, for conciliating the affections of his ſubjects in Arragon, who had been diſguſted by the treatment which they had received in the former

Lenity and moderation of the duke of Lerma.

(*g*) Grotius, lib. viii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v. Piaſecii Chronica Geſtorum in Europa Singularium, an. 1599. Gonſalez Davila, & lib. ii. cap. 4. Thuan. Hiſt. lib. cxxii. cap. 6, 8, &c.

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mer reign. Philip and his young queen, accompanied by the duke and many other courtiers, having ſet out to viſit the city of Saragoſſa, notice was ſent to the inhabitants, by order of the king, that he could not enter their town with pleaſure till the heads of thoſe citizens, who had ſuffered in the unfortunate affair of Antonio Perez, were taken down from the gates, and that inſcription eraſed which recorded their pretended crime. This order, ſo agreeable to the people, and which was inſtantly obeyed, was accompanied with the royal pardon to all thoſe who had been concerned in the inſurrection, and a declaration, that the king could not be happy while any of his faithful ſubjects had cauſe of grief. He then made a magnificent entry into the town, amidſt the ſtrongeſt demonſtrations of affection and joy on the part of the inhabitants; and ſoon after he ſolemnly confirmed all their rights and privileges *(h)*.

AMONG the entertainments which the people of Saragoſſa preſented to their king on this occaſion, there was one, which, at the preſent period, will appear ſomewhat extraordinary; a diſpute held at the univerſity, at the conferring the degree of doctor, the ſubject of which was, whether the emperor be the lord or ſovereign of the whole world *(i)*.

September.

DURING the courſe of the tranſactions that have been related, Albert and Iſabella arrived in the Netherlands (*k*). They entered Bruſſels with a ſplendid court and retinue, and were received with extraordinary magnificence. There was conſiderable difficulty in adjuſting the form of the

The archduke's arrival in the Netherlands.

(*h*) Gon. Davila, lib. ii. cap. 8. (*i*) Davila.

(*k*) He had tarried much longer than his new ſubjects had reaſon to expect, but no contemporary hiſtorian has informed us of the reaſon of his delay.

the oath of allegiance which they adminiſtered to their new ſubjects; and the ſtates of Brabant demanded that, beforehand, certain forts and citadels ſhould be demoliſhed, and the ancient rights and privileges of the province ratified; but, finding that the archdukes, (this was the title which Albert and Iſabella now aſſumed) were utterly averſe to comply with their requeſts, they were perſuaded to deſiſt from their purpoſe, and agreed, though with much reluctance, to take the oath required. It was likewiſe a matter of great offence to the Flemings that Albert, beſides aſſuming the Spaniſh dreſs, and requiring to be ſerved upon the knee, had formed his court according to the model of that of Spain, and in every thing adopted the Spaniſh manners and cuſtoms, in preference to thoſe of the Netherlands. This conduct was probably intended to gratify the Spaniards, on whom Albert ſaw he muſt principally depend during the continuance of the war; but it contributed to alienate the affections of his Flemiſh ſubjects, and to prevent them from exerting themſelves with active zeal in his behalf (*l*). 1599.

HE ſtood however much in need, at the preſent juncture, of all the aſſiſtance which they were able to afford. Although he had received a conſiderable ſupply from the duke of Lerma, before his departure from Spain, yet having, in conformity to the practice of the age, expended large ſums in idle pomp and ſhow in his marriage ſolemnity, and his magnificent entrance into Bruſſels, and other towns which he and Iſabella viſited on their acceſſion, he found himſelf utterly unable to diſcharge the arrears due to his troops, who no ſooner entered their winter quarters than they began to mutiny againſt their officers. The Spaniſh forces,

A mutiny among the Spaniſh troops.

(*l*) Grotius, lib. viii. p. 379, & Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. v.

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1600. PRINCE Maurice, having received information of theſe diſorders, did not ſuffer ſo favourable an opportunity of action to eſcape. After reducing January. the town of Wachtendonc, and the fort of Creveceur, and making a ſucceſsful attack on the In March. Spaniſh cavalry, in the neighbourhood of Bois le Duc, where he put near five hundred of them to the ſword, he laid ſiege to St. Andrew. This fort, the only fruit of the operations of a whole campaign, the archduke juſtly conſidered as a place of the firſt importance, both on account of the ſtrength of the fortifications, and the great advantage which it afforded him for invading the revolted provinces. He was therefore extremely Siege of St. Andrew. ſolicitous to preſerve it, and for this purpoſe aſſembled together at Bois le Duc ſuch a body of troops as were deemed ſufficient to raiſe the ſiege. Of theſe troops he gave the command to Velaſco, by whom the fort had been erected; and on the part of this officer no time was unneceſſarily loſt. But all his attempts were rendered ineffectual by the vigilance and foreſight of Maurice, who, beſides fortifying his camp and all the approaches to it, had cut the dyke of the Maeſe, and laid all the

(m) See Metern, fol. 451.

the low grounds betwixt it and Bois le Duc under water. The garriſon conſiſted of twelve hundred men, who, although they had mutinied againſt their officers, yet regarding the fort as their only pledge for the payment of their arrears, ſtrenuouſly exerted themſelves in its defence.

BUT perceiving that, notwithſtanding their moſt vigorous efforts, Maurice was making daily progreſs in the ſiege, and having no proſpect of deliverance, they liſtened to a propoſal which was made to them by the prince, in order to ſave time, and agreed to ſurrender the fort for a ſum of money equal to their arrears (*n*). Immediately after which, conſcious that they had committed an unpardonable crime againſt the Spaniards, they enliſted in the army of the United States; and as they knew that they could not expect quarter in caſe they ſhould fall into the hands of their former maſters, they were on many occaſions of ſingular uſe, by the deſperate intrepidity which they diſplayed (*o*).

May.

BY theſe diſaſters the archdukes were afflicted in the moſt ſenſible manner. They received information at the ſame time that prince Maurice, having on no former occaſion exerted greater diligence in his military preparations, was reſolved to proſecute the approaching campaign with extraordinary vigour, in the hopes of making ſome important conqueſts before the mutineers were perſuaded to return to their duty. All their endeavours for this end had hitherto proved ineffectual. They had ſome ground to ſuſpect that the reſt of the troops were infected with the ſame mutinous ſpirit, and dreaded that many of them might

(*n*) A hundred and twenty-five thouſand guilders.

(*o*) Triumphs of Naſſau, printed 1613. Grotius, Hiſt. lib. ix. and Bentivoglio.

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might be induced to imitate the treacherous example of the garriſon of St. Andrew.

Convention of the ſtates at Bruſſels.

The ſtates of the provinces ſubject to their authority, having been lately convened at Bruſſels, Albert repreſented to that aſſembly that, as the ſource of all the diſorders which prevailed was his inability to diſcharge the arrears due to his troops, it was neceſſary they ſhould grant him an extraordinary ſupply. He had reaſon to expect that ere long he ſhould receive remittances from Spain; but the demands of the mutineers muſt be immediately ſatisfied, otherwiſe there was ground to dread that the moſt pernicious conſequences would enſue.

Adviſe an accommodation with the revolted ſtates.

The ſtates replied, by expreſſing their apprehenſion of theſe conſequences, and by giving him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their attachment and fidelity; but inſinuated that, conſidering the exhauſted ſtate of the provinces, and the difficulty which the court of Spain had ever found in ſupporting ſo great a number of forces, no other effectual remedy could be applied to the preſent diſorders but an accommodation with the revolted ſtates.

They had conceived hopes at this time that an accommodation might be brought about by the mediation of ambaſſadors, whom the emperor had ſent into the Netherlands, in order to procure a reſtitution of ſome towns on the German frontier, of which the contending parties ſtill retained the poſſeſſion. The ambaſſadors found no difficulty in accompliſhing the object of their commiſſion; and having paſſed over into Holland, they prevailed on the United States to ſend deputies to Bergen op Zoom, to negociate a treaty with deputies ſent thither by the archdukes. But the Dutch being unalterably determined to maintain

tain their independence, and diſcovering the ſame diſtruſt of the archdukes, with which they had long been actuated towards the Spaniards, the conferences were no ſooner begun than they were broken off; and both parties retired, extremely diſſatisfied with each other.

A negociation for peace between Spain and England,

WHILE a reconciliation was thus, in vain, attempted between the archdukes and the United Provinces, a negociation was begun for reſtoring peace between the queen of England and the king of Spain. Some advances had been made for this purpoſe to the Engliſh miniſters by the cardinal Andrew, while he was governor of the Netherlands, and neither of the courts at variance ſeemed at this time to have been inclined to prolong the war. It was agreed that a congreſs ſhould be held at Boulogne; and miniſters were ſent thither by the contending powers. But this negociation likewiſe proved abortive, as the plenipotentiaries found it impoſſible to adjuſt the ceremonial among them to the ſatisfaction of their reſpective courts. The precedence had, from time immemorial, been yielded to the crown of England, by the kings of Caſtile and Arragon; and Elizabeth maintained that it ſtill belonged to her, notwithſtanding the union of theſe crowns, and the conqueſt of Granada, ſince Spain, conſidered as one kingdom, was greatly inferior to England in reſpect of antiquity, which was the only ground on which a point of this nature could properly be decided. But the Spaniſh miniſters could not perceive the force of this reaſoning. They claimed the precedence on account of the ſuperior extent and power of the Spaniſh monarchy; and, even when Elizabeth, in order to prove the ſincerity of her pacific diſpoſition, offered to agree to an equality, they rejected this offer, and inſiſted that the ſuperior dignity of the catholic king ſhould be recogniſed.

abortive.

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To this the queen as peremptorily refuſed her conſent; and, ſoon afterwards, the plenipotentiaries left Boulogne.

United States reſolve to invade Flanders.

This unexpected iſſue of the congreſs was matter of great joy to the United States. They had ſuffered much anxiety from the apprehenſion of loſing ſo powerful an ally as queen Elizabeth; and now, when they were delivered from this apprehenſion, they reſolved to improve to the utmoſt the advantages which they derived from her alliance, by employing the Engliſh forces, and as many of their own, as could be ſpared from the defence of the frontier towns, in an invaſion of Flanders. To form this reſolution, they were encouraged by the mutiny of the Spaniſh troops; and they were, at the ſame time, earneſtly ſolicited to carry it into execution by the merchants of Zealand, who were extremely deſirous of diſpoſſeſſing the archdukes of the ſea-ports in Flanders, which afforded ſhelter to ſome Spaniſh ſhips of war, by which their trade had lately received conſiderable interruption. In compliance with their requeſt, it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Nieuport; and about the middle of June, the army, amounting to fifteen thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, ſet ſail from Ramekins in Walcheren, the place of rendezvous, and landed in Flanders near Ghent. After reducing ſome ſmall forts, prince Maurice led them towards Bruges, and paſſed almoſt within reach of the cannon of that place, not without hopes, which proved fallacious, that by the ſight of ſo flouriſhing an army, and the late diſaſters which had befallen the archdukes, the inhabitants might have been induced to throw off the Spaniſh yoke, and return to their former connection with the United Provinces.

From Bruges he marched towards Nieuport, and, by the way thither, made himſelf maſter, with little difficulty, of certain forts called St. Albert, Snaerſeerck, Bredene, and Oudenbourg, in which he left garriſons, with the view of retarding the progreſs of the enemy, in caſe they ſhould venture to approach (*p*). He then inveſted Nieuport by land, while his fleet blocked up the harbour; and, as the town was neither very ſtrong nor well prepared for a vigorous defence, he hoped in a few weeks to be able to compel the garriſon to ſurrender.

Siege of Nieuport.

The archduke, in the mean time, exerted himſelf with great activity in his preparations for an attempt to make him raiſe the ſiege; and, having had the good fortune to perſuade a conſiderable number of the Spaniſh mutineers to return to their duty, his army ſoon amounted to twelve thouſand foot, and twelve hundred horſe. Both he and Iſabella, upon the firſt news of the enemy's arrival in Flanders, had repaired to Ghent, in order to provide for the ſecurity of that important place, and the other towns of the province. The troops were ordered to aſſemble together at Bruges; and as in their march thither they paſſed near Ghent, Iſabella, mounted on horſeback, went out to meet them, and rode along the lines animating and exhorting them, giving them repeated aſſurances that, in future, they ſhould not have the ſame ground as hitherto to complain of the irregularity of their pay; and declaring that, rather than their demands ſhould not be ſatisfied, ſhe would expoſe to ſale her plate and jewels, and deliver up to them the funds appropriated to the ſupport of her court and ſervants. This ſpeech, joined to her majeſtic air and

(*p*) Maurice was attended by a number of the deputies of the ſtates.

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and manner, produced a powerful effect upon the minds of the ſoldiers, who received it with ſhouts of high applauſe, and called out to her that they were ready to expoſe their lives to every danger in her defence. Albert, on this occaſion, omitted nothing in his power to confirm them in their preſent diſpoſition, and acquainted them that he was determined to fight at their head, and to ſhare their fortune.

Agreeably to this reſolution, having joined his army at Bruges, he ſet out with it from thence about the end of June. His firſt object was the reduction of the forts above mentioned, in which his ſucceſs correſponded with his moſt ſanguine hopes. The garriſons which Maurice had left in theſe forts, were intimidated by the ſight of ſo great a force, and after a feeble reſiſtance ſurrendered them, on condition, that they ſhould be ſuffered to depart with their arms and baggage. The archduke himſelf ſubſcribed the capitulation; but, though his intention was ſincere, he could not protect the garriſon of Snaerſeerck, conſiſting of two companies of ſoldiers, from the fury of the Spaniſh mutineers, who fell upon them, notwithſtanding their officers prohibition, and put them all to the ſword.

Prince Maurice being at the ſame time informed of the ſurrender of the forts, which he had expected would have held out much longer, and of the near approach of the enemy, was thrown into great perplexity. From his confidence of bringing the ſiege to a ſpeedy concluſion, he had neglected to fortify his camp; the number of his troops was not ſufficient to enable him both to continue the ſiege, and to oppoſe the enemy in the open field; and he had even reaſon to dread, from the rapidity of their march, that he

he ſhould not have leiſure before their arrival, to put himſelf into a proper poſture of defence. BOOK I. 1600.

IN order to retard their progreſs, and to gain as much time as poſſible, he immediately diſpatched his kinſman, count Erneſt of Naſſau, with two regiments of foot, conſiſting of Zealanders and Scots, and four troops of horſe, to ſeize on the bridge of Leffingen, by which the enemy muſt paſs in their way to Nieuport. But before count Erneſt could reach this place, they had advanced, and taken poſſeſſion of it. Erneſt however, knowing how neceſſary it was to afford time to Maurice to prepare for their reception, reſolved, how fatal ſo ever the conſequences ſhould prove to himſelf and his detachment, that he would not retire without fighting: and this generous reſolution was happily attended with the deſired effect. Albert, believing that Maurice's whole army muſt ſurely be at hand, ſpent a conſiderable time in making the proper diſpoſitions for a general engagement. At length, being informed that Erneſt's troops had received no augmentation ſince their firſt appearance, and that no other part of the enemy's army was in ſight, he gave orders for an attack. The troops under Erneſt kept their ground for ſome time; but, the horſe having quickly given way, they were overpowered by numbers, and obliged to retire. In this action, upwards of five hundred of the Scots were ſlain, with many officers of diſtinguiſhed reputation (*q*). July 2.

THE archduke's hopes were greatly heightened by this ſucceſs, and he wrote to Iſabella that having with ſo great facility diſcomfited the van-guard of the enemy's army, he expected ſoon to inform

(*q*) Piaſecius, p. 182.

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form her of the defeat of the whole. He judged, however, that there was ground to heſitate with regard to the conduct which it was proper to purſue; and, in order to aſſiſt him in forming his reſolution, he called a council of his moſt experienced officers. Gaſpard Zapena, a Spaniard of great experience, was of opinion that it was altogether unneceſſary, and would therefore, in the preſent circumſtances, be extremely imprudent to riſk a battle. The enemy's general, through his confidence of being able to reduce Nieuport before an army could be aſſembled to oppoſe him, had brought himſelf into the moſt dangerous ſituation in which he had been ever placed. He durſt not, now, in the face of ſo powerful an army, continue his operations againſt the town. His communication with Oſtend was intercepted, ſince the archduke was fortunately ſituated between him and that place; and, ſhould he attempt to make his eſcape by ſea, when his highneſs was ready to fall upon him, in the hurry of embarkation, the greateſt part of his troops muſt be cut to pieces. He therefore thought that the archduke ought not immediately to advance, with a deſign to attack the enemy; but ought rather to take the proper meaſures for reducing them, without expoſing himſelf to the chance of a battle; and if he did, he believed, that ere long he would be able to oblige the enemy to lay down their arms. But whether his opinion on this head ſhould be rejected or embraced, it was at leaſt neceſſary that, before he advanced any further, he ſhould procure information of the ſituation of the enemy, of which he was entirely ignorant; and, before adventuring to attack them, ſhould wait for the arrival of Velaſco, who in a few days would join him with a reinforcement of three thouſand troops.

THIS prudent council was warmly oppoſed by the ſieur la Barlotte, an old Flemiſh commander, of no leſs experience than Zapena, but whoſe courage, notwithſtanding his advanced age, ſtill bordered on temerity. He maintained that the preſent favourable opportunity of attacking the enemy ought not to be ſuffered to eſcape; that the archduke would find them entirely unprepared for their defence, intimidated by the rapidity of his approach, and diſheartened by the defeat which their troops, under Erneſt of Naſſau, had ſo recently ſuſtained; that, as the advantages he muſt derive from theſe circumſtances, were more than ſufficient to compenſate for the want of the troops under Velaſco, ſo his inferiority in number to the enemy was more than counterbalanced, by the ſuperior diſcipline and bravery of his troops; that his troops were at preſent animated with the higheſt degree of ardor; and that the delaying to lead them forward, when they were ſo eager to engage, would only ſerve to damp their alacrity, while it would afford leiſure to the enemy, either to fortify their entrenchments, or to ſecure their retreat.

THIS reaſoning was received with high applauſe by a great majority of the council; and the ſoldiers, eſpecially the Spaniſh mutineers, impatient to advance, could hardly be reſtrained.

ALBERT, however, being ſtrongly impreſſed with a ſenſe of the ſolidity of Zapena's reaſons for delay, ſtill heſitated as to which of the councils given him, he ſhould embrace; when chance, which often directs the moſt important events, contributed to fix his reſolution. The army having a view from their preſent ſituation of the ſea-coaſt, a great number of ſhips were ſeen in their courſe from Nieuport to Oſtend. The Spaniards

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prepoſſeſſed with the idea that the enemy durſt not wait for their approach, concluded that they had already begun their flight, and that, at leaſt, a part of them were on board the ſhips which they obſerved. Albert himſelf too readily yielded to this deluſion; and inſtantly gave orders to his troops to begin their march. He was, at this time, only at the diſtance of a few miles from Nieuport, and, as he advanced with great rapidity, his cavalry arrived within ſight of the enemy about mid-day, and his whole army about four or five hours before ſun-ſet.

HE ſoon diſcovered how greatly he and his officers had erred in their conjectures with regard to the conduct and ſituation of the enemy. Far from meditating flight, prince Maurice had ordered his fleet to quit the coaſt, and retire to Oſtend; by which prudent meaſure, he at once gave his army proof of the confidence which he repoſed in them, and reduced them to the alternative of death or victory. He had withdrawn all his troops from the ſiege, except a number which he judged ſufficient to reſtrain the ſallies of the garriſon. He had advanced to a little diſtance from the town, partly to encourage his troops, by ſhewing that it was not with reluctance that he had reſolved to accept of battle; and partly becauſe the ſituation of the ground was more convenient for drawing them up in the order which he moſt approved.

BESIDES his Dutch forces, he had ſeveral regiments of Britiſh, French, and Swiſs, commanded by officers of diſtinguiſhed merit, who had acquired the moſt conſummate knowledge of the military art in the civil wars of France, and in the Netherlands; and theſe men, he well knew, from long experience, would execute his orders with equal ſkill and valor.

HE

He thought it neceſſary, however, to encourage and animate the troops, and for this purpoſe, he rode from rank to rank, reminding them that they were about to engage with an enemy who were only inferior in numbers, and fatigued with their march; but, who, in the manner of their approach, had given proof of extreme temerity: that it entirely depended on themſelves whether they ſhould return to their country and their friends, crowned with glory and victory, or be cut to pieces by an enemy over whom they had often triumphed, and have their names for ever covered with infamy. From his confidence in their bravery, he had ordered the tranſports to leave the coaſt; and he now lead them on to battle, under a conviction that they would follow the example which he would ſet before them, and reſolve either to die or conquer. Theſe exhortations were every where received with the moſt joyful acclamations; and the whole army ſeemed to be animated with that intrepid ſpirit which he wiſhed to inſpire.

He gave the command of his van-guard to ſir Francis Vere, that of his main body to the count of Solms, and of the rear-guard to Oliver Vander Tempel, lord of Corbeck. He diſtributed his cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Naſſau, partly in the front, and partly on the flanks; and having taken no particular ſtation to himſelf, he was at liberty to go from place to place, whereſoever he found his preſence neceſſary. He was accompanied by his brother the celebrated prince Frederick Henry, who was only ſixteen years of age (*r*); and by the duke of Holſtein, the prince of Anhalt, the count of Coligni, lord Gray, and ſir

(*r*) Maurice urged his brother to go by ſea to Oſtend, but Henry inſiſted that he ſhould be permitted to remain and to ſhare his brother's fate.

Book I. 1600. Robert Drury, grandſon of the famous admiral of that name, and by ſeveral other noblemen of the firſt rank, in the different proteſtant ſtates in Europe, who had lately come into the Netherlands to improve themſelves, by his leſſons and example, in the art of war.

Having drawn up his army upon the downs by the ſea-ſhore, and planted his artillery on ſome of the higheſt of the little hills of ſand of which the downs are formed, he reſolved, in that poſture, to wait for the enemy's approach. Albert was greatly diſappointed, when he found him ſo well prepared for his defence; and he was ſomewhat diſcouraged when he obſerved, that from the poſition he had made choice of, the Spaniſh army would have both the ſun and the wind in their face: the latter of which circumſtances he dreaded would prove particularly inconvenient, from the light ſandy ſoil on which they were about to engage. It was now, however, too late to entertain the thoughts of a retreat; and his troops were as confident and as eager and impatient for the combat as before. They had long cheriſhed a contempt of the enemy; and they were now heard in all the ranks uttering threats, that they would give no quarter to any of the heretics, except prince Maurice and his brother, whom they would reſerve to adorn the triumph of their general.

Battle of Nieuport. The battle was begun by the Spaniſh cavalry, under Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who endeavoured to gain the flank of the Dutch army, by advancing along the ſands between the ſea and the downs; but Maurice, having foreſeen that this might be attempted, had made proviſion againſt it, by planting cannon on the ſands, and ordering ſome of his ſhips of war to approach the ſhore as near as poſſible. Mendoza was therefore unable

unable to effectuate his purpoſe, and was obliged to retire, after having ſuſtained conſiderable ſlaughter. 1600.

In the mean time, the two armies, after a diſcharge of their artillery, having advanced within muſket-ſhot of each other, the Engliſh forces in the van, under ſir Francis Vere, were attacked by the Spaniſh mutineers, who, in order to retrieve their honour, diſplayed on this occaſion the moſt deſperate intrepidity. The Britiſh troops received their aſſault undaunted, and for ſome time withſtood their fury; their general had his horſe ſhot under him, and was twice wounded. Still, however, he maintained his ground, refuſing to give any attention to his wounds, till his brother, ſir Horatio Vere, arrived with freſh troops to his relief. Theſe troops, while engaged in combat, with the mutineers, having been vigorouſly attacked in flank by the Spaniſh cavalry, were thrown into diſorder, and many of them began to fly towards the ſhore.

But the battle was inſtantly reſtored. Prince Maurice, having divided his army into battalions, ordered two of thoſe which compoſed his main body to advance; and by them, the Spaniards were in their turn compelled to retreat, and time afforded to the Britiſh troops to rally. In ſupport of the Spaniards, the archduke brought forward his Walloons and the Iriſh, and with their aſſiſtance, the mutineers would once more have regained their ſuperiority, had not Maurice, without delay, led on another freſh battalion, conſiſting of Swiſs, and of thoſe Wallooons who had ſurrendered to him the fort of Saint Andrew. The Britiſh forces likewiſe returned to the charge; and ſoon after, the whole of both armies, horſe and foot, were engaged from one wing to the other.

The

BOOK I. 1620.

THE Dutch cavalry, commanded by count Lewis of Naſſau, who, in this battle highly diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his activity and valour, proved in every rencounter an overmatch for that of the enemy, and having broken their ranks, drove them with great ſlaughter from the field of battle.

THE combat was better ſupported by the Spaniſh infantry; where Albert himſelf was preſent, expoſing himſelf to every danger, and ſometimes mingling with the foremoſt combatants. His troops, in every quarter, gave proof of the moſt determined bravery. The battle had laſted for more than three hours; during which time, notwithſtanding the fatigue of their rapid march from Liffinguen, they had fought without intermiſſion, and often repulſed the freſh battalions of the enemy. From the beginning, they had been extremely incommoded with the ſun and wind in their face, and ſtill more with the duſt or ſand. The Dutch artillery too had kept up a conſtant fire upon them during the whole engagement, and having been not only planted on higher and firmer ground with planks under it to prevent it from ſinking in the ſand, but better ſerved and more ſkilfully directed, it had made great havock among the Spaniſh troops. Still, however, they preſerved their ranks, and ſeemed determined ſooner to lay down their lives, than yield to an enemy, whom they had been ſo much accuſtomed to deſpiſe. Albert had made ſeveral attempts to get to the windward of the enemy, but had been as often prevented by the prudent precautions and vigilance of prince Maurice. At length, having thrown off his helmet, that he might be the more eaſily diſtinguiſhed by his men, he received a wound in the ear with a pike, and was obliged to retire. Through ſome accident, his horſe, which

which was conſpicuous, fell into the hands of the enemy. His troops obſerved this, and believing that he himſelf had been taken priſoner, or killed, were greatly diſheartened. They ſtill kept their ranks; but in the langour of their exertions, they gave manifeſt ſymptoms that both their ſtrength and courage had begun to fail.

THIS abatement of their vigour did not eſcape the vigilant eye of Maurice, who inſtantly reſolved to improve the advantage which it afforded him; and for this purpoſe, having collected his whole force, he renewed the aſſault upon the enemy in front, with his infantry, and with his cavalry in flank. It happened, at the ſame time, that the Spaniſh magazine of gun-powder, deſigned for the uſe of the artillery, took fire. The Dutch cavalry availed themſelves of the confuſion which this accident occaſioned, and puſhed forward with irreſiſtible force, crying out, Victory, victory! This cry being inſtantly communicated to the reſt of the army, animated them with redoubled ardor. The Spaniards, unable any longer to reſiſt their fury, gave way on every ſide, and falling ſoon after into confuſion, betook themſelves to flight. The victors purſued for ſome time, and put great numbers to the ſword; but the night coming on, the prince gave orders for ſounding a retreat. His troops, he knew, muſt be exceedingly exhauſted and fatigued, as they had taken no food ſince the morning, and, almoſt the whole day, had either ſtood under arms, or been engaged in battle: beſides that, he was well acquainted with the intrepid ſpirit of the enemy, who might rally and return when he was unprepared for reſiſtance, and moſt of his troops employed in the purſuit. For this reaſon, he ſelected ſuch of them as had ſuffered leaſt from the fatigue which they had undergone, and ſtationed them as a guard

Book I. a guard to the reſt of the army, who remained all night on the field of battle.
1600.

The contemporary hiſtorians differ widely in their accounts of the number of the ſlain. On the part of the Spaniards, Reidan, an hiſtorian who is generally well informed, ſays that it amounted to five thouſand, but Grotius makes it only three thouſand; while the loſs on the ſide of the victors did not exceed one thouſand: and the greateſt part of theſe, he ſays, were of the Engliſh troops, who diſtinguiſhed themſelves by their intrepidity in this engagement, and had eight of their captains killed, and all the reſt wounded, except two.

The Britiſh officers were almoſt the only perſons of diſtinction who fell in the army of the ſtates; but in that of the army of the archduke, beſides ſo great a number of his beſt troops, Zapena, and colonels Baſtock, de Laſſo, D'Avalos, and many other officers of great merit, were either killed in the field of battle, or died afterwards of their wounds. The admiral of Arragon and De Vigliar were taken priſoners; and the count de Boucquoi, Barlotta, and many others wounded, and rendered long unfit for ſervice. All the Spaniſh artillery, baggage, and proviſions, with more than a hundred ſtandards, fell into the hands of the victorious army (s). Such was the battle of Nieuport, or, as it is ſometimes called, the battle of the Downs, the event of which proved ſo extremely different from what the confidence of the Spaniards and their generals had prompted them to

(s) Among the Italians who fell in this battle the cardinal Bentivoglio mentions his brother and his nephew, two young noblemen, about twenty years of age, who had lately entered into the ſervice of Spain, and were much regretted on account of their youth and bravery.

to expect. Their defeat was, no doubt, partly owing to the disadvantages under which they fought; although it was acknowledged by all parties that nothing could surpass the prudence, vigour, and intrepidity, which prince Maurice displayed from the beginning to the end of the engagement. His skill in the siege of fortified towns had long been highly celebrated; but it now appeared that he was equally possessed of all the other talents which form a consummate general, and all Europe at this time resounded with his praise (*t*).

Allbert, having left the field of battle immediately after seeing his troops give way, arrived on the same night at Bruges, where he soon after set out for Ghent, and was there received by Isabella, with the same firm and masculine spirit which she had discovered upon the various reports that had reached her, first of his being killed, and afterwards of his being wounded and taken prisoner. He returned next day to Bruges, and there employed himself in collecting his scattered troops.

Prince Maurice, in the mean time had retired on the next day after the battle to Ostend, to recruit his army in a place of safety, and to consult with the deputies whom the states general had sent thither to assist him with their advice. His enterprize against Nieuport was a measure which the states themselves had first suggested, and which Maurice had undertaken at their desire. It does not appear that he himself had approved of this measure; and it was strongly condemned by his kinsman, count William of Nassau, whom the Dutch

(*t*) Grotius, lib. ix. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vi. The heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, printed in the year 1613 Piasecii Chronica Gest. in Europa singularium, an. 1600.

BOOK I. Dutch hiſtorians celebrate as a perſon of the moſt conſummate prudence.
1600.

To lead the army ſo far into the enemy's country as Nieuport, truſting to an event ſo extremely uncertain as the continuance of the mutinous ſpirit of the Spaniſh troops, William had repreſented as a raſh and dangerous enterprize, by which the exiſtence of the commonwealth would be expoſed to imminent danger for the ſake of acquiring a ſingle town. That, even although they ſhould conquer Nieuport, yet the great expence of defending a place at ſo great a diſtance from them would more than counterbalance all the advantages they could derive from the poſſeſſion of it; and that, if the archduke ſhould be able to appeaſe the mutineers, the army of the ſtates might ſuffer a defeat, or, they might be reduced by famine, as the ſupplying them with proviſions would entirely depend on the winds and waves.

THESE apprehenſions had hitherto been happily diſappointed; but from the events which had fallen out, it manifeſtly appeared how much reaſon there had been for entertaining them. The mutineers had eaſily been perſuaded to return to their duty. The archduke had in due time collected a ſufficient force; and if he had liſtened to the counſel that was given him by Zapena, and waited for the arrival of Velaſco, without precipitating an engagement, the army of the ſtates would probably have either been obliged to lay down their arms without fighting, or in the hurry of attempting to get on board their ſhips, the greater part of them would have been deſtroyed.

THE deputies, after the defeat of their troops at Leffinguen, had come to be, in ſome meaſure, ſenſible of the error into which the ſtates had been betrayed;

betrayed; and, from that time till the victory was fully decided, they had been diſquieted with the moſt dreadful apprehenſions. From theſe apprehenſions they were now happily delivered; but being ſtill impreſſed with a ſenſe of the danger which they had ſo narrowly eſcaped, they thought that, notwithſtanding the great advantage they had obtained, there was ground for heſitating whether it was expedient to perſevere in the plan of operations that had been begun.

THEY gave proof on this occaſion, by the ſlowneſs of their deliberations, how much wiſer it had been on the part of the ſtates to have left prince Maurice at perfect liberty with regard to the conduct of the war, than to require him, as they had done, to follow the opinion of men who, from their ignorance of military affairs, were ſo extremely ill qualified to adviſe. They differed widely in their opinions from each other; and while ſome thought that the army ought immediately to return to Nieuport, others were of opinion that it ought rather to penetrate into the interior parts of Flanders. The former of theſe opinions at length prevailed; and on the fourth or fifth day after the battle, the ſiege of Nieuport was reſumed.

THIS meaſure ought either not to have been adopted, or carried ſooner into execution. The archduke, having exerted great activity in repairing the faults which he had committed, had ſent Velaſco (*u*), with a reinforcement to the garriſon of Nieuport of two thouſand five hundred men, who having marched with great expedition, had entered the town before prince Maurice had inveſted it. The operations however of the ſiege were

Siege of Nieuport reſumed.

(*u*) Bentivoglio, Grotius. Thuanus ſays it was Barlotti and not Velaſco.

Book I. 1600. were renewed; but the garriſon, after making ſome vigorous ſallies on the beſiegers, ſoon convinced prince Maurice that he could not juſtly expect to reduce them before the archduke would arrive with another army, which he was collecting together for their relief.

Moved by this conſideration, and dreading that he might ſoon be again involved in the ſame danger, from which he had ſo recently eſcaped, he raiſed the ſiege, and having led back his troops to Oſtend, he put them on board the tranſports which the ſtates had provided for that purpoſe, July 18. and returned to Holland; judging it impracticable, on account of the difficulty of his ſituation, in the heart of the enemy's country, to derive any advantage whetever from the deciſive victory he had obtained *(w)*.

The greateſt part of the ſeaſon fit for action ſtill remained; but both parties were greatly exhauſted with the exertions which they had already made

(w) Bentivoglio. Thuanus, lib. cxxiv, &c.
Before he embarked, Maurice made an attempt to reduce a Spaniſh fort in the neighbourhood of Oſtend, called St. Catherine: but in this too he was diſappointed by the vigour and activity of Barlotta, who by forced marches arrived with a conſiderable body of forces before the prince had time to make any progreſs in the ſiege. Barlotta himſelf however loſt his life on this occaſion. He was a native of Luxemburg, and had practiſed ſurgery in Paris, where, having been employed in his profeſſion by count Charles of Mansfeldt, when he commanded the Spaniſh troops in France, the count took an attachment to him, and gave him a commiſſion among his troops. He ſoon diſtinguiſhed himſelf by his activity and enterprize, obtained the higheſt military honours, and was conſidered as one of the ableſt officers in the ſervice of Spain. His low birth, joined to his native arrogance and preſumption, procured him many enemies among his inferiors and equals: but the archduke was ſincerely ſorry for his death.

made, and no other memorable tranſactions paſſed during the courſe of the preſent year (x). BOOK I. 1600.

Decline of agriculture and manufactures.

IN Spain, the operation of the ſeveral cauſes of decline, above mentioned, was at this time ſenſible felt in every department of the ſtate. Complaints were heard all over the kingdom of the neglect of agriculture and the decay of manufactures; and great numbers of the people, being without employment, were reduced to a ſtate of indigence, which rendered it impoſſible for them to contribute their proportion of the taxes and ſupplies.

Expedients for remedying thoſe evils.

SEVERAL councils were held to conſider of the proper remedies for thoſe evils; but the duke of Lerma, and the other Spaniſh miniſters, appear to have been extremely ignorant of the cauſes from which they proceed. They ſuppoſed them to have riſen principally from the ſcarcity of money: and this they aſcribed partly to the great quantities of plate that were employed in the churches, and in the houſes of the rich, and partly to the exportation of gold and ſilver for the purchaſe of foreign manufactures.

BUT as no expedient occurred at preſent to prevent the latter of theſe practices, while the manufactures of Spain were at ſo low an ebb, they reſolved immediately, if poſſible, to put a ſtop to the progreſs of the former; and, with this view, a royal edict was publiſhed, requiring all churches, corporations, and individuals of whatever rank within the kingdom, to deliver upon oath, to certain magiſtrates who were named, an exact inventory of all the plate, whether gold or ſilver, in their poſſeſſion. In the body of the edict this reaſon

(x) Davila, &c. p. 77. ch. ix.

Book I. 1600.

reaſon for the publication was aſſigned, that from the information which his majeſty had received, there was ground to believe the quantity of the precious metals in plate and in church utenſils to be ſo enormous, that, if it were converted into coin, and circulated throughout the kingdom, it would be found ſufficient to reſtore the nation to that happy ſtate of wealth and proſperity which it had formerly enjoyed; and that, for this reaſon, the king had, with the advice of his preſent counſellors, reſolved, not only to prevent the farther encreaſe of plate, but afterwards, under the ſevereſt penalties, to prohibit the exportation of it to foreign ſtates.

But it was ſoon found impracticable to carry this edict, which would not probably have been in any degree productive of the advantages propoſed by it, into execution. The clergy were highly incenſed becauſe the ſacred utenſils were comprehended in it; and, both in writings and harangues from the pulpit, they repreſented the edict as an attack upon the privileges of the church. Neither Philip, nor his miniſter, the duke of Lerma, had reſolution to contend againſt an order of men whom they dreaded, and whoſe favour they had been above all things ſolicitous to conciliate. Their deſign was therefore ſuddenly relinquiſhed, and no other attempt made, on the preſent occaſion, to remedy the diſorders which prevailed.

It was not probable that any effectual remedy could be applied to them, till peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed with England and the United Provinces. Notwithſtanding which it was judged neceſſary, for the reaſons formerly mentioned, to continue the proſecution of the war againſt both theſe powers, without regard to the prejudice which from thence

thence the monarchy was likely to ſuſtain (y). Orders were given for the equipment of a fleet to ſupport the Catholics of Ireland in their rebellion againſt Elizabeth; and both money and a reinforcement of Italian and Spaniſh troops were ſent into the Netherlands.

THE archduke had at the ſame time prevailed upon the ſtates aſſembled at Bruſſels to grant him much greater ſupplies than formerly; and theſe he employed in making numerous levies in Germany, and the Walloon or ſouthern provinces. The enemy however was ſooner prepared to take the field. Prince Maurice, having drawn his army out of winter quarters, early in the ſpring, and ordered them to rendezvous in the neighbourhood of the fort of Schenck, ſeemed for ſome time to intend an attack on Bois le Duc; but it ſoon appeared that his real deſign was to attempt the reduction of Rhinberg; the poſſeſſion of this important place being neceſſary in order to facilitate the expulſion of the Spaniards from Guelderland, a part of which was ſtill ſubject to their authority.

THE archduke no ſooner received intelligence of his deſign, than he ordered count Herman of Berg to ſet out with a body of troops to reinforce the garriſon; but before the count had time to execute his commiſſion, Maurice had drawn lines of circumvallation round the place, and fortified the approaches to his camp in ſuch a manner, as rendered all acceſs impracticable. Albert had therefore no other expedient for ſaving Rhinberg left, but to make a diverſion, by attacking ſome important place belonging to the United States, in the hopes that Maurice might be thus induced to abandon his preſent enterprize.

AT

(y) Gonſalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. 9.

BOOK I. AT the earneſt requeſt of the people of Flanders, he reſolved to lay ſiege to Oſtend; the garriſon of which place, though ſomewhat checked by adjacent forts, had been able to make incurſions into the heart of the province, and often laid the inhabitants of the open country under the moſt burthenſome contributions.

1601.

THE ſtates of this province, notwithſtanding the peculiar hardſhips under which they laboured, had diſcovered great alacrity in raiſing their proportion of the ſupplies lately granted to the archduke; and they now promiſed ſtrenuouſly to exert themſelves in furniſhing him with every thing neceſſary for carrying on the ſiege with vigour.

SUCH were the motives by which Albert was influenced in forming his reſolution to undertake the ſige of Oſtend; the moſt hazardous enterprize in which he had ever been engaged, and which was attended with more important conſequences, than any other which occurs in the hiſtory of the Netherlands.

Deſcription of Oſtend.

OSTEND ſtands on the ſea coaſt, in a marſhy ſoil, and almoſt ſurrounded with canals; two of which being much larger than the reſt, and communicating with the ſea, receive ſmaller veſſels at all times, and at high-water, admit of ſhips of a conſiderable magnitude. It was an open fiſhing town, till the year 1572, when it was firſt fortified with a paliſade by the duke of Alva. At the pacification of Ghent, the inhabitants having thrown off the Spaniſh yoke, the fortifications were ſo much ſtrengthened and augmented by the United States, that the duke of Parma, who inveſted it in the year 1583, deſpairing of ſucceſs, abandoned

doned his enterprize, and could never afterwards be perſuaded to reſume the ſiege. BOOK I. 1601.

OSTEND is divided into two parts, called the Old and the New Town. The former of theſe is waſhed by the ſea, againſt the ravages of which it was ſecured by a ſtrong fortification, formed of huge and well compacted beams or paliſades; and the latter was defended by a wall flanked with baſtions, and the canals already mentioned, to which there had lately been added a covered way, fortified with numerous redoubts. As, from the ſituation of Oſtend, on the coaſt of Flanders, it afforded a convenient ſhelter to the ſhips of the United Provinces, the ſtates had ever been extremely ſolicitous for its preſervation. They had ſpared no expence in rendering the fortifications as compleat as poſſible, and beſides a numerous garriſon under the command of an experienced officer, they had always kept it richly furniſhed with proviſions and military ſtores. Nor were theſe the only circumſtances which had deterred the duke of Parma from renewing his attempt againſt it. He conſidered, what was of much greater importance than even the ſtrength of the place, that while the Dutch preſerved their ſuperiority at ſea, the garriſon might continue to receive whatever ſupplies and reinforcements they ſhould ſtand in need of, till his ſtrength and reſources being exhauſted, he ſhould be compelled to raiſe the ſiege. To this conſideration, the archduke ſeems not to have paid that attention which it merited. He did not poſſeſs the ſame military ſkill as the duke of Parma, and could not therefore ſo clearly perceive the difficulties he muſt encounter in his intended enterprize. He was not by nature bold or raſh; yet, from the facility of his temper, he was apt too readily to

BOOK I. 1601.

adopt the raſh imprudent meaſures that were recommended by his counſellors (y).

HAVING ſet out with his numerous army about the end of June, he began his operations againſt Oſtend on the 4th or 5th of July. Prince Maurice, in the mean time, who ſecretly rejoiced to obſerve his enemy engage in ſo dangerous an undertaking, perſiſted in the ſiege of Rhinberg; and in a few weeks, notwithſtanding the moſt vigorous defence on the part of the garriſon, he compelled them to capitulate.

Rhinberg capitulates.

BUT the attention of both parties was now almoſt totally engroſſed by the ſiege of Oſtend; where Charles Vander Noot the governor, before the beſiegers had time to compleat their intrenchments, had ſallied out upon them, and killed upwards of five hundred men. This unfortunate beginning, however, did not deter the archduke from the proſecution of his enterprize.

Siege of Oſtend.

HAVING taken the neceſſary precautions to prevent the future ſallies of the garriſon, and ſtationed one part of his troops in the downs to the weſtward of the town, and the reſt of them on the ſouth and eaſt, he ſoon opened his batteries, and began a furious cannonade in every quarter. But his diſtance from the body of the place, occaſioned by the canals, ditches, and other outworks, which the induſtry of the beſiegers had greatly multiplied, rendered his fire of ſmall effect; and ſhowed him that it muſt long remain impoſſible to compel the garriſon to ſurrender, unleſs he could

(y) Vide Bentivoglio, Le Clerc, and Grotius. Thuanus, lib. vi. p. 76, &c.

could prevent them from receiving reinforcements and ſupplies by ſea. BOOK I. 1601.

IN this opinion he might have been confirmed by the proof which the United States had lately given, how much they were determined to exert themſelves with vigour in the defence of the place. Though Vander Noot was an officer whom they highly eſteemed, yet they had taken from him the chief command, and given it to ſir Francis Vere, who, next to prince Maurice, was the moſt renowned of all their generals, for his military prudence and capacity; and to engage Vere to accept of this command, they had conſented to his ſelecting the flower of the Engliſh forces, for a reinforcement to the garriſon. They had, at the ſame time, ſent to Oſtend a copious ſupply of military ſtores and proviſions; and were unanimous in reſolving that whatever it ſhould coſt them, they would defend the town to the laſt extremity.

THIS reſolution, and the vigour which the ſtates had begun to diſplay, drew the attention of all Europe to the operations of this important ſiege; and with the permiſſion of the ſtates, the town was viſited by many illuſtrious foreigners, from Germany, Denmark, France, and England (z), who were led there by curioſity to view ſo intereſting a ſcene of action, and the deſire of being thereby enabled more clearly to comprehend the relations of thoſe military atchievements which they expected to be performed by the contending parties.

THE archduke had ground for much ſolicitude with regard to the final iſſue of his enterprize;

(z) As the duke of Holſace, the king of Denmark's brother, the earl of Northumberland, and others.

Book I. 1601. but he could not now deſiſt, without expoſing himſelf to reproach and ridicule; and therefore he applied himſelf with redoubled ardor to the proſecution of the ſiege.

It might be brought to a period, he imagined, either by carrying it on in the ordinary form, by mines, batteries, and aſſaults, or by rendering himſelf maſter of the entrance of the canals, and thereby intercepting the communication of the garriſon by ſea, with the United Provinces. He ought maturely to have conſidered which of theſe two methods of procedure was the moſt likely to prove effectual, and to have confined his attention to one of them, without ſuffering it to be diverted by the other. But, inſtead of this, he employed his forces, ſometimes in carrying on attacks upon the enemy's entrenchments, and ſometimes in attempting to block up the canals; and, by this diviſion of his ſtrength, as the ſiege was protracted to an enormous length, ſo it was attended with an immenſe expence of blood and treaſure.

For ſeveral weeks his principal object was to approach ſtill nearer than where his batteries were firſt opened to the fortifications of the town. The garriſon, on the other hand, omitted nothing in their power that could obſtruct his approach. They adventured, on ſome occaſions, to ſally out, and to attack the beſiegers ſword in hand: and in the mean time, they laboured indefatigably in caſting trenches, and raiſing new redoubts, wherever they apprehended there was danger of the enemy's attempting an aſſault. An inceſſant fire was all the while kept up from the Spaniſh batteries, on the one hand, and the fortifications on the other; and great numbers were killed on either ſide.

At

AT length, the archduke, perceiving that his operations were not attended with the ſucceſs which he expected, had recourſe to the other expedient above-mentioned, and employed a great part of his forces in attempting to obſtruct the entrance to the canals. One of them was the entrance of the harbour, and here he began his operations. But, as all the ground to a conſiderable diſtance from the ſhore was ſand, no mound which he formed of it, could ſuſtain a battery, or reſiſt the violence of the waves. He was therefore obliged to collect together from the neighbouring towns, a great quantity of huge beams, of which and bricks he reſolved to form a dyke at the mouth of the canal. The beams were driven deep into the ground, then bound together, and the intermediate ſpaces filled with bricks. Of this ſort of building, one was piled upon another, till the whole was raiſed to a ſufficient height; after which, being planted with a numerous battery of cannon, the enemy's ſhips found all acceſs to the harbour utterly impracticable.

BUT the hopes which Albert had from thence conceived, of being able to reduce the town by famine, were quickly fruſtrated by the ingenuity and great exertion of the governor and garriſon. They inſtantly applied themſelves to enlarge the mouth of the other canal, which paſſed through the heart of the town, and ſoon rendered it capable of receiving the largeſt ſhips.

The archduke however did not deſpair of being able to deprive them of this reſource; and he immediately began the ſame ſort of operations at the entrance of this canal, as thoſe by which he had made himſelf maſter of the other. At firſt, his troops and pioneers proceeded with great

BOOK I. 1601.

great alacrity, as they were ſheltered from the fire of the beſiegers, by a dyke which had been raiſed to defend the town againſt the encroachments of the ſea. But the garriſon reſolved to forego the advantage which they derived from this defence; and having ſtrengthened their fortifications, as well as they could, by ſtakes, huge ſtones, and other materials fitted to repel the fury of the waves, they demoliſhed the dyke, and, as by this expedient, the Spaniſh works were expoſed to the artillery of the town, and a great part of the adjacent country laid under water, the archduke was obliged to draw off his troops to a greater diſtance, and to have recourſe to other meaſures which required greater experience and time to carry into execution.

IN the mean time, the ſtates general of the United Provinces held frequent conferences to conſider how they might beſt improve the leiſure which they enjoyed, while the Spaniſh army was detained before Oſtend. They wiſhed to have made an attack on the iſland of Cadſant, and afterwards to have undertaken the reduction of Sluys. But, at the preſent juncture, they had neither the money nor the troops which prince Maurice thought neceſſary for ſo difficult an enterprize. The flower of their army had, after the taking of Rhinberg, been ſent to Oſtend; and the great expence which attended the defence of that place, had almoſt exhauſted their finances. Much time was ſpent in deliberating, and various expeditions were propoſed. At length, towards the end of October, when the ſeaſon of action was nearly elapſed, they formed the reſolution of undertaking the ſiege of Bois le Duc, the garriſon of which important place, they underſtood, amounted only to three hundred men.

IN

In obedience to their commands, though extremely diffident of ſucceſs, prince Maurice immediately began his march, and having arrived before the place on the firſt of November, he judged, that, conſidering the great extent of the fortifications, the garriſon muſt ſoon find it neceſſary to capitulate, provided he could prevent the entrance of more troops. With this view, he inſtantly began to draw lines of circumvallation round the town, and at firſt, this work was carried on with great rapidity. But ſoon afterwards, it was retarded by a violent froſt, which happened, this year, much ſooner than uſual: and the archduke had time to ſend a large detachment of his army, above a thouſand of which forced their way into the town, before the entrenchments were compleat; while the reſt lay at a little diſtance from the prince's camp, with the deſign of embracing any opportunity that might offer of annoying him. Still, however, he perſiſted in his deſign: but as the froſt continued daily encreaſing in violence, and put an entire ſtop to his operations, he complied with the deſire of the deputies of the ſtates, who as uſual, attended him in the camp, and raiſed the ſiege (*a*).

Siege of Bois le Duc

End of November.

Maurice had no ſooner retired from Bois le Duc, than Albert, having recalled his troops, reſumed his operations, which had been ſuſpended during their abſence, againſt Oſtend: and in a few days after, he had ground to entertain the hope of being able to terminate the ſiege. The fortifications of the town next the ſea, had lately ſuffered conſiderable prejudice from the fury of the waves; and the garriſon, through ſickneſs and deſertion, and the great numbers killed by fatigue and the inceſſant fire of the beſiegers, was reduced

(*a*) Metern, lib. xxii. Grotius, lib. x. Bentivoglio, &c.

Book I. 1601. duced from eight thouſand to between two and three thouſand men. Sir Francis Vere had given repeated notice of his diſtreſsful ſituation to the United States: but, till the raiſing of the ſiege of Bois le Duc, they had no troops which they could ſpare; and after troops were procured, and put on board the tranſports, they were prevented from ſailing by contrary winds. About the ſame time, the archduke had ordered a ſelect body of forces to paſs over the harbour at low-water, in the middle of the night, who ſet fire to a temporary defence, compoſed of huge piles of faggots and other combuſtible materials, which had been placed at the foot of the rampart, on the north ſide of the town, to prevent the further encroachments of the ſea. The fire burnt furiouſly for three days and nights, baffling all the attempts of the garriſon to extinguiſh it. The rampart was thus much weakened, and a greater number of men were neceſſary for its defence. In the midſt of this diſtreſs, the governor received notice that the archduke had been aſſiduouſly employed in preparing for a general aſſault, and would certainly carry his deſign into execution on the next day, or, at fartheſt, on the day immediately following. Vere, though poſſeſſed of the moſt unqueſtionable courage, was too ſenſible of the preſent weakneſs of his garriſon and fortifications, and too well acquainted with the perſevering and intrepid ſpirit of the Spaniſh troops, not to be alarmed with the danger which threatened him; and, in order to avert it, he made uſe of an expedient to which a brave man will hardly, even when neceſſity requires it, have recourſe. Without any ſerious intention of capitulating, he ſecretly ſent over to the archduke an officer, to ſignify that he was ready to treat with him for the ſurrender of the town. Albert, ſuſpecting no diſſimulation, gladly liſtened to this

this propoſal, and hoſtages were inſtantly exchanged. He came ſoon, however, to entertain ſome doubt of the governor's ſincerity, and urged him, without delay, to propoſe his terms. This, the governor, by employing different pretexts, found means to defer from day to day, till a reinforcement of troops which he had expected, arrived from Zealand. This reinforcement conſiſted only of five companies, amounting to four hundred men. But finding that the archduke could not be any longer deceived, and having already gained ſufficient time to repair the breaches in the rampart, he ſent him word, that ſince his maſters the ſtates had augmented his garriſon, he could not now, conſiſtently with his honour, conſent to give up the town.

As Vere had begun this tranſaction without communicating it to his officers, ſome ſuſpicions were at firſt entertained of his fidelity by all ſuch perſons as were averſe to a ſurrender; and the ſtates general were not entirely ſatisfied, either with the duplicity he had employed, or the example which he had given of entering into a treaty with the enemy, without the knowledge of his council of war. But no perſon had ſo much reaſon to be offended as the archduke, who though he did not heſitate to ſend back the hoſtages, was both incenſed and mortified when he conſidered how he had been deceived by an enemy, whom he might probably have compelled to lay down his arms (*b*).

THE fortifications of the place were now more ſecure than formerly, and the garriſon had been reinforced. Still however, being moved by paſſion, more than the probability of ſucceſs, he reſolved

(*b*) If he had improved the opportunity which he had loſt.

Book I. 1601. ſolved to execute the deſign which the hopes of a capitulation had induced him to lay aſide, and gave orders for a general aſſault. He intended to make his principal attack on the weſt, near the harbour, which had been for ſome time in his poſſeſſion; but, in order to divert the enemies attention and divide their forces, he reſolved at the ſame time to make attacks in other quarters, and gave the command of a body of troops, deſtined to act on the eaſt ſide, to the celebrated count de Boucquoi; having committed the execution of his principal deſign to Auguſtin Meſcia, an experienced officer, and governor of the citadel of Antwerp.

January 7th, 1602. EARLY in the morning he began to play off his batteries, and kept up a furious cannonading in every quarter till midnight, when, the tide having gone back, Meſcia led forward the Spaniſh troops. They were drawn up in a compact body, forty men in front, and the foremoſt ranks clothed in complete armour, followed by the muſketeers and by others, who were provided with ſcaling ladders, and whatever elſe was judged neceſſary, either for acquiring or ſecuring poſſeſſion of the rampart. They advanced acroſs the old harbour, in which there was between three and four feet water, with great ardour and the moſt determined intrepidity; but the garriſon were well prepared for their defence. The governor had beforehand ordered the cannon to be removed from that part of the fortifications where he expected their principal attack, and in their place had planted ſeven large mortars, which were loaded with ſtones, flints, bullets, and other inſtruments of miſchief. He had likewiſe inſtructed thoſe to whom he had committed the charge of theſe mortars to keep up their fire till the enemy ſhould approach. This order was well obeyed, and the Spaniards had

had almoſt reached the foot of the rampart, when the mortars were diſcharged, and made dreadful havock among the foremoſt ranks: a great number was killed and wounded, and the ranks were thrown into confuſion. Still however they continued to advance, thoſe who were behind puſhing forward thoſe who were before, till the greater part of them were ſo near that every ſtroke and ſhot of the beſiegers did certain execution. The night came on, yet the Spaniards ſeemed ſtill determined to perſiſt. To prevent a ſurprize, the governor ordered a great number of fires to be lighted up within the rampart, and the battle continued to be as bloody and deſperate as before. BOOK I. 1602.

THE Spaniſh troops at the ſame time crowded together in the harbour, ready to advance to fill up the places of thoſe who fell; when the governor had recourſe to an expedient which he had meditated from the beginning. There were two ſluices within the fortification, one of which ſerved in the time of ebb to keep the water in that part of the canal which lay within the town, and the other to reſtrain it in that part which ran up into the country. Having ordered both theſe ſluices to be opened, ſo great a quantity of water was poured into the harbour, that many of the Spaniards were carried down by the violence of the ſtream, and drowned; while many others, attempting to ſave themſelves by laying hold of the palliſades on the rampart, were ſlaughtered by the enemy. The archduke had commanded his cavalry to keep cloſe in the rear of the infantry to prevent them from having recourſe to flight. It was thus rendered impoſſible for the latter to make their retreat ſo ſoon as neceſſity required; and by this means they were obliged to ſtand expoſed to the fire of the beſiegers, long after it was manifeſt that their moſt vigorous efforts could be

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be of no avail. A part of the cavalry having entered the water, with a deſign to obſtruct the violence of the current, ſeveral horſes with their riders were likewiſe drowned, and Meſcia at length found it neceſſary to give the ſignal of retreat. The aſſailants having been equally unſucceſsful in every other quarter, were obliged to abandon the aſſault. In this raſh and deſperate enterprize about fourteen hundred of the Spaniards and Italians were either killed or drowned, among whom were ſeveral perſons of the firſt rank, while the loſs of the beſiegers amounted only to forty killed, and a ſmall number wounded (*c*).

THE archduke would have renewed the aſſault on the ſecond day after his repulſe, but was prevented by a mutiny of his Italian and Spaniſh troops, who were highly exaſperated at the barbarous, and what they deemed diſgraceful manner in which they had been uſed. They bitterly complained that they had been treated like ſlaves or brutes, and not like ſoldiers of unqueſtionable bravery, when they were compelled by the cavalry to ſtand expoſed to the enemy's fire, after the ſluices being opened, it was rendered impoſſible for them to advance. They complained that this meaſure, which had been adopted without conſent of the council of general officers, was contrary to every rule of war, and they declared, that ſince they had not been treated as ſoldiers, they would no longer act as ſuch. Albert, ſoured with his ill ſucceſs, was equally alarmed and provoked at this behaviour, and in order to prevent the infection of their example from ſpreading through the reſt of his army, he inſtantly cauſed between

(*c*) Meteren, liv. xxiii. Grotius, lib. xi. ab initio. Bentivog. part. iii. lib. vi.

between forty and fifty of the moſt ſeditious to be executed, and ſent a hundred and fifty to the gallies. By this prompt ſeverity he quelled the mutiny; but, finding it neceſſary to relinquiſh his deſign of renewing the aſſault, he now bent his whole attention to the blocking up of the canal. 1602.

Spaniſh levies in Italy excite jealouſies.

DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions the court of Spain, notwithſtanding their inability to furniſh the archduke either with the troops or money neceſſary to inſure ſucceſs in his conteſt with the United States, was engaged in other expenſive enterprizes. By their order the count de Fuentes, governor of Milan, had ſome time before made ſuch numerous levies of troops, as excited in the minds of the Italian ſtates and princes an apprehenſion, which at the preſent period ſeems to have been without foundation, that ſome ambitious deſign had been conceived of reducing Italy under the Spaniſh yoke. Of theſe troops a part was ſent to the archduke Ferdinand, to aſſiſt him in his operations at Caniſſa againſt the Turks; another part of them to the Netherlands; and the reſt were intended for an expedition againſt Algiers, which was ſtill the principal ſeat of thoſe numerous pirates, by whom the coaſt and the ſhips of Spain continued to be no leſs moleſted than in the former reign. About ten thouſand troops were employed in ſeventy gallies, partly Genoeſe and partly Spaniſh, commanded by the celebrated Doria, and they had a proſperous voyage till they were within a few days ſailing of the deſtined port. Had they immediately landed, it is probable they would have ſucceeded in their enterprize, as the greater part of the pirates, agreeably to information which Doria had received, were abſent, and ſuch of them as had been left behind, were unprepared for their defence: but, unfortunately, one

of

Book I. 1602. of the capital ſhips had been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, on which account the debarkation was delayed till next day; and in the intervening night a dreadful ſtorm aroſe, which not only rendered all attempts to land impracticable, but obliged the fleet to leave the coaſt and return to Sicily (*d*).

Invaſion of Ireland. THE court of Spain was not diſcouraged by the failure of their attempt againſt Algiers, from engaging in another enterprize, which was ſtill more difficult to be carried into execution. The war with England had not for ſeveral years been vigorouſly proſecuted by either of the two contending powers; and no event had happened which deſerves to be recorded: but Philip, or more properly the duke of Lerma, had, about this time, conceived the hopes of being able to give a mortal wound to the power of Elizabeth, by an invaſion of Ireland, where a great number of the natives were in open rebellion againſt her, under the earl of Tyrone.

PHILIP the Second, by various intrigues carried on by eccleſiaſtics, had fomented the diſcontents of the Iriſh, and on different occaſions had ſent them ſupplies of arms and military ſtores. Many of them had been engaged, by the kind treatment which he ordered to be given them, to enter into his ſervice in the Netherlands: and of theſe, many having returned to their native country, had, through the knowledge which they had acquired, in ſome meaſure contributed to teach their countrymen the rules of military diſcipline, thereby rendering them a much more formidable enemy than they had hitherto been to the Engliſh troops.

TYRONE

(*d*) Thuanus, lib. cxxvi. Piaſecii Chronica, an. 1601.

TYRONE, whoſe affections Elizabeth had in vain endeavoured to conciliate, though noted for his treachery and cruelty, vices which generally attend on barbarous manners, yet, being brave and active, had perſuaded many of his countrymen to enliſt themſelves under his banners, by flatteringly inſpiring them with the hopes of deliverance from the Engliſh yoke. He had applied for aſſiſtance to the court of Spain, and being ſeconded in his application by ſeveral ſeminaries of Engliſh prieſts and Jeſuits, ſolicitors the moſt likely to ſucceed with Philip and his miniſter, he had obtained a promiſe both of arms and troops.

A BULL of excommunication having been publiſhed by three ſucceeding popes (*e*) againſt Elizabeth, abſolving her ſubjects from their allegiance, and inviting all catholic princes to take poſſeſſion of her dominions, the ſuperſtitious mind of Philip was eaſily impreſſed with a perſuaſion that, by ſupporting the rebels, and aboliſhing Elizabeth's authority in Ireland, he would act the meritorious part of a faithful ſon of the church, and ſerve the cauſe of God and of the catholic religion. And, although he had too much indolence to be capable of being principally actuated by ambition, yet he could not but deſire to add Ireland to his dominions, as, beſides the great extent and fertility of that iſland, its commodious harbours would occaſionally afford a retreat and ſhelter to his ſhips, and better enable him to diſpute the empire of the ſea with England and the United Provinces.

DETERMINED by theſe conſiderations, he gave orders for the equipment of a fleet of tranſports and ſhips of war, ſufficient for carrying ſix thouſand

(*e*) Pius V. Gregory XIII. Clement VIII. the preſent pope.

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ſand troops; and ſo confident was he and his miniſter of the ſucceſs of their intended enterprize, that, beſides the troops, a great number of families, including women and children, were put on board, with the deſign of eſtabliſhing a Spaniſh colony in the kingdom which they expected to ſubdue. They had lent too eaſy faith to the exaggerated accounts which Tyrone had given them of his ſtrength: and they were not ſufficiently acquainted with the character and abilities of lord Mountjoy, whom Elizabeth had appointed viceroy and commander in chief of the Engliſh forces.

THE command of the Spaniſh troops, and the conduct of the expedition, were committed to Don John D'Aguilar, who had learnt the rudiments of war under the duke of Alva, and had afterwards acquired ſome military reputation from a ſucceſsful enterprize, in which he had the chief command, againſt the town of Blavet in Bretagne.

HE ſet ſail from Spain in the end of Auguſt, accompanied by ſome ſhips of war, under Don John Guevara, and arrived at Kinſale, in the ſouth of Ireland, on the 8th of October: but a part of his tranſports having been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, he found, on his arrival at Kinſale, that he could muſter only four thouſand men. With this little army, he applied himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the place, reſolving to remain there, till he ſhould be joined by Tyrone, or till the reſt of his forces ſhould arrive. The ſhips of war under Guevara returned immediately after the troops were landed; and, ſoon after, the harbour of Kinſale was blocked up by a ſquadron of Engliſh men of war, commanded by ſir Richard Leviſon. Agreeably to his inſtructions

inſtructions from the court of Spain, D'Aguilar diſperſed a manifeſto over the adjacent country, in which he aſſumed the title of general in the holy war, undertaken for the preſervation of the catholic faith in Ireland; and whilſt he invited people to come into his aſſiſtance, he declared, that he was ſent by his maſter the king of Spain, with no other intention but to deliver them from the dominion of the devil and the heretical queen of England.

THE Iriſh had formerly, on different occaſions, received the juſteſt grounds of complaint againſt the Engliſh government; and at this time they were highly incenſed on account of the introduction of what the Engliſh, with good reaſon, regard as one of their moſt valuable privileges, the inſtitution of trials by jury; they were therefore generally animated with a ſpirit of diſcontent againſt their ancient maſters. The greater part of them were likewiſe ſtrongly attached to the popiſh faith; and their prieſts, who were wholly in the intereſt of Spain, poſſeſſed an entire aſcendant over them, having perſuaded them that their anceſtors had originally ſprung from Spain, had thereby created in their minds a ſtrong predilection in favour of the Spaniards.

THEY were diſcouraged, however, from complying with D'Aguilar's invitation to have recourſe to arms, by conſidering the ſmall number of troops which he had brought to their aſſiſtance; and they reſolved to remain quiet till the arrival of the reſt, which he had aſſured them would quickly follow.

THE viceroy was, at this time, engaged in the proſecution of the war againſt Tyrone, in the northern parts of the iſland. His arms had been

Book I. 1602. attended with great ſucceſs; he had defeated ſeveral parties of the rebels, and had made priſoners of many of their leaders, ſome of whom he had ſent to England. Tyrone himſelf, with his adherents, had fled before him, and taken ſhelter in thoſe faſtneſſes in the northern Provinces, where the marſhy ground rendered it difficult for the Engliſh general to advance. Here, however, the rebel chief was in a manner beſieged, and as the country was but little cultivated, he muſt ere long have been obliged, through the want of ſubſiſtence, to ſubmit to the conqueror. In this critical ſituation were the affairs of the inſurgents when the Spaniſh troops arrived. Upon receiving information of their arrival, the viceroy, juſtly dreading that the inſurrection would ſoon become more general, reſolved, without delay, to exert his utmoſt vigour againſt the invaders. With this intention, having left a part of his cavalry to watch the motions of Tyrone, he ſet out for Kinſale, and having marched with great rapidity, he ſoon arrived before the place, and began the ſiege with between eight and nine thouſand men. But before he had time to make any conſiderable progreſs, he received notice that the Spaniſh tranſports above mentioned, which had been ſeparated from the reſt of the fleet, had arrived at Baltimore, with two thouſand ſoldiers on board, under the command of an officer named Ocampo; and ſoon after he was informed, that the froſt having ſet in with great violence in the marſhy country where he had left Tyrone, that leader and his followers had made their eſcape over the ice, had joined Ocampo with upwards of four thouſand men, who together with the Spaniards, were on their march to raiſe the ſiege of Kinſale. This alarming intelligence he procured by intercepted letters from Ocampo and Tyrone to Aguilar; and from theſe letters too he underſtood their plan of opera-

operations, the time of their approach, and the route which they intended to purſue. He therefore prepared himſelf for his defence; and, having drawn off the greater part of his army to an advantageous ſituation, at ſome diſtance from the town, he left no more forces than were ſufficient to reſtrain the eruption of the Spaniards under Aguilar. BOOK I. 1602.

WHEN Tyrone ſaw the Engliſh army ſo advantageouſly poſted, and prepared for his attack, his courage failed; and notwithſtanding the remonſtrances of Ocampo, who reproached him with cowardice, he gave orders to his men to change the direction of their march, hoping to reach a march which lay near, and thus to avoid the neceſſity of fighting. But the viceroy, perceiving his intention, haſtened forward with all his forces, and attacked him in the rear. Finding then that an engagement was unavoidable, he reſumed his courage, and faced about to the enemy. But the rebels were no match in the open field for the Engliſh forces. They were quickly thrown into confuſion, and put to flight. The Spaniards, who fought deſperately for ſome time, being forſaken by their daſtardly aſſociates, were overpowered by numbers, and Ocampo himſelf with ſeveral officers, made priſoners. In this battle, above twelve hundred men were killed upon the ſpot, a great proportion of whom were Spaniards. The reſt of that nation fled to Baltimore and other places on the coaſt, in which they had left garriſons. Such of the Iriſh as were taken, were hanged as rebels; the greater part of them, among whom was Tyrone, eſcaped through their knowledge of the country; but were totally diſperſed.

IT was eaſy for D'Aguilar, when he received intelligence of this defeat, and the cowardly behaviour of the Iriſh, to perceive how much the

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court of Spain had been miſtaken in their judgment of the facility of eſtabliſhing their authority in Ireland. There could be no ſecure dependence, he ſaw, on aſſiſtance from the natives; and no army, which in the preſent ſtate of the finances could be ſent from Spain, could be able to contend alone with the Engliſh forces. He reſolved, therefore, to employ all his influence to diſſuade the king from perſiſting in ſo deſperate an attempt: and, being at the ſame time conſcious, that with ſo ſmall a number of troops as were under his command in Kinſale, he could not juſtly expect to be able, above a few weeks, to defend the town againſt a general of ſo much ſkill and vigour as the viceroy, he reſolved to ſave the lives of his ſoldiers, and to deliver the place into the hands of the Engliſh, provided he could obtain from them ſuch terms as his honour would permit him to accept.

In a few days after the battle, he gave the viceroy notice of his intention, and explained to him the motives of his conduct, and the ſentiments which he had come to entertain of the Iriſh rebels, and of the folly of the enterprize, into which the court of Spain, through miſinformation, had been betrayed.

But he accompanied his offer with a declaration expreſſed in the ſtrongeſt terms, that, in caſe the viceroy ſhould refuſe to grant him the conditions which he required, the honours of war to his troops, with a promiſe of tranſporting them and their cannon and ammunition to Spain, in Engliſh ſhips; and an act of indemnity to the inhabitants of Kinſale, by whom he had been ſo kindly received and entertained, he and his ſoldiers were unalterably determined to defend the town to the laſt extremity.

Lord Mountjoy could not but reſpect the ſpirit by which this declaration was dictated. He was

was prompted by the native generoſity of his diſpoſition to comply with the terms propoſed, and he thought himſelf juſtifiable in point of prudence for complying with them, when he conſidered how much his army was likely to ſuffer in the operations of a ſiege, carried on in the middle of winter, againſt ſo brave and ſo determined an enemy.

WITHOUT heſitation, therefore, he agreed to D'Aguilar's demands. Kinſale, Baltimore, and ſome other forts, in the poſſeſſion of the Spaniards, were delivered into the hands of the viceroy; and D'Aguilar with his troops, cannon, and ammunition, were ſoon after tranſported to Spain in an Engliſh fleet.

PHILIP, after hearing of the iſſue of the battle, having deſpaired of their preſervation, greatly rejoiced at their arrival. He highly approved of the capitulation, and, with the advice of his counſellors, reſolved, in conſequence of the information which he received from D'Aguilar, to abandon the Iriſh rebels to their fate; and henceforth to apply himſelf with more undivided attention to his affairs in the Netherlands (*f*).

(*f*) Van Meteran, lib. xxiii. Carte's Hiſt. of England, book xix. Thuanus, &c.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE THIRD,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK II.

THE archduke, after the repulſe of his army, as above related, by the garriſon of Oſtend, was adviſed by ſome of his principal officers to raiſe the ſiege. He was himſelf extremely reluctant to comply with this advice, but thought it neceſſary, before rejecting it, to know the ſentiments of the court of Spain. Philip's miniſters could judge of the propriety of his perſiſting in his enterprize, only by the information which he tranſmitted to them; and there is ground to believe that, having conceived an opinion that it would be inconſiſtent with his honour to relinquiſh it, his repreſentation was calculated to make them think too lightly of the obſtacles which it was neceſſary to ſurmount, and too highly of the importance of the place. They believed it to be impoſſible for the garriſon to defend it much longer againſt ſo great a force, and they imagined that by the reduction of it they might ruin the trade of the United Provinces, and thus inſure ſucceſs in the future operations of the war. It was therefore determined that the archduke ſhould continue the ſiege, and that

Book II. 1602. that no aſſiſtance ſhould be with-held which could enable him to bring it to the deſired concluſion.

Siege of Oſtend continued.

THEIR aſſiſtance on the preſent occaſion was the more neceſſary, as his own finances were almoſt entirely exhauſted, and he had little proſpect of receiving any conſiderable ſupport from the aſſembly of the ſtates. He convened this aſſembly however, and urged them, on account of the neceſſity of his affairs, to grant him an immediate ſupply. The deputies were liberal in their profeſſions of loyalty; but, in return to his application, they repreſented that, in their preſent circumſtances, it was impoſſible for them to comply with his requeſt, as the province of Brabant had, almoſt every ſeaſon, been obliged to pay the moſt exorbitant contributions to the enemy, and not only that province but ſeveral others had long been cruelly robbed and plundered by the mutineers.

CONSCIOUS of the truth of this repreſentation, he could not perſiſt in his demand, but was obliged to reſt ſatisfied with what he received from the ſtates of Flanders, who, being more deeply intereſted than the reſt in the conqueſt of Oſtend, contributed to the utmoſt of their power to aſſiſt him in carrying on the ſiege.

HAVING, ſince the failure of his late attempt, deſpaired of being able to reduce the garriſon by ſtorm, his principal object now was to intercept the communication with the United Provinces, by blocking up the entrance of the canal. For this purpoſe he brought engineers from Italy and other places, and, by their direction, various works were undertaken at an immenſe expence. But at the mouth of the canal their labour was rendered fruitleſs by the fury of the waves; and when

when they attempted to raiſe a dyke and batteries on the banks of the canal, ſome nearer to the town, they were not only expoſed to the enemy's artillery, but were often interrupted by the garriſon, who on different occaſions ſallied out upon them, deſtroyed their works, and put great numbers to the ſword. In order to avoid the farther repetition of theſe diſaſters, they began at a diſtance from the canal, and out of the reach of the beſieged, to conſtruct huge machines, formed of beams ſtrongly bound together, which, when finiſhed, they intended to puſh forward to the banks of the canal, and on theſe, after covering them with turf, ſtraw, and other materials, to erect their batteries. But the finiſhing of this, and other works which they attempted, required a conſiderable length of time; a great part of the preſent year was ſpent in preparing them, all the other operations of the ſiege were thus relaxed. In the mean time abundant ſupplies of ſtores and proviſions were introduced into the town. The garriſon, many of whom were ſickly and wounded, was entirely changed. By the new garriſon, conſiſting of ſelect troops, partly Britiſh and partly French and Dutch, all the damage which the fortifications had ſuſtained were repaired; and ſo little dread was entertained of the ſucceſs of the beſiegers, that general Vere, with the conſent of the ſtates, went over to England, devolving the command, during his abſence, upon the ſieur Frederick de Dorp.

THE defence of Oſtend had coſt the United Provinces about a hundred thouſand florins each month, beſides the pay of between ſix and eight thouſand troops; yet, from the great increaſe of their commerce, joined to the frugality of their manners, they were not only able to bear the burthen of this expence, but to maintain a conſiderable

Book II. 1602. ſiderable fleet, and at the ſame time to make ſo great an augmentation of their land forces, that prince Maurice began his operations this campaign with twenty-four thouſand foot and ſix thouſand horſe, a more powerful army than any former one which he had commanded ſince the commencement of the war.

The United States aſſiſted by Henry IV. of France, and the queen of England.

In raiſing this army they were ſecretly favoured by Henry IV. who permitted the ſieur de Bethune, of the houſe of Melun, to levy troops for them in France; and in Germany, where they were befriended by ſome princes of the Proteſtant religion, they raiſed a body of two thouſand four hundred horſe. But their moſt uſeful ally was the queen of England, who furniſhed them with three thouſand men to fill up the vacancies in the Engliſh regiments already in their ſervice, and ſoon after ſent them three thouſand more. The obtaining of this reinforcement had been Sir F. Vere's principal object in going over to England, and he now returned from thence, and was appointed to the command of all the Engliſh forces.

The Spaniſh army, on the other hand, had not for many years been ſo much reduced in number as at the preſent period. Many had been killed, or had died of a peſtilential diſeaſe, and of the hardſhips which they had undergone before Oſtend; and the Italian and Spaniſh mutineers amounted to a conſiderable number; notwithſtanding which, the court of Spain and the archduke were as obſtinately as ever reſolved to proſecute the ſiege. The United States rejoiced at their obſtinacy, and hoped it might ere long prove fatal to their power in the Netherlands. They conſidered the preſent juncture as the moſt favourable for action which could occur, and therefore had reſolved ſtrenuouſly to exert themſelves in

in attempting to make ſome important conqueſt in the ſouthern provinces, which, in caſe the garriſon of Oſtend ſhould be obliged to capitulate, might fully compenſate for the loſs. 1602.

They had conceived an expectation at this time that the people in the ſouthern provinces, who had lately ſuffered great oppreſſion from the rapacity of the mutineers, might be induced to ſhake off the Spaniſh yoke; and in this expectation they publiſhed a memorial addreſſed to the ſtates of theſe provinces, enumerating the grievances which they muſt be conſcious of having ſo long ſuffered; repreſenting how much they had been abuſed in the late king's transference of the ſovereignty over them to the archdukes, notwithſtanding which they were ſtill as much as ever ſubject to the tyranny of Spain; and calling upon them, in remembrance of their firſt engagements, to return into their former connection and alliance with their kinſmen in the United Provinces. In order to procure attention to this memorial, they reſolved that their army ſhould march into the heart of Brabant, to be ready to afford ſupport to ſuch of the inhabitants as ſhould be willing to vindicate their liberty; and this meaſure, it is ſaid, received the approbation both of the French monarch and the queen of England.

But prince Maurice could not be ſatisfied that it was either expedient or practicable. The people, he thought, were too much inured to the Spaniſh government, and too much overawed by citadels and garriſons, to liſten to the invitation of the ſtates; and he dreaded the difficulty of being able to ſupport ſo numerous an army in an enemy's country for ſo long a time as would be neceſſary for the end in view. The Spaniſh army, indeed, could not at preſent contend with him

BOOK II. 1602.

him in the open field; but they could harraſs him in his march, and intercept his convoys of proviſions; beſides, that the archduke was in daily expectation of receiving a reinforcement of troops from Spain and Italy (*a*).

MOVED by theſe conſiderations, the ſtates conſented that, till it ſhould appear whether their memorial was likely to produce the deſired effect, he ſhould lead his army along the eaſt ſide of Brabant; that, by keeping it near the Maeſe, he might more eaſily receive ſupplies from the neutral powers in that neighbourhood. Having aſſembled his army at Nimeguen, he paſſed the Maeſe near Marck, and towards the end of June he had advanced as far as Maſtryc, when he was obliged to ſtop for ſeveral days, through an unjuſtifiable action of his Engliſh troops, who having on their march ſold a great part of the bread with which he had furniſhed them, could not procure any in the country where they now were, and were obliged to bring it from a conſiderable diſtance. This delay was, in the iſſue, attended with important conſequences.

THE archduke, having heard with much anxiety that Maurice had begun his march, had diſpatched Mendoza, admiral of Arragon, who had lately been ſet at liberty, with ſix thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, to watch his motions, and, if poſſible, to obſtruct his progreſs. Mendoza was come as far as Tienen, a fortified town in the center of Brabant, and was there employed in caſting up entrenchments to ſecure his troops. Could prince Maurice have immediately advanced, he might have attacked him with the higheſt probability

(*a*) Siri ſays that Maurice intended marching through Brabant to lay ſiege to Nieuport, or ſome other ſea-coaſt town. Vide vol. i. p. 126. Mem. recondite.

bability of ſucceſs. But through the delay occaſioned by the improvident conduct of the Engliſh troops, Mendoza had not only full leiſure to complete his intrenchments, but received a reinforcement of eight thouſand men, under the marquis of Spinola, who at this time arrived from Italy, and, if the prince could have haſtened forward, might eaſily have been intercepted before he reached the Spaniſh camp. Maurice ſtill however continued to advance, till he arrived within a little diſtance of the enemy, and once and again offered battle; but, finding that Mendoza was unalterably reſolved to decline it, and was now too ſtrong to be compelled, and conſidering how dangerous it muſt be, in the face of ſo great a force, to remain much longer in a country where it was ſo difficult to procure proviſions, he returned haſtily towards the Maeſe; and, about the middle of July, began to put in execution the only part of the general plan of his operations which he himſelf had judged practicable, by laying ſiege to the town of Grave.

Siege of Grave.

THIS place, one of the ſtrongeſt in the Netherlands, and deemed of great importance, on account of its ſituation on the banks of the Maeſe, and its neighbourhood to the dominions of the ſtates, had remained in the hands of the Spaniards, ſince the year 1586, when, as above related, the young baron de Harmont, involved himſelf in ruin and infamy, by ſurrendering it, without neceſſity, to the duke of Parma. It was defended, at this time, by Antonio Gonſalez, a Spaniſh officer of diſtinguiſhed merit; and, as the archduke had before-hand dreaded the danger which impended over this important place, he had ſent a body of ſelect troops to reinforce the garriſon, which, after their arrival, amounted to fifteen hundred men. From ſuch a governor and garriſon

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ſon Prince Maurice expected to meet with the moſt vigorous reſiſtance; and he could not doubt that Mendoza would quickly follow him, and attempt to compel him to raiſe the ſiege. But he did not deſpair of bringing his enterprize to a happy iſſue before the approach of winter, provided he could prevent the entrance into the town of any farther reinforcement and ſupply. With this view, he drew lines of circumvallation round his camp, extending from that part of the river which is above the town to that other part of it which is below. Theſe lines were more than half a German league in length, of an extraordinary height and depth, and ſtrengthened by a great number of redoubts planted with cannon. While this laborious work was going on, he reduced a fort belonging to the garriſon, on the other ſide of the river, directly oppoſite to the town, and having ſtationed a part of his troops there, he next threw two temporary bridges over the Maeſe, one above, and the other below the town. When theſe works were finiſhed, the town was completely inveſted on every ſide, and the garriſon muſt, ere long, have found it neceſſary to capitulate: but, as he knew not what quantity of ſtores they poſſeſſed, and conſequently was ignorant how long they might be able to ſuſtain the blockade, he reſolved, in order to ſave time, to carry on the ſiege in the uſual form, and immediately began by opening trenches in different quarters, to make regular approaches to the town.

A COTEMPORARY hiſtorian (*b*), who upon the ſpot examined the various works which prince Maurice executed on this occaſion, ſpeaks of them as the moſt maſterly which had ever been exhibited in any ſiege. In order the more effectually

(*b*) Van Meteren.

tually to ſave his men from the enemy's fire, the trenches were made of a greater depth than uſual; both the workmen and ſoldiers were, at every approach, ſecured againſt the ſallies of the garriſon, by mounds and batteries; and when the trenches were advanced within a certain diſtance of the fortifications, ſpacious covered ways, of ſufficient breadth to admit of carriages, were formed, which led from the trenches to the ditch. The garriſon made frequent ſallies, in which they diſplayed the moſt unqueſtionable bravery; but, through the precautions mentioned, they were as often repulſed with loſs, while few of the beſiegers were killed either in theſe ſallies, or by the artillery of the place.

MENDOZA had, in the mean time, advanced from Tienen as far as Venlo, which ſtands on the banks of the Maeſe, about twelve German miles higher than Grave, and there deliberated with his council of war, whether it was practicable to compel prince Maurice to raiſe the ſiege. But he quickly perceived how vain and ruinous it muſt prove to attack a numerous enemy in ſuch ſtrong entrenchments, for whom he was not an equal match in the open field; and therefore he reſolved to reſt ſatisfied with introducing a reinforcement of ſelect troops into the place. Had this meaſure been attended with ſucceſs, it muſt have rather ſerved to haſten than to retard the ſurrender, as the ſtock of proviſions in the town muſt thereby have been ſooner conſumed. It was adopted, however, by Mendoza, who was probably more influenced by the dread of the reproach which he would incur, if he made no attempt, than by the proſpect of any advantage that could accrue from it.

THE execution of this enterprize was committed to an Italian general of the name of Spina; who

Book II. 1602. who was ordered, with a thouſand choſen troops, to attack the enemy's entrenchments in the night, at a place where they appeared to be the weakeſt, and to attempt to force his way acroſs their camp into the town.

ANOTHER party, equal in number, was appointed to ſupport him, and, in caſe of a repulſe, to ſecure his retreat; while a third detachment was ſent to make a feigned attack in another quarter, in the hopes of dividing the attention of the beſiegers, and thereby rendering it eaſier for Spina to execute his deſign. But prince Maurice was every where upon his guard. The Spaniards were repulſed; and, leaving behind them their carriages, with their ſcaling ladders, and other apparatus, they fled precipitately to their camp.

Sept. 20. MENDOZA, now deſpairing of ſucceſs, retired with his whole army towards Maeſtricht; and, a few days after, the garriſon capitulated upon honourable terms (*c*).

Naval affairs. DURING the courſe of theſe tranſactions the contending parties exerted themſelves at ſea, with ſomewhat greater vigour, than for ſeveral years preceding. The court of Spain had, before the preſent period, ſent a ſquadron of gallies to cruize on the coaſt of Flanders, under the command of Frederick Spinola, a Genoeſe nobleman, who had ſerved under the duke of Parma, and given ſome diſtinguiſhed proofs of vigour and abilities. From this ſquadron the Dutch trade had ſuſtained conſiderable prejudice: and Spinola, encouraged by his ſucceſs, having gone himſelf to Madrid to ſolicit an augmentation of his fleet, had obtained ſix gallies more, which he had conducted in ſafety

(*c*) Van Metern, l. xxiv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Grotius, lib. undecimo. Heroic Acts of Prince Maurice, &c.

ty into the harbour of Sluys. This harbour afforded him the moſt commodious ſhelter and retreat. His gallies lying at anchor in the canal which leads to it, iſſued forth againſt the enemy when they were leaſt prepared to oppoſe them, and either took or ſunk a great number of their trading veſſels. With a more numerous ſquadron, and a greater number of ſoldiers on board, he would have ventured to a greater diſtance from the coaſt, and thus have in ſome meaſure intercepted the communication of Oſtend with Holland and Zealand. He could likewiſe have ſometimes ventured to make a deſcent upon their coaſts; or have entered their harbours and canals; and ſeized or burnt their ſhipping.

IMPRESSED with a conviction that from ſuch ſpirited naval enterprizes the enemy muſt ſuffer more eſſentially than from the ſiege of their towns, or the operations of the Spaniſh army in the field, he this year made a ſecond journey into Spain, after having communicated his intention to his elder brother Ambroſe, the celebrated marquis of Spinola. This nobleman, ſo juſtly renowned on account of the military talents which he afterwards diſplayed, had not yet entered into public life, though he was at this time about thirty years of age. But his ambition was now roufed by his brother's ſucceſs, and being conſcious of great abilities, he reſolved henceforth to avail himſelf of his fortune, which was one of the greateſt in Genoa, in order to render himſelf illuſtrious.

HAVING, from the information communicated to him by his brother, conceived an opinion that the war in the Netherlands might be ſucceſsfully carried on at ſea, he empowered his brother to propoſe to the court of Spain that, in caſe they would grant an augmentation of the number of

Book II. 1602. their gallies at Sluys, he would raiſe at his own expence a body of eight thouſand troops, to be commanded by himſelf, and to ſerve occaſionally on board his brother's fleet.

The Spaniſh miniſter readily conſented to this propoſal, and gave the marquis a commiſſion for levying the troops, while orders were at the ſame time iſſued for the equipment of the gallies. The marquis, with the aſſiſtance of his numerous friends, and of the count de Fuentes, governor of Milan, punctually fulfilled his part of the agreement, and, as above related, arrived with his troops in the Netherlands at a fortunate juncture, when, without his aid, the admiral of Arragon muſt have abandoned the province of Brabant to the army of the United Provinces.

His brother was not ſo fortunate in conducting from Spain the gallies with which the king had furniſhed him. They were eight in number, with above a thouſand ſoldiers on board, and fifteen hundred ſlaves, who ſerved as rowers. But two of theſe gallies were, before their departure, burnt by ſome Engliſh ſhips of war on the coaſt of Portugal; and other three, having been intercepted by an Engliſh and Dutch ſquadron, which lay in wait for them in the narrow ſeas, and either taken or deſtroyed, Frederick arrived in Flanders only with the remaining three.

He was deeply affected by this diſaſter. His force, which he had been at ſo great pains in ſoliciting, was ſtill too ſmall for carrying the deſigns which he had formed into execution, and for ſeveral months he could not engage in any memorable enterprize. But, having become impatient under this inactivity which neceſſity impoſed on him, he ventured with eight gallies, having a great number of ſoldiers

ſoldiers on board, and ſome frigates, to attack a ſquadron of Dutch ſhips of war, which had for ſome time been ſtationed on the coaſt. The conteſt was bloody and obſtinate on both ſides; but as the Dutch were favoured by the wind, and could navigate their ſhips with greater dexterity, they were enabled to avoid grappling with the Spaniards, and had thus a much ſmaller number killed. At length Frederick himſelf received a mortal wound, of which he died ſoon after, and his fleet, diſheartened by this calamity, and perceiving that their utmoſt efforts to come to cloſe fight were ineffectual, retired into the canal of Sluys (*d*). Book II. 1602. May, 1603.

THE marquis of Spinola was at this time employed in raiſing troops in Italy, and ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to carry his firſt deſign into execution; but his brother's death, joined to the weakneſs of the Spaniſh fleet at Sluys, obliging him to abandon it, he now reſolved to turn his attention from the ſea to the land ſervice, and with this intention he returned to the Netherlands, where the archduke was diſpoſed to give him every mark of eſteem and confidence.

THIS prince had never before ſtood ſo much in need of the counſel and aſſiſtance of his friends. The promiſes of money made him by the court of Spain had been only in part fulfilled, and the mutinous ſpirit of his troops, occaſioned by his inability to pay their arrears, had riſen to the greateſt height.

THEY had no ſooner retreated after their repulſe in attempting to raiſe the ſiege of Grave, than almoſt all the Italians, except thoſe who were commanded by the marquis of Spinola, refuſed to obey the order which the admiral of Arragon had Mutiny and deſertion.

(*d*) Meteren, Bentivoglio, &c.

BOOK II. 1603.

had iſſued for their marching towards Maeſtricht, and withdrew themſelves in a body from the camp. They were accompanied by ſeveral officers of experience and abilities, and by theſe men were conducted towards Hochſtrate, a fortified town in Brabant, of which, as they came upon the garriſon by ſurpriſe, they eaſily acquired poſſeſſion. Their number having been augmented by other mutineers, who flocked to them from every quarter, ſoon amounted to three thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, and almoſt the whole of them were veteran ſoldiers, diſtinguiſhed for their knowledge of military diſcipline. Having choſen an elect, or leader, and filled up from among themſelves the places of all ſuch officers as had not joined in the mutiny, they eſtabliſhed, with general conſent, a ſyſtem of regulations which they judged neceſſary for their ſafety and preſervation, after which they applied themſelves to ſtrengthen the fortifications of the town, and then ſent out parties to lay the inhabitants of the adjacent country under contributions. Emboldened by their numbers, they made incurſions into the interior and more diſtant parts of the province, and when the people refuſed to comply with their exorbitant demands, they laid waſte the country, and indulged themſelves in every ſpecies of injury and outrage. This populous and fertile province had long been expoſed to the inroads of the troops of the United States; but they had never been treated with ſo great cruelty by the enemy as on this occaſion, by the troops which had been hired for their defence.

THE archduke having convened the ſtates to deliberate concerning a proper remedy for theſe diſorders, he was urged by that aſſembly to employ whatever money could be raiſed to give the ſoldiers immediate ſatisfaction with regard to their arrears,

arrears, becauſe without this they repreſented the country muſt be involved in utter ruin.

BUT Albert, conſcious that he had not funds ſufficient at once to ſatisfy the mutineers, and to pay the arrears due to his other troops; and judging, from paſt experience, that unleſs he could ſatisfy them all, the example of thoſe who had mutinied would be quickly followed by their companions, for this reaſon he entertained ſome doubt of the prudence of the advice which the ſtates had given him, and declined complying with it, till he ſhould know the ſentiments of the court of Spain.

Miſconduct of the Spaniſh court.

THAT court ought to have been ſenſible of the folly of expecting that diſcipline could be maintained among troops, eſpecially foreign troops, unintereſted in the iſſue of the war, when their pay was withheld from them. They ought, long before this time, to have perceived the abſurdity of keeping an army on foot, which they were unable to ſupport. They ought, on the preſent occaſion, to have reſolved to reduce the number of their troops, and to reſt ſatisfied with a defenſive war, or, by greater œconomy at home, to enable themſelves to make more liberal remittances to the archduke, or to have put an end to the war, by empowering him to grant to the United States ſuch terms of peace as they were willing to accept. But, inſtead of adopting any of theſe meaſures, which prudence and neceſſity required, they reſolved that, for an example to the reſt of the army, the mutineers ought to be reduced to obedience by force, and for this end they gave orders for levying ſeveral new regiments with the utmoſt poſſible expedition. It does not appear that the archduke was diſſatisfied with this reſolution of the Spaniſh council, and he inſtantly

BOOK II. 1603. inſtantly applied himſelf to carry it into execution. More than half a year was ſpent in raiſing the troops, and making the other neceſſary preparations; and during all that time, the people of Brabant were expoſed to the violence and depredations of the mutineers. In order to intimidate them Albert publiſhed an edict of proſcription, in which he declared, if they did not return to their duty in three days after receiving the copy of the edict which he ſent them, they ſhould be conſidered as rebels to his government, and be all put to the ſword without mercy. To this edict the mutineers publiſhed an anſwer, expreſſed in the moſt contemptuous terms. They were more than ever exaſperated, and they reſolved that, rather than ſubmit to a prince, by whom they thought their ſervices were ſo ungratefully requited, they would enter into the ſervice of the United States, and make him feel the weight of their reſentment.

January 2. AGREEABLY to this reſolution they ſent a deputation of their number to prince Maurice, to enquire whether, in caſe they were attacked by the archduke's forces, he would afford them his protection. Maurice, conformably to his conduct on a former occaſion, gave them the moſt gracious reception, and agreed that, in caſe they ſhould be obliged to abandon Hochſtrate, they might retire with ſafety under the walls of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, or Swenberg. He likewiſe permitted them to purchaſe proviſions in theſe towns, and left them ground to hope that, if Albert ſhould not be induced to treat them with greater lenity, he would exert himſelf to the utmoſt in their behalf.

Spaniſh mutineers protected by Maurice

THE United States conſidered this mutiny as the moſt fortunate event that could have happened, becauſe it would greatly retard the archduke's operations

operations in the ſiege of Oſtend, and prevent him from engaging in any new enterprize during the preſent campaign. They highly approved therefore of the prince's conduct with regard to the mutineers, and empowered him to enter into a formal treaty with them, of which the following were the principal conditions; that, in return for his aſſiſtance againſt the Spaniards, they would ſerve in his army for the reſt of the campaign; and farther, that in the caſe of an accommodation with the archduke, they would not carry arms for four months againſt the United Provinces. The ſtates believed that this treaty could not expoſe them to the imputation of acting ungenerouſly towards an enemy, whoſe whole conduct in the war they regarded as tyrannical and unjuſt; and they thought themſelves juſtified for fomenting the mutiny, by the practice of moſt nations, and particularly of the Spaniards themſelves, who on all occaſions encouraged deſertion from the armies of their enemy. BOOK II. 1603.

THE archduke was greatly alarmed when he received intelligence of this tranſaction, and, being at the ſame time more than ever incenſed againſt the mutineers, he collected his troops with the greateſt expedition which the ſtate of his affairs would permit, and ſent them, under the command of Frederick, count of Berg, to lay ſiege to Hochſtrate. Theſe troops amounted to ſeven thouſand foot, and three thouſand horſe; and, as Hochſtrate was but indifferently fortified, he muſt have ſoon compelled the mutineers to lay down their arms; but prince Maurice, already prepared to fulfill his agreement with the mutineers, advanced towards him with a ſuperior army, which he had aſſembled at Gertrudenberg, July 10. and before the count had time to make any progreſs

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greſs in the ſiege, obliged him to retire into the interior parts of the province.

MAURICE followed him for ſome time, but finding it impoſſible to overtake him, without entering too far into the enemy's country, he ſuddenly returned and laid ſiege to Bois le Duc. He had lately given the mutineers a proof of the truſt which he repoſed in them, by entering their camp with only ſeven or eight of his attendants; and, on the preſent occaſion, he gave them a farther proof of confidence, by employing them equally with his own troops in the operations of the ſiege.

Bois le Duc beſieged by prince Maurice.

THE archduke, extremely anxious for the preſervation of Bois le Duc, which he conſidered as one of the moſt important frontier towns, ſent a reinforcement of troops to the count of Berg, and ordered him to march without delay to its relief. The count's army was now nearly equal to that of the enemy, and he arrived in time to ſeize an important ſtation adjacent to the town, which prince Maurice had not found leiſure to ſecure. From this ſtation he could eaſily introduce whatever reinforcements or ſupplies were neceſſary. But the inhabitants, having hitherto ſucceſsfully defended the place without the aſſiſtance of the Spaniards, were utterly averſe to the admiſſion of regular forces. The count laboured to perſuade them that their preſervation entirely depended on admitting them, but they refuſed to liſten to his requeſt; and prince Maurice ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to bring the ſiege to the deſired concluſion.

AT length the archduke, having come himſelf to Bois le Duc, endeavoured, but in vain, to overcome the obſtinacy of the citizens, till having

ing obtained their permiſſion to ſuffer a body of Walloons to paſs through the town, under the pretext of their being neceſſary to oppoſe the enemy on the other ſide, he called them together, while the Walloons were within the walls, and once more repreſented to them the neceſſity of yielding to his deſire, if they meant to preſerve their religion and their liberty. They remained ſtill as averſe as ever to his propoſal; but believing that, while ſo great a number of his troops were within the town, it would be in vain to refuſe their conſent, they agreed with much reluctance to admit a garriſon of three thouſand regular forces; and at the ſame time a large ſupply of ſtores and proviſions were introduced.

The two armies continued for ſome time longer in ſight of each other, and ſeveral ſkirmiſhes paſt between them with various ſucceſs. At length prince Maurice deſpairing, on account of the approach of winter, to bring the ſiege to the deſired iſſue, abandoned his entrenchments, and retired in good order to ſome diſtance from the town. There he remained a whole day, in expectation that the enemy might now be induced to riſk a battle; but being informed, that ſo far from intending this, they had, as ſoon as he left his entrenchments, directed their march towards the interior parts of the province, he broke up his camp, and put his troops into winter-quarters.

To the mutineers, who repreſented to him that Hochſtrate was too ſmall for their accommodation, he aſſigned the town of Gram, of which he himſelf was lord paramount, retaining the citadel in his own hands, and requiring that Hochſtrate ſhould be put into his poſſeſſion. He likewiſe entered on this occaſion into a new agreement with them; the conditions of which they

continued

Book II. 1603. continued religiouſly to fulfil till the following year, when the archduke, ſtanding much in need of their aſſiſtance, and dreading that many of his other troops were about to join them, found it neceſſary to grant them an act of indemnity for all paſt offences, together with full and immediate payment of their arrears (*e*).

Death and character of Elizabeth, queen of England.

In the courſe of the tranſactions related in this book an important event happened, in which both the contending powers were equally intereſted, the death of Elizabeth, queen of England. This great princeſs, whoſe reign was ſo long and proſperous, had through her whole life enjoyed uninterrupted health, which ſhe had been careful to preſerve by regular exerciſe, and the ſtricteſt temperance. But towards the end of the preceding year, having been ſeized with a cold, which confined her for ſeveral days, ſhe found her ſtrength conſiderably impaired; and, in the hopes of deriving benefit from a change of air, ſhe removed from Weſtminſter to Richmond; but there ſhe grew daily worſe, could neither ſleep nor eat as uſual, and though her pulſe was regular, ſhe complained of a burning heat in her ſtomach, and a perpetual thirſt. Both her looks and ſpirits had from the beginning been greatly affected; buſineſs of every kind had become an intolerable burthen to her; and at length ſhe ſunk into a deep melancholy, expreſſing the anguiſh of her mind by tears and groans, and obſtinately refuſing nouriſhment, as well as all the medicines which the phyſicians preſcribed for her recovery. This melancholy might have entirely proceeded from her bodily indiſpoſition, although, from ſome late diſcoveries, there is ground to believe that it was greatly heightened, if not principally

Hume's Hiſtory.

(*e*) Van Meteren, lib. xxv. xxvi. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Piaſecii Chronica an. 1603.

cipally occaſioned, by remorſe and grief conceived on account of her having ordered the execution of her favourite, the earl of Eſſex. But to whatever cauſe her dejection of mind was owing, it preyed upon her exhauſted frame, and in a few weeks put a period to her life, in the ſeventieth year of her age, and the forty-fifth of her reign. BOOK II. 1603.

IT is not ſurpriſing that we meet with ſuch contradictory deſcriptions of the character of this princeſs in the cotemporary hiſtorians, whoſe paſſions were too much inflamed to ſuffer them to judge impartially of her character: but it ſhould ſeem impoſſible for any perſon, who is not blinded by prejudice, to refuſe her a place among the moſt illuſtrious princes of whom we read either in ancient or in modern times.

SHE was not indeed exempt from the imperfections that are incident to humanity, and ſhe was ſubject to ſeveral of thoſe weakneſſes which characteriſe her ſex. She cannot be vindicated from the imputation of female vanity, and the love of admiration on account of her exterior accompliſhments. We ſhould have loved her more if ſhe had been more gentle and indulgent, leſs imperious and violent, or more candid and ſincere. From natural temper, her paſſions of every kind were ſtrong and vehement, and, among her courtiers, they ſometimes betrayed her into improprieties; but they were almoſt never permitted to influence her public conduct, which was uniformly regulated by the principles of prudence, and a regard for the public good; even her ambition was controuled and governed by theſe principles, of which ſhe gave a rare and ſignal proof, when ſhe refuſed to accept of the ſovereignty of the United Provinces. Her penetration and ſagacity, her prudence and foreſight, her

Book II. 1603. her intrepidity in the midſt of danger, her activity and vigour, her ſteadineſs and perſeverance, and her wiſe œconomy, which prompted her to ſave every unneceſſary expence, however ſmall, while it permitted and enabled her to undergo the greateſt, when neceſſity required; theſe qualities in her character, which are acknowledged by her enemies, as well as her admirers, no prince, of whom we read in hiſtory, appears to have poſſeſſed in a more eminent degree.

Few princes have been placed in ſo difficult circumſtances, or have had ſo many, and ſuch formidable enemies to oppoſe; yet almoſt no prince ever enjoyed a reign ſo long and proſperous. While the neighbouring nations were almoſt continually involved in the calamities of war, ſhe was able, notwithſtanding the unremitted attempts of her foreign enemies, and her popiſh ſubjects, to preſerve her dominions in almoſt uninterrupted peace. Nor did her own ſubjects only reap the fruits of her great abilities, but her friends were every where ſupported and protected by her power; while her enemies, though poſſeſſed of much greater reſources, were either checked and reſtrained, or humbled and overcome: without her judicious interpoſition, the reformation in Scotland muſt have been extinguiſhed; a race of popiſh princes muſt have inherited the crown of that kingdom; and the difference of religion there, and in England, joined to the hereditary right of the Scottiſh princes to the Engliſh throne, whilſt it muſt have proved a copious ſource of diſcord, would long have prevented the union of two nations, which muſt have often been unhappy while they remained divided, and were, by nature, deſtined to be one. Nor were the benefits which mankind derived from her wiſe and active reign confined to Britain; but it is likewiſe probable, that

that without her aid and her exertions, the proteſtants in France muſt have been extirpated; the beſt and greateſt of the French monarchs muſt have been excluded from the throne; France itſelf muſt have ſunk under the Spaniſh yoke; the republic of the United Provinces muſt have been cruſhed in its infancy; and an overgrown and enormous power eſtabliſhed, which muſt have overwhelmed the liberties of Europe, and prolonged the reign of ignorance, bigotry, and ſuperſtition. BOOK II. 1603.

HER death gave equal ſorrow to the Dutch as it afforded joy to the archdukes and the court of Spain. The former were thereby deprived of a powerful friend, who had often ſupported them in the time of their diſtreſs; whereas the latter were delivered from a determined enemy, by whom they had been long controuled in all their enterprizes.

THE affliction of the former was the more ſincere, becauſe they had ground to ſuſpect that Elizabeth's ſucceſſor had not the ſame favourable ſentiments of their cauſe, nor the ſame affection for their republic, as the queen had entertained. James, though of a gentle and indulgent temper, averſe to the exerciſe of deſpotic power, had conceived the moſt extravagant notions of the meaſure of obedience due from ſubjects to their prince; and, being naturally open and unreſerved, had, on ſome occaſions, condemned the conduct of the United States, and given them the name of rebels to their rightful ſovereign. The court of Spain, deſirous to conciliate his favour, had before the death of Elizabeth, made him an offer of their aſſiſtance to vindicate his right to the Engliſh crown, in caſe he ſhould meet with oppoſition. Intelligence of the queen's death had James I. King of England.

no

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no ſooner reached the Netherlands than the archduke, conſidering the war with England as at an end, had iſſued a proclamation, forbidding all hoſtilities againſt the ſubjects of the king of England, and ordering all the Scotch and Engliſh priſoners to be ſet at liberty (g). The like orders were iſſued by the court of Spain. And, in return to theſe advances, James, by proclamation, recalled the letters of marque which had been granted againſt the Spaniards by Elizabeth.

FROM theſe concurring circumſtances, the ſtates perceived how little ground they had to hope for the friendſhip of the Engliſh monarch. They reſolved, however, that nothing ſhould be wanting on their part, which might induce him to change his ſentiments, and, for this end, they ſent a ſolemn embaſſy, at the head of which were the celebrated Barnevelt, Lord of Tempel, and prince Henry Frederic, brother to prince Maurice, to congratulate him on his acceſſion, and to ſolicit his renewing the alliance which had ſubſiſted between them and Elizabeth.

Ambaſſadors from Holland, France, and Spain, to the king of Great Britain.

THESE ambaſſadors, on their arrival in London, found that the ſuſpicions which the ſtates had entertained of the king's prejudice againſt them, were but too well founded. James ſtill continued to employ the ſame diſreſpectful language, when he ſpoke of their republic as formerly; nor could they at firſt obtain an audience. After ſome delay, they were at length admitted into his preſence, through the perſuaſion of his Engliſh counſellors. But though Barnevelt exerted all his eloquence, which he poſſeſſed in ſo eminent a degree, to make him ſenſible of the danger to which Britain would be expoſed, if, by

(g) See Gonſalez Davila.

by with-holding his aſſiſtance, he ſhould ſuffer the United Provinces to fall back again under the dominion of Spain, he could only draw from him a general and vague reply: "That he had not, at preſent, leiſure to conſider fully of the ſubject which had been propoſed to his conſideration, and would not, therefore, now declare what reſolution he ſhould form; but he was himſelf deſirous to live at peace with them, and all his neighbours; and, in caſe they would imitate his example, he would chearfully employ his good offices to procure them peace with Spain, upon reaſonable terms." BOOK II. 1603.

IT ſufficiently appeared from this reply, that the plan of conduct which the king had formed, was extremely different from that which had been purſued by his predeceſſor; and the ambaſſadors would have immediately returned home, in deſpair of being able to intereſt him in their behalf, had not they been in daily expectation of the arrival of the French ambaſſador; through whoſe interceſſion they hoped that James might be induced to lend a more favourable ear to their requeſt.

HENRY had appointed for his ambaſſador to England, on this occaſion, the marquis of Roſni (*b*), whom, on account of his ſuperior talents and fidelity, he eſteemed the moſt of all his miniſters. No ſubject had ever performed more important ſervices to his prince; and Henry could not, without great inconvenience, ſpare a miniſter ſo neceſſary to him in the adminiſtration of his kingdom. But from various reports, which were propagated at this time, he had conceived a ſuſpicion that James might be perſuaded to enter into

(*b*) Afterwards duke of Sully.

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into an alliance with the court of Spain, and no perſon he believed was more likely to engage him to alter his intention than Roſni, whom he highly reſpected on account of his inviolable attachment to the proteſtant religion, and uſed to celebrate as the greateſt ſtateſman in Europe.

JAMES was highly pleaſed with Henry's choice of his ambaſſador, and received him with more than ordinary marks of diſtinction and regard. It had been reported to him by ſome of the partizans of Spain, that Henry, and even Roſni himſelf, had ſpoken diſreſpectfully of his character (*i*); and James ſo far deſcended from his dignity as to mention what he had heard to the marquis; but the impreſſion which it had made upon him was eaſily effaced; and Roſni, from his firſt audience, conceived the hopes of being able to accompliſh the object of his embaſſy.

A party among the Engliſh miniſters were, not without reaſon, ſuſpected to be attached to the intereſts of Spain, and others, dreading the difficulties which they muſt encounter in providing funds for carrying on the war, were averſe to all engagements either to France or the ſtates general. From theſe men, the propoſals of the French monarch met with conſiderable oppoſition. But the ambaſſador, having been admitted by the king to a private audience, and having explained to him at full length his maſter's views, which he ſhowed were all calculated to promote the general intereſt of Europe, and the ſecurity of the proteſtant religion, whereas the court of Spain were daily giving freſh proofs of the moſt inordinate and turbulent ambition; he had the addreſs to convince him, that a regard to the ſafety of his dominions,

(*i*) It was was reported to him, that Henry had called him captain of arts, and clerk of arms.

dominions, as well as the intereſt of his religion, required that he ſhould join himſelf with France, and reſolve to ſupport the United Provinces. A treaty of alliance to this purpoſe, was accordingly drawn up, and ſoon after ſigned and ratified; of which the following were the principal articles.

That the two kings ſhould mutually contribute their aſſiſtance to prevent the Dutch from being overpowered by the Spaniards; that, for this purpoſe, a ſufficient number of troops ſhould be levied within the dominions of the king of England, and ſent from thence to the Netherlands as ſoon as poſſible; that the whole expence of theſe troops ſhould be defrayed by the king of France, but that the half (*k*) of what he advanced, ſhould be deducted from the debt which he owed to Elizabeth. It was reſolved, that in order to avoid an open rupture with the court of Spain the utmoſt ſecrecy ſhould be obſerved in levying the troops, and in tranſporting them to the continent; but it was agreed, that in caſe theſe tranſactions could not be concealed, and the Spaniards, in revenge for the aſſiſtance afforded to the Dutch, ſhould attack either, or both of the contracting princes, they ſhould mutually aſſiſt each other, and furniſh ſuch a number of troops, to be employed by ſea or land, as ſhould be judged ſufficient for their mutual defence, and the preſervation of the United Provinces (*l*).

James immediately fulfilled his part of this agreement, by giving ſecret orders to the lord Buccleugh to raiſe a body of two thouſand men

(*k*) Grotius ſays two thirds.

(*l*) Sully's Memoirs, book xvi. Carte's Hiſtory of England.

BOOK II. 1603. in Scotland; who, ſome months after, were ſent over to join the army of the ſtates (*m*).

THE archdukes and the court of Spain were greatly alarmed, when they heard of the kind reception which the king had given to the French ambaſſador, and they ſuſpected that ſome treaty had been concluded between them. It does not, however, appear that they received particular intelligence of the purport of it; and they ſtill entertained the hopes of being able to fix James in their intereſt.

THE archdukes had early ſent over the count D'Aremberg, as their ambaſſador, to congratulate him on his acceſſion; and ſoon after Don John de Taxis, count of Villa Mediana, arrived in the ſame capacity from Spain. It was commonly believed that the former of theſe noblemen, who was eſteemed as a ſoldier, but was extremely ill qualified for his preſent employment, had, ſoon after his arrival in England, given his countenance to a conſpiracy, formed by the lords Grey, Cobham, Sir Walter Raleigh, and others, for ſubverting the preſent government, and raiſing Arabella Stuart to the throne. It ſhould ſeem that he had, at leaſt, lent an ear to the conſpirators, without thinking it incumbent on him to communicate their intention to the king's miniſters; and by this imprudent conduct he rendered himſelf ſo obnoxious to James, that, in his hands, no treaty of agreement with his maſter could have ſucceeded. But James was ſtill as much as ever bent on peace with Spain, nor had he meant to preclude himſelf from concluding it by

(*m*) Carte and Meteren, Vittorio Siri, tom. i. p. 248. For the preciſe ſum due to Elizabeth, vide Sully, book xxi. near the beginning.

by his treaty of alliance with the French monarch.

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Taxis left no art untried to confirm him in this pacific diſpoſition; and, at the ſame time, laboured to remove thoſe prejudices againſt the Spaniards which he had long entertained, and had been lately awakened by count D'Aremberg's concern in the conſpiracy. He was warmly ſeconded by the queen, who, being attached to the Spaniſh intereſt, had conceived the deſire of having the young prince, her ſon, married to the infanta; and, by bribes and promiſes, it was believed, he had gained over a conſiderable party of the Engliſh counſellors.

The French king and the ſtates general, thought they had much reaſon to dread the influence of ſuch powerful agents, and they employed all their intereſt to counteract them, and to divert the king from his intention. James gave them repeated aſſurances that Henry ſhould have no ground to complain of him for any breach of the alliance into which he had ſo lately entered, nor the ſtates for being inattentive to their intereſt; but the preſent ſituation of his affairs, he told them, rendered it neceſſary for him to put an end to the Spaniſh war.

He accordingly gave orders to his miniſters for holding conferences for this purpoſe, with the Spaniſh and Flemiſh ambaſſadors, and in the mean time cauſed an entire ſtop to be put to all hoſtilities.

Thoſe appointed by the archdukes were D'Aremberg, and Richard of Verreicken; and Rouida, a ſenator of Milan, had come over to the aſſiſtance of Taxis.

Book II. 1604. The letter which Taxis brought to James from the king of Spain was addreſſed to him not in the uſual ſtyle, To our Brother, but to our Couſin; and, in enumerating James's titles, though France was mentioned, Ireland was omitted. James laughed at the latter of theſe abſurdities, into which he ſuppoſed the Spaniſh court had been led, by their complaiſance to the pope, who had publiſhed a bull, declaring Ireland to be a fief of the holy-ſee; but he ſharply expreſſed his reſentment at the term Couſin.

It ſoon appeared that the claims of the two nations on each other, were but few in number. No conqueſts had been made by either of the two parties, which the other could inſiſt to have reſtored; and neither of them claimed an indemnification for the expences of the war; but there were two points which were difficult to be adjuſted, and occaſioned the holding of many conferences. The Spaniards, on the one hand, inſiſted that James ſhould engage to prevent his ſubjects from entering for the future into the ſervice of the United States; and he, on the other, required that they ſhould enjoy the liberty of trade to the Indies.

The Spaniſh ambaſſador repreſented, that his maſter had expected to find in his Britannic majeſty, a good and faithful ally; and hoped to have formed an offenſive and defenſive alliance with him; but if he was ſtill determined, in imitation of his predeceſſor, to give aſſiſtance to the rebels in the Netherlands, it was impoſſible but the catholic king muſt conſider him rather as an enemy than a friend. The Engliſh commiſſioners replied, that their maſter could not now regard the Dutch in the light of rebels; their ſovereignty had been acknowledged by ſome of the greateſt princes

princes in Europe, and the king had, on his accession, found so close a connection subsisting between them and his English subjects as could not be dissolved without considerable prejudice to his kingdom: he was therefore resolved to permit them to make levies within his dominions as formerly; but as he intended to observe a strict neutrality, he was ready to grant the same permission to the archdukes and the king of Spain, and farther to engage that he should not send any of his own troops to the assistance of the states, nor furnish them either with money or with military stores. The Spanish commissioners finding, after several conferences, that all their remonstrances on this head proved ineffectual, were obliged to acquiesce in the king's proposal.

Peace between Spain and England.

The other article above mentioned, which related to the India trade, was the subject of several conferences, and of great altercation between the commissioners. The Spaniards maintained that, as they were the first discoverers of the Indies, and their right to these countries had been confirmed by the sovereign pontiff, no other nation was entitled to trade there without their permission; that for weighty reasons they had refused to grant this permission, not only to the king of France in the treaty of Vervins, but likewise to the emperor, and to the archdukes; that these reasons still subsisted, and therefore they must not only decline granting it to the English, but insist that the king of England shall, by proclamation, prohibit all his subjects from continuing to trade in India, as they had done for some years past.

This chimerical pretension was treated by the English commissioners with the contempt which it merited; the Spaniards themselves had traded to many parts of India, besides those where they

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they had eſtabliſhed their dominion; and no reaſon could be given why the Engliſh ſhould not enjoy the ſame liberty. James peremptorily refuſed to publiſh the prohibition which was requeſted of him. His ſubjects had for many years been in poſſeſſion of the India trade, and he reſolved that they ſhould not be deprived of it by any article in the preſent treaty.

THE diſputes on this ſubject roſe to ſo great a height as to give ground to apprehend that the conferences would have proved abortive; but, as both parties were eagerly bent on peace, it was at length propoſed that no mention whatever ſhould be made of the Indies in this treaty, and to this propoſal they both yielded their conſent.

ALL the other articles were eaſily adjuſted; but as Taxis had not plenipotentiary powers, the ſigning of it was delayed for ſome time longer. This however had been reſerved for Don John de Velaſco, duke of Frias, and conſtable of Caſtile, who, ſeveral months before had come to Bruſſels, in his way to England, but had remained till now in Flanders, either on account of his health, which was the excuſe he offered for his delay, or, as was ſuſpected by the Engliſh, becauſe he judged it to be incompatible with his dignity to come over to England till he knew that peace would certainly be concluded. He had requeſted the Engliſh monarch to ſend his commiſſioners to treat with him in the Netherlands; but James declined complying with this requeſt, becauſe the catholic king, he ſaid, had firſt offered to ſend his ambaſſador to England, and he choſe to have the treaty carried on under his own eye (*n*).

VELASCO

(*n*) Carte, Sully, Beaumont, Meteren, and Siri Mem. recondite, tom. i. p. 200, &c.

VELASCO arrived at Dover on the 5th of Auguſt, and was from thence conducted by ſome Engliſh noblemen ſent to receive him, with great pomp to London. The treaty was ſigned on the 19th of Auguſt, and next day was ratified by the king (o). The publication of it gave general ſatisfaction both to the Spaniſh and Engliſh nations; but was unacceptable to the Engliſh ſailors, becauſe they alone, by the numerous captures they had made, had derived any advantage from the war.

DURING the courſe of theſe negociations, the war in the Netherlands was carried on with more than ordinary vigour. The ſiege of Oſtend had laſted for more than two years and a half, and the beſiegers, during all that time, had exerted their utmoſt ſtrength and ſkill, yet ſo vigorous was the oppoſition which they received from the garriſon, that they had not been able to make any conſiderable impreſſion on the place. Thoſe huge machines, above mentioned, which were intended for blocking up the canal, were no ſooner brought within reach of the artillery of the town, than, by the well directed ſhot of the beſiegers, they were either demoliſhed or ſet on fire. The beſiegers too made innumerable ſallies, in which they diſplayed the moſt determined intrepidity, and completed the deſtruction of ſuch parts of the Spaniſh works as could not be reached by the artillery.

THE principal engineer employed in conſtructing theſe works was Pompeo Targoné, an Italian, who poſſeſſed an inventive genius, but had never till now enjoyed an opportunity of reducing his theories

(o) It was not till the following year that the earl of Nottingham, lord high admiral, was ſent to Madrid to witneſs the notification of this treaty, by the king of Spain.

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theories to practice. Of this man's ingenuity the archduke unfortunately entertained too favourable an opinion, and was thus too eaſily induced to approve of projects, which, on trial, were found impracticable, but were attended in the execution with immenſe expence. His machines were all conſtructed at ſome diſtance from the town, but when they were brought forward to the places where they were to be uſed, they were expoſed, either to the violence of the tide, or to the fire of the beſiegers; and it often happened that works were in a few hours deſtroyed, or rendered uſeleſs, on which the labour of many weeks had been employed.

THE archduke came at length to be undeceived in the expectations which he had formed of the ſucceſs of theſe works. His patience was now greatly exhauſted; and he began to ſuſpect that the repeated diſappointments which he had met with muſt be in a great meaſure owing to the want of ſkill or vigour on the part of thoſe to whom he had committed the conduct of the ſiege.

The command of the Spaniſh army given to the marquis of Spinola.

THE marquis of Spinola had been only a few months in the Netherlands, and, till his arrival there, had never witneſſed any military operations; yet Albert, with the conſent of the court of Spain, reſolved to devolve on him the command of the army, and the proſecution of this ſiege, in which the ſtrenuous efforts of his moſt experienced commanders had been of ſo little avail. In forming this reſolution it was generally believed that, in the iſſue, he ſhould find he had been betrayed into ſtill greater imprudence than when he repoſed ſuch undeſerved confidence in the abilities of Targoné, and many of his officers were greatly incenſed at a choice ſo expreſſive of his diſtruſt in their abilities; but having conceived a high

high admiration of Spinola, partly on account of his ſpirited conduct in ſome enterprizes of ſmall importance in which he had been engaged, and partly from the prudence and ſagacity, of which he had given proof as often as he had conſulted him on the conduct of the war, Albert perſiſted in his reſolution, and was juſtified by the event. BOOK II. 1604.

SPINOLA was highly pleaſed with ſo flattering a diſtinction, but could not avoid feeling much anxiety when the archduke communicated to him his intention. He heſitated for ſome time whether to accept, at ſo critical a juncture, of ſo important a command, in which, inſtead of acquiring fame, he might, at his very entrance upon the military life, expoſe himſelf to ſo great a riſk of incurring cenſure and reproach: and therefore, before he agreed to the archduke's propoſal, he convened together ſuch of the officers as he confided in, and deſired them deliberately to conſider whether it was practicable to bring the ſiege of Oſtend to the deſired concluſion.

THESE men differed widely from each other in their ſentiments on the ſubject, and only contributed to increaſe his perplexity. But, being conſcious of reſources within himſelf, of which thoſe who attempted to diſſuade him could form no conception, his hopes and his ambition at length prevailed over his doubts and fears, and determined him to accept of the command.

THE failure of many enterprizes, he believed, had been greatly owing to the mutinous ſpirit of the troops, occaſioned by the irregularity of their pay; and to remedy this evil was the firſt object to which he applied his attention. Upon enquiry, he found that large ſums of money had been miſ-

applied,

Book II. 1604. applied, or embezzled by thoſe who had the care of the military cheſt. Theſe perſons he diſmiſſed from their employments, and ſubſtituted others, upon a plan of greater œconomy, in their room. But he ſtill perceived that the military funds were too ſmall to enable him to keep the troops in good humour, and at the ſame time to carry on ſucceſsfully all the expenſive operations of the ſiege. Of the truth of this he ſpared no pains to convince the archduke and the Spaniſh miniſters; and, in the mean time, till they ſhould deviſe expedients for furniſhing him with more ample ſupplies, he pledged his private fortune for ſuch conſiderable ſums, as put it in his power to give inſtant ſatisfaction to the troops.

In conducting the operations of the ſiege, his deference for the judgment of the archduke determined him to perſiſt for ſome time longer in the attempt, which had coſt ſo much expence of blood and labour, to intercept the navigation of the canal; and, in order to form the intended dyke, and batteries on the banks of it, great quantities of ſtones and earth and other materials were brought from a diſtance, on floats or rafts conſtructed by Targoné. But this work, being expoſed both to the fire and the ſallies of the beſieged, advanced ſlowly. It could not be finiſhed, he perceived, for many months; and, even when it ſhould be finiſhed, though it would render the navigation of the canal more difficult to the Dutch ſhips, yet many of them, he foreſaw, by taking advantage of the night, and winds and tides, might elude his batteries, and the garriſon ſtill continue to receive ſupplies. In order to prevent this, Targoné had, with the archduke's approbation, begun to erect, on large boats ſtrongly bound together, a huge floating caſtle, which he propoſed to ſtation in the mouth of the canal, and to plant it with cannon.

cannon. But Spinola conſidered this project as chimerical. A pile ſo huge and unwieldy could not, he ſuſpected, be brought from the place where the engineer was employed in building it to the mouth of the canal; although it ſhould be found practicable to do this, yet the machine would not long reſiſt the violence of the tide; and, unleſs a dyke of an extraordinary heighth and ſtrength could be raiſed to ſhelter it, it would ſoon be demoliſhed by the artillery of the town.

Determined by theſe motives, Spinola abandoned the deſign of blocking up the canal, and reſolved, henceforth, to employ his whole ſtrength in carrying on the ſiege by mines, batteries, and aſſaults. The archduke, notwithſtanding the repulſe which he had met with in the aſſault above related, would, on the ſecond day after, have reſumed his attempt, if the troops, diſcontented with his treatment of them on that occaſion, had not refuſed to obey. But the whole army was now under the moſt perfect diſcipline, and having no longer any ground to complain of their want of pay, they were ready to give every proof of their attachment to their general, from whom they had received ſo much greater attention than had formerly been ſhown them. Encouraged by this diſpoſition of his army, Spinola iſſued his orders for a general aſſault, in the ſame quarter where the former one had failed, at the ſmall canal which encompaſſed the fortifications on the weſt. In order to inſpire his troops with emulation, he divided them into four battalions, one of which was entirely compoſed of Germans, the ſecond of Spaniards, the third of Italians, and the fourth of Walloons, and other ſoldiers raiſed in the county of Burgundy. Great quantities of materials had been provided for forming dykes acroſs the canal, at thoſe parts where he intended the troops ſhould paſs;

Book II. 1604. paſs; and the foremoſt ranks were ordered to carry before them a ſort of rampart formed of twigs and faggots, to ſcreen them from the fire of the enemy's ſmall arms in their approach.

The garriſon, having received intelligence of his deſign, were well prepared for their defence; and the aſſailants had no ſooner entered the canal than they began a dreadful fire upon them, both with their ſmall arms and their artillery. Great numbers fell, notwithſtanding the precautions which had been taken: ſtill however they continued to advance. The Walloons having been ſtationed fartheſt from the ſea, where the canal was of the ſmalleſt depth, were the firſt who arrived on the other ſide, and the reſt of the army quickly followed. The garriſon ſtill maintained their ground, and kept up an inceſſant fire, by which the braveſt of the aſſailants fell in heaps above one another. Spinola was in the midſt of his troops, giving orders, and exhorting them to perſevere. They were animated by his example, as well as his exhortations, and it being now become more dangerous to retreat than to advance, they haſtened forward with the moſt deſperate intrepidity, and attacked the ravelins and half-moons which defended the counterſcarp. The garriſon withſtood their fury for ſome time; but at length, after great numbers had fallen on both ſides, they were compelled to abandon their outworks, and retire within the ditch.

Spinola could not at this time attempt with ſafety to proceed any farther in the attack; but, having covered his men from the enemy's fire, he immediately began, by working trenches, to make ſtill nearer approaches to the place (*p*).

The

(*p*) Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.

1604.

THE ſtates general were in the mean time deliberating whether to attempt to raiſe the ſiege, by marching the army to Oſtend; or to undertake ſome new conqueſt on the coaſt of Flanders, by which the loſs of Oſtend, which they had now more reaſon to dread than ever, might be compenſated. After mature deliberation, the latter of theſe meaſures was adopted, as the eaſieſt to be carried into execution; and it was agreed to undertake the reduction of Sluys (*q*), which, as it lay nearer to the United Provinces, would prove in every reſpect a more valuable poſſeſſion than Oſtend.

THE troops were ordered to rendezvous at Williamſtadt, where prince Maurice, attended by the deputies of the ſtates, arrived on the 24th of April, and next day he ſet ſail with upwards of twelve thouſand men for the iſle of Cadſant, which is ſeparated from Sluys by the great canal. Having diſembarked without oppoſition, he ſoon reduced all the forts upon the iſland. From Cadſant he paſſed over into that part of Flanders which lies to the eaſtward of Sluys, and laid ſiege to a ſtrong fort called St. Catherine. The garriſon of this fort, having made a more vigorous reſiſtance than he expected, he reſolved, rather than be detained before it any longer, to leave it behind him in the enemy's poſſeſſion, and gave orders for having his artillery drawn off in the middle of the night; but one of his cannon having ſunk in a marſh, a great number of ſailors were employed in raiſing it, who made ſo great a buſtle and noiſe, that the garriſon, believing the whole Dutch army to be at hand, and that they were removing their artillery to a more advantageous ſituation, in order to renew the attack, were ſeized

(*q*) See volume ii. p. 237. of Philip II.

Book II. 1604. ſeized with a panic, and fled precipitately towards Iſendyck. Of this unexpected event the prince received intelligence next morning, when he took poſſeſſion of the fort: and from thence he proceeded to Iſyndyck, Ardenbourg, and other places, all of which he eaſily compelled to ſurrender.

In the mean time Spinola, having been informed by Serrano, the governor of Sluys, of the danger which threatened him, ſent him a reinforcement of three hundred men. With this reinforcement, joined to as great a number of the garriſon as could be ſpared, Serrano, who was an officer diſtinguiſhed for his activity and enterprize, reſolved to embrace the opportunity which the preſent diſtance of prince Maurice's army afforded him, to make an attack on the iſle of Cadſant.

Had his deſign ſucceeded, he muſt have got poſſeſſion of all the Dutch tranſports, together with their military ſtores, and thus have rendered it impracticable for Maurice to proceed in his intended enterprize againſt Sluys. Some companies of Scots troops, which had been ſtationed in Cadſant, having no apprehenſion of danger, were off their guard, and Serrano had time to land ſix hundred of his men without oppoſition; but the Scots, having ſoon received intelligence of their landing, ſet out inſtantly to oppoſe them, and having come upon them, before they were completely formed, attacked them with uncommon fury, and drove them back in great confuſion to their boats.

The prince had now ſubdued all the fortified places which lay to the eaſt of Sluys, and was advancing weſtward, when he was met by Velaſco, general of the archduke's cavalry, who had been ſent to obſtruct his progreſs. Velaſco had poſted his

his troops in a ſtrong ſituation, near Dam, which ſtands on the canal of Bruges. He had the good fortune in the beginning to repulſe a party of the Dutch horſe, who were ſent before the reſt of the army to attack his intrenchments; but the infantry coming up, he was overpowered by numbers. About eight hundred of his men were killed and taken priſoners, and he himſelf with the reſt was obliged to retire precipitately towards Dam. Book II. 1604.

After this ſucceſs Maurice, judging it unneceſſary to loſe time in laying ſiege to this fort, proceeded in his march, and, with little difficulty, made himſelf maſter of all the forts on the great canal, by which Sluys communicates with the ſea; immediately after which he aſſigned their ſeveral ſtations to his troops in the neighbourhood of the town; and began to form a line of circumvallation round the place, by working deep intrenchments, where the ſoil permitted, caſting bridges over the numberleſs little canals and rivulets, by which the ground is almoſt every where interſected, and fortifying the whole at certain diſtances with redoubts (*r*).

In theſe laborious operations, ſeveral weeks were employed, and before the works were finiſhed, the archduke found means, at different times, to reinforce the garriſon with fifteen hundred men. Prince Maurice was not ſorry for the introduction of theſe troops into the town. He had received certain intelligence that the ſtock of proviſions in the place, was not ſufficient long to ſupport ſo great a number; he had no intention to carry on the Siege of Sluys.

(*r*) In order more deeply to impreſs the minds of his ſoldiers with a ſenſe of the importance of their preſent enterprize, Maurice appointed the 21ſt of May to be obſerved as a day of faſting and of prayer to the Almighty, for his bleſſing upon their arms.

BOOK II. 1604. the ſiege by batteries or aſſaults, and he hoped ſoon to be able to render the blockade ſo compleat, as to prevent the entrance of ſupplies.

THE archduke, on the other hand, expected ere long to be able to raiſe the ſiege, and dreaded no danger but from the weakneſs of the garriſon. He was deeply ſenſible of the great importance of Sluys, which, beſides affording the moſt commodious retreat to the Spaniſh gallies, was conveniently ſituated for an invaſion of the United Provinces, and enabled him to give great annoyance to their trade. He could not, however, perſuade himſelf to forego the fruits of his long continued labours before Oſtend, by raiſing the ſiege of that place; but he reſolved, for ſome time, to ſuſpend his operations there, and ſignified to Spinola, his deſire that he ſhould immediately march to the relief of Sluys, leaving no more troops behind him, than were ſufficient to reſtrain the ſallies of the garriſon.

SPINOLA, who was well acquainted with the character of prince Maurice, had a juſt ſenſe of the difficulty of carrying the archduke's deſign into execution, and remonſtrated againſt it as impracticable; but finding that Albert could not be prevailed on to alter his reſolution, he agreed to accept of the command, upon condition that the officers of greateſt experience ſhould accompany him in the expedition. He could hardly flatter himſelf with the hopes of ſucceſs, and he wiſhed that others ſhould partake in the cenſure which he was likely to incur. The archduke readily conſented to this propoſal; and, being joined on this occaſion by a great number of the mutineers, who had been perſuaded to return to their duty, he began his march with ſix thouſand foot, and

two

two thouſand horſe, beſides a train of artillery, and a large convoy of proviſions. BOOK II. 1604.

THE garriſon of Sluys had already begun to ſuffer greatly from the want of wholeſome food; and Serrano had repeatedly ſent notice, that without a ſupply, he could not poſſibly hold out for many days longer. Spinola therefore advanced towards Sluys with the utmoſt expedition; and, having received intelligence that the weakeſt part of the enemy's lines was at a village called Tervarde, he made an attack upon them in that quarter, in the middle of the night. But the Dutch troops were prepared for his reception; and though he had taken every precaution to inſure ſucceſs, he was obliged, after repeated attempts, to retire with conſiderable loſs.

HE then fetched a compaſs round by Ardenbourgh, and directed his march towards the iſle of Cadſant, in the hopes of making himſelf maſter of that iſland, from whence he might by water introduce proviſions into Sluys. He expected to have come upon the enemy in ſurprize, by fording the canal which ſeparates Cadſant from Flanders on the eaſt. But prince Maurice, having ſuſpected his deſign, had planted a half moon battery there, and ſtationed ſome ſelect troops to diſpute his paſſage, under count William of Naſſau. Over theſe troops, Spinola at firſt gained ſome advantage, and drew them from the battery: but Maurice himſelf, coming up with freſh troops to their aſſiſtance, Spinola was, at length, obliged to abandon his attempt, after an obſtinate conteſt, in which he ſuffered the loſs of five hundred killed, and as many wounded. Auguſt.

HAD not Spinola entered with reluctance on his preſent enterprize, his prudence might juſtly

Book II. 1604. have been impeached; but as his diſapprobation of it, and his diffidence of ſucceſs were known to the enemy by intercepted letters, as it had been known from the beginning to his friends, and nothing had been wanting on his part to carry it into ſucceſsful execution; it ſerved, notwithſtanding his repulſe, to heighten his character for military ſkill, and confirmed the archduke in the high opinion which he entertained of his abilities.

Auguſt 19. He returned without delay to Oſtend; and, on the ſecond day after his retreat, Serrano, the governor of Sluys, capitulated upon honourable terms. His garriſon amounted to four thouſand men, beſides a great number of ſlaves, who had formerly been employed on board the gallies; but his ſtock of proviſions had, ſeveral days before, been entirely conſumed, and the ſtrength of the ſoldiers was ſo much impaired, that more than ſixty of them died on the road to Dum, which is only two hours march from Sluys.

Capitulation of Sluys.

By one article of the capitulation, all the artillery and military ſtores, and by another, all the ſhips and ten Spaniſh gallies, which had ſo long infeſted the Dutch trade, were delivered into the hands of the conqueror.

Fourteen hundred ſlaves, the greater part of whom were Turks, were ſet at liberty; and as many of them choſe to return to their native country, the United States, in order to conciliate the friendſhip of the Corſairs, treated them with great humanity while they remained in Holland, and afterwards ſent them in Dutch ſhips to Barbary (*ſ*).

The

(*ſ*) Grotius, lib. xiii. Meteren, and the triumphs of Naſſau. Bentivoglio, p. 3. cap. vii.

THE glory which prince Maurice acquired from ſo important a conqueſt, was greatly heightened by the compariſon which men generally inſtituted between the rapidity of his progreſs, and the ſlowneſs of that of the Spaniards before Oſtend. Judicious obſervers thought there was hardly room for this compariſon, the two caſes being extremely different in the moſt important reſpects from each other; but it was univerſally acknowledged that Maurice had, on no former occaſion, diſcovered greater vigour and vigilance, or greater military ſkill.

THE archduke, on the other hand, was ſeverely mortified; nor was he entirely free from apprehenſion of being ere long ſubjected to a ſtill greater mortification, as a conſiderable part of the ſeaſon fit for action ſtill remained, and he expected that Maurice, whoſe army had ſuffered almoſt no diminution, would next attempt to compel him to raiſe the ſiege of Oſtend. In order to prevent this, which he would have conſidered as the greateſt calamity that could befall him, he gave immediate orders for ſtrengthening the fortifications of Dum, Blackenberg, and other places, by which the prince's army could approach.

BUT Maurice had no intention of entering ſo far into an enemy's country, whoſe forces were ſuperior in number to his own; and the ſtates general, highly ſatisfied with the ſucceſs which had already attended their arms, reſolved to employ the remainder of the ſeaſon in ſecuring their new conqueſts. No expence was ſpared to render Sluys impregnable, and Cadſant, Iſyndyck, and ſeveral other places in the neighbourhood of Sluys, were ſtrongly fortified.

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THE marquis of Spinola had, in the mean time, reſumed his operations before Oſtend, and was daily making nearer approaches to the town. He had already croſſed the ditch, and compelled the garriſon to retire from all that part of the place called the Old Town, but one redoubt (*t*), from which, as it was conſiderably elevated above the other fortifications, the beſiegers made dreadful havoc among his troops. He reſolved, whatever it ſhould coſt him, to make himſelf maſter of this redoubt. His Spaniſh and Italian troops, having been again and again repulſed with great ſlaughter, could not be perſuaded to renew the attack: and this arduous undertaking was therefore committed to two regiments of Germans, who, allured by promiſes, and puſhed on by emulation to execute what the Italians and Spaniards had abandoned in deſpair, advanced towards the fort with the moſt determined intrepidity. The garriſon ſprung a mine upon the foremoſt of theſe regiments, and blew up a great number of them in the air. The reſt, however, ſupported by the ſecond regiment, ſtill continued to advance, and having attacked the garriſon ſword in hand, they drove them with irreſiſtible fury from the place.

THE garriſon, by the advice of a Scotch engineer of the name of Dixter, had provided againſt this diſaſter, by drawing a ſtrong intrenchment flanked with baſtions, and fortified with artillery betwixt the Old and the New part of the Town; and behind this, they had likewiſe drawn another intrenchment of the ſame kind, acroſs the middle of the New Town; being determined to diſpute every inch of ground, and to maintain their defence till the laſt extremity.

FROM

(*t*) Called the ſand-hill.

FROM the progreſs however which Spinola had already made, and the ſkill and vigour with which his operations were conducted, it could not be doubted, that he muſt ere long get poſſeſſion of the place. The garriſon ſtill continued to make the moſt vigorous ſallies upon his miners and his troops; but ſince they had loſt the fort of Sand-hill, theſe ſallies were made at a much greater expence of blood, on their part, than formerly: their new works had not yet acquired the ſame ſolidity and ſtrength as thoſe from which they had been expelled; and, being now confined within ſuch narrow limits as could not admit of any conſiderable reinforcement of freſh troops, they were expoſed to much greater danger than before, of being overpowered in every aſſault, by the ſuperior numbers of the enemy.

THE ſtates general, influenced by theſe conſiderations, and thinking it extremely doubtful whether the preſervation of Oſtend, ſince the conqueſt of Sluys, was an object worthy of the expence and attention it muſt coſt, reſolved to perſiſt no longer in the defence, and ſent inſtructions to the ſieur de Marquette the governor, to prepare himſelf for capitulating upon honourable terms.

ON receiving theſe inſtructions, Marquette immediately conveyed to Fluſhing, by the ſhips which were then lying in the harbour, all deſerters, and other perſons, who had any particular reaſons for dreading the enemy's reſentment, together with a part of the artillery and ſtores; after which he ſent two of his principal officers to treat with Spinola of the ſurrender of the place.

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THIS general, whether from admiration of that intrepid bravery which the garriſon had diſplayed, or becauſe he was ſtill diffident of ſucceſs, and deſirous to avoid the further effuſion of blood, readily agreed that the garriſon ſhould march out with all the honours of war, and be ſafely conducted by land to Sluys; that waggons ſhould be furniſhed to the ſick and wounded; that the inhabitants ſhould be at liberty to quit the town without moleſtation; and that all priſoners on both ſides ſhould be releaſed. This agreement was made on the 20th of September, in the beginning of the fourth year ſince the commencement of the ſiege; and on the ſecond day after, Spinola was put in poſſeſſion of the town. He religiouſly fulfilled all the articles of the capitulation, and while the garriſon was preparing to ſet out, he gave proof of a generoſity of ſpirit, of which no other inſtance has occurred in the hiſtory of the preſent war, by inviting the governor, and all the colonels and captains in the place, to a magnificent entertainment, where he treated them with every mark of diſtinction and reſpect.

Oſtend capitulates.

FROM Oſtend, the governor marched at the head of his garriſon, amounting to near four thouſand men, with a ſmall train of artillery, along the ſea coaſt, till they arrived in the neighbourhood of Sluys, where they were met by prince Maurice, who received them in the moſt gracious manner, and gave them every teſtimony of applauſe and gratitude. They were ſoon after followed by almoſt the whole body of inhabitants, who choſe rather to reſide at Sluys than Oſtend; and the chief magiſtrate of Oſtend was appointed chief magiſtrate of Sluys.

SUCH was the termination of this celebrated ſiege, which, beſides an enormous expence of labour

labour and military ſtores, had coſt the contending parties the lives of near a hundred thouſand men. Oſtend could not, on any account, be deemed worthy of this expence; yet the Dutch ſeemed to have acted wiſely in defending it with ſo great obſtinacy. They could, no where elſe, have encountered the enemy on more advantageous terms: and, while the ſiege continued, they not only enjoyed profound tranquillity at home, but were at liberty to ſecure and extend their frontier, by the acquiſition of Rhinberg, Grave, Cadſant, Iſyndyck and Sluys.

THE conduct of the archduke does not admit of any ſuch apology. Hardly any of the places which he had loſt was of leſs importance than Oſtend; and Sluys, from its excellent harbour, and its neighbourhood to Zealand, was of much greater importance. His arms, at a juncture, when his finances were low, and his troops mutinous, ought rather to have been employed in defending his own dominions, than in attacking thoſe of the enemy: and if he had found leiſure for acting offenſively, he ought to have made his attack on ſome place of eaſier conqueſt, in the preſervation of which the United Provinces were more deeply intereſted.

BUT if he ever came to be ſenſible of his error, it was not till he thought that it could not be retrieved with honour; and he was encouraged to perſiſt in it by the Spaniſh miniſters, who were at too great a diſtance from the ſcene of action to judge of the conduct which it was proper to purſue.

BUT there was reaſon now to expect that neither the archduke, nor the court of Spain, would for the future be guilty of the ſame ſort of imprudent

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prudent conduct, as that into which, on different occaſions, they had been hitherto betrayed; as both he and they were impreſſed with a juſt eſteem of the prudence and great abilities of the marquis of Spinola, and had reſolved to devolve on him the entire direction of the war. He had already given ſtriking proofs of ſuperior capacity; and no perſon doubted that he would ſtill be found deſerving of that extraordinary confidence that was repoſed in him.

A CHIEF ſource, Spinola knew, of thoſe diſappointments and loſſes which Albert had ſuſtained, was his irregularity in the pay of his troops, and in order to remedy this evil, the marquis reſolved either to reduce their number, or to be well aſſured of procuring more ample funds for their ſupport. But no ſufficient funds could be procured, unleſs they were furniſhed by the court of Spain, and therefore, as ſoon as he put his army into winter quarters, he ſet out for Madrid, in the hopes of being able to convince the Spaniſh miniſters of the neceſſity of either making greater exertions, and furniſhing more liberal ſupplies, or of reſolving as ſoon as poſſible to put a period to the war.

Scarcity of the precious metals in Spain.

THE Spaniſh finances were in no better order at this time than at any former period. From that decay of induſtry, of which the cauſes have been already mentioned, Spain was no longer able to furniſh either her colonies or herſelf with manufactures of her own production. The gold and ſilver which ſhe imported from America no ſooner arrived, than it was tranſmitted, for the purchaſe of manufactures, to other nations that were more induſtrious; and the ſcarcity of the precious metals in Spain, had riſen to ſo great a height, that the duke of Lerma had, laſt year, raiſed

raiſed the nominal value of the copper coin, which by a royal edict was made nearly equal to that of ſilver. But this abſurd expedient ſerved only to encreaſe the evil which it was intended to prevent or remedy (*u*). 1604.

COUNTERFEIT copper money, of equal intrinſic value to the current coin in Spain, was poured into that kingdom by the neigbouring nations; theſe nations, at the ſame time, received gold and ſilver in return; they ſtill continued likewiſe to receive the price of their manufactures in gold and ſilver. And thus was Spain more than ever drained of theſe precious metals. The diſtreſs ariſing from thence was ſenſibly felt from one end of the kingdom to the other, and the miniſters often found it difficult to procure money ſufficient for the neceſſary purpoſes of goverment. But, being now delivered from the burthen of the war with England, and hoping that henceforth the returns of treaſure from America would be greater and more certain than they had hitherto been, they reſolved, in conformity to the king's inclination, to ſpare no expence to enable the archduke to carry on the war in the Netherlands with vigour.

The court of Madrid reſolves to carry on the war.

AGREEABLY to this reſolution, the marquis of Spinola, to whom Philip, on this occaſion, gave every proof of eſteem and confidence, was immediately furniſhed with a conſiderable ſum of money. The ſtrongeſt aſſurances were likewiſe given him, by the miniſters of greater punctuality in their future remittances; and there was at the ſame time conferred upon him, full power to employ all the money which he received, or was afterwards to receive, in the manner which he ſhould

(*u*) Gonſalez Davila, lib. ii. cap. xiv.

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ſhould judge to be moſt expedient. The conduct of the archduke, it ſeems, and that of thoſe to whom he had committed the adminiſtration of his finances, had rendered this precaution neceſſary; he had never obſerved that ſtrict œconomy which the exigencies of his affairs required; and it ſhould appear, that being ſenſible of this defect in his character, and conſcious of his inability to correct it, he was well pleaſed to have the diſpoſal of the money ſent from Spain, devolved upon Spinola.

THE marquis having thus accompliſhed the deſign of his journey to Madrid, and obtained from Philip and his miniſters their approbation of his plan of operations for the next campaign, returned without delay to Bruſſels. The firſt object of his attention was to remove every ground of diſcontent among his troops, by applying a part of the money which he had brought along with him to the diſcharge of their arrears; immediately after which, he gave orders for making numerous levies in Germany and in the Southern Provinces of the Netherlands. The Spaniſh miniſters had promiſed to ſend him a veteran regiment from Spain by ſea; and they had given inſtructions to the governors of Naples and Milan, to provide for him a ſtrong reinforcement of Italians (*v*).

THE United Provinces on the other hand, being already well acquainted with the activity and enterprize of Spinola, had ſtrenuouſly exerted themſelves in their military preparations, and were ſooner ready to take the field. They had formed the deſign of laying ſiege to Antwerp, where they had learnt that the number of the garriſon was neither

(*v*) Some officers were ſent over to recruit in Britain, but James diſcouraged his ſubjects from entering into the Spaniſh ſervice. Vide Carte. Yet ſoldiers were raiſed among the catholics, as appears from the ſequel.

neither adequate to the extent of the fortifications, or the great importance of the place. Prince Maurice did not approve of this expedition, but engaged in it at the requeſt of the ſtates. Having put a part of his army on board tranſports, under count Erneſt of Naſſau, he himſelf marched over land with the reſt from Bergen op Zoom, and joined Erneſt, at the fort of Lillo, which ſtands on the north ſide of the Scheld, about two leagues diſtant from Antwerp, and was ſtill in poſſeſſion of the Dutch.

His intention was to lay all the low grounds between Lillo and Antwerp under water, by cutting the dyke of the Scheld, together with the counterdyke at Courveſtain, and then to croſs over the inundation, and to pitch his camp on the higher grounds which lie near the town. He would thus have had a much ſmaller ſpace to incloſe with his entrenchments, while his army would have been entirely ſecure on one ſide againſt the approach of the enemy. His deſign had been carefully concealed, and if his tranſports had not been detained by contrary winds, his enterprize would probably have been attended with ſucceſs. But Spinola, conjecturing from the embarkation of a part of his forces, and his choice of Bergen for the rendezvous of the reſt, that he could not have any other object in view but the ſiege of Antwerp, had time to take every precaution to prevent him from carrying his plan into execution. He had greatly augmented the garriſons of the town and of the forts upon the counterdyke; and at the ſame time had lined the banks of the Scheld on both ſides with a ſufficient number of troops to oppoſe his landing (*w*).

MAURICE

(*w*) He had likewiſe come himſelf to Antwerp, with all the forces which he could collect together, and having thrown a bridge

Book II. 1605. MAURICE attempted however, to make a deſcent on the Flanders ſide near Caloo, but finding his utmoſt efforts ineffectual, and that Spinola was every where upon his guard, he abandoned his firſt attempt; and after reducing the caſtle of Woude, a ſtrong fort in the neighbourhood of Bergen, he embarked his army, and made a deſcent in Flanders, near Iſyndyck, with an intention of laying ſiege either to the Sas of Ghent or Hulſt.

MAURICE himſelf had diſapproved of this expedition, as well as of his attempt on Antwerp, and had adviſed to employ the army on the banks of the Rhine, where he thought there was reaſon to dread an irruption of the enemy; but he had yielded to the judgment of the ſtates, who being anxious for the preſervation of Sluys, were deſirous of getting poſſeſſion of as many fortified towns as poſſible, in the neighbourhood of that important place. They had formerly had repeated proofs, how ill qualified they were to judge of the proper conduct of the war; and from the ſequel, it will appear, how much wiſer it had been, if, on the preſent occaſion, they had liſtened to the opinion of their general.

MAURICE had not time to begin his operations, either againſt the Sas of Ghent or Hulſt, when Spinola, who on this occaſion derived great advantage from his bridge over the Scheld, arrived in ſight with all his forces: but, as neither of the two generals were inclined to try the fortune of a battle, they immediately applied themſelves to fortify their reſpective camps; reſolving, each of them,

bridge over the Scheld, a little above the town, he ſtood prepared to march whenever the enemy ſhould adventure to begin their attack.

them, to await till ſome favourable opportunity ſhould offer of annoying his enemy, without expoſing himſelf to danger. Several ſkirmiſhes were fought by foraging parties, with various ſucceſs, but neither party was able to gain any conſiderable advantage over the other. 1605.

AT length, Spinola having effectually provided for the ſafety of the two places which Maurice had intended to attack, left a part of the army under the count of Berg, to watch his motions, and ordered the reſt to direct their march towards Maeſtricht.

ABOUT this time he expected the arrival of the troops which had been raiſed for the archduke's ſervice in Germany and Italy, and he had appointed Maeſtricht for the place of rendezvous. Agreeably to the promiſe given him by the court of Spain, a regiment, conſiſting of twelve hundred men, had been embarked at Liſbon, in eight ſhips, which, in order to elude the vigilance of the enemy, had been hired from Hamburgh of the Engliſh and Daniſh merchants. But, notwithſtanding their precaution, they were intercepted by the Dutch admiral Hautain, whom the ſtates had ordered to lie in wait for them in the Engliſh channel. Four of them were either taken or deſtroyed, and the remaining four obliged to take ſhelter in Dover, where they were ſhut up by the Dutch till the following winter, when the long nights afforded them an opportunity to eſcape to Flanders (*x*).

THE

(*x*) The ſtates diſgraced themſelves, and ſullied the victory which they obtained on this occaſion, by ordering all the priſoners to be tied, two and two together, and thrown into the ſea. Yet neither Grotius nor Van Meteren, the two moſt reſpectable of the Dutch hiſtorians, have ſpoken of their conduct as reprehenſible. Their pretext for this barbarity, was to damp

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THE marquis of Spinola lamented the loſs of the Spaniſh troops the more, as they were all veteran ſoldiers, commanded by officers of great experience. But all the German and Italian forces which he expected, having arrived in ſafety, he reſolved without further delay, to enter upon the execution of the plan of operations, which, in concert with the archduke, he had formed for the remainder of this campaign. It had been his intention, ever ſince the ſurrender of Oſtend, to eſtabliſh the theatre of the war beyond the Rhine, in that part of the dominions of the ſtates, where the ſuperiority of their naval force could be of no avail. His army would thus, he thought, be in ſome meaſure ſupported at the enemy's expence; it would be eaſier for him to ſuppreſs the mutinous ſpirit of his troops, in caſe it ſhould again appear; and as the ſtates had no dread of an attack in that quarter, he expected to find ſome of their principal towns unprepared for a defence. His deſign had been carefully concealed even from the general officers: councils of war had been held, in which the archduke, in order more effectually to prevent a diſcovery, had ſometimes propoſed to undertake the ſiege of Sluys, and ſometimes that of Bergen op Zoom, or of Grave, or of Breda; and the different opinions of the officers had, from time to time, by ſecret agents, been communicated to the ſtates.

Spinola's plan for conducting the war.

PRINCE Maurice, as already mentioned, was almoſt the only perſon upon whom theſe artifices did

damp the courage of the Spaniards, but it rather ſerved to inſpire them in all their rencounters with deſperate rage and fury; and as no better reaſon could be given for treating with ſo great inhumanity the priſoners whom they took at ſea, than thoſe who were taken in the ſiege of towns, or in the field of battle, it was an example calculated to revive that ſavage method of carrying on the war, which had excited ſuch general horror when it was practiſed by the duke of Alva and his ſon.

did not produce the desired effect. He could not be persuaded that Spinola, who had given conspicuous proof of superior sagacity, would undertake the reduction of any of these towns, where the army of the states was at hand to interrupt his operations. He suspected that his attack must rather be intended against some more distant place, which could not be so easily relieved; and had therefore proposed to station the troops on the banks of the Rhine, in order to prevent the enemy from entering the Dutch dominions on the eastern frontier (*y*). But the states having, in consequence of the information they had received of the deliberations in the archduke's council of war, rejected this advice, Spinola was now at liberty to carry his design into execution.

Before he left Flanders, he had given orders to the count de Boucquoi, his general of artillery, to secure a convenient passage for his army over the Rhine; and this active officer, after planting batteries on the banks, and thereby clearing the river of some Dutch armed vessels, which were stationed there, had begun to erect two strong forts, one on each side of the Rhine at Keiserwert, a small town in the electorate of Cologn. As soon as these forts were finished, Spinola set out from Maestricht, with all the troops which he had assembled there; and having joined those which were under Boucquoi, and crossed the Rhine at the passage which had been secured for him, he called a council of war, and, for the first time, communicated to them his design. July.

The enemy, he told them, had been first led to expect an attack in Flanders, and they now believed that he had formed a design on Rhinberg.

(*y*) Grotius. Meteren.

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berg. But his intention, from the beginning, had been to lay ſiege to Lingen; and by the reduction of that important place, to open an entrance into Frieſland. He was ſenſible how much it was contrary to the common maxims of war, to leave behind him ſo ſtrong a place as Rhinberg, but he did not from thence apprehend any danger or inconvenience, ſince, with the forts which had been erected, he could always command a ſafe paſſage over the river; beſides that, the ſucceſs of his enterprize againſt Lingen, muſt greatly depend on the celerity with which it ſhould be executed, as prince Maurice would no ſooner hear of the danger to which that place was expoſed, than he would haſten to its relief. That although Lingen lay at a great diſtance, and the march muſt be performed in a neutral country (z), in which the troops would not be ſupported by plunder, yet there was no ground to dread a ſcarcity of proviſions; he had brought a conſiderable quantity along with him; he had money ſufficient to purchaſe whatever more ſhould be neceſſary; and, as he was determined to enforce the ſtricteſt military diſcipline, he had received aſſurances from the towns of Weſtphalia, that, on that condition, they would chearfully furniſh him with ſupplies. But attention to diſcipline was indiſpenſibly neceſſary, and for this reaſon, he was reſolved that every violation of the rules of it ſhould be puniſhed with the utmoſt ſeverity and rigour.

WHAT he declared on this occaſion to his officers, he afterwards carried into execution. Some of the ſoldiers having ventured, notwithſtanding the peremptory orders which he had iſſued, to leave their ſtandards, they were inſtantly ſeized and put to death. The reſt were intimidated by this example; and although a great part of them had

(z) Weſtphalia and the dutchy of Cleves.

had long been accuſtomed to rapine and diſobedience under former generals; yet ſo great is the power of diſcipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almoſt no army ever marched through a neutral country againſt which the inhabitants had ſo little reaſon to complain. His camp, in conſequence of this prudent conduct, was at all times abundantly ſupplied, and no time was loſt in ſending out detachments to procure proviſions. The inhabitants ſtill retained a bitter remembrance of their ſufferings from the Spaniſh army, under the admiral of Arragon, and were in ſome meaſure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the juſtice and humanity which he diſplayed.

AFTER traverſing a part of the dutchy of Cleves and Weſtphalia, he firſt directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town in the province of Overyſſell, and ſoon compelled the garriſon to capitulate; immediately after which he advanced towards Lingen, which lies at the diſtance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel, and, without meeting with any oppoſition, aſſigned to his troops their ſeveral quarters round the town. Prince Maurice, on whom the ſtates general had, as formerly mentioned, beſtowed the property of Lingen and its territory, as a reward for his important ſervices, had, at his own expence, made great additions to the fortifications of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for ſeveral years, been turned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time, only by the ordinary garriſon, amounting to five or ſix hundred men.

Spinola lays ſiege to Lingen.

EVEN with ſo ſmall a garriſon, however, Prince Maurice had expected it might ſuſtain a ſiege of ſeveral weeks; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe, ſeemed at firſt determined to

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(z) Weſtphalia and the dutchy of Cleves.

had long been accuſtomed to rapine and diſobedience under former generals; yet ſo great is the power of diſcipline over troops which regularly receive their pay, that almoſt no army ever marched through a neutral country againſt which the inhabitants had ſo little reaſon to complain. His camp, in conſequence of this prudent conduct, was at all times abundantly ſupplied, and no time was loſt in ſending out detachments to procure proviſions. The inhabitants ſtill retained a bitter remembrance of their ſufferings from the Spaniſh army, under the admiral of Arragon, and were in ſome meaſure animated with gratitude to Spinola for the juſtice and humanity which he diſplayed. [Book II. 1605.]

After traverſing a part of the dutchy of Cleves and Weſtphalia, he firſt directed his march to Oldenzeel, a fortified town in the province of Overyſſell, and ſoon compelled the garriſon to capitulate; immediately after which he advanced towards Lingen, which lies at the diſtance of only one day's march from Oldenzeel, and, without meeting with any oppoſition, aſſigned to his troops their ſeveral quarters round the town. Prince Maurice, on whom the ſtates general had, as formerly mentioned, beſtowed the property of Lingen and its territory, as a reward for his important ſervices, had, at his own expence, made great additions to the fortifications of it. But as the enemy's attention had, for ſeveral years, been turned to another quarter, it was defended, at this time, only by the ordinary garriſon, amounting to five or ſix hundred men. Spinola lays ſiege to Lingen.

Even with ſo ſmall a garriſon, however, Prince Maurice had expected it might ſuſtain a ſiege of ſeveral weeks; and the governor, an officer of the name of Cobbe, ſeemed at firſt determined to

Book II. 1605. defend it till the laſt extremity. Spinola was therefore obliged to begin the ſiege in form, and to make his approaches to the place as uſual, by working trenches. The garriſon had not ſufficient numbers to interrupt his operations, and he ſoon reached the ditch, which was of an extraordinary breadth and depth, and filled with water; nor could the water be drawn off, becauſe the ditch lay conſiderably lower than the adjacent ground. But at length, his troops got over it, though not without conſiderable ſlaughter, by filling it up with earth and faſcines, and then begun to work a mine under one of the principal baſtions of the town; when the garriſon, importuned by the inhabitants, and deſpairing of being able to defend themſelves much longer, capitulated on honourable terms.

Auguſt 18.

Prince Maurice, in the mean time, had advanced as far as Deventer, the capital of Overyſſell, and was employed in preparing for an attempt to raiſe the ſiege.

On the firſt intelligence which he received of the march of the enemy from Maeſtricht, he had diſpatched his brother, Henry Frederick, with four thouſand foot, and one thouſand horſe, to watch their motions; and a few days after, he had ſet out himſelf, at the head of another diviſion of his forces. But, having judged it neceſſary to leave a conſiderable proportion of them in Flanders to oppoſe any attempts which the enemy might make in that province, he was obliged to ſtop for ſome days at Deventer, till he had collected a ſufficient number of troops from the neighbouring towns, to enable him to undertake the relief of Lingen; and before his preparations were complete, a meſſenger arrived with the news of its ſurrender. He was highly incenſed againſt the

the governor and officers, for the feeble defence they had made of a place of ſo great importance, and threw them all into priſon, where they remained for near a twelvemonth, and though they were afterwards ſet at liberty, they were all of them degraded from their rank. BOOK II. 1605.

He had juſt cauſe for the reſentment which he felt on this occaſion, as Spinola, who had thought it unneceſſary to ſecure his army by entrenchments, muſt have raiſed the ſiege as ſoon as the army of the ſtates had approached. He had ground likewiſe for great anxiety, when he conſidered the defenceleſs ſtate of moſt of the towns in the neighbourhood of Lingen; and particularly that of Bourtang and Coevorden, by the conqueſt of which the enemy would have a free courſe into the provinces of Groningen and Frieſland. It was believed, that if Spinola had immediately attacked theſe places, he might, without great difficulty, have made himſelf maſter of them. But having ſpent ſome time in ſtrengthening the fortifications of Lingen, he thereby afforded leiſure to prince Maurice to provide for their ſecurity. He judged it to be of greater importance to preſerve what he had already acquired, than to multiply his conqueſts; and, as Maurice had collected an army in the neighbourhood, nearly equal to his own, he thought that he could not venture any farther into the enemy's country ſo late in the ſeaſon, without expoſing himſelf to the greateſt riſk. Having, therefore, taken every neceſſary precaution for the ſafety of Lingen and Oldenſal, he returned afterwards to Keyſerwert, and repaſſed the Rhine.

The forts which had been erected there, having given offence to the elector of Cologne, on whoſe territory they had been raiſed, the archduke,

Book II. 1605. in order to appeaſe its reſentment, had ſent orders for demoliſhing them; which Spinola did accordingly, and then began to build other two, a little farther down the river, at Rorerort in the county of Meurs, which was at that time ſubject to the Dutch.

While a part of his army was employed in building theſe forts, ſo neceſſary for preſerving his communication with his late conqueſts, he ſent the reſt, under the count de Bucquoi, to lay ſiege to Wachtendonc, a town in Guelderland, which ſtood in a marſhy ſoil, and was deemed one of the ſtrongeſt towns in that province, but was at this time rendered more acceſſible than uſual by a long continued drought. As the fortifications however were complete, and the garriſon numerous (*a*), he had reaſon to apprehend that the ſiege muſt laſt for ſeveral weeks, and that prince Maurice, who had left Overyſſel, and was encamped in the neighbourhood of Weſel, would certainly attempt to raiſe it. He therefore ordered the count de Bucquoi to fortify his camp with ſtrong entrenchments, and having lately received a ſtrong reinforcement of Italians, beſides a conſiderable number of Engliſh, Scotch, and Iriſh Catholics, whom James, agreeably to his treaty of peace with Spain, had permitted the archduke to enliſt in his dominions, he took his ſtation near Rorerort, with a reſolution to attack prince Maurice's army in the rear, in caſe he ſhould venture to approach to Wachtendonc.

In diſtributing their quarters to his troops on the north ſide of the Rhine, next to the enemy, he committed an error which was likely to have been attended with fatal conſequences, by ſtationing

(*a*) Twelve hundred men.

ing his cavalry at the village of Mulleim, on the banks of the Roer, where they were at too great a diſtance from the infantry to receive immediate ſupport; no entrenchments had been thrown up to ſecure them againſt an attack, nor was there any place of ſhelter near but a fort on the other ſide of the Roer, oppoſite to Mulleim, called the caſtle of Broeck, which was neither ſtrongly fortified nor furniſhed with a ſufficient garriſon. Prince Maurice, having got intelligence of their poſition, reſolved to avail himſelf of the advantage which it afforded him, and inſtantly ſet out from his camp at Weſel, with all his cavalry, and a ſelect body of infantry, amounting to two thouſand four hundred men. That no time might be unneceſſarily loſt on the march, the foot ſoldiers were put into carriages: the cavalry was ordered to haſten forward before the foot, one half of them commanded by Marcellus Baex, an officer of diſtinguiſhed ſpirit and intrepidity, and the other half by prince Henry Frederick, who was at that time only twenty years of age, but who had already given conſpicuous proof of ſuperior prudence and capacity. Prince Maurice himſelf followed as quickly as poſſible with the infantry, colonel Baex was ordered to croſs the Roer, and to endeavour to get poſſeſſion of the caſtle of Brock, in order to intercept the enemy's communication with their camp, while Henry, ſupported by prince Maurice, was to attack them at Mulleim.

Baex was ſucceſsful beyond what could juſtly have been expected in his firſt aſſault upon the fort, having expelled the garriſon from every part of it but one, which was defended by a ſmall number of men; but he was interrupted in his progreſs by the accidental arrival of a party of foragers, who attacked him with great vigour, and

BOOK II. and obliged him to abandon his attempt upon the fort.

1605.

Engagement near the village of Mulleim.

IN the mean time prince Henry had paſſed a narrow defile, which the enemy had left unguarded, and was about to begin the attack at Mulleim. It was unfortunately judged proper to defer it for a little time till the infantry ſhould arrive ſomewhat nearer. At length he gave orders for his troops to advance, and they obeyed at firſt with great alacrity; but finding that, through the delay in making the attack, the enemy had taken the alarm, and were in a better poſture of defence than they had expected, they were ſeized, though greatly ſuperior in number, with a ſudden panic, and, after an irreſolute and feeble effort, they turned their backs and fled, till they were met by prince Maurice at the head of the infantry.

ASHAMED of their daſtardly behaviour, and being ſeverely reproached by the prince, they were perſuaded to return. The Spaniſh cavalry, from whom they had ſo precipitately fled, far from venturing to purſue, were in great confuſion retreating acroſs the Roer, before a ſmall number of the Dutch cavalry that had remained with their commander. Henry was now rejoined by the reſt, and being likewiſe ſupported by the Engliſh and Scotch infantry, under colonel Vere and lord Buccleugh, he purſued the enemy to the other ſide of the river; but there the Spaniards, commanded by Trivulcio, in the abſence of Velaſco, general of the cavalry, having recovered their ranks, returned with great reſolution to the charge; and the Dutch, being again unaccountably ſtruck with terror, gave way before an inferior enemy, and left prince Henry almoſt alone in the field of battle. He muſt have been cut to pieces or taken priſoner, but for the ſeaſonable interpoſition of the

the Britiſh troops, who, being armed with pikes, attacked the Spaniſh cavalry, and kept them long at bay. 1605.

HENRY, perceiving himſelf abandoned by almoſt all his men, went over with the few that remained with him, and joined the troops under colonel Baex, who had been long engaged in combat with the enemy in another part of the field. Soon after this the Spaniards, having received a reinforcement under Velaſco, this part of the Dutch cavalry too was intimidated, and the two commanders, with a ſmall number of adherents, were left, ſurrounded by the enemy; but in the mean time prince Maurice arrived with his vanguard, and having planted ſome field-pieces on a riſing ground, he played them off ſo ſucceſsfully upon the Spaniards, that he ſoon threw them into confuſion, and put them to flight with conſiderable ſlaughter. He was preparing to purſue them into a wood, where they had taken ſhelter, when he received intelligence that Spinola himſelf was approaching with all his forces.

THIS general had got early information of the attack, and had inſtantly ſet out at the head of ſix hundred men, leaving orders for two thouſand more to follow as quickly as poſſible. In order to intimidate the enemy, by making them believe that his whole army was at hand, he ſent forward a great number of drummers on horſeback, and as the ground was favourable to his ſtratagem, it produced the deſired effect. Prince Maurice gave immediate orders for ſounding a retreat. Spinola purſued, and made conſiderable ſlaughter; but his troops were ſtopt ſhort in their career by colonel Vere, who being ſupporting by the count de Chatillon, with a ſelect body of French infantry, placed his men in an advantageous ſituation, behind

Book II. 1605. hind a hedge, and kept up ſo hot a fire upon the Spaniards, as obliged them to deſiſt from the purſuit.

The loſs of men in this action, which laſted for upwards of eight hours, was conſiderable; and probably not leſs than five hundred men on either ſide. Had the Dutch cavalry arrived at Mulleim a little earlier, or acquitted themſelves after their arrival as they had done on all former occaſions, the Spaniards muſt have been compelled to lay down their arms (*b*). Prince Maurice therefore, who had never before conceived more ſanguine hopes of victory, was highly incenſed againſt them for their puſillanimous behaviour, and reproached them in the ſevereſt terms. He could no longer conſide in their courage for the execution of any important enterprize, and found it neceſſary to act with the utmoſt circumſpection through the reſt of the campaign (*c*).

In order however, if poſſible, to extinguiſh the memory of this repulſe, he ſoon after made an attack in the middle of the night on the town of Guelders, and he ſo far ſucceeded as to demoliſh one of the outer gates of that place, by fixing a petard in it; but the garriſon having taken the alarm, by the burſting of another petard which happened to fall into the ditch, he was repulſed with loſs, and obliged to abandon his attempt. His ill ſucceſs in this, and in his enterprize at Mulleim, made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of

(*b*) Grotius, in ſpeaking of this action, makes the following obſervation, "tum id ſi eveniſſet, reliqua exercitus invadere ſtatuit, laudabili conſilio, & magnam illo die victoriam elaturus, ni Deo viſum, longa Batavorum proſpera & belli gloriam adverſis retundere: namque haud alii rectius cauſæ tam fatalem pavorem adſcripſerim."

(*c*) Grotius, lib. xiv. p. 469, &c. Van Met. lib. xxvii. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii.

1605.

of the garriſon of Wachtendonc. They had from the beginning expected that he would come to their relief, and, in the hopes of his being able to raiſe the ſiege, they had given him the ſtrongeſt aſſurances of their reſolution to defend the town to the laſt extremity; but when they found that, notwithſtanding his moſt vigorous exertions, the enemy ſtill maintained their ſuperiority, their courage failed, their defence became more feeble and irreſolute, and, on the twentieth day after the commencement of the ſiege, they offered to capitulate, though their number ſtill amounted to more than a thouſand men.

FROM Wachtendonc Spinola ordered the count de Bucquoi to lead his troops againſt the caſtle of Cracao, of which the count made himſelf maſter in a few days, and obliged the garriſon to ſurrender at diſcretion.

HAD not the ſeaſon been ſo far advanced, it is probable, from the great diſparity between the contending parties during this campaign, the ſtates muſt have ſuffered ſtill greater loſſes; but it was now the end of November, the rains had begun to fall, and the troops were greatly exhauſted with the fatigues which they had undergone. Spinola therefore, after carefully providing for the ſecurity of his new conqueſts, ſent his army into winter-quarters, and his example was ſoon after followed by prince Maurice. This general had at no former period ſuffered the enemy to gain ſo great advantages with impunity; yet, on his part, neither prudence and vigilance, nor vigour and activity, were wanting in oppoſing their deſigns. Had the ſtates permitted him to follow his own judgment in the conduct of the war, a different plan of operations would have been adopted;

Book II. 1605. adopted; Spinola would probably have been prevented from paſſing the Rhine, and the places loſt have been preſerved. His army was from the beginning much inferior in number to the enemy, yet, if his well concerted attack at Mulleim had not proved abortive, through that unaccountable panic with which his troops were ſeized, the Spaniſh cavalry would have been cut off, and Spinola obliged to act on the defenſive through the reſt of the campaign.

But while for theſe reaſons it ſhould ſeem that no blame can juſtly be imputed to prince Maurice, Spinola was ſurely well entitled to the applauſe which he received from his contemporaries, by whom he was henceforth regarded as one of the greateſt generals of the age.

Sanguine hopes of the Spaniards.

The Spaniſh miniſters had no reaſon to repent of the confidence they had repoſed in him, when they reflected on the vigour and great abilities he had exerted during this campaign; and their hopes of being able to compel the revolted provinces to lay down their arms were at this time raiſed to the greateſt height. The archduke likewiſe had conceived the moſt ſanguine expectations of ſucceſs, and was aſſiduouſly employed throughout the winter, in preparing for a vigorous proſecution of the war.

Having removed the ſeat of it into the enemy's country, his ſubjects in Brabant and Flanders could, with greater eaſe than formerly, afford their annual ſupplies; but theſe were not alone ſufficient to enable him to carry the plan concerted with the general for the next campaign into execution; and, in order to procure from Spain the aſſiſtance which was requiſite, he judged it neceſſary that Spinola himſelf ſhould undertake another

another journey to Madrid. The Spaniſh miniſters had acquainted him that they were at preſent involved in the greateſt difficulties, occaſioned by the loſs of ſome of their ſhips loaded with treaſure, which had foundered in a ſtorm, in their paſſage from America; but he hoped that, through Spinola's perſonal influence with the king, which was ſo great as even to excite the jealouſy of his miniſters, they might be induced to have recourſe to ſome extraordinary expedient for his relief. Book II. 1605.

THE marquis, who left Bruſſels about the middle of winter, found, on his arrival at Madrid, that the account tranſmitted to the archduke, of the exhauſted ſtate of Philip's finances, had not been exaggerated. There was hardly money in the exchequer ſufficient to defray the neceſſary expences of government, and the miniſters had no proſpect of being able to procure the ſums requiſite for carrying on the war with vigour, before the ſeaſon fit for action would be elapſed. Philip could not reſolve, in the midſt of victory, to abandon a cauſe in which he was ſo deeply intereſted: and Spinola was determined to decline accepting of the command of the forces, unleſs an adequate fund ſhould be provided for their pay. Many weeks were ſpent in fruitleſs endeavours to raiſe the money which he demanded (*d*). At length the miniſters offered to mortgage the treaſure which was expected to arrive towards the end of the year from America. And the merchants of Cadiz and other places, upon receiving an obligation for their reimburſement from that fund, agreed to advance the money that was wanted: upon a condition, which marks their diffidence either in the good faith or good œconomy of the miniſters, that the marquis of Spinola

Expedient of the Spaniſh miniſtry for raiſing ſupplies.

(*d*) It amounted to three hundred thouſand crowns a month.

Book II. nola ſhould give an additional ſecurity for their payment on his eſtates in Italy.
1606.

The marquis did not heſitate in complying with this requeſt; and, immediately after receiving bills of exchange for the money, he ſet out for the Netherlands, by the way of Italy. In that country he was ſeized with a fever which detained him for ſeveral weeks, and prevented him from reaching Bruſſels till the beginning of June.

Sickneſs of Spinola.

The ſtates general, on the other hand, having got early intelligence of the difficulty which he muſt encounter in raiſing money, had long flattered themſelves with the hopes that he would not be able to procure it. They were afterwards amuſed for a conſiderable time by a report which had been propagated of his death; an event which they were perſuaded would contribute more than any other that could happen to relax the archduke's exertions in the proſecution of the war. Influenced by theſe hopes, and this report, joined to their deſire of avoiding any unneceſſary expence, they had been uncommonly remiſs in their military preparations. They had not availed themſelves of Spinola's detention in Italy; and when they heard, not only that he had arrived in the Netherlands, but was daily receiving reinforcements of freſh troops from Germany and Italy, they were filled with the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions; but it was now too late to remedy their error. They had not ſufficient time to augment their army, by making new levies, as they uſed to do in Britain; and almoſt all the proteſtant ſoldiers, whom they might have enliſted in France and Germany, were, during the greateſt part of this ſummer, detained at home; thoſe in France, by a quarrel between the king and duke of Bouillon; and thoſe in Germany, by an

Strange remiſſneſs in the conduct of the United States.

inſurrection

insurrection of the inhabitants of Brunswick, against their sovereign. BOOK II. 1606.

When the campaign therefore was about to be opened, their forces, being greatly inferior in number to those of the enemy, prince Maurice was obliged to adopt a plan of operations which was merely defensive. Prince Maurice adopts defensive operations.

Having carefully provided for the security of such of the frontier towns, as were most exposed to danger, he next applied himself to fortify the banks of the Waal and the Issel, wheresoever he suspected that the enemy might attempt to transport their forces.

Along the banks of all that part of Waal, which extends from the fort of Schench to the isle of Bommel, redoubts, at small distances from each other, were raised on the north dyke of the river. The troops, to which the defence of these redoubts was committed, were ordered to keep themselves in constant readiness to march to each other's assistance, on the first notice of an attack. And a great number of armed barks and boats were ordered to cruize in the river, to watch the motions of the enemy, and to be ready to attack them, in case of their adventuring to embark.

The same care and pains were taken in fortifying the Issel; on the banks of which another line of redoubts was raised, extending from Arnheim to Hattem, which stands at the distance of only a few hours march from the Zuider Sea.

These works, in which the Dutch were more expert than any other nation, and which had been carried on with surprising expedition, were far advanced before Spinola had fully prepared

to

BOOK II. 1606.

to take the field. His plan had, from the beginning, been what the ſtates and prince Maurice had ſuſpected, to penetrate into the provinces of Utretcht and Holland, through the Betuwe on one ſide, and the Veluwe on the other. He juſtly conſidered, that while the Dutch maintained their ſuperiority at ſea, it was only on their eaſtern frontier, he could expect to make any ſenſible impreſſion; and that, in caſe he ſhould ſo far ſucceed as to get poſſeſſion of Utretcht, which was a large town, but weakly fortified, not only the numerous fortified places which lie to the north and eaſt, would be eaſily compelled to ſubmit, becauſe their communication with Holland would be interrupted; but Holland itſelf, the chief ſeat of the wealth and ſtrength of the revolted provinces would be laid open in that quarter, where it would be moſt ſucceſsfully attacked.

Spinola determined to penetrate into Utretcht and Holland.

HE was ſenſible, that ſince the ſtates had employed ſuch wiſe precautions for their defence, it muſt now be extremely difficult for him to carry this plan into execution. But he ſtill reſolved to perſiſt in it, and hoped, on one ſide or other, either to find the enemy off their guard, or to overpower them by his ſuperior numbers.

HAVING divided his forces, he gave the command of one army, conſiſting of ten thouſand foot and twelve thouſand horſe, to the count de Bucquoi, with inſtructions to attempt to tranſport it over the Waal into the country of Betuwe; and he himſelf conducted another, ſtill more numerous, into the province of Overyſſel, which had been the ſcene of his operations in the preceding year.

BUCQUOI, having paſſed the Maeſe at Mooch, pitched his camp in the neighbourhood of that village.

village, reſolving to attempt the paſſage of the Waal, between the fort of Schench and Nimeguen, and, in caſe of his being able to effect it, to lay ſiege to the latter of theſe places. With this view, he tranſported a great number of boats in carriages from the Maeſe; and having launched them in the Waal, he put a ſelect body of troops on board, under the command of Juſtiniano, an Italian general of diſtinguiſhed abilities. But before Juſtiniano could approach the oppoſite bank, Dubois, a French general, in the ſervice of the ſtates, had drawn up ſome companies of French and Engliſh ſoldiers, brought haſtily from Nimeguen, and was prepared to diſpute his landing. Juſtiniano ſtill continued to advance, having firſt obliged all the Dutch armed veſſels to retire, by planting a battery at the place of his embarkment. An obſtinate engagement ſoon followed, in which he loſt about one hundred and twenty men.

The rowers were intimidated, and being furniſhed with a pretext, from the rapidity of the current, they ſuffered the boats to fall down the ſtream. Dubois followed along the dyke of the river. Other attempts were made afterwards to approach the ſhore, but the enemy were every where prepared to make reſiſtance. At length the boats, which at firſt had proceeded in good order, being attacked by the Dutch armed veſſels, which were ſix abreaſt, were thrown into confuſion; and Juſtiniano, deſpairing of ſucceſs, abandoned his attempt.

Spinola in the mean time had paſſed the Rhine at Rorerort, and was advancing through the province of Overyſſel. But he was greatly retarded in his progreſs by an extraordinary quantity of rain which had begun to fall before he left

Rorerort,

BOOK II. 1606. Rorerort, and continued falling after he had ſet out upon his march. All the rivers were ſwelled to an unuſual height; and at thoſe places, where in ordinary ſeaſons they were fordable, much time was loſt in collecting boats, or in building temporary bridges. A great part of the country through which he marched being naturally wet and marſhy, the roads were every where ſo much broken, that the one-half of his army was commonly a whole day behind the other. The artillery carts, and his waggons with proviſions, of which he had near three thouſand, were dragged along with the utmoſt difficulty, and, as they often ſunk in the mud, they proved almoſt every hour the occaſion of confuſion and delay. Many of his men fell ſick from the unhealthineſs of the ſeaſon, and many were overpowered by the extraordinary fatigue which they underwent.

IT was paſt the middle of July before he arrived in the neighbourhood of the Iſſel; and he ſtill entertained the hopes of finding it practicable to bring his enterprize to the deſired iſſue: but, as the rains had not yet begun to abate, he found the river every where unfordable. It was, at the ſame time, crowded with armed veſſels, which muſt have rendered all attempts to caſt a temporary bridge over it impracticable: and prince Maurice, having had leiſure to fortify the oppoſite banks, had collected an army of ten thouſand foot, and two thouſand five hundred horſe, with which he ſtood prepared to oppoſe his paſſage.

AFTER deliberating for ſome days what courſe he ſhould purſue, he would have undertaken the ſiege of Deventer or Zutphen. But, beſides that every precaution had been taken for their defence, prince Maurice had pitched his camp on the oppoſite ſide, at an equal diſtance from each

each of theſe places, and was ready, with forces nearly equal to his own, to march to their relief. Book II. 1606.

He had, in the mean time, ſent the count de Solre with a detachment of his army down the river, to attempt a paſſage in the neighbourhood of Swoll, where he hoped the enemy might not be ſo much upon their guard. But de Solre was vigorouſly repulſed by the garriſon of Swoll, ſupported by ſome armed veſſels, and obliged to return, without being able to execute his enterprize.

Spinola therefore found it neceſſary to relinquiſh his plan of penetrating through the country of Veluwe, and to reſt ſatisfied with employing his arms againſt ſome of the towns of the province of Zutphen, where Maurice could not attempt to interrupt his operations, without expoſing himſelf to the riſk of a general engagement. He firſt attacked the town of Lockem, and in a few days compelled the garriſon to ſurrender. Immediately after which he laid ſiege to Groll, a town much better fortified than Lockem, and defended by a garriſon of one thouſand three hundred men. He was the more deſirous to get poſſeſſion of the place, as it would greatly contribute to the ſecurity of his former conqueſts, Lingen and Oldenzeel. And for the ſame reaſon prince Maurice was equally ſolicitous to prevent it from falling into his hands. Siege of Groll.

The prince, therefore, having augmented his army, by drawing the garriſons from Zutphen, Deventer, and other places, reſolved to attempt, without delay, to raiſe the ſiege. But Spinola being acquainted with his deſign, puſhed forward his operations with the moſt unremitted ardour, and, though not without conſiderable ſlaughter

Book II. 1606. of his troops, he, in a few days, drove the garriſon from all the out-works of the place.

They might ſtill, however, have reſiſted till prince Maurice had arrived; but the governor, a young man of little experience, being either prevailed upon by the importunity of the inhabitants, or intimidated by the threats of Spinola, who ſent him notice that if he did not immediately ſurrender, he would put all his garriſon to the
Auguſt 14. ſword, capitulated on the ninth day after the commencement of the ſiege.

Spinola had no ſooner got poſſeſſion of the town, and repaired ſome breaches in the fortifications, than he reſolved to remove his army from Overyſſel, where their health was greatly affected by the humidity of the ſoil, and to employ them in ſome other quarter, in which they would not be expoſed to the ſame inconveniencies. Having called a council of war to aſſiſt him in his deliberations on this occaſion, it was agreed, conformably to his own propoſal, that no enterprize could be undertaken at that time, with any probability of ſucceſs, of equal importance with the ſiege of Rhinberg.

Rhinberg beſieged. This town, which commands one of the moſt convenient paſſages over the Rhine, had, ſeveral times, been taken and retaken, ſince the commencement of the war; and the Dutch, in whoſe poſſeſſion it had remained ſince the year 1601, when it was ſubdued by prince Maurice, had, at an immenſe expence, made great additions to the fortifications. Round the old fortifications, they had drawn a new rampart, ſtrengthened with half-moons, redoubts, and ravelins, and had ſurrounded the whole with a ſecond ditch, of extraordinary breadth and depth; to which they had added

added a covered way. They had erected on the island, which is ſeparated by a narrow channel from the town, a ſtrong fort with regular baſtions, of nearly the ſame extent, as the iſland itſelf; and they had furniſhed another fortification of ſtill greater extent and ſtrength, defended by a deep intrenchment, on the oppoſite bank of the river. BOOK II. 1606.

SPINOLA was aware of the difficulty he muſt encounter in reducing a town ſo ſtrongly fortified, and which he knew likewiſe to be abundantly ſupplied with proviſions and military ſtores: but, having been greatly diſappointed by the failure of his enterprize againſt the interior provinces, and being deſirous of performing ſome atchievement, that might juſtify the opinion which the archduke and the court of Spain had conceived of his abilities, even the difficulty of accompliſhing his deſign proved a motive for adopting it; while, at the ſame time, it determined him to exert his utmoſt vigour in the execution.

HAVING ſent orders to the count de Bucquoi to come to his aſſiſtance, the count immediately directed his march towards Rhinberg along the ſouth-ſide of the river, while he himſelf advanced towards it on the north. No delay was unneceſſarily admitted by either general; but before they could throw up their intrenchments, prince Maurice, having received intelligence of their deſign, had time to ſend his brother Henry Frederick with a reinforcement to the garriſon of two thouſand men. Henry was accompanied on this occaſion by a large body of cavalry, and having executed his commiſſion without any loſs, he immediately returned with the cavalry to the camp, where his brother was preparing to march to the relief of the beſieged with all his forces.

Book II. 1606.

In the mean time Spinola began the ſiege by attacking the fort above-mentioned, which had been raiſed on the ſide of the river oppoſite to the town. Of this fort, which communicated by temporary bridges with the iſland and with the town, and was deemed a poſt of the firſt importance, the defence was given to colonel Edmund, a Scotch officer of diſtinguiſhed merit, who had been advanced in the ſervice of the ſtates from the rank of a common ſoldier to that of colonel. Beſides a numerous garriſon, upwards of ſeventy French gentlemen, who had come into the Netherlands to learn the military art, ſerved under him as volunteers; and, that they might merit promotion on their return to their native country, were ready to expoſe themſelves to every danger. With this determined band, ſupported by his garriſon, both horſe and foot, he ſallied out againſt Spinola, as ſoon as he approached, threw a great part of his army into confuſion, and made conſiderable ſlaughter. Spinola himſelf narrowly eſcaped being taken priſoner: but freſh troops coming forward to his aſſiſtance, Edmund was at length repulſed, and obliged to retire into the fort.

From the intrepid ſpirit which the garriſon diſplayed in this ſally, joined to the character of their commander, Spinola had reaſon to expect the moſt vigorous reſiſtance. But a few days after, Edmund was killed by a ſhot from the enemy's camp while he was viewing his intrenchments; and the garriſon, immoderately diſheartened by his death, evacuated the fort in the following night, and paſſed over into the iſland.

This precipitate meaſure, the effect of ſudden dejection, on account of the loſs of their commander, was quickly attended with the moſt important

tant conſequences. The fortifications of the iſland were in a great meaſure commanded by the artillery of the fort which they had ſo haſtily abandoned, and Spinola, by keeping up an inceſſant fire on them, from which their ramparts did not long afford protection, compelled them to take ſhelter in the town.

HE then applied himſelf to ſtrengthen the fortifications which he had gained on the banks of the river, in order to prevent prince Maurice from approaching on that ſide to the relief of the beſieged; and having brought his bridge of boats above mentioned from Rorerort, he tranſported the greateſt part of his forces over the Rhine, to co-operate with the count de Bucquoi, who had begun his operations againſt the town.

BEING already ſecured againſt an attack on the ſide towards the river, he now laboured to render himſelf equally ſecure on the other ſide, by caſting a ſtrong intrenchment round his camp. And as he was perpetually preſent himſelf, and no hands were permitted to be idle, the work was carried on with extraordinary expedition, while a great proportion of his troops were employed in making their approaches to the town.

THERE was nothing omitted on the part of the garriſon, which prudence and bravery could perform, to retard their progreſs. Animated by the example of the French volunteers, they ſpurned at danger, and made ſeveral vigorous ſallies on the enemy, in ſome of which they ſucceeded in their attempts to demoliſh their works, and in all of them put conſiderable numbers to the ſword.

BUT the exertions of the beſiegers were in proportion to the obſtacles which they found it neceſſary

Book II. 1606. ſary to ſurmount. Spinola had on no former occaſion given more conſpicuous proofs of vigour, ſkill, and bravery; he expoſed himſelf to every danger to which his troops were expoſed, and at the ſame time diſcovered the moſt perfect compoſure and tranquillity. The conduct of Bucquoi and Velaſco fully juſtified the opinion that was entertained of their abilities. The duke D'Oſſuna, one of the firſt grandees in Spain, the princes of Caſerta and Paleſtrina, and the marquiſſes of Eſt and of Bentivoglio (*e*), were commonly mingled with the foremoſt combatants, and exhibited a bright example of the moſt heroic valour. The behaviour of the troops correſponded to this example of their general and officers. The Italians and Spaniards on the one hand, and the Walloons and Germans on the other, animated by their leaders, and ſtimulated by ambition to ſurpaſs their companions, diſplayed in every rencounter the moſt determined intrepidity.

THE garriſon therefore, notwithſtanding the moſt obſtinate reſiſtance, were compelled to abandon one part of their fortifications after another; and it ſoon appeared, that in order to ſave themſelves from utter deſtruction, they muſt, ere long, deliver up the town, unleſs prince Maurice ſhould come ſpeedily to their relief.

THIS general had already croſſed the Rhine near Weſel, with an army amounting to fourteen or fifteen thouſand men; and had advanced as far as Alphen, which lies at the diſtance of only a few hours march from Rhineberg. From his approaching ſo near, and from the various movements of his troops, Spinola could not doubt that he intended to attack his intrenchments. He therefore immediately applied himſelf to fortify ſome

(*e*) Nephew to the celebrated hiſtorian of that name.

ſome hills adjoining to his camp; and having ordered ſuch of his forces as had been left for guarding the fort on the oppoſite ſide of the river, to come to his aſſiſtance, he ſtood prepared to accept of battle, in caſe it ſhould be offered by the enemy.

BUT prince Maurice was too prudent, and too well acquainted with the character of Spinola, as well as with the ſtrength of his preſent ſituation, to expoſe his army to ſo great a riſk. From the time when the garriſon had abandoned the fort on the oppoſite ſide of the river, he had deſpaired of being able to raiſe the ſiege, as all communication with the town on that ſide was thereby intercepted, and the enemy enabled to effectuate a junction of their forces. They were now greatly ſuperior to his in number. No precaution had been omitted by their general to prevent a ſurprize. It was impoſſible to attack them without reſolving to try the fortune of a battle. And he conſidered that while the preſervation of Rhineberg would be the only fruit which he could reap from a victory, a defeat muſt be attended with the loſs of other towns of ſtill greater importance, and, at the ſame time, render it practicable for Spinola to execute his firſt plan of an invaſion of the country beyond the Waal; he thought it rather fortunate that this general, with ſo numerous an army, had engaged in an enterprize which could not greatly affect the proſperity of the United Provinces; and hoped that, by his perſiſting in it, he would exhauſt his ſtrength, and loſe what remained of the ſeaſon fit for action.

MANY of prince Maurice's countrymen, however, were diſſatisfied with his inactivity on this occaſion, and the ſtates general ſent deputies to his camp to acquaint him they had expected he would

Book II. would have made an attempt to raiſe the ſiege. But having brought over the deputies to his opinion, he deſpiſed the general cenſure to which his conduct was expoſed, and ſtill adhered to his reſolution.

1606.

By the various movements which he made he prevented the garriſon from deſpairing of his approach; kept the enemy under perpetual alarms; and thus contributed in ſome meaſure to retard their progreſs. But Utenhove, the governor, coming at length to perceive that the prince had no ſerious intention to relieve him, and dreading, if he perſiſted much longer in the defence, that the town might be taken by aſſault, reſolved to capitulate, and offered to deliver up the town upon certain honourable conditions, which Spinola
October 1. readily granted, as the winter ſeaſon was faſt approaching, and his army had already ſuffered ſuch conſiderable diminution that in ſeveral regiments hardly one half of the original number remained at the termination of the ſiege (*f*).

Spinola had hitherto preſerved the moſt perfect diſcipline in his army, and had fully experienced the benefit ariſing from it, in the facility with which he procured ſupplies from the neutral countries adjoining to his camp. But, ſome time before the preſent period, a convoy with a part of his money, having been intercepted by the enemy, and the affairs of ſome merchants, who had accepted his bills, having fallen into diſorder, in conſequence of loſſes ſuſtained at ſea, he was no longer able to pay his troops with the ſame regularity as formerly, and conſiderable arrears had become due. They had begun to complain before

(*f*) Grotius, lib. xv. Van Meteren, lib. xxviii. Bent. parte, iii. lib. vii.

before the termination of the ſiege, and ſoon after the ſame mutinous ſpirit appeared among them, which had ſo often proved pernicious to the Spaniſh intereſt in the Netherlands. Spinola, in his treatment of the mutineers, mingled gentleneſs with ſeverity, and omitted nothing in his power to prevent the infection from becoming general; but his endeavours were in a great meaſure ineffectual. A conſiderable number deſerted, and went over to the enemy's camp; while a body of two thouſand horſe and foot, with ſeveral officers, directed their march towards Breda, and put themſelves under the protection of prince Maurice; who, agreeably to his uſual maxims, reſolved to encourage them in their revolt; and ſent orders to the governor of Breda to grant them permiſſion to fortify their quarters under the cannon of the town, and to purchaſe proviſions from the citizens.

Mutiny and deſertion of Spaniſh troops.

As ſoon as intelligence had reached him of the ſurrender of Rhineberg, Maurice had retired with his army into the province of Overyſſel; and he now reſolved to embrace the opportunity, which the mutiny of Spinola's troops afforded him, to recover ſome of the towns in that province which had been loſt. He firſt attacked Lochem, which he reduced in a few days, and immediately after he laid ſiege to Groll. Spinola, anxious for the preſervation of a place which he deemed of great importance, immediately conceived the deſign of attempting to relieve it, and called a council of war to deliberate on the ſubject. A great majority of his officers endeavoured to perſuade him to relinquiſh his deſign, by arguments drawn from the lateneſs of the ſeaſon, the humidity of the country through which he muſt paſs, joined to the weakneſs of his army, and the pernicious conſequences which muſt

Siege of Groll.

BOOK II. 1606. must accompany a defeat. He was deeply ſenſible of the force of theſe objections. But he conſidered that the loſs of Groll would probably ſoon draw after it that of all his other conqueſts beyond the Rhine; that his late conqueſt of Rhineberg would thereby become in a great meaſure inſignificant, as it derived its importance chiefly from the ſecure communication which it afforded with his other conqueſts; that the glory he had acquired would thus be quickly buried in oblivion; and the fruit of all thoſe labours loſt, which had been attended with ſo great an expence of blood and treaſure.

STIMULATED by theſe motives, he perſiſted in his deſign, though it could not perhaps be juſtified on the principles of prudence; and inſtantly ſelected from his whole army eight thouſand foot, and twelve hundred horſe, on whoſe obedience and bravery he could depend for the execution of any enterprize, however dangerous. Theſe troops were highly pleaſed with the flattering diſtinction which they received, and began their march with every ſymptom of ardour and alacrity.

THE ſucceſs of his enterprize Spinola knew muſt entirely depend on his preventing the enemy from having time to compleat their entrenchments, and with this view he advanced towards them with the utmoſt rapidity, and in a few days arrived within ſight of the town. Prince Maurice, on the other hand, having from the beginning believed that Spinola would not attempt to interrupt his operations, had neglected to employ ſuch precautions as might have obſtructed his approach. Being deſirous to ſpare his men, he had not as uſual drawn any lines of circumvallation round the place, and his camp itſelf had no other defence on one ſide but ſome marſhy ground, which he had

had thought ſufficient to prevent any ſudden incurſion of the enemy. BOOK II. 1606.

IT was in this quarter that Spinola reſolved to begin his attack; and having drawn up his army in four battalions, each of which had a ſmall train of artillery attending them, and a part of the cavalry ſecured by a double row of carriages on their flanks, he firſt rode through the ſeveral ranks, encouraging and exhorting them, and at the ſame time declaring that he was determined either to die or conquer; immediately after which he gave the ſignal to advance.

BUT prince Maurice had from the firſt appearance of the enemy reſolved to decline the combat, and had already began to raiſe the ſiege. He firſt withdrew his troops in good order to an advantageous ſituation, near his camp, where he was free from danger, and ſoon after retired to a greater diſtance from the town. His army was greatly ſuperior in number to that of the enemy; but many of his men were ſickly, and worn out with the fatigues of a long campaign; and the event of battles he conſidered, depended leſs on the numbers than on the intrepidity and vigour of the combatants. To the ignorant his conduct was a matter of cenſure and ſurprize: but, as both his ſkill and courage were unqueſtionable, the conſtraint which he impoſed upon himſelf on this occaſion was, by the more prudent and judicious, deemed deſerving of admiration and applauſe.

SUCH was the concluſion of this campaign, through accidents againſt which no human prudence could provide. Spinola had been diſappointed in his hopes of reducing the interior parts of the United Provinces; but, from his conduct in

BOOK II. 1606. in the ſiege of Rhineberg, and the relief of Groll, all the world were ſatisfied that, on his part, neither abilities nor vigour would have been wanting to carry the plan which he had concerted into ſucceſsful execution (*g*).

(*g*) Piaſecii Chronica. Grotius, lib. xv. Bentivoglio, part. iii. lib. vii. Meteren, lib. xxviii.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK III.

SOON after the tranſactions above related a negociation for peace was begun, in the courſe of which it appeared that neither of the two contending parties were intent on the farther proſecution of the war. But, in order fully to comprehend their views and motives, a more particular account of ſome of their operations at ſea, in the Eaſt Indies, and in America, is neceſſary, than could have been conveniently given in the preceding books. Book III. Negociation for a peace.

IT may juſtly appear ſurpriſing, that a ſtate poſſeſſed of ſo ſmall a territory as the republic of the United Provinces ſhould have been able to ſupport the expence of a war at home againſt ſo potent an enemy. Yet, during the continuance of this war, their exertions were not confined to the Netherlands. They maintained at the ſame time a numerous fleet of ſhips of war, with which they generally proved victorious in all their naval rencounters with the enemy, while they ſucceſsfully attacked his dominions in the moſt diſtant quarters of the globe. They had been much

Book III. much indebted for their ſucceſs in the Low Countries to the aſſiſtance in money and troops which they received from Henry IV. and queen Elizabeth; but as the aid which theſe princes could afford them was never liberal, they muſt have ſunk under the power of their enemies, but for thoſe copious reſources which they opened by the extenſion of their trade.

Progreſs of arts in the Low Countries.

The inhabitants of the Low Countries had for ſeveral centuries been diſtinguiſhed by their induſtry, and their ſkill in manufactures. Even in the time of the Roman republic, they had given proofs of their ſuperior ingenuity (*a*). When by the irruptions of thoſe northern barbarians who overturned the Roman empire, all the uſeful arts of life, as well as letters and ſcience, had been well nigh extinguiſhed, they were firſt revived and ſucceſsfully cultivated by the Flemings, and other inhabitants of the Netherlands. About the middle of the tenth century, free marts, or fairs, were eſtabliſhed by Baldwin, earl of Flanders, to which great numbers of merchants from Germany, France, and other places reſorted, to purchaſe the manufactures in which the Flemings ſo much excelled. The example of Baldwin was imitated by his ſucceſſors for almoſt three centuries, during which period the induſtry and commerce of the Flemings were carried to the greateſt height, and remained unrivalled by the other European nations. But the ſucceeding ſovereigns, finding it neceſſary for defraying the expence of the wars in which they were often engaged with the neighbouring princes, to impoſe various taxes on commodities, great numbers of the manufacturers and merchants, unaccuſtomed to ſuch impoſitions,

(*a*) Eſt ſummæ genus ſolertiæ, atque ad omnia imitanda quæ a quoquo traduntur aptiſſimum. Vide Cæſar, lib. vii.

poſitions, withdrew into Holland, where they were at once free from taxes, and much leſs expoſed to thoſe calamities of war, which they had often experienced in the more open provinces of Flanders and Brabant.

The art of ſalting herrings having, in the fourteenth century, been diſcovered by William Bucrem, a native of Pierulem, in Flanders, the herring trade, which hath proved ſo copious a ſource of wealth and induſtry to the Netherlands, was firſt cultivated by the citizens of Sluys and Bruges; but it was ſoon afterwards communicated to the Dutch, who improved to the utmoſt the advantages which their ſituation afforded them for carrying it on with ſucceſs. They were, at the ſame time, in poſſeſſion of the cod and whale fiſhery; and, while they exported great quantities of fiſh, and of manufactures, they were every year extending their trade in the ſouthern parts of Europe, in the countries which lie round the Baltic, and in thoſe parts of Germany with which they communicated by the Rhine and other rivers which paſs through their territory, before they fall into the ſea.

Before the middle of the ſixteenth century the provinces of Holland and Zealand underwent an important change by the great increaſe of the number of inhabitants, occaſioned by the perſecutions on account of religion in France and Germany. Charles the Fifth had reſolved to extirpate the Proteſtants from his dominions in the Netherlands, as well as from thoſe in Germany; but he had been in a great meaſure deterred from the proſecution of his deſign, partly by the partial affection which he bore towards his Dutch and Flemiſh ſubjects, and partly by his dread of the fatal conſequences, with which the rigorous execution

BOOK III. cution of his edicts might be attended, with regard to their manufactures and their trade.

BOTH the French and German Proteſtants therefore found an aſylum in the Netherlands, and imported thither their families, their wealth, and their induſtry. Of the advantages reſulting from thence Brabant and Flanders participated in common with the more northern maritime provinces, but the intolerant and oppreſſive Spirit of the Spaniſh government prevented them from long enjoying theſe advantages. It was chiefly by the manufacturers and merchants that the opinions of the reformers were embraced; they were perſecuted with the moſt unrelenting fury, and they likewiſe moſt ſeverely felt the burthen of thoſe oppreſſive taxes that were impoſed. By the cruel treatment which they received ſeveral thouſands of them were compelled to withdraw into other countries. Many went over to England, where Elizabeth was ready to afford them her protection. But when the maritime provinces had aſſerted their liberty, and Ghent, Bruges, and Antwerp, after an unſucceſsful ſtruggle, had again ſubmitted to the Spaniſh yoke, by much the greater part of the Flemiſh emigrants retired into Holland or Zealand, and took up their reſidence in Middleburg, Haerlem, Leyden, and Amſterdam. In their new abode they enjoyed the free exerciſe of their religion, a privilege which they deemed a compenſation for every hardſhip they might find it neceſſary to undergo. The country which they had made choice of being of ſmall extent, could not afford ſuſtenance for one third part of its inhabitants. But being ſituated in the heart of Europe, at the mouth of ſeveral navigable rivers, and moſt of the towns communicating with each other by theſe rivers, or by canals, no country could be more commodious either for inland

land or foreign trade. While their ſituation therefore prompted them to apply themſelves to commerce, by the conveniencies which it afforded for carrying it on, they at the ſame time found it neceſſary to engage in it, as the only means of their ſubſiſtence and ſupport. Book III. And commerce.

No branch of it, to which they could find acceſs, or from which any profit could be derived, was neglected; nor did they confine themſelves, like other nations, to the exporting of ſuch of their own commodities as they could ſpare, or the importing of ſuch commodities from other countries as their neceſſities required, but they likewiſe traded for other nations, and had many of their ſhips continually employed in carrying the merchandize of one nation to another. This ſpecies of commerce had been formerly poſſeſſed by the Anſeatick or maritime towns on the Baltick; but the ſituation of the Dutch, between the Northern and Southern European nations, was more commodious for carrying it on. The neceſſity which their circumſtances impoſed upon them, of continual action and employment, had prompted them to engage in it; and their extreme frugality and rigid œconomy, by rendering it practicable for them to trade for ſmaller profits, had enabled them to wreſt it from their competitors, and to engroſs it almoſt wholly to themſelves.

Among the various branches of commerce in which the Dutch diſplayed ſo much activity and enterprize, one of the moſt conſiderable conſiſted in carrying from the countries lying round the Baltick to the different ports in Spain and Portugal, great quantities of corn and naval ſtores; in return for which, beſides fruits, wine, and other productions of thoſe Southern Kingdoms, they received the gold and ſilver of America, and

Book III. the ſpices and other commodities which the Portugueſe imported from India or Liſbon. The period when this branch of trade commenced, cannot be exactly aſcertained. Being of ſmall extent at firſt, it has eſcaped the notice of hiſtorians. But it had become conſiderable ſoon after the beginning of the ſixteenth century, and before the middle of that century, it was deemed a ſpecies of commerce of the firſt importance. It was equally neceſſary to Spain and Portugal as to the United Provinces, and was for this reaſon connived at by the court of Spain for many years after the revolt in the Netherlands; being ſtill carried on by the Dutch themſelves, who found no other precaution neceſſary but to ſail under the flag of ſome neutral power at peace with Spain. But Philip's reſentment againſt his revolted ſubjects being on ſome occaſions too violent to be reſtrained by conſiderations of policy or prudence, the Dutch ſhips were ſometimes confiſcated, the commanders thrown into priſon, and the ſailors either ſent to the gallies, or compelled to ſerve on board the Spaniſh fleet. This monarch having come at length to ſuſpect that the commerce which he had hitherto in ſome meaſure permitted, was of infinitely greater advantage to the enemy than to himſelf, and being deſirous to deprive them of what he believed to be a principal ſource of their increaſing wealth and ſtrength, he reſolved to enforce an edict which he had formerly publiſhed, prohibiting his ſubjects in Spain and Portugal from holding intercourſe with the revolted provinces; the Dutch traders were, in conſequence of this reſolution, every year more harraſſed than the preceding, till the reſtraints and vexations which they ſuffered had become intolerable.

Finding themſelves therefore under the neceſſity of abandoning this gainful traffic, they began to

to conſider whether they might not, in another way, ſecure to themſelves the advantages which they had hitherto derived from it.

HAVING ſo long acted as carriers for the Portugueſe, in diſtributing the rich productions of the Eaſt over the Northern nations, they well knew where to find the ſpeedieſt ſale for theſe productions, and they likewiſe knew that the demand for them was every year increaſing: nor, when they conſidered the great advantages of their ſituation, joined to their ſuperior naval power, could they doubt of being able to deprive the Portugueſe of this profitable trade, provided they could procure the commodities requiſite for carrying it on.

BUT, for this purpoſe, it was neceſſary they ſhould perform a voyage of ſeveral thouſand leagues, through ſeas with which they were unacquainted; that they ſhould viſit countries of which they were almoſt entirely ignorant; and after their arrival there, ſhould enter into a competition with a bold and enterprizing nation, who, beſides being in poſſeſſion of the trade of theſe countries, had eſtabliſhed a formidable military force for its protection. The Dutch, though ſufficiently aware of theſe difficulties, were not thereby deterred from perſiſting in their deſign. In order to ſhorten their voyage, the great extent of which through unknown ſeas, was the principal cauſe of their dread, they made three different attempts to diſcover a paſſage to India, by the Northern Ocean; but theſe attempts, like all others of the ſame kind, proving fruitleſs, they reſolved to undertake the voyage to India by the cuſtomary route, provided they could procure ſome perſon already acquainted with it to conduct them.

BOOK III. IT happened opportunely when they were deliberating on the ſubject, that ſome merchants of Amſterdam received an application from Cornelius Houtman, a native of Flanders, who was in priſon for debt in Liſbon; repreſenting, that having made ſeveral voyages with the Portugueſe to India, he was not only well acquainted with the courſe of navigation thither, but likewiſe with the nature of the India trade; and that, in caſe they would furniſh him with a ſum of money to purchaſe his liberty, he would gladly communicate to them all neceſſary information, and undertake in perſon the conduct of their ſhips. His propoſal was inſtantly accepted, the money which he requeſted for his releaſe, was tranſmitted to him, and ſoon afterwards he arrived at Amſterdam. The merchants, highly ſatisfied with the information which they received from him, and perceiving him to be a man of uncommon penetration and abilities, immediately formed an aſſociation, to which they gave the name of the Company of Diſtant Countries, and equipped a ſquadron, conſiſting of four ſhips, which they put under his command. This little ſquadron had two hundred and fifty men on board, and a hundred pieces of cannon, which were furniſhed by the ſtates; beſides naval and military ſtores, and a variety of merchandize fitted to the taſte of the Indian nations (*b*).

As the principal object of the voyage was to procure more particular information than they yet poſſeſſed concerning the country, and the different branches of trade which it afforded, Houtman was inſtructed, as much as poſſible, to avoid the

(*b*) The two largeſt of theſe ſhips were of two hundred and thirty tons; the third, of one hundred and thirty; and the fourth, of fifty. The value of the whole equipment was eſtimated at four hundred thouſand florins.

the ſettlements of the Portugueſe, and carefully to abſtain from all hoſtilities, when they were not neceſſary for his defence: nor was he inattentive to theſe inſtructions; he might, in his way to India, have ſeized a rich carrack in which the archbiſhop of Goa was returning home; but though he went on board that veſſel, in order to procure intelligence, he ſuffered it to proceed on its voyage without moleſtation. Book III.

After viſiting the coaſts of Africa and Brazil, he doubled the Cape of Good Hope, and proceeded to the iſle of Madagaſcar, in which iſland and that of St. Mary he was detained for ſome time, in conſequence of a diſſenſion which happened between him and the other commanders, with regard to the route which it was proper to purſue. From St. Mary he at length proceeded to Sumatra, and from thence to Bantam, in the iſland of Java, where he began to purchaſe pepper and other ſpiceries. At firſt he was well received, and no averſion was diſcovered by the natives to enter into a commercial treaty with him; but the jealouſy of the Portugueſe merchants, a conſiderable number of whom reſided at Bantam, being inſtantly alarmed, they reſolved to exert their influence to effectuate his ruin. For this end, carrying rich preſents in their hands, the only means of procuring acceſs to the princes of India, they repreſented the Dutch to the king or general of Bantam as pirates, and the common enemies of human kind, of whoſe rapine and violence his ſubjects would ſoon have fatal experience, if they did not embrace the preſent opportunity, when they were few in number, to cut them off, and to prevent their return. The governor, ignorant, and therefore credulous, was eaſily perſuaded of the truth of this repreſentation, and conſented to follow the counſel that was given him. But diſtruſting his ability to deſtroy

Operations in the Indies.

June, 1596.

Book III. them by open force, he reſolved to employ fraud and treachery. He pretended an inclination to have a commercial treaty, which had been propoſed by the Dutch, concluded, and deſired that Houtman and the other officers would come to his palace to adjuſt the terms. Suſpecting no deceit, Houtman, and one or two more, complied with his requeſt, and were immediately taken into cuſtody. The governor had abſurdly believed that all the officers would have accepted his invitation, and that the ſhips, having no perſons on board that were fit to command them, would then have become an eaſy prey. Being diſappointed in this expectation, he dreaded the conſequences of putting his priſoners to death, while their companions remained at liberty to take vengeance on him for his perfidy. Still, however, he detained them in priſon, and refuſed to liſten to the repeated ſolicitations of their friends in their behalf; till the Dutch ſhips having begun to cannonade the town, and laid part of it in ruins, he at length reſtored them to their liberty.

Soon after this, Houtman finding, on a review of his men, that by death, occaſioned chiefly by the climate, they had ſuffered a diminution of more than one third of their number, ordered one of his ſhips to be burnt, and ſet ſail for Europe with the reſt; carrying with him ſome of the natives of Madagaſcar and Sumatra, a Japaneſe, a Chineſe, and a pilot of the name of Abdul, diſtinguiſhed for his knowledge of the Indian ſeas. After a proſperous voyage of between five and ſix months, he arrived ſafe in the Texel in the beginning of Auguſt, 1597, having ſpent almoſt two years and a half in his expedition. He hardly brought home with him wealth ſufficient to defray the expence of his equipment; but both he and his companions were now able to give

give the moſt ſatisfactory information to their employers. The Indians too, whom he had induced to accompany him, were likely to be afterwards of the greateſt uſe; and the hopes which his countrymen conceived of greater ſucceſs in their future voyages, were raiſed to the greateſt height (*c*).

The Portugueſe, they knew, would give all the oppoſition in their power to every attempt which they could make, either to eſtabliſh their trade, or to procure a ſettlement in India; but, from the accounts which they had received of the declining power of the Portugueſe, and of the manner in which the eaſtern nations were affected towards them, they hoped to be able, either to elude, or to counteract their malignity.

A bolder and more enterpriſing ſpirit had never been diſplayed than the Portugueſe had manifeſted in their numerous conqueſts and diſcoveries; and no conqueſts, ſo extenſive and important, had been ever made with ſo ſmall a force, or by a nation poſſeſſed of ſuch ſcanty reſources. Animated at once by almoſt all the paſſions which moſt powerfully impel the human mind, by avarice, by bigotry, and by ambition, they had performed exploits, which ſeemed to be beyond the power of man, and were regarded by all thoſe barbarous nations, over whom they triumphed with ſo great facility, as more than men. They had made themſelves maſters of all the more important parts of the coaſt of Guinea. They had expelled the Arabians from that of Zanguebar, where they had formed ſettlements, which gave them the command of all the gold and ſilver

Portugueſe ſettlements in India.

(*c*) Meteren, lib. xvii. & xviii. Antonii Thyſii Hiſtoria Navalis, Lugd. Batav. 4to. 1657, p. 117, &c.

Book III. ſilver mines in their country, from Sofala to Melinda. They had acquired a decided ſuperiority over the Egyptians, though aided by the Venetians, in the Red Sea; and had thus put an entire ſtop to that gainful trade which the Venetians had ſo long carried on with India, by the way of Suez and Alexandria. Their arms had been attended with equal ſucceſs in the Perſian Gulf, and on the coaſts of Perſia, Malabar, and Malacca. They had acquired poſſeſſion of Ceylon, and the Molucca and Sunda iſlands; and, by their eſtabliſhment at Macao, they had ſecured to themſelves the trade of China and Japan.

Had the Portugueſe, at the preſent period, poſſeſſed the ſame vigour and intrepidity of which they had given ſuch conſpicuous proof on their firſt arrival in India, it is probable that any attempt to diſpoſſeſs them would have proved abortive: but they were no longer the ſame people as before. The firſt conquerors of India were all extinct; and their ſucceſſors, a few only excepted, were men defiled with the moſt odious vices, which rendered them a ſcourge to the people committed to their care. Removed to ſo great a diſtance from the ſeat of government, as gave them hopes of impunity for the moſt flagitious crimes; corrupted by proſperity, and enervated by the climate, while their religion, of the moſt illiberal kind, only ſerved to render them more ferocious, their conduct towards the natives was equally oppreſſive and perfidious. Attempts were made, by ſome virtuous viceroys, to reform the numberleſs abuſes which had been committed; but theſe great men, whoſe names are handed down to poſterity with juſt applauſe, were too few in number, and their government of too ſhort continuance, to produce any permanent effect. Corruption of every kind had ſtruck its root too deep to be ſo

eaſily

eaſily extirpated; and the natives, who had been long diſguſted, began to feel contempt, mixed with abhorrence of their oppreſſors, in the room of that reſpect and dread which they had formerly been accuſtomed to entertain.

AFTER the ſubjection of Portugal to the crown of Spain, the affairs of the Portugueſe in India were more than ever neglected by the government at home, and diſorders of every kind were increaſed and multiplied. It was believed by ſome perſons, that Philip II. agreeably to the maxims of his malignant policy, was well pleaſed that the power of his new ſubjects ſhould ſuffer a diminution, as he would thereby find it eaſier to maintain his uſurped authority. But it is more reaſonable to ſuppoſe that his attention being wholly engroſſed by objects, which he judged to be of greater importance, he had not leiſure to attend to the affairs in India; and found it, therefore, in ſome meaſure neceſſary to leave the ſeveral governors at liberty to act without controul. However this be, it is certain that they acted more like independent monarchs than the ſubjects of one common prince, to whom they were accountable for their conduct, and ſeemed to have forgotten the relation which they had bore, and the duties which they owed, both to their country and to one another; while each individual was ſolely attentive to his private intereſt, and ſeldom ſcrupled to promote it at the expence either of faith or of humanity. The natives had, on different occaſions, taken arms, and attempted to vindicate their rights againſt their lawleſs oppreſſors. Their efforts hitherto had not been vigorous, nor attended in the iſſue with ſucceſs; but they were become more than ever impatient under the injuries which they ſuffered, and longed for an opportunity to aſſert their liberty.

SUCH

BOOK III. SUCH was the ſtate of the Portugueſe, and ſuch the diſpoſition of the natives with regard to them, when the Dutch made their firſt voyage to the Indies. They were thereby encouraged to perſiſt in their attempt to eſtabliſh trade in thoſe parts; and a ſpirit of enterprize and adventure was excited, which ſoon diffuſed itſelf over all the maritime provinces. The Spaniſh miniſters imprudently contributed to quicken this adventurous ſpirit, and to confirm the Dutch in the reſolution they had formed, by republiſhing, ſoon after the acceſſion of the preſent king, an edict, prohibiting the Spaniards and Portugueſe from all commercial intercourſe with them in the ſtricteſt manner, and under the ſevereſt penalties. They might have perceived the folly of this meaſure from the effects which their former reſtrictions on the Dutch trade had already produced; but they attended only to the immediate inconvenience which was occaſioned thereby to the enemy, without conſidering either the advantages which the Dutch might ultimately derive from their prohibition, or the prejudice which the Spaniards and Portugueſe were likely to ſuſtain.

BY the advice of the count de Fuentes, a nobleman of great abilities, but naturally haughty and ſevere, and extremely ignorant of the commercial intereſt of his country, the prohibitory edict was carried into the moſt rigorous execution. A ſtrict enquiry was made, at all the ſeaports of Spain and Portugal, whether any of the Dutch had come thither under the colours of any neutral power; and as a conſiderable number were diſcovered to have been guilty of this temerity, their ſhips and goods were confiſcated, and they themſelves either caſt into priſon, or ſent to the gallies, and condemned to work as ſlaves.

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THE ſtates general, in order to expreſs their contempt of this conduct of the Spaniſh court, publiſhed an edict, in which, beſides prohibiting all intercourſe between their ſubjects and thoſe of the king of Spain, they declared, that they would treat as enemies the ſubjects of all neutral powers, who ſhould carry commodities, of whatever kind, to the ports of Spain, Portugal, or Flanders.

To this manifeſto, copies of which were ſent to the courts of the ſeveral maritime powers, no anſwer was returned, nor any objection made, by the ſtates or princes who received it; and the French monarch gave, on this occaſion, a ſtriking proof of his favour for the Dutch, by publiſhing a declaration, that if any of his ſubjects ſhould, for the ſpace of ſix months, adventure to trade with Spain, they muſt do it at their private riſk, without the hopes of his protection.

WHILE the Dutch in this manner ſhewed their contempt of the Spaniſh trade, and the prohibitory edict, being more than ever intent on proſecuting the trade which they had begun in India, ſeveral different aſſociations were formed by the merchants in Holland and Zealand, almoſt immediately after the return of their fleet under the command of Houtman; and before the end of the following year, more than eighty ſhips, completely equipped, and furniſhed with various articles of commerce, were ſent out; the greater part of them to the Eaſt Indies, and ſome to the Weſt, and to the coaſts of Africa, while others were ordered to attempt the paſſage by the Streights of Magellan into the Pacific Ocean.

Dutch trade in both Indies, and on the coaſt of Africa.

THEY were divided into ſmall fleets, conſiſting chiefly of four, ſix, or eight armed veſſels, from about

Book III. about one hundred and fifty to three and four hundred tons, ſome of which had regular troops on board, that were furniſhed by Prince Maurice and the ſtates. Their inſtructions were nearly the ſame as thoſe which had been given to the commanders employed in the firſt expedition, to avoid the ſettlements of the Portugueſe and, as much as poſſible, to abſtain from hoſtilities. But it was impoſſible for them ſtrictly to comply with theſe inſtructions. Their enemies were ſpread almoſt every where over the coaſts which they viſited; and being equally animated by jealouſy, and by reſentment, were reſolved to give them all the oppoſition, and to do them all the miſchief in their power. They had laboured to inſpire the natives with the ſame malignity; and on the minds of ſome of them their miſrepreſentations had produced the deſired effect. It was not only the dangers, therefore, of voyages, ſo long and difficult, through climates the moſt adverſe to the human conſtitution, which the Dutch encountered in the proſecution of their deſign; but, after their arrival on thoſe coaſts, where the trade, which they deſired to eſtabliſh, muſt be carried on, they found it neceſſary to fight, and to negociate by turns. They had the prejudices of the natives to overcome; and they were obliged to ſtand perpetually on their guard againſt the machinations of the Portugueſe, who practiſed every method which they could deviſe to accompliſh their deſtruction, whether of ſecred fraud, or open force and violence.

The Portugueſe had no ſuch formidable oppoſition to encounter, when they firſt arrived in India. The ſhips of their enemies were few in number, and much inferior to their's, both in reſpect of ſtrength and ſize; and the towns which they attacked were weakly fortified, and unſkilfully

fully defended by a daſtardly, effeminate, and feeble race of men. Whereas the Dutch encountered fleets of ſhips of the ſame conſtruction as their own, and were obliged to contend with an enemy, who, beſides being accuſtomed to the climate, and familiarly acquainted with the Indian ſeas, were not leſs diſtinguiſhed than themſelves for their naval and military ſkill.

But their conduct was wiſely adapted to their circumſtances, being equally prudent whether it reſpected the natives or the Portugueſe. They ſoon convinced the former of the falſhood of thoſe injurious aſperſions which the latter had caſt upon their character; and by the moderation, juſtice, and humanity, which they diſplayed in all their dealings, proved that, in purity of manners, they were much ſuperior to their accuſers. They were ſoon allowed to trade in many places, from whence the Portugueſe had laboured to exclude them; and as with indefatigable induſtry they improved to the utmoſt every advantage which they enjoyed, they came, ere long, to procure admiſſion to ſeveral of the moſt important branches of commerce.

As the extenſion of their trade, and not conqueſt, was the great object which they purſued, they avoided all unneceſſary rencounters with the Portugueſe; but they were generally well prepared to defend themſelves when attacked, gave many proofs of the moſt determined bravery, and ſometimes triumphed over the ſuperior force and numbers of the enemy. Still, however, they kept the great end of their voyages perpetually in view. The ſame time which they found it neceſſary to ſpend in repairing the damages ſuſtained in battle, was likewiſe employed in trading with the natives; and as ſoon as their cargoes were complete, and their

Book III. their damages repaired, they returned to Holland: thus enriching their employers, and enabling them not only to defray the expence of their equipment, but to exert themſelves with redoubled vigour in the proſecution of their deſigns.

Although ſome of the numberleſs voyages which they had undertaken, had, through miſconduct or croſs accidents, proved unfortunate, they had been in general ſufficiently ſucceſsful to render it their intereſt to perſevere. The ſocieties, however, of merchants, by whom the Indian trade had been carried on, were not ſatisfied with the profits which it afforded. They complained that too great a number of adventurers had engaged in it; and that in conſequence thereof, as they muſt pay much higher prices for Indian goods than had been formerly given by the Portugueſe, ſo they found it neceſſary to ſell them much cheaper; and would either be ruined by their efforts to eſtabliſh this new branch of commerce, or obliged to abandon it altogether.

This evil, which could hardly have been apprehended in the beginning of a trade, attended with ſo great expence and danger, would probably have ſoon been remedied by a diminution of the number of competitors, the natural conſequence of ſmall profits in any branch of commerce; and if the evil complained of, had been the only reaſon for the interpoſition of the ſtates, it may be queſtioned whether they ought to have interpoſed. But, beſides this, there was another reaſon of greater weight. The Portugueſe in India, being under the direction of their governors or viceroys, could more eaſily act in concert, than the great number of independent Dutch ſocieties: and the ſmall fleets or ſingle ſhips, belonging to theſe ſocieties, were expoſed to the danger

ger of being ſeparately attacked and deſtroyed one after another, by an enemy with whom if they too could act in concert, they might be able to contend. Determined by theſe conſiderations, the ſtates general in the year 1602, united the ſeveral ſocieties of traders into one body, under the name of the Eaſt India company; on which, beſides the excluſive privilege of trading beyond the Cape of Good Hope on the one hand, and the Straights of Magellan on the other; they conferred the power of adminiſtering juſtice, of building forts, of appointing governors and garriſons, of raiſing troops, and of making peace and war with the Indian princes. A fund, amounting to more than ſix millions of florins, was immediately ſubſcribed for by the merchants in the principal maritime towns, and managers were appointed, under whoſe direction all the trade to India was henceforth to be carried on. This company being the firſt regular commercial ſociety, of which we read in hiſtory, has ſerved in ſome meaſure as a model to all the trading companies that have been created in modern times. It conſiſted chiefly of thoſe who had been engaged as private adventurers in the Indian trade; and by theſe men, who had profited from their former errors, and were well acquainted with that trade in all its branches, the affairs of the company were, from the beginning, conducted with conſummate ſkill; nor was their good fortune inferior to the prudence which they diſplayed. Having, by their juſtice and moderation, extinguiſhed thoſe groundleſs prejudices againſt their national character, which the Portugueſe had laboured to inſtil into the minds of the Indian princes, they were almoſt every where received with favour, and in ſeveral places obtained permiſſion to eſtabliſh factories, and to build forts for the protection of their trade. They were requeſted by

Dutch Eaſt India Company.

ſome

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ſome of theſe princes, to lend their aſſiſtance in expelling the Portugueſe, and in their rencounters with that nation they generally came off victorious. They made innumerable captures of their richeſt ſhips. Their trade was every year more widely extended, and the profits ariſing from it, were greater than they had been accuſtomed to derive from any former branch of commerce. The principal cauſes of their weakneſs have been already explained, and to theſe muſt be added this conſideration, that, on the other hand, the trade and power of the Portugueſe were quickly haſtening to decay. While their rivals were every ſeaſon receiving reinforcements both of ſhips and troops, they were left unſupported by their friends in Europe, to ſtruggle with the difficulties which ſurrounded them. The ſtrength of Portugal had long been exhauſted by the too numerous emigration of its inhabitants, and the Spaniſh miniſters, beſides that their attention was entirely occupied by other objects, found more than ſufficient employment at home for all the force and treaſure which they poſſeſſed.

IT was this reaſon, and not, as has been ſuppoſed, the deſire of having Portugal reduced to a ſtate of weakneſs, and thereby rendered more tame and obſequious, that prevented the Court of Spain from affording that aſſiſtance to the Portugueſe in India, which their exigencies ſo much required at the preſent period. They were almoſt equally inattentive, or equally unable to afford ſupport to the Spaniſh traders and coloniſts as to the Portugueſe. Many captures were made of their ſhips loaded with the treaſures of America and the Indies. Their fleets were ſometimes blocked up in their harbours, till the ſeaſon fit for entering on their voyages had elapſed; and their ſettlements on the coaſts were often plundered, ſom[illegible]

ſometimes by the Dutch, and ſometimes by the Engliſh, with impunity. BOOK III. 1602.

NOR was it only in the Indies, and on the coaſts of America, that the ſubjects of the Spaniſh monarchy were expoſed to the depredations of their enemies. While the war with England ſubſiſted, the coaſts of Spain itſelf had been inſulted both by the Dutch and Engliſh, and many ſhips in the harbours either taken or deſtroyed. After the eſtabliſhment of peace with France and England, the Spaniſh miniſters had conceived the hopes of finding it eaſy, not only to reſiſt the moſt vigorous efforts of the Dutch, but ere long, to reduce them to obedience. But although they had now only a ſingle enemy to contend with, whom they had long been accuſtomed to deſpiſe, that enemy, through the great increaſe of their trade and navigation, were become more powerful, while they themſelves, from the decay of their trade and other cauſes, were much weaker than before. For ſome time paſt, therefore, the Spaniards had found it equally difficult to defend themſelves againſt the Dutch alone, as they had done formerly againſt the Dutch, and Engliſh, and French united.

PHILIP's miniſters were not ignorant of the ſources from whence the Dutch had received ſo great an acceſſion of wealth and power; and of one of theſe we have ſeen, they had in vain endeavoured to deprive them, by the prohibition of their trade with Spain and Portugal. Another not leſs copious they knew, was their cod and herring fiſhery, on the coaſt of England and the Netherlands; and to deprive them of this, and at the ſame time, to intercept their navigation in the narrow ſeas, between the ſouthern and northern ſtates of Europe, had for ſome years been a

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principal object of their attention. It was with this view that all thoſe gallies had been equipped, which, as formerly related, had been intruſted to the command of Frederick de Spinola; and with the ſame view there had been fitted out at Nieuport and Dunkirk a great number of armed veſſels, from which the Dutch ſuffered conſiderable moleſtation in their coaſting trade and fiſhery. But all Spinola's gallies had either been deſtroyed or had fallen into the hands of the Dutch, when they got poſſeſſion of Sluys; and the States having provided ſome ſhips of war on purpoſe, had, on ſome occaſions, taken ſignal vengeance on the privateers of Nieuport and Dunkirk, the crews of which they always treated as pirates, and either hanged or drowned. Their fleets now rode triumphant from the Baltic to the ſtreights of Gibralter, and their European as well as their African and Indian trade was at this time in a much more flouriſhing condition than ever (*d*).

The Spaniards attempt to deſtroy the Dutch commerce.

The courts of Spain and Bruſſels had long beheld this ſuperiority of the naval power of the Dutch, with much anxiety. They dreaded from it the utter extinction of their commerce; and perceived, that in order to prevent this effect, it would, ere long, be neceſſary to put a period to the war. Nor did peace appear to be leſs neceſſary, when they conſidered what had hitherto been the iſſue of their military operations at land, than when they reflected on the numberleſs loſſes which they had ſuſtained at ſea. Their moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to reduce the revolted provinces

Cauſes which induced the Spaniſh miniſters to wiſh for peace.

(*d*) Recueil des Voyages &c. Van Meteren paſſim; --- Grotius. De Wit's Maxims --- Thyſii Hiſt. navalis, paſſim. Huet on the Dutch Commerce. Janizon Etat preſent des Prov. Un. Recueil des voyages qui ont ſervi a l'Etabliſſement & aux Progrès de la Compagne des Indes Orientales formèe dans les Provinces Unies des Pais-Bas, a Rouen, 1725.

vinces to obedience had ſerved only to render the people more expert, and more obſtinate in their defence; to ſtrengthen the bond of their internal union; and to confirm the neighbouring powers in their reſolution of affording them aſſiſtance and ſupport. The maritime provinces almoſt ſurrounded by the ſea, and every where interſected by the rivers and canals, had hitherto been found impregnable; and the ſouthern frontier had lately been ſtrengthened by the acquiſition of ſome of the ſtrongeſt places in Flanders and Brabant, Sluys and Breda. BOOK III. 1607.

THE Marquis of Spinola had wiſely directed his attack againſt the confederates in that quarter, where they were the worſt prepared for reſiſtance. The army which he commanded, had been the moſt numerous which could poſſibly be collected.

THROUGH the united exertions which had been made by the arch-dukes, the court of Spain, and by the marquis himſelf, who had mortgaged his ample fortune in order to procure money, his troops having regularly received their pay, had been kept under the ſtricteſt diſcipline. All his operations had been conducted with conſummate ſkill; and nothing had been omitted on his part which might have enſured ſucceſs; yet he had been utterly unable to ſurmount the difficulties which he encountered. Inſtead of penetrating into the interior provinces, he had been obliged to reſt ſatisfied with conqueſts, from whence no ſolid advantage could be derived. From the fatigues which they had undergone, and the moiſture of the climate, the army had lately ſuffered conſiderable diminution. Thoſe funds from whence the marquis had defrayed the expences of the laſt campaign, had for ſeveral months been

BOOK III. 1607. almoſt entirely exhauſted; and conſiderable arrears being now reſting to the ſoldiers, the ſame mutinous ſpirit by which they had formerly been actuated, had again begun to appear. A part of them as above mentioned, had already abandoned their officers; and having choſen others from among themſelves, had begun to indulge themſelves in every ſpecies of licentiouſneſs. To theſe diſorders no adequate remedy could poſſibly be applied during the continuance of the war. All the money which could be raiſed in the Netherlands, or furniſhed by the court of Spain, would be hardly ſufficient to defray the expence of the new levies which muſt be made before the next campaign. And in the mean time the licentious ſpirit of the mutineers muſt diffuſe itſelf throughout the army; and both the army itſelf and the provinces, be thereby expoſed an eaſy prey to a watchful enemy; who, being poſſeſſed of more certain reſources for carrying on the war, had been always ready to avail themſelves of every advantage that was afforded them (*e*).

BESIDES theſe conſiderations there were ſome others, which with Philip and his miniſters, were ſuppoſed to have had ſtill greater weight. A report at that time prevailed, that the Dutch, having entered into a correſpondence with the Moors on the coaſt of Barbary, had agreed to furniſh them with ſhips to tranſport an army into Spain. And another report was likewiſe propagated, that the French monarch having formed the deſign of annexing the Netherlands to France, was now prepared and reſolved to carry it into execution. It does not appear, that there was any juſt foundation for either of theſe reports. But they ſeem to have made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of the

(*e*) Grotius Lib. XV. Bentiv, art xiii. lib. viii.

the Spaniſh miniſters; who dreading that either an interruption of that domeſtic tranquillity which Spain had ſo long enjoyed, or the entire loſs of the Netherlands, muſt be the conſequence of the continuance of the war, were now more deſirous than ever to have it brought to a concluſion.

The Archduke Albert ſolicitous for peace, and why.

THE archduke was ſtill more ſolicitous for peace than the Spaniſh miniſters. From the commencement of his ſovereignty he had lived in perpetual diſquietude. He had fully experienced the vanity of his hopes of ſucceſs from the ſupport of Spain, which he knew to be too much exhauſted, and removed at too great a diſtance from the ſcene of action, to afford him the aſſiſtance that was neceſſary. He had no heirs of his own body to whom he could tranſmit his dominions. And both he and the infanta, beſides being ſenſibly affected by the calamities in which their ſubjects were involved, were deſirous to paſs the remainder of their days in peace.

Peace recommended by Spinola.

THEY were confirmed in their reſolution by the marquis of Spinola, who did not heſitate in adviſing peace, notwithſtanding the renown which he had acquired from his conduct of the war. But his ambition being tempered with prudence and moderation, he wiſely judged it better to reſt ſatisfied with the glory which he had already gained, than to run the riſk of expoſing himſelf to reproach, by attempting what he knew to be impoſſible. He was better acquainted than any other perſon with the difficulties to be encountered in the proſecution of the war, and therefore exerted all his influence to perſuade the archduke and the Spaniſh miniſters of the folly of perſiſting in their attempt. The time might come, he repreſented, when the confederates divided among themſelves,

(*f*) Memorie recondite, Vol. i. p. 418.

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themſelves, and no longer ſupported by ſo powerful an ally as the king of France, might be induced or compelled to return to their allegiance; but while, through their dread of Spain, their internal union was preſerved inviolate, and a prince ſo near them, poſſeſſed of ſuch inexhauſtible reſources, ever ready to lend them his aſſiſtance, as it was abſurd to expect to bring the war to the deſired iſſue, ſo the conſequences of perſiſting in it muſt prove equally ruinous to the dominions of the archdukes, and to the Spaniſh monarchy (*g*).

Albert offers peace to the confederacy.

ALBERT, who entertained the moſt profound reſpect for Spinola's judgment, being now more firmly than ever perſuaded, that peace was neceſſary, reſolved, whatever conſtruction might be put upon his conduct, to make the confederates an offer of it without delay. Having previouſly ſounded their inclinations, by two perſons of the names of Wittenhorſt and Gevart, he ſome time after ſent theſe men back to Holland, with inſtructions ſigned by himſelf and the infanta (*h*).

Prince Maurice oppoſes an overture for peace.

THESE inſtructions they firſt communicated privately to ſeveral individuals, and afterwards requeſted to be permitted to lay them before the aſſembly of the ſtates. The members were of different opinions with regard to the expediency of granting them this permiſſion: and prince Maurice endeavoured to diſſuade the ſtates from granting it, by expreſſing his apprehenſions that ſome inſidious deſign was covered under the preſent propoſal, and that as no treaty with Spain, or with the archdukes, while they were ſo entirely governed in all their conduct by the court of Spain, could be productive of any good effect, ſo the

(*g*) Bentivoglio Grotius, Baudius, &c.

(*h*) Dated January 3, 1607.

the granting of a public audience to the commiſſioners would only ſerve to inſpire the people with fallacious hopes of peace, and ſo damp their zeal in the proſecution of the war.

BUT Maurice yielded (*i*), on this occaſion, to the perſuaſions of the celebrated John Olden Barnevelt, penſioner of Holland; one of the greateſt ſtateſmen of the age, and equally eminent for his public ſpirit as his political abilities and integrity. By this venerable patriot it was urged, that while the king of Great Britain ſtood an idle ſpectator of the war, and the French monarch ſeemed to have ſome great object in view, which he deemed of more importance than the ſupport of the Dutch republick, both theſe princes were well pleaſed to obſerve the Spaniards exhauſt their ſtrength by an obſtinate perſeverance in the war with the Netherlands; and would probably be more liberal in their offers of aſſiſtance to the ſtates than they had hitherto been if there were a negociation begun for the eſtabliſhment of peace. A great majority of the aſſembly, with Maurice himſelf, came readily into this opinion, and the commiſſioners were readily admitted to an audience. They repreſented that the archdukes, being deſirous to put an end to the calamities of war, were ready to enter into treaty with them, either for eſtabliſhing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, and would conſent to ſuch reaſonable terms as they could not ſuppoſe would be rejected by the United Provinces. That the ſtates could not be ignorant of the equity of the pretenſions of the archdukes; that in all their conduct they had ſhewn how averſe they were to every ſevere and arbitrary meaſure in the government of their ſubjects; that they would claim nothing to which they

Peace ſtrenuouſly recommended by Barnevelt.

(*i*) It does not appear to have been candour or conviction. Vide Jeannin tom. iii. 106, 107.

Book III. 1607. they had not the moſt unqueſtionable title; and that the ſtates might aſſuredly depend on receiving from them every ſort of ſatisfaction and ſecurity they could require for the full enjoyment of their rights and privileges.

To this propoſal the ſtates, after an interval of a few days, replied, that no regard could be paid to what the commiſſioners had delivered in the aſſembly; ſince the archdukes, it appeared, ſtill perſiſted in ſuppoſing themſelves poſſeſſed of a right to the ſovereignty of the United Provinces. That in the ſolemn deed, entitled the Union of Utrecht, the ſtates having, on the juſteſt grounds, renounced the authority of the king of Spain, had aſſerted their liberty and independence; that this deed had been recognized by many of the European ſtates and princes; that they had long maintained their liberty by force of arms; and were ſtill determined to maintain it to the laſt extremity; and to reject every propoſal for treating with the archduke or the king of Spain, either for a truce or a perpetual peace, unleſs they were acknowledged as a free ſtate, over which theſe princes could pretend to no authority.

The United States inſiſt on a recognition of their freedom.

With this anſwer the commiſſioners returned to Bruſſels, from whence they wrote a letter to the ſtates, acquainting them that, by the propoſal which had been made, the archduke did not mean to claim any authority over them, or to introduce any change into their form of government; but, leaving all their laws and inſtitutions on their preſent footing, to put a period to the miſeries attendant upon war, by a peace or truce; and, ſoon afterwards, another commiſſioner was ſent into Holland, in whom it ſhould ſeem Albert could put greater confidence than in his firſt commiſſioners. This perſon was Ney, or Neyen, a native

native of Antwerp, who had been educated in the Proteſtant religion, but having afterwards embraced the Popiſh faith, had reſided for ſeveral years in Spain, and was at this time general of the order of Franciſcans; a man of conſiderable learning, and of great integrity and abilities, and highly diſtinguiſhed for his eloquence and addreſs. Having been upwards of twenty years of age before he left the Netherlands, he retained a warm affection for his native country; he was at the ſame time animated with zeal to ſignalize himſelf in the ſervice of the archdukes and the court of Spain, and undertook the taſk impoſed upon him with great alacrity. BOOK III. 1607.

He had no ſooner after his arrival in Holland had an interview with ſome of the principal perſons in the republic than he diſcovered that it would be vain to hope for ſucceſs in the execution of his embaſſy, unleſs the ſtates were in the treaty propoſed to be acknowledged free and independent, and for this reaſon he immediately returned to Bruſſels, in order to convince the archdukes of the neceſſity of making this conceſſion.

These princes, conformably to the tenor of the above mentioned letter, written by Wittenhorſt and Gevart, at their deſire, were willing to agree that no mention ſhould be made in the treaty of their right of ſovereignty, but expreſly to diſclaim this right, and formally to acknowledge the ſovereignty of the ſtates, they conſidered as equally dangerous and diſhonourable. It would be in words to acknowledge what in their hearts they muſt diſavow; it would be to give their ſanction to rebellion, and thereby to afford encouragement to their ſubjects to imitate the example of the revolted provinces.

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BEING conſcious however, from the ſtate of their finances, that they were utterly unable to carry on the war, they reſolved, in conformity to the advice of their counſellors, to yield at leaſt ſo far as to impower their commiſſioners to declare, that they were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority: a form of expreſſion which might be adopted they thought conſiſtently with their honour, as it only denoted a matter of fact, but did not import either a renunciation of their own right to the ſovereignty, or an acknowledgment of a right inherent in the ſtates to independence.

A letter from the archdukes to the United States.

IN the hopes however that it might ſatisfy the confederates, Ney was immediately ſent back to the Hague with a letter addreſſed to the ſtates, and ſigned both by Albert and Iſabella, of which the following were the principal contents: that being extremely ſolicitous to put a ſtop to the effuſion of human blood, they were ready to treat with the United States as with a free people, from whom they claimed no ſubmiſſion or obedience: that they were willing to treat either for the purpoſe of eſtabliſhing a perpetual peace, or a long truce, of twelve, fifteen, or twenty years, during the continuance of which the contending parties ſhould retain what they at preſent poſſeſſed; unleſs it ſhould be mutually agreed, for the common intereſt of both, to make an exchange of certain towns and territories: that, in order to prevent all ſuſpicion of fraud or ſiniſter intention, ambaſſadors, natives of the Netherlands, ſhould be nominated by the archdukes, and an equal number named by the United States: that the ſtates ſhould have their choice of the time and place of meeting; and that while the negociation was carrying on, there ſhould be an entire ſuſpenſion

ſion of hoſtilities for eight months, both by ſea and land. BOOK III. 1607.

FROM the ſequel it will appear that all the members of the ſtates were not equally diſpoſed to agree to theſe propoſals; but by a great majority they were thought a ſufficient ground for a negociation or treaty.

No objection was made to the words in which the declaration of the independence of the republic was expreſſed. The ſtates, conſcious of the ſuperiority of their naval force, refuſed to conſent to the ceſſation of hoſtilities at ſea; but they agreed that no hoſtile enterprize ſhould be undertaken againſt any of the towns or provinces of the Netherlands, and no new forts erected. It was declared that the truce of eight months ſhould commence on the fourth of May: and the archdukes engaged to procure a ratification of the preſent convention, including the declaratory clauſe, within three months, from the king of Spain (*b*).

THIS agreement having been firſt made with Ney, and a few days after confirmed in proper form by Albert and Iſabella, was immediately communicated by the ſtates general to the particular ſtates, and a day of thankſgiving to Heaven for the proſpect of peace appointed to be obſerved throughout the provinces.

THE people in general ſincerely rejoiced on this occaſion, and were greatly elated when they reflected on the proof which the propoſal and conceſſion of the archdukes afforded of the difficulties to which they were reduced. The proſpect of peace matter of joy to the people of the United Provinces.

THE

(*b*) Grotius, lib. xvi. Baudius, lib. i, Bentivoglio, lib. viii. and Meteren, liv. xxviii.

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THE war had now ſubſiſted for almoſt forty years; and though, during a part of that time, only ſome of them had been much expoſed to the calamities which are commonly attendant upon war, in the immediate ſcenes of action, yet moſt of them had experienced theſe calamities in ſome degree. They had, on numberleſs occaſions, been diſquieted with the moſt dreadful apprehenſions; and they had long groaned under the weight of thoſe enormous taxes, which the ſupporting of ſo many fleets and armies make it neceſſary to impoſe.

A party in the United States repreſent the archdukes propoſals as inſidious.

THERE was a conſiderable proportion however of the people whoſe intereſt and proſperity depended on the continuance of the war, and particularly thoſe who held employments, which muſt either be ſuppreſſed, or rendered much leſs lucrative in the time of peace. By ſuch perſons peace was no leſs dreaded than it was deſired by the generality of their countrymen; and the archdukes propoſals were repreſented as deceitful and inſidious. Unhappily many of the clergy joined in repreſenting them in this light; and, by their inflammatory harangues from the pulpit, contributed to encreaſe the difficulties which the ſtates afterwards encountered in carrying on the treaty.

The negociation for peace matter of ſurprize to neighbouring ſtates and princes

THIS negociation was a matter of great ſurprize to the neighbouring ſtates and provinces. They could not ſuppoſe that the archdukes would have ventured to make ſuch humiliating conceſſions, if they had not beforehand obtained the conſent of the court of Spain; and that court, they thought, would never have conſented to it, but in order to procure by artifice what they had been unable to accompliſh by force of arms. They were not wholly unacquainted with the diſorder that had taken place in the Spaniſh finances; but they could

could hardly believe that a prince poſſeſſed of ſuch copious reſources as thoſe of Philip, could be reduced ſo low as to find it neceſſary to treat with his rebellious ſubjects on equal terms. They were therefore ſuſpicious that the Spaniſh miniſters had ſecretly formed ſome deſign, by which their intereſt or the intereſt of Europe might be affected; and they were confirmed in their ſuſpicion, by reflecting on the ſecrecy with which the negociation had been carried on. At Bruſſels it had been communicated only to a very ſmall number of the archdukes miniſters. At the Hague, the ſtates general alone had been privy to it; and at both theſe places it had been carefully concealed from all the foreign reſidents, till it was made known by the ſtates general to the particular ſtates, when they appointed the day of public thankſgiving. Theſe precautions gave a myſterious appearance to the conduct of both parties; yet they had probably been uſed with no other view, but either to avoid the perplexity ariſing from too great a multitude of counſellors, or to prevent oppoſition to the treaty in its infancy, and before the reſolution was fully formed, whether it ſhould be rejected or embraced.

Likewiſe an object of jealouſy.

THERE were no princes ſo well entitled to be conſulted on this occaſion by the ſtates as the kings of Great Britain and France, to whom the provinces had been ſo much indebted for their aſſiſtance in carrying on the war. The former of theſe princes, from the narrowneſs of his revenue, joined to his bad œconomy in the adminiſtration of it, had never been able to furniſh them with pecuniary ſupplies; but notwithſtanding the difficulties in which he was involved, he had conſented that the one half of the money with which the French king ſupplied them, ſhould be deducted from the debt which that prince owed to the

Book III. 1607. the crown of England, and had at all times afforded encouragement to their levies of troops in Britain; while he had ſecretly diſcountenanced thoſe which, in conſequence of the permiſſion granted in the treaty of peace above mentioned, were attempted by the archduke or the king of Spain.

Conduct of the French king towards the United States, after the peace of Vervins.

THE obligations however of the ſtates were much greater to the French than to the Britiſh monarch; for Henry was not only more able, but more diſpoſed to contribute to their ſupport. Before the peace of Vervins, he had always conſidered their cauſe and intereſt as his own; and after that peace, had given them every proof of friendſhip that was conſiſtent with fidelity to thoſe engagements which he had come under to the king of Spain. His proteſtant ſubjects had been freely admitted to enter into their ſervice, and had, every campaign, formed a conſiderable proportion of their troops. When, in order to procure tranquillity to France, he found it neceſſary to engage that he would not any longer afford aſſiſtance to the ſtates, he had ſolemnly declared to the Spaniſh ambaſſadors, that he did not thereby mean to preclude himſelf from repaying thoſe ſums to the ſtates, which they had lent him in the time of his diſtreſs. And, for ſome years, the repaying of theſe ſums (*i*) was the only aſſiſtance in money which he afforded them. But after diſcovering that, in violation of the peace of Vervins, the court of Spain had formed intrigues with the Mareſchal Biron, and his other diſſatisfied ſubjects, the object of which was the ſubverſion of his government, thinking himſelf then at liberty to retaliate upon them for ſo great an injury,

(*i*) The amount of theſe ſums was ſeven millions three hundred and ſeventy-eight thouſand and eight hundred livres. Sully, liv. xxi.

jury, he had been more open and liberal than formerly in lending his aſſiſtance to the United Provinces. He ſpared no pains to perſuade the king of England to enter into an alliance with him for their ſupport; and had, yearly, advanced them ſums of money for the payment of their forces. Book III. 1607.

It would be abſurd to ſuppoſe, that in the kindneſs which Henry had manifeſted to the ſtates, his conduct had entirely proceeded from motives of friendſhip and generoſity.

It can ſeldom happen that a prince, in his conduct towards foreign ſtates, could be juſtified for acting under the influence of ſuch motives. A regard to the intereſt of his ſubjects, was, as it ought to have been, the ruling principal of Henry's conduct; and his liberality towards the United Provinces proceeded from his conviction, that on their proſperity, in ſome meaſure, depended the peace and tranquillity of his own dominions.

HAVING formerly ſuffered ſo much from the arms, and afterwards from the intrigues of the Spaniards, he was ſtill diſquieted with apprehenſions of the danger to which he was expoſed from their turbulent ambition. He had long beheld with pleaſure their fruitleſs conteſt in the Netherlands, which had contributed ſo much to exhauſt their ſtrength. But having, in concert with ſome of his wiſeſt miniſters, formed a plan for the humiliation both of the German and Spaniſh branches of the Auſtrian family, which required leiſure before he could bring it to maturity (*k*), he was not diſpleaſed to hear that the ſtates had agreed to the archdukes propoſals for entering into a treaty; but not having been previouſly conſulted upon the ſubject, and the archdukes having made

(*k*) Sully's Memoirs, p. 324, &c.

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made greater conceſſions than he expected, he dreaded that the court of Spain muſt have formed ſome deep inſidious deſign, either againſt the ſtates themſelves or the princes in alliance with them; and therefore he reſolved to beſtow all that attention upon the preſent negociation in the Netherlands, which a tranſaction of the higheſt conſequence deſerved.

The preſident, Jeannin, ſent ambaſſador to the Hague from France.

His affairs in that country had hitherto been managed with great prudence by his preſident, monſieur de Burerwall; but, being determined, if poſſible, to acquire a direction of the preſent negociation, and vigilantly to watch over the conduct of the contracting powers, he ſent to the Hague, in quality of ambaſſador extraordinary, the preſident Jeannin, a miniſter of great experience, who is equally celebrated in the annals of Henry's reign, and in thoſe of his ſucceſſor, for his fidelity, his eloquence, and his political abilities.

This able negociator had no ſooner arrived than he required admiſſion into the aſſembly of the ſtates; where, after reminding them of the zeal with which his maſter had for ſo many years exerted himſelf in their behalf, he inveighed, with much ſeverity, againſt thoſe who had falſely accuſed the king of aiming at the ſovereignty of the Provinces; and then gently reproaching the ſtates with giving a colour to this aſperſion, by entering into a treaty with the enemy, without his knowledge or conſent. But as no prince, he added, could more eaſily forgive his enemies; ſo there was none more ready to overlook the omiſſions of his friends: and, to prove the ſincerity of his friendſhip for the ſtates, the king had now ſent him in the character of ambaſſador, with powers to aſſure them of the continuance of his

his assistance, in case a continuance of the war should be found expedient; or if they chose to put a period to it, to assist them in establishing an honourable and lasting peace. He concluded with requesting that a committee of the states might be appointed, to whom he might more particularly communicate his instructions, and with whom he might occasionally deliberate concerning the measures which it might be proper to pursue. BOOK III. 1607.

THE states readily complied with this request, and expressed how sincerely they rejoiced to find so great a king disposed to take so warm an interest in their affairs.

THIS interposition of Henry gave equal uneasiness to the court of Spain, as it afforded joy to the states. They knew that all his influence would be employed, either to prevent an accommodation, or to render it derogatory to the honour and interest of Spain. And they were well acquainted with the superior talents of Jeannin, who, while he would keep the states perpetually on their guard, would encourage them to persist in their most exorbitant demands.

THE courts of Spain and Brussels had reason likewise to look for opposition from the British, as well as from the French monarch. For James had no ground, they thought, to entertain any jealousy of the Dutch; as their dependence on him for their English and Scotch troops, which formed so great a proportion of their army, his possession of the cautionary towns, which were so many keys of the Netherlands, the situation of his dominions, and the coincidence between his subjects and those of the states in religious opinions, seemed to render him secure of their alliance. It

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could not therefore but be agreeable, they imagined, to this prince, to contribute his endeavours, in the treaty of peace, to promote the intereſt of the ſtates at the expence of Spain. They ſuppoſed it, however, to be more likely that he might exert his influence to render this truly abortive, from an apprehenſion which they had given him ground to entertain, that if Spain were at peace with the United Provinces, ſhe might employ her leiſure in fomenting the diſcontents of his popiſh ſubjects in Ireland.

The king of England concurs with the French monarch in promoting peace.

But they afterwards found that they had erred in this conjecture. Indolence, and an averſion to war, were predominant principles in the character of James; and on this occaſion determined him, in oppoſition to his political intereſt, to concur with the French monarch, in promoting the eſtabliſhment of peace; beſides that, he could not decently have attempted to diſſuade the Dutch from liſtening to the propoſals which had been made to them, without being more liberal than the narrow ſtate of his finances would permit, in contributing to their aſſiſtance. James had been no leſs alarmed than Henry, by the intelligence which he received of the negociation between the ſtates and the archdukes; and had expreſſed to Caron, the Dutch reſident at London, his ſurprize at the ſecrecy with which it had been carried on. But the ſtates, ſolicitous to preſerve his friendſhip, having ſent two of their number to explain to him the motives of their conduct, he readily admitted of their apology, and ſoon after ſent ſir Ralph Winwood and ſir Richard Spencer, in the character of ambaſſadors, to aſſiſt them in bringing the treaty to the deſired concluſion.

About the ſame time ambaſſadors arrived in Holland from the king of Denmark, the elector Palatine,

Palatine, the elector of Brandenburg, the landgrave of Heſſe, and ſeveral other proteſtant princes of Germany; who, having no intereſt of their own to adjuſt or ſecure, could have no other motive in ſending them, but to afford to the ſtates, on this important occaſion, a proof of the concern which they took in their proſperity (*l*). Book III. 1607.

In the mean time an event happened, which, by elevating the hopes of one of the contending parties, while it depreſſed thoſe of the other, contributed to haſten the treaty to a concluſion. The ſtates having, early in the ſpring of this year, equipped a fleet of twenty-ſix ſhips of war, beſides tranſports with ſtores and proviſions, they put it under the command of Heemſkirk, one of the braveſt officers, and moſt ſkilful navigators in the Netherlands, with inſtructions to ſail for the weſtern coaſts of Spain and Portugal, and by watching the motions of the enemy, to provide for the ſafe arrival of the Eaſt India fleet. The preſervation of this fleet, which there was ground to believe the Spaniards were prepared to intercept, the ſtates informed him was to be conſidered as a principal object of his expedition; but they required beſides, that he ſhould give all poſſible annoyance to the enemy, and remember, that the archdukes having made propoſals for a treaty of peace, the iſſue of this treaty, and conſequently the future proſperity of the United Provinces, would greatly depend on the ſucceſs with which his arms in the preſent enterprize ſhould be attended. Operations of the Dutch at ſea, under admiral Heemſkirk.

Heemskirk, flattered with the truſt repoſed in him at ſo critical a conjuncture, aſſured the ſtates, when he received his inſtructions, that whether

(*l*) Baudius, lib. i. Bentivoglio, Grotius, and Winwood, vol. ii.

Book III. 1607. he ſhould die or ſurvive, they ſhould not have reaſon to repent of the honour they had conferred on him; and, in order to expreſs his confidence of ſucceſs, he declared that he would not accept of any reward or pay, unleſs the booty ſhould amount to more than five hundred thouſand florins; in which caſe he would accept only of his ſhare of what ſhould remain after that ſum was deducted. He was already, ſays Grotius, poſſeſſed of a greater fortune than his manner of life required; and, being animated more by the love of glory than of riches, under the ſimple ſhow and moderate deportment of a citizen, he concealed all the qualities of a hero.

April 10. HAVING left the Texel on the 25th of March, he firſt directed his courſe towards Liſbon; but being informed on his arrival in the mouth of the Tagus, by ſome merchants whom he had ſent before him, under neutral colours, to procure intelligence, that the firſt diviſion of the Portugueſe and Spaniſh fleet intended for the Indies and America, had already ſailed, and that the ſhips belonging to the ſecond, were neither fully equipped nor had got their cargoes on board; but that a Spaniſh fleet of ſhips of war was then riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar, he immediately ſet ſail for that place, and ſoon arrived within ſight of the enemy.

April 24 or 25.

The Spaniards having, for ſeveral days, obſerved him ſteering his courſe along the coaſt of Andaluſia, had given notice to the admiral Don John Alvarez D'Avila of his approach; and Davila had full leiſure to put his fleet into a proper poſture of defence. It conſiſted of twenty-one ſhips, nine of which were greatly ſuperior in ſize to thoſe of the enemy, and was drawn up under the cannon of the fort, having the admiral's galleon,

on, which was much larger than the reſt, in front. Heemſkirk was fully aware of the great advantage which the Spaniſh admiral muſt derive from his ſituation; but this conſideration rather ſerved to confirm him in his purpoſe than to deter him from carrying it into execution.

FOR the greater, ſaid he to his officers, in a council of war which he held before the engagement, the danger to which we ſhall be expoſed, and the more arduous our attempt, the greater will be the glory we ſhall acquire, and the more important the ſervice we ſhall perform to our country, if our arms ſhall be crowned with victory. Many illuſtrious exploits have our countrymen atchieved in different quarters of the globe, but we are the firſt who ſhall adventure to attack the royal fleet in the ſtrongeſt port of Spain; and, by our ſucceſs, ſhall ſhow how little reaſon the Spaniſh monarch, with his long proud liſt of titles, has to boaſt that he is the ſovereign of the ſeas. Let us not be diſheartened by the enormous ſize of the enemy's ſhips, for this very circumſtance, by rendering them unwieldy in all their motions, will facilitate our conqueſt. I require you to do nothing, of which I ſhall not ſet you an example. But when the engagement ſhall be begun, we muſt remember it will be no longer poſſible to eſcape, we muſt either conquer or periſh. Nor is it only our own preſervation that depends on the fortitude we ſhall diſplay in our preſent enterprize, but the ſafety of the rich fleet that is in its way from India, the ſafety of all our countrymen, who are engaged in trade in this part of the world, and the terms likewiſe of peace which the ſtates ſhall obtain from the enemy. Let us only exert ourſelves as we have done on former occaſions, and diſcover that contempt of danger which is the ſureſt pledge of victory, and we ſhall enjoy the

Book III. 1607. the glory and felicity of putting a period to the war, and thereby ſecure to our countrymen that liberty for which they have fought for more than forty years.

HAVING delivered theſe exhortations with that natural military eloquence, which he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree, and received from all the officers preſent, the moſt ſolemn aſſurances, confirmed by oath, that, to the utmoſt of their power, they would imitate his example, and fulfill his commands, he communicated to them his plan of attack, and, as ſoon as they had returned to their reſpective ſhips, he gave the ſignal to advance.

WHEN Davila perceived them approaching, he ordered the maſter of a Dutch merchantman, whom he had a priſoner on board his ſhip, in chains, to be brought upon the deck, and enquired of him what he imagined might be his countrymen's deſign: to attack your fleet, anſwered the priſoner; to which Davila, ſmiling contemptuouſly replied, that he could not ſuppoſe it, ſince his ſingle ſhip, he thought, would prove an over match for all the Dutch veſſels that were in ſight. That may be true, ſaid the other, but, either I know nothing of the character of my countrymen, or the battle will be inſtantly begun.

Heemſkirk attacks a Spaniſh fleet riding at anchor in the bay of Gibraltar

HEEMSKIRK himſelf led the van, and ſteered his courſe directly towards Davila, who, inſtead of that contempt which he had ſo recently expreſſed, being now overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment at the ſight of ſuch unprecedented intrepidity, gave orders to ſlip his anchors, and to retire behind his other ſhips, hoping that the enemy would thus be induced to exhauſt their fury upon them, and

and that afterwards he might come in for a ſhare of the victory. Book III. 1607.

But Heemſkirk, agreeably to his reſolution, which he had communicated to his officers, that he himſelf would attack the admiral's galleon, without heſitation entered within the line of the Spaniſh fleet, and ſtill continued to advance, keeping up his fire till he had come within muſket ſhot of the enemy. Davila having, before his approach, given the firſt broadſide, it was now returned by Heemſkirk, whoſe fire being more ſkilfully directed, did greater execution. But ſoon after, while this gallant ſeaman ſtood giving orders, on the moſt conſpicuous part of the deck, his left leg was carried off by a cannon ball, and his thigh being at the ſame time torn and ſhattered, he perceived, from the great effuſion of blood, that he could not have many minutes to ſurvive. Theſe he employed in exhorting thoſe about him to perſevere in the attack, and to remember the oath which they had taken, and the duty which they owed to themſelves and to their country; after which having recommended himſelf to the Divine Mercy, and appointed an officer of the name of Verhoeve to command the ſhip, he expired. Death of Heemſkirk.

So great a diſaſter was calculated to fill the minds of the ſpectators with diſmay and terror; but that intrepid ſpirit with which his example had inſpired them, far from being extinguiſhed by his death, was rather nouriſhed up into rage and fury, by their deſire of taking ſignal vengeance on the enemy. The battle, which had been ſuſpended for a little while, was inſtantly renewed with the ſame vigour as before; and another captain, called Lambert, coming up to ſupport Verhoeve, they united together in their aſſault on the Spaniſh admiral's

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admiral's ſhip, and battered her at once on both ſides with uncommon violence.

IN the mean time the reſt of the Dutch fleet had begun their attack upon the other galleons, with the ſame alacrity and ardour; and the Spaniards long gave proof of equal bravery in their defence. But at length, two of their ſhips were ſet on fire and burnt by the enemy, a third was ſunk, a fourth, from ſome accidental cauſe, blew up, and all the reſt, except the admiral's galleon, run aſhore.

THE admiral himſelf had been killed about the ſame time with Heemſkirk, but the officer who ſucceeded him in the command, had maintained the combat with inflexible fury, and the iſſue for ſeveral hours remained doubtful. At length, a third Dutch ſhip arriving to the aſſiſtance of the other two, the Spaniſh commander hoiſted a white flag, as a ſignal that he was ready to ſurrender.

Vindictive fury of the Dutch.

BUT the Dutch, animated by the ſame implacable and vindictive ſpirit, with which their war againſt the Spaniards had generally been conducted, paid no regard to this ſignal, and ſtill continued firing till they had beaten down the flag. The hearts of the Spaniards then ſunk within them, and their efforts began to relax. The Dutch perceiving this, inſtantly boarded their veſſel, and attacked them with ſo much fury, that they were quickly over-powered. Moſt of them were put to the ſword, and the reſt compelled to jump over board into the ſea, where many of them were either ſhot or drowned. In this engagement the Spaniards loſt near two thouſand men; and, beſides the ſhips above-mentioned, which were burnt or ſunk, almoſt all the reſt were rendered unfit for future ſervice; whereas

They obtain a ſignal victory.

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not a ſingle Dutch ſhip was either loſt or deſtroyed, and only about a hundred men were killed. BOOK III. 1607.

So ſignal a victory, which excited the moſt dreadful apprehenſions in the minds of the people along the ſouthern coaſt of Spain, might have been attended with the moſt important conſequences, if Heemſkirk had lived to improve it; and either Cadiz or Gibraltar might have been reduced. But the officers, on whom the command had devolved, were ſatisfied with the glory they had acquired, and, in two days after the engagement, retired to Tetuan, on the African coaſt; from whence, after repairing their damages, and ſending home two of the tranſports with the ſick and wounded, and the body of the admiral, they ſailed in different ſquadrons to the coaſt of Portugal, Azores, and other places, where they expected to enrich themſelves by the capture of the merchant ſhips.

BUT although this victory was not attended with any new conqueſt, it had conſiderable influence on the temper and conduct of the contending parties at the preſent criſis. It contributed to inſpire the Dutch with greater confidence of ſucceſs in the proſecution of the war, and to render them more intractable; while it tended, on the other hand, to produce a more complying temper on the part of the Spaniards, and to heighten their ſolicitude for the eſtabliſhment of peace.

Effects of this victory on the contending parties.

THE archdukes had given the moſt convincing evidence how ſtrongly they were actuated with this ſolicitude. They had not only made the firſt advances to the ſtates, and readily agreed to preliminary terms, which, by all the powers of Europe, were thought humiliating; but no ſooner had a ceſſation of hoſtilities been agreed to, which extended

BOOK III. 1607. extended only to hoſtilities at land, than they ſet at liberty, without a ranſom, all the Dutch ſailors, who had been taken priſoners by their ſhips of war, and ſhewed themſelves determined, if poſſible, to put an end to every ſpecies of hoſtility.

THESE princes had, from the beginning, taken too little pains to ſave appearances, and had ſuffered their eagerneſs for peace to betray them into an act of indiſcretion, which, by putting the ſtates more than ever upon their guard, tended to increaſe the difficulty of accompliſhing their deſign. Their agent having, agreeably to his inſtructions, requeſted a private interview with Aerſens, the Dutch ſecretary, after returning him thanks for his good offices with the ſtates, deſired him to accept of a diamond of conſiderable value for his wife, and acquainted him that the archdukes, deeply impreſſed with a ſenſe of his good intentions, had given orders for the reſtoration of his houſe in Bruſſels; while the marquis of Spinola had ſent him an obligation for fifty thouſand crowns, fifteen thouſand of which ſhould be paid upon demand, and the reſt as ſoon as either a peace or a long truce ſhould be concluded. Aerſens, having conjectured what might be Ney's intention in wiſhing for an interview, and having previouſly conſulted prince Maurice concerning the part which he ſhould act, accepted, though with ſeeming reluctance, both of the diamond and Spinola's obligation for the money; but, agreeably to his concert with Maurice, he delivered them up to the council of ſtate, to whom he gave a particular relation of the whole affair in a few days after (*m*).

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(*m*) Grotius, 520.

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THIS tranſaction, therefore, ſerved only to excite ſuſpicions of the archdukes deſigns; while it afforded a ſtriking proof how extremely averſe they were to the continuance of the war, and thus contributed to confirm the ſtates in their reſolution of inſiſting upon the moſt advantageous and honourable terms.

Eagerneſs of the archdukes for peace encourages the Dutch to inſiſt on high terms.

THE court of Spain was not in reality leſs anxious with regard to the iſſue of the preſent negociation than that of Bruſſels; but, whether from pride or policy, they better concealed their anxiety, and artfully acted for ſome time as if the treaty had been entirely the plan of the archdukes, to which the king found himſelf under no neceſſity, ariſing from the ſituation of his own affairs, of yielding his conſent.

OF the truth of this, their conduct, with regard to the ratification of the late agreement between the ſtates and the archdukes, affords ſufficient evidence. In order to obtain that ratification, Ney, the Franciſcan, had gone to Madrid, and, after a delay of ſeveral weeks, during which he had occaſion for all his addreſs and eloquence, he had now returned with it to Bruſſels. It was immediately after carried to the Hague by Verreiken, Albert's principal ſecretary; to whom the ſtates, impatient to know particularly the contents of his inſtructions, granted an audience on the next morning after his arrival. They had been beforehand informed, by a letter from Spinola, that their agreement with the archdukes had been ratified by the king, and that it was in order to communicate to them the deed of ratification that Verreiken was ſent into Holland. But they were extremely diſſatisfied, when they examined this deed, both with the form and the contents.

The United States diſſatisfied with Philip's ratification of the preliminaries of peace.

IT

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It was conceived in vague and general terms, and not in the common form of a compact or convention. It did not comprehend the eſſential clauſe relative to the ſovereignty and independence of the United Provinces. Even in the copy of the archdukes agreement, which was prefixed to the deed, that clauſe was omitted; and, in contradiction to the ſpirit and meaning of it, the archdukes were ſtyled the ſovereigns of the Netherlands. It was ſubſcribed by Philip, "I, The King," (Yo el Rey) a form of ſubſcription which he only uſed where his ſubjects were addreſſed. It was ſealed with his ſmall ſeal, inſtead of the great one; and it was written on paper, and not on vellum, as was uſual in all tranſactions of importance.

These omiſſions and informalities were inſtantly perceived by all the deputies; but, that their conduct might not appear precipitate, they appointed another meeting for the mature conſideration of them; after which they unanimouſly reſolved to reject the deed of ratification, as being neither ſuch as the archdukes had undertaken to procure, nor affording a ſufficient ground for proceeding in the intended treaty. Verreiken, to whom this reſolution was communicated, laboured to perſuade the ſtates that the defects and informalities complained of muſt have been entirely owing to careleſſneſs on the part of the tranſcriber, it being impoſſible to doubt that the king would have entirely rejected the agreement, if he had not meant to grant his ratification of the whole.

But the ſtates remained inflexible in their purpoſe; for it was equally impoſſible, they thought, to ſuppoſe that a deed of ſo great importance, in the conſequences of which not only the archdukes,

dukes, but the king himſelf, were ſo deeply intereſted, could have been left by his miniſters to be deviſed by an inferior clerk or ſecretary. It was impoſſible but his miniſters muſt have perceived the want of ſo eſſential a clauſe as that which related to the independence of the provinces; a clauſe which was obviouſly of ſuch a nature, that it was impoſſible to doubt of its having been purpoſely omitted, but without which they were unalterably reſolved to decline all farther negociation, either with the archdukes, or with the court of Spain. 1607.

VERREIKEN, perceiving that no arguments he could employ would prove effectual, requeſted liberty to remain at the Hague for ſix days longer, till he ſhould acquaint the archdukes with what had paſſed, and receive their inſtructions for his future conduct. With this requeſt the ſtates complied; and, before the expiration of the time ſpecified, a letter from the archdukes arrived, in which they engaged, that, though they could not perceive the validity of theſe objections which the ſtates had made to the form of the king's ratification, who thought, that, as he had ratified a part of the convention without objections to the reſt, the deed ought to be conſidered as a ratification of the whole; yet, in order to remove every obſtacle to the treaty propoſed, and to ſhew how ſincerely they deſired the eſtabliſhment of peace, they would procure another ratification in the form required: but, in the mean time, they hoped, and requeſted, that the ſtates would give proof of ſincerity on their part, by recalling their fleet from the coaſts of Spain.

ON this occaſion a violent conteſt aroſe among the deputies, and ſeveral of them diſcovered an inclination

The treaty in danger of being broken off.

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inclination to break off the treaty without delay. It was now ſufficiently manifeſt, they alledged, that the Spaniards were not ſincere in their profeſſions. It was abſurd to expect that an enemy, ſo inveterate and implacable, would ever ſeriouſly think of peace on fair and equitable terms, till they were compelled by ſome dire neceſſity. It was evident that their object had, from the beginning, been to diſarm the confederates, and to procure a reſpite from the war, till their preparations for proſecuting it with greater vigour were complete. The fleet, therefore, ought not to be recalled, but to be reinforced, and the people rouſed from their preſent lethargy, by appriſing them of the ſnare which had been laid for their deſtruction.

THESE were not, however, the ſentiments of the greater part of the deputies; for although the whole aſſembly were diſpoſed to aſcribe duplicity and artifice to the court of Spain, only ſome of them thought there was any ground for calling in queſtion the ſincerity of the archdukes, who, in the opinion of the generality, had, to the utmoſt of their power, fulfilled their engagements, and could not be juſtly blamed for the defects or informalities of the ratification.

The United States agree to recall their fleet from the coaſts of Spain.

IT was therefore reſolved, partly from the reſpect due to theſe princes, and partly from dread of the imputation of inſincerity in the profeſſions which they had made of their deſire of peace, that the fleet ſhould be recalled. But they, at the ſame time, required that the ratification, executed in proper form, ſhould be produced within a limited time ſpecified; and, in order to prevent any future omiſſion or error, they delivered to Verreiken three copies, preciſely of the ſame import, one in Latin, another in French, and a third

third in Dutch, declaring, that, without a faithful tranſcript of one or other of theſe, they would inſtantly break off the negociation, and apply themſelves to the proſecution of the war.

IT was Barnevelt who made this declaration, in the name of the other deputies; after which he reminded Verreiken of the attempt which had been made by the Franciſcan to corrupt the ſecretary. "There," ſaid he, "is the diamond, and here is the marquis of Spinola's obligation for fifteen thouſand crowns. Let them both be reſtored to their proper owners: ſuch preſents are not neceſſary for the purpoſe of obtaining peace, if your maſters wiſh for it, on equitable terms; and if they are not willing to agree to ſuch terms, their preſents will not be ſufficient to procure it. Were it poſſible that one or two perſons could be found in this aſſembly ſo baſe as to accept your bribes, and, for the ſake of them, to make a ſacrifice of the liberty of their country, yet a great majority will retain their integrity, and render your largeſſes, though they were much greater than your maſters can afford, of no avail (*n*)."

VERREIKEN, being unprepared for this attack, was thrown into ſome confuſion, and replied, that "Ney muſt certainly have done what he was accuſed of without any authority from the archdukes." It was impoſſible that the ſtates could give credit to this aſſertion; but, being ſatisfied with having ſo publicly expreſſed their reſentment, the meeting was immediately diſmiſſed, Verreiken permitted to return to Bruſſels, and ſoon after the fleet was recalled.

THE

(*n*) Grotius and Baudius.

BOOK III. 1607. THE archdukes, at the ſame time, renewed their applications at the court of Spain; and at length, though not without conſiderable difficulty, obtained ſuch a ratification of their convention from the king as they hoped the confederates would accept.

IN this new deed all the ſame clauſes were inſerted, which the copies tranſmitted by the ſtates contained, and nearly the ſame form of expreſſion was obſerved; but to the declaration that the king and archdukes were willing to treat with the confederates as with a free people, over whom they pretended to no authority, a clauſe was annexed, declaring, that in caſe the negociation ſhould be broken off on account of religion, or any other diſputed point, the ratification ſhould be void, and all matters remain on their preſent footing. Beſides which, the deed was incorrectly written, ſome words being interlined, and others wholly omitted. It was written in Spaniſh, and not in Latin, French, or Dutch, as had been requeſted; upon paper, and not on parchment, and ſubſcribed like the former one not with the name of the king, but with the words "I The King," as if Philip had ſtill conſidered the confederates as his ſubjects.

THESE latter circumſtances, though they afforded a proof of extreme careleſſneſs, or of the moſt childiſh obſtinacy, on the part of the Spaniſh miniſters, were deemed of ſmall importance; and it was proved that even the king of England, in his late treaty of peace with Spain had acquieſced in the ſame form of ſubſcription. But the deputies could not be ſo eaſily reconciled to the clauſe annexed to the declaration of their liberty; for although, as they repreſented to the archdukes commiſſioners, they were free, whether the

the king of Spain ſhould acknowledge it or not, yet the annexed clauſe ſeemed to imply that their freedom depended on the will of the king; and to accept of the ratification with a clauſe of this import, might be interpreted as an acknowledgment, on their part, of the truth of the poſition which the cauſe implied. Beſides that, from the manner in which mention is made in this annexed clauſe of religion, and other diſputed points, there was ground to ſuſpect, that, in the treaty propoſed, the king intended that the eſtabliſhment of religion, and other matters which reſpected the internal government of the provinces, ſhould be diſcuſſed.

To this the people of the United Provinces would never be perſuaded to conſent. To inſiſt upon it, would be to treat them as a dependent, and not as a free people; and, therefore, to the ſtates it appeared extremely doubtful, whether, in order to ſave a great deal of unneceſſary trouble, it were not expedient that the negociation ſhould be inſtantly broken off. But, as they ſhould be ſorry to give ground to ſuſpect that they were not deſirous to put a period to the calamities of war, they had reſolved to refer the whole matter to the ſtates of the particular towns and provinces, that the people might have an opportunity of judging for themſelves in a matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted. With this anſwer the commiſſioners returned to Bruſſels, after receiving an aſſurance from the ſtates, that, in ſeven weeks from the preſent time, information would be tranſmitted to the archdukes whether the ratification was rejected or received (*o*).

(*o*) Baudius, Grotius, &c. Jeannin, tom. i. Lettre au Roy, Oct. 27, 1607.

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Diſputes and parties in the United Provinces.

At this juncture, both the people and their rulers differed widely in their ſentiments with regard to the queſtion that was now before them; while one party maintained that the ratification ought, without heſitation, to be rejected, and the other thought, that although it was not altogether ſuch as they wiſhed it to have been, yet it ought to be admitted as a ſufficient foundation for the treaty that was propoſed. Prince Maurice was at the head of the former of theſe parties, and Barnevelt of the latter; and each of theſe leaders exerted himſelf with great activity and zeal in gaining converts to his opinion. There was ground to ſuſpect that the motives by which the prince was actuated, on this occaſion, were not perfectly pure and diſintereſted, but that he dreaded the diminution of his power, if peace were eſtabliſhed, and, partly on this account, was deſirous of the continuance of war. The reaſoning,

The ſtates, on this occaſion, required that the original deed itſelf ſhould be left in their hands. The commiſſioners having no inſtructions on this head, the Franciſcan went himſelf to Bruſſels to receive them; and the archdukes agreed to the requeſt of the ſtates on theſe conditions, that they ſhould give an obligation in writing to reſtore the deed if required, and ſhould, at the ſame time, declare that the archdukes, in procuring it from the king, had fully performed the engagement which they had come under in their firſt agreement with the ſtates. The ſtates refuſed their conſent to theſe conditions, but ſtill inſiſted, that, as the deed was addreſſed to them, it ſhould be ſuffered to remain in their poſſeſſion. Ney returned to Bruſſels a ſecond time, and prevailed on the archdukes to yield to their demand. Though the ratification was not ſuch as the ſtates wiſhed it to have been, yet it ſhould ſeem to have been no ſmall gratification to them, that the king had granted a declaration, however qualified and expreſſed, of their being a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. In return for the complaiſance of the archdukes on this occaſion, they would gladly have given the declaration required, that theſe princes had fully performed their engagement, but thought it was impoſſible to give it conſiſtently with truth.

ing, however, which he employed, was ſpecious, and made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of many of his countrymen. BOOK III. 1607.

As the court of Spain, he ſaid, had on former occaſions given the moſt unqueſtionable evidence of their duplicity, ſo at preſent it was impoſſible to doubt of their being actuated by ſome ſiniſter deſign. In their firſt ratification, they had not only declined to acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, but had expreſly affirmed, that they were ſubject to the dominion of the archdukes. To their ſecond, they had ſubjoined a clauſe which rendered their independence contingent and precarious, and wholly dependent on the will of the king. Whoever conſiders the vaſt dominions of Spain, and her inveterate habits of domination and pride, would not be eaſily convinced that ſhe intended to obſerve a truce, or peace, any longer than it might ſuit her views of tyranny and conqueſt. It was the deſign of that ambitious and politic nation, to break the ſpirit of the confederates by the habits of indolence and luxury. The martial ſpirit would leave the republic, and would not be eaſily revived. The citizens would become remiſs and inattentive to the defence of objects, which, when they knew them to be in danger, they conſidered as dearer than life. None are ſo eaſily ſubdued as thoſe who think they have nothing to fear. The fear of the enemy is a bond of unity, and produces both military diſcipline and civil obedience, while ſtates living in ſecurity, opulence, and eaſe, are ſubdued by habits of effeminacy, torn by inteſtine diſcords, and thus fall an eaſy prey to ſome ambitious and warlike neighbour. It was for this reaſon, that Scipio Naſica oppoſed with ſo much wiſdom, the falſe policy of Cato, who adviſed the deſtruction of Carthage.

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WHEN the minds of the confederates ſhould cool, and their patriotiſm begin to languiſh, the Spaniards hoped, by various arts of corruption, to bring them again under the yoke of their former ſovereigns. But whatever might be the effect of ſuch artifices, they would recruit their exhauſted ſtrength, and whenever a fit opportunity ſhould offer, violate the peace they now ſolicited.

THEIR army, at the preſent period, was univerſally diſcontented on account of their want of pay. Great numbers had already mutinied; and if the war continued, there was ground to expect, that the greateſt part would refuſe to ſubmit to the controul of military diſcipline. With ſuch an army, no prudent general would venture to engage in any important enterprize. And the people, among whom they were quartered, being grievouſly oppreſſed, both by the government and the mutineers, were ready to ſhake off a yoke which had become intolerable.

THE Spaniards were ſtill leſs formidable at ſea than at land. From the great decreaſe of their trade, they found it impoſſible to procure ſailors ſufficient to man their ſhips of war; and their fleets, far from being able to contend with thoſe of the ſtates, were even unable to defend themſelves in their harbours, under the cannon of their forts.

SUCH was the preſent ſtate of the Spaniſh fleet and army; whereas thoſe of the confederates had never been in ſo flouriſhing a condition. Their army was at preſent, as it had always been, under the moſt perfect diſcipline; regularly paid, and abundantly ſupplied with every thing neceſſary to enable it to act with vigour: while their fleets,

fleets, more numerous than ever, had in almoſt every quarter of the globe proved an overmatch for thoſe of the enemy; and had obtained over them ſeveral important victories, which had been attended with a great increaſe of trade, and wealth, and power. They had eſtabliſhed trade in many places, which, till lately, had been viſited only by the Spaniards and Portugueſe. They had got poſſeſſion of ſeveral of the moſt important branches of the Indian commerce; and if they did not ſuffer themſelves to be diverted from the proſecution of their naval enterprizes, they would ere long make themſelves maſters of the whole. The war, therefore, which they had carried on againſt the enemy at ſea, had already proved, and would ſtill continue to prove, a mine of gold to the United Provinces; while their military operations at land, had neither exhauſted their riches nor their ſtrength. Their army in a great meaſure conſiſted of foreign troops, while the natives were permitted to apply themſelves to manufactures and trade, and all the money expended for the ſupport of the army, was ſpent at home, either in purchaſing the manufactures of the country, or thoſe commodities which merchants found it ſo beneficial to import from foreign parts. It had indeed been found neceſſary to impoſe taxes on ſeveral commodities; and many perſons complained of the burthens of theſe taxes, yet both the riches and the number of the people had every year increaſed, ſince the taxes were impoſed; and no country abounded more in the neceſſaries and conveniencies of life. BOOK III. 1607.

OF the truth of theſe obſervations, the Spaniards were ſufficiently aware. They had come at length to perceive that the war had to the confederates proved a copious ſource of proſperity; while their own ſtrength had been exhauſted by

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it, and their commerce almoſt ruined; and they were for this reaſon deſirous of a temporary peace, hoping thereby to avert the danger to which they ſaw themſelves expoſed; to deprive the confederates of the advantages which they at preſent enjoyed; to ſow diſcord among the provinces, and to accompliſh, by fraud and artifice, what they had hitherto been unable to attain by force of arms. That ſuch was their intention, appeared from the diſingenuity of their conduct with regard to the deed of ratification.

But whether this was in reality a deſign or not, no doubt could be entertained that, as it was for the intereſt of the Spaniards that peace ſhould be eſtabliſhed, it was no leſs for that of the ſtates that the war ſhould be proſecuted with vigour, till the enemy were reduced to the neceſſity of acting with greater ſincerity, and more equitable terms could be obtained, than they had ground to expect at the preſent period.

This reaſoning produced the deſired effect, chiefly in Holland and Zealand, where the people were conſcious, that their proſperity had been in ſome meaſure owing to the war; while their ſituation rendered them more ſecure againſt its attendant calamities, than the inhabitants of the inland provinces. But the reaſons on the other ſide, which were urged by Barnevelt, were generally thought to be more deſerving of attention and regard.

The reaſonings urged by Barnevelt for peace.

There was too much ground, he allowed, for the imputation which had been caſt upon the court of Spain, of inſincerity in their conduct, with regard to the deed of ratification. It was evident, from the manner in which they had acknowledged the independence of the States, how extremely

extremely reluctant they had been in granting that acknowledgment. The clauſe annexed to it, declaring that in caſe the negociation ſhould be broken off, the ratification ſhould be void, ought not to have been inſerted. It was even unneceſſary to inſert it for any purpoſe which the Spaniards could have in view, becauſe, in every treaty, the validity of any particular conceſſion, muſt depend on the event of the treaty, and if it prove abortive, all the claims of the contending parties, whether real or pretended, muſt remain as before its commencement. From the inſertion however of this clauſe, it could not be inferred that the court of Spain had formed any inſidious deſign. Their reluctance to acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, might juſtly have been expected; and the little pains which they had taken to conceal it, afforded a ſtrong preſumption that their intentions were ſincere.

BUT although they ſhould in reality intend to violate the peace which they now ſolicited, was this a ſufficient reaſon for refuſing to treat with them, or for declining to accept of a peace upon equitable terms? Ought peace to be rejected in every caſe, where it was poſſible that the conditions of it might be violated? Ought ſtates to live in perpetual war, becauſe there was ground to apprehend, that they might not be able to maintain a perpetual and uninterrupted peace? If the Spaniards ſhall hereafter revive their claim of ſovereignty over the provinces, will this claim derive any validity from the preſent treaty, in which they have ſo explicitly renounced it? Will they not then juſtly expoſe themſelves to the reproach of having acted with duplicity; and is it not the natural tendency of ſuch a conduct, to increaſe the number of their enemies, while we ſhall then, as well as now, be poſſeſſed of arms to maintain our

BOOK III. 1607. liberty, and have the ſame or more numerous friends to aſſiſt us in counteracting their tyrannical deſigns?

GREAT diſorders, it was true, prevailed at the preſent period in the Spaniſh monarchy: the royal navy had ſuffered a conſiderable diminution, and the archdukes army was extremely ill paid and mutinous. But although this conſideration might juſtify the ſtates in demanding the moſt advantageous terms of peace, it would not juſtify them for reſolving to perſiſt, at all adventures, in the proſecution of the war. From negligence and inattention, but chiefly from the folly of engaging at once in too many difficult and expenſive enterprizes, Spain was weakened; but it would be madneſs to proceed on the ſuppoſition, that her ſtrength was ſpent, for ſhe was ſtill poſſeſſed of inexhauſtible reſources; and nothing but greater prudence and moderation were requiſite to render her formidable to all her enemies. During the laſt campaign, ſhe had exerted herſelf more vigorouſly than ſeveral years preceding, and if the rivers that year had not been ſwelled to an unuſual height, her troops might have penetrated into the heart of the provinces. She might ſtill continue, and perhaps redouble her exertions; and if ſhe was incenſed, as ſhe would juſtly be, in caſe the ſtates ſhould obſtinately refuſe to treat with her, ſhe might be determined to direct her whole attention againſt the dominions of the ſtates, and put forth a degree of ſtrength which they would be unable to withſtand.

THEIR arms had hitherto been attended with greater ſucceſs, than could juſtly have been expected againſt ſo potent an enemy; but of all human events they ſhould remember thoſe of war were the moſt fortuitous. The republic had in former

former periods been brought ſo low, that the ſtates would gladly have ſubmitted to the ſovereignty of a foreign prince: and one unfortunate campaign, or the loſs of a fleet, which depended for its preſervation on the mercy of the winds and waves, might again reduce them to the like deſperate condition.

THEY had been enabled to attain their preſent proſperity, by the friendly aſſiſtance of the queen of England, and the king of France; but the former of theſe princes, who had long been their principal ſupport, was dead, and her ſucceſſor either not ſo able, or not ſo willing to aſſiſt them; while the latter was far advanced in years; was deſirous for reaſons which could not be eaſily penetrated, to have the war brought to a concluſion; and although during his life, they might truſt that he would not ſuffer them to be oppreſſed, yet he might ere long leave his kingdom to an infant ſon, during whoſe minority, the Spaniards were likely to have greater influence over the French counſels, than the United States.

THE great object, as well as the end of war was peace; and advantageous terms of peace could never be ſo eaſily obtained, as when the enemy found it neceſſary to apply for it, in order to retrieve the ruined ſtate of his affairs. The object of the preſent war had, from the beginning, been to ſhake off the yoke of the Spaniſh government, and to aſſert their liberty. This object was now ſecured, and the king of Spain himſelf was ready to treat with them as with a free people, over whom he pretended to no authority. Could they be juſtified in their own eyes, or could they be juſtified in the opinion of the world, if they ſhould refuſe to treat with him? Would the pretext that he was inſincere in the acknowledgment which he had

BOOK III. 1607. had made of their independence, and that poſſibly he will hereafter revive his claim, and refuſe to fulfill his engagement, afford a vindication of a conduct ſo ſingular, ſo haughty, and contemptuous? Was the war to be proſecuted till they had accompliſhed the diſſolution of the Spaniſh monarchy? Was this an event either to be expected or deſired? Were the people of the United Provinces to be the only people on earth, who were never to enjoy the bleſſings of tranquillity?

THE war indeed had been the occaſion of proſperity to ſome, who ought to reſt ſatisfied with the advantages which they had already derived from it: but to great numbers, it had often been a copious ſource of diſtreſs and miſery. Many groaned under the burthens which the war had made it neceſſary to impoſe; and many lamented the loſs of their friends, and the ruin of their fortunes, which are the inſeperable concomitants even of the moſt ſucceſsful war. It was ſurely deſirable to put a period to theſe calamities; and if they did not embrace the preſent opportunity of doing it, provided it could be done conſiſtently with their honour, and their future ſecurity, they would be anſwerable for all the blood that ſhould be ſpilt, and could not be juſtified in the ſight either of God or man."

THIS diſcourſe, which was delivered in an extraordinary aſſembly, where deputies from all the provinces and almoſt all the towns were preſent, deriving weight from the character of the ſpeaker, as well as from the ſolidity of the reaſoning which it contained, was liſtened to with great attention; and, while it produced conviction in the minds of the greater part, it impoſed ſilence upon the reſt, and extorted their conſent to the meaſure which it was intended to recommend. Prince Maurice, ſupported

ſupported by the deputies from the province and towns of Zealand, propoſed that the form of an explicit and unconditional acknowledgment of their independence ſhould be tranſmitted to the archdukes, to be ſubſcribed by them as a preliminary article; but this motion being rejected as harſh and offenſive by a great majority, it was at length reſolved to appoint ambaſſadors for the purpoſe of negociating peace; and notice of this reſolution was immediately ſent to the court of Bruſſels (*o*). Dec. 24th.

It was at the ſame time propoſed to the archdukes that the conferences ſhould be held at the Hague, which for ſome time paſt had been the ſeat of government in the United Provinces; and, in order to induce them to comply with this propoſal, it was ſuggeſted, that, as the ambaſſadors of the ſtates could not be inveſted with very ample powers, they might often have occaſion to conſult their conſtituents; and if any other place of meeting, or any town within the territories of the archdukes were made choice of, much time would be loſt, and the negociation be unneceſſarily prolonged.

Commiſſioners for peace on the part of Spain.

THE archdukes, ſolicitous to avoid every cauſe of delay, readily agreed to this propoſal, and immediately appointed for their commiſſioners the marquis of Spinola, Mancicidor, a Spaniard, their ſecretary at war, Richardot, the preſident of their privy council, Verreikens, their private ſecretary of ſtate, and Ney, the Franciſcan, to whoſe activity and addreſs they thought themſelves much indebted

(*o*) Grotius, lib. xvi. Bent. part. iii. lib. viii. The time fixed for the ſuſpenſion of arms being expired, it was prorogued on the preſent occaſion, and afterwards, from time to time, on different occaſions, till the treaty was concluded.

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indebted for having brought the negociation thus far.

And on that of the United States.

THE commiſſioners appointed by the ſtates were nine in number, ſeven of whom were nominated by the ſeven provinces, and the remaining two by the ancient body of the nobles. Theſe two were count William of Naſſau, a near relation of prince Maurice, and Walraeve, lord of Brederode; and thoſe appointed by the ſeveral provinces were among the moſt reſpectable perſons in the commonwealth: but the confidence of the people of all ranks, at this important criſis, was chiefly placed in Barnevelt, who was nominated commiſſioner by the province of Holland.

Suſpicion of Spain the predominant paſſion of the Dutch.

THIS virtuous and able ſtateſman was indefatigable in his attention to every ſtep of the preſent negociation; and, before the conferences were begun, he deviſed an expedient admirably calculated to promote the end in view. The predominant paſſion in the minds of his countrymen was ſtill, as it had been for many years, ſuſpicion of the intentions of the court of Spain. It had been chiefly from this quarter that he encountered ſo much difficulty in perſuading them to agree to the archdukes propoſals of a conference; and he ſtill dreaded that the ſame cauſe might prevent this conference from being attended with the deſired effect. This diſtruſt of the Spaniards he apprehended would ſhew itſelf on every occaſion, and on the ſlighteſt grounds; and it would be carefully fomented by prince Maurice and others, who wiſhed for a continuance of the war. In order, therefore, to quiet the apprehenſions of the people, to deprive the prince and his partizans of a pretext, of which he knew they would readily lay hold, and at the ſame time to intimidate or over-awe the Spaniards, he propoſed to the French

and

and Britiſh miniſters that, before the conferences were opened, their maſters ſhould enter into a new alliance with the ſtates; that they ſhould engage to employ their endeavours to procure for them an equitable peace; and, in caſe of their procuring it, ſhould farther engage to afford them ſuch aſſiſtance as ſhould be neceſſary for maintaining it inviolate.

This propoſal did not meet with the ſame favourable reception from the Britiſh as from the French monarch. Though James was determined by the motives above explained to concur with Henry in promoting the eſtabliſhment of peace; yet, having ground for doubt whether the intereſt of his own dominions did not rather require that the war ſhould be continued, he was never ſo deeply intereſted, as he deſired that the ſtates ſhould believe, in the ſucceſs of their preſent negociation (*p*). Beſides that, he knew how much it was in the power of the Spaniards to diſturb his tranquillity by their intrigues with the Iriſh Catholics, and was therefore unwilling to incur their reſentment. Influenced by theſe conſiderations, he declined at this time to enter into the propoſal alliance. But Henry more decided in his

(*p*) This appears from ſeveral paſſages in Winwood's Memorials, and particularly from the letters writ by the earl of Saliſbury to Sir R. Winwood, Sir Richard Spencer, and Sir Charles Cornwallis. "You added (ſays Saliſbury, in a letter dated March 20th 1607, to the two former) that this comfort you have that both parties deſire the peace with more than an ordinary affection. Which words I rather judge to proceed out of a contemplation of the tedioufneſs which this buſineſs is to bring with it, than out of any affectionate deſire or good judgment of the effects which this buſineſs is to bring with it; conſidering that the beſt in that kind that can be hoped for, is like to add but trouble and care to us in theſe parts; and yet I would not have you now gather that I would have you break it." Vol. ii. p. 378.

Book III. his conduct, and leſs afraid of the conſequences of giving offence to the court of Spain, readily yielded his conſent, and ſent orders to the preſident, Jeannin, to finiſh the treaty without delay.

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Against this meaſure, which no pains were taken to conceal, the Spaniſh miniſters having warmly remonſtrated at the court of France, and having received no other anſwer, but that if rightly underſtood, it muſt contribute to haſten the eſtabliſhment of peace, they from thence perceived that it was become neceſſary for them, and therefore reſolved, if poſſible, to procure the French king's aſſiſtance in their negociation with the ſtates. For this purpoſe, but under a different pretext, the marquis of Villa Franca was ſent to Paris, in the character of ambaſſador, and from that time Henry acted as mediator between the contracting powers, although it was well underſtood how much more he favoured the pretenſions of the Dutch than thoſe either of the archdukes
1608. or the king of Spain (*q*).

In the mean time the archdukes commiſſioners arrived at the Hague, and a few days after the
Feb. 6th. conferences were begun (*r*). The two or three firſt ſeſſions having been employed by the commiſſioners in examining their powers, and in diſcuſſing certain objections againſt them, which, after ſome

(*q*) Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. & Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 69.

(*r*) A great number of people from the other towns had come to the Hague at this time, chiefly moved by their curioſity to ſee Spinola, who for ſome years had been an object of their higheſt admiration, which was on ſome occaſions mixed with terror. Prince Maurice having gone out to meet him, received him into his own coach, and conducted him to the Hague. And both theſe great men, it is ſaid, were well pleaſed to find the high opinion which they had formed of each other's abilities, from their actions, juſtified by their diſcourſe which they held together in the preſent interview.

ſome altercation, it was agreed were not ſufficient to ſtop their procedure; the Dutch commiſſioners required, as a preliminary article, a ſolemn acknowledgment, in the name of the king of Spain and the archdukes, of the independence of the United Provinces; including an explicit renunciation of all right to authority over them; together with an obligation, binding on their ſucceſſors as well as on themſelves, that they ſhould not henceforth uſe the arms or titles of the provinces, or any other marks of their ancient ſovereignty. BOOK III. 1608.

THE commiſſioners of the archdukes were much offended at the latter part of this requiſition; and, beſides remonſtrating againſt it to the Dutch commiſſioners themſelves, they bitterly complained to the Britiſh and French ambaſſadors, of the arrogance diſcovered in making ſo unuſual a demand. It had been the ordinary practice, they obſerved, of princes to retain the titles of the ſtates or kingdoms which they had loſt. The Catholic king was ſtyled king of Jeruſalem, and duke of Burgundy; the king of France called himſelf king of Navarre; and the king of England ſtill aſſumed the title of king of France. In requiring his Catholic majeſty therefore to renounce his titles as well as his ſovereignty, the ſtates were not only guilty of arrogating to themſelves the privilege of introducing a new practice, but of impeaching the conduct of the greateſt ſovereigns in Europe, and particularly of the kings of France and Britain, who had no leſs reaſon to be offended at the demand of the Dutch commiſſioners than the king of Spain.

THE French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, however, declined on this occaſion to interpoſe, and the archdukes commiſſioners, after having obtained the

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the conſent of the archdukes, acquainted thoſe of the ſtates at the next meeting, that they were ready to grant the renunciation required in its full extent. The Dutch were agreeably ſurpriſed at the facility with which the Spaniards thus yielded to their requeſt; but when Richardot, who was the ſpeaker on this occaſion, added that, in return for ſo liberal a conceſſion, it was expected that the ſtates would agree to abſtain for the future from all commerce in the Indies, and reſt ſatisfied, as they had done till about ten years before, with the trade which they had carrried on with Spain, and other countries in Europe, they were inflamed with indignation, and exclaimed, that one moment the king and archdukes acknowledged them to be a free and independent people, and the next ſhewed they were determined to treat them as ſlaves, and, if poſſible, to deprive them of the moſt valuable branches of their liberty: that theſe princes, in renouncing their claim to the ſovereignty of the provinces, had given nothing to the ſtates which they did not poſſeſs before; while, in requiring them to relinquiſh their trade to India, they, in effect, required them to abandon what was known to be a principal ſource of their wealth and power: but they declared that no conſideration would ever induce them to comply with a demand which was equally exorbitant and unjuſt; for, under what pretext could the Spaniards claim the excluſive privilege of trading to the Indies? Theſe countries were not the property of the Spaniards, but belonged to a great number of independent princes, many of whom choſe rather that their ſubjects ſhould engage in trade with the Dutch than with the Spaniards or Portugueſe. Theſe countries were likewiſe of an immenſe extent; they could furniſh materials for trade to all the commercial nations in Europe; and it was a violation of the law of nature, and contrary to the general

The Dutch refuſe to give up their trade to India.

general good of mankind, for any one nation to endeavour to engroſs the whole. The ſtates would not refuſe to agree to any arrangement with regard to the Indian trade, which was calculated to promote the mutual intereſt of both nations. But, having been reduced by the Spaniards themſelves to the neceſſity of having recourſe to this new branch of commerce, having begun it in the face of difficulties, which it had required an enormous expence, and the moſt vigorous exertions to ſurmount, having eſtabliſhed a company for carrying it on, and already taſted of the profits ariſing from it, they were determined, whatever ſhould be the conſequences, to perſevere. The Spaniſh commiſſioners had no other reply to make to this anſwer of the ſtates, but that the Spaniards and Portugueſe had long been in the ſole poſſeſſion of the trade to India, and that the king of Spain had not only refuſed to grant a participation in that trade to the French and Engliſh, but likewiſe to his well affected ſubjects in the Netherlands: but no regard was paid to theſe conſiderations by the commiſſioners of the ſtates; and they were confirmed in their purpoſe by the unanimous voice of their countrymen, joined to a repreſentation which was made on this occaſion to the ſtates by the India company.

The trade, they repreſented, with Spain and Portugal, had never been, and could never be productive of any advantage to individuals or to the public, equal to that which aroſe from the trade to India. In this, and the other branches of foreign trade, of which the Spaniards wanted to deprive them, upwards of a hundred and fifty ſhips and eight thouſand ſailors were employed. Theſe ſhips were all of a conſiderable ſize, and might at any time be converted, at a ſmall expence, into ſhips of war, when the public exigencies

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cies ſhould require. The Indian trade was not only infinitely more profitable than the Spaniſh, as it conſiſted in going to the fountain head for thoſe commodities, which they had formerly purchaſed at ſecond hand from the Spaniards and Portugueſe, but was likewiſe much more ſafe and certain, becauſe it did not, like the other, depend on the caprice of the king or of the miniſters of Spain. They had formerly experienced how little they had to rely on the trade with Spain and Portugal. Their ſailors had been ſeized and impriſoned, or ſent to the gallies to work as ſlaves, and their ſhips and goods had been confiſcated. It would be always in the power of the Spaniards to exerciſe the ſame oppreſſions. They would renew them under various pretexts, on the ſlighteſt grounds of offence; and after having perſuaded the ſtates to abandon their Indian commerce, they would next exclude them from that of Spain and Portugal, in the hopes that by thus reducing their naval power, they might again compel them to ſubmit to their authority. The ſtates might judge of how much importance the trade of India was to the Spaniards, from the eagerneſs which they diſcovered to prevent any other nation from partaking in it; but it was of ſtill greater importance to the people of the United Provinces, who depended almoſt entirely upon that trade for their ſubſiſtence, and, without the reſources which they derived from it, would be utterly unable to maintain their liberty and independence. Nor was it intereſt only which the ſtates would ſacrifice, by granting the requeſt of the Spaniſh commiſſioners, but likewiſe their integrity and honour; ſince alliances had been formed with the Indian princes, and ſome of theſe princes, truſting to the protection of the company, acting by the authority of the ſtates, had ſhaken off the yoke of the Spaniards, and thereby expoſed themſelves to their ſevereſt vengeance,

vengeance, if, by any article in the preſent treaty, the company were to be prevented from fulfilling their engagements.

The ſtates were more than ever determined, by theſe conſiderations, to reject the requeſt of the Spaniſh commiſſioners; but, that they might afford ſome proof of the ſincerity of their deſire of peace, they gave them their choice of the three following propoſals. The firſt, that, conformably to the ordinary tenor of treaties of peace, both parties ſhould equally enjoy the liberty of commerce by ſea and land. The ſecond, that the united Provinces ſhould abſtain from all commerce with countries under the government of Spain, on this ſide of the northern tropic, while, on the other ſide, all matters ſhould remain on their preſent footing; the ſtates being ſatisfied that peace ſhould take place on this ſide, while hoſtilities, if unavoidable, might continue on the other. And the third, that Spain ſhould give no moleſtation to the Dutch in India for ſeven years, before the expiration of which a new treaty ſhould be ſet on foot, in order to deviſe ſome proper means of accommodation. The Spaniſh commiſſioners replied, that they were not poſſeſſed of power to agree to any of theſe propoſals. They knew that the king of Spain had renounced his ſovereignty over the provinces, in the hopes of their conſenting entirely to deſiſt from the Indian trade; but they ſhould appoint one of their number to go to Madrid for new inſtructions. The Franciſcan was accordingly diſpatched for that purpoſe; and, in the mean time, the commiſſioners proceeded to take ſome of the other points in queſtion under their conſideration.

The Dutch having, from the beginning, ſuſpected, on account of the mention of religion in

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the king's ſecond ratification, that it was intended to propoſe ſome change in their eſtabliſhed religion, required of the Spaniſh commiſſioners to declare whether they had received any inſtructions on that head, and what their inſtructions were. The commiſſioners acknowledged that they were indeed inſtructed to make a propoſal to the ſtates with regard to religion; but added, that they could not enter on the diſcuſſion of this article till ſeveral others had been diſcuſſed. Of all the articles they knew, there was none in which the king and the duke of Lerma were ſo deeply intereſted; but ſince their arrival in Holland, they had come to be perſuaded, from private information, that no propoſal which they were empowered to make on this ſubject would be liſtened to by the ſtates. They were likewiſe afraid that the diſcuſſion of a point of ſo delicate a nature, on which the paſſions of the Dutch would be ſo eaſily inflamed, might occaſion a ſudden diſſolution of the conferences; and from the ſequel it is probable that they had ſent the Franciſcan to Madrid as much for the purpoſe of ſounding the inclinations of the court, and knowing their ultimate reſolution on this head, as on that of the Indian commerce. Although they were repeatedly urged, therefore, by the Dutch to declare what they were inſtructed to propoſe with regard to religion, they as often declined complying with their requeſt, and inſiſted that it was better previouſly to examine the other queſtons in diſpuſe.

ONE of theſe related to the duties which, during the war, had been laid by the Dutch on all goods imported by the Scheld to Antwerp. The archdukes commiſſioners inſiſted that all thoſe duties ſhould be taken off: nor were thoſe of the ſtates unwilling to aboliſh ſuch of them as had been impoſed in conſideration of the war; but they

they required that the ſame duties ſhould ſtill be paid by the ſubjects of the archdukes and the king of Spain as were exacted from the ſubjects of the ſtates, to enable them to defray the expence of the fortifications on the banks of the Scheld, and of the ſhips of war that were neceſſary for the protection of their commerce. This was the pretext which they employed, although it is probable they were chiefly actuated by their dread leſt the trade of Antwerp ſhould be revived to the prejudice of that of their own commercial towns in the maritime provinces.

Another point which engaged the attention of the commiſſioners, regarded the mutual exchange of thoſe towns and diſtricts which the contending powers had acquired by conqueſt from one another. The ſtates were at this time in poſſeſſion of Sluys, and the iſle of Cadſant in Flanders, and of Breda, Bergen op Zoom, and Gertrudenberg, in Brabant; all of which places were of the firſt importance, on account of their ſituation and ſtrength. The Spaniſh commiſſioners, however, propoſed and urged that theſe places ſhould be given to the archdukes, who were ſovereigns of the provinces in which they lay, and that the ſtates, in compenſation for them, ſhould accept of Oldenſeel, Groll, and Lingen. But the Dutch commiſſioners rejected this propoſal with great diſdain, alledging that the towns poſſeſſed by the ſtates were of infinitely greater value than thoſe which were offered in exchange for them; and declaring, that as no conceſſions which the archdukes would make were a ſufficient equivalent, both parties, agreeably to what the archduke had propoſed in the beginning of this negociation, ſhould retain what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion.

A third

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A THIRD queſtion related to the boundaries between the dominions of the ſtates and thoſe of the archdukes; a fourth, to the reſtitution of the effects belonging to individuals which had been confiſcated; and, beſides theſe, there were ſeveral other matters treated of, concerning which the oppoſite parties contended with great warmth, and diſcovered a wide diverſity of ſentiment.

The property of individuals reſtored by the treaty for peace.

MANY weeks paſt in fruitleſs altercation. The parties ſeemed to be more than ever exaſperated againſt each other; and the difficulties which prevented them from coming to an agreement ſeemed daily to increaſe.

Obſtinacy of the Dutch.

THE Dutch were extremely tenacious of their claims, and the archdukes commiſſioners often complained of this obſtinacy to the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors; but their conduct was, at the ſame time, explicit and undiſguiſed; and, from the commencement of the negociation, they had openly declared, that, whatever conceſſions they might be induced to make in other matters, there were two points, religion and the trade to India, on which no ſuch conceſſion was to be expected as the Spaniards were likely to require.

To procure ſome new inſtructions with regard to theſe important articles, had, as already mentioned, been the purpoſe for which the Franciſcan had been ſent to Madrid. The time fixed for his return was expired, and no ſatisfactory account of his delay was given by the archdukes commiſſioners, who ſtudiouſly avoided all diſcourſe concerning him, and maintained an obſtinate ſilence with regard to his ſucceſs.

THE Dutch were exceedingly diſguſted at this behaviour: they knew not to what cauſe it could be

be aſcribed: they were not without ſuſpicion of ſome inſidious deſign; and they at length reſolved, that either the archdukes ambaſſadors ſhould give them ſatisfaction concerning the cauſe of Ney's delay, or that the treaty ſhould inſtantly be broken off. BOOK III. 1608.

HAVING, accordingly, in the moſt peremptory terms, required to know what was the ultimate determination of the king of Spain with regard to the Indian trade, the ambaſſadors, thinking it unneceſſary any longer to conceal what they knew, replied (*r*), that Ney had not been able to obtain a more favourable anſwer to his application than this, that the king, from his ardent deſire of reſtoring peace to his dominions, was ſtill ready to renounce his claim of ſovereignty over the provinces in the form propoſed; but, in return for ſo great a ſacrifice, required that the ſtates ſhould abſtain from all commerce to the Indies, and permit the exerciſe of the Catholic religion throughout the whole extent of their dominions. Auguſt 10. Diſputes concerning the Catholic religion and the Indian trade.

OF this declaration the deputies of the ſtates gave immediate information to the ſtates general, and the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors. James having lately entered into that defenſive alliance with the ſtates which he had formerly declined, and Henry, beſides concluding ſuch an alliance, having empowered (*ſ*) Jeannin to acquaint them, that, in caſe the preſent treaty were not broken off without his conſent, he had reſolved to aſſiſt them in the proſecution of the war; both theſe princes were well entitled to be conſulted on the preſent

(*r*) Bentivoglio, Grotius, &c. Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 652, &c.

(*ſ*) Negociations de Jeannin, tom. i. p 44. Seconde Inſtruction au Monſieur Jeannin.

BOOK III. preſent occaſion. Henry could not decently have neglected the opportunity, which was preſented to him, of interpoſing in behalf of the religion which he profeſſed, and therefore he had inſtructed Jeannin to adviſe the ſtates, if poſſible, to grant to their Catholic ſubjects the indulgence which Philip had demanded for them; but he did not inſiſt on their compliance with his advice: he was ſenſible that this indulgence might endanger their internal peace, eſpecially if it was granted at the requeſt of the king of Spain; and therefore left them at liberty to determine, both with regard to religion and their Indian trade, whether any conceſſion could be made conſiſtently with their intereſt and ſecurity.

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THE ſtates themſelves unanimouſly thought that there was no room for heſitation on the ſubject. With the conſent of Jeannin, as well as of the Engliſh ambaſſadors, they rejected the conditions that were propoſed; and, at the next meeting with the archdukes commiſſioners, it was declared by thoſe of the ſtates, that they conſidered the inſiſting upon theſe conditions as a violation of the promiſe which had been made of treating with them as with a free people; that they could not conſider the conduct of Spain as conſiſtent, fair, or candid, and were therefore determined to break off the preſent treaty; and, without ſuffering themſelves to be any longer deceived, to reſume the proſecution of the war (*t*).

THE ſtates ſeem to have received ſufficient provocation on this occaſion for the reſentment with which they were inflamed; but, from a letter of the

(*t*) Meteren, liv. xxx. folio 650, &c.

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the preſident Jeannin's to the king of France, it appears that it was not the court of Spain ſo much as the archdukes commiſſioners, of whom they had reaſon to complain. For Philip, it appears from this letter, had, from the beginning of the negociation, declared that he would never conſent to renounce his ſovereignty, but on the condition that the free exerciſe of the Catholic religion ſhould be eſtabliſhed in all the provinces; and he had charged the commiſſioners to open the conferences by acquainting them that this was his unalterable reſolution. But the commiſſioners had thought it expedient to change the order of their inſtructions, and to begin with an acknowledgment of the freedom of the ſtates, hoping thereby to render them more obſequious in other articles; and afterwards, when both parties were in better humour with each other, to obtain from Philip ſome relaxation in his demand with regard to the Catholic religion (*u*).

THIS information was communicated to the deputies of the ſtates, and afterwards to the ſtates general, with an intention to ſooth their reſentment; but it ſerved rather to turn it into another channel, by directing it againſt the archdukes commiſſioners inſtead of the court of Spain. And it likewiſe ſerved to rivet their conviction, that no ſolid peace could ever be obtained from that court, whoſe bigotry was the ſame in the preſent as it had been in the former reign, without a conceſſion on their part, which they deemed to be no leſs contrary to good policy than it was inconſiſtent with ſincerity in their profeſſion of the Proteſtant faith. They were confirmed, therefore, in this reſolution of declining to proceed any

(*u*) Negotiations de Jeannin, tom. ii. p. 403, 404.

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any farther in the treaty, and ſeem to have ſatisfied the Engliſh and French ambaſſadors, that they had ſufficient motives to juſtify their conduct.

These ambaſſadors, however, ſtill believed it to be practicable to reſtore tranquillity to the United Provinces, although not by a perpetual peace, yet by a long truce between the contending powers. The obſtacles to the eſtabliſhment of peace had chiefly ariſen from the pride and bigotry of the court of Spain; but theſe obſtacles, they thought, might be more eaſily ſurmounted in attempting to conclude a truce than a peace, becauſe, if only a truce were concluded, that court might flatter themſelves with the hopes, that, at the expiration of it, they might recover their conceſſions, and accompliſh the ſeveral objects in which they were ſo deeply intereſted; beſides that, there was ground to ſuſpect, that, from the beginning of the negociation, it was a truce, and not a perpetual peace, that was intended by the Spaniſh miniſters.

The preſident Jeannin admitted to an audience of the ſtates.

The preſident Jeannin having previouſly concerted with the Engliſh ambaſſadors certain preliminary articles, without which he knew that all farther treaty muſt prove abortive, requeſted an audience of the ſtates, and, being admitted into their aſſembly, after expreſſing the concern of the French and Engliſh monarchs on account of the unſucceſsful iſſue of the late conferences, he added, that theſe princes, being deeply impreſſed with a conviction of the neceſſity of putting a period to the war, had, in caſe it ſhould be found impracticable to eſtabliſh a laſting peace, commanded their ambaſſadors to recommend to the ſtates a truce of ſeveral years, provided that ſuch a truce

a truce could be obtained on advantageous and honourable terms. For, in recommending this meaſure, he ſubjoined, it is by a regard for the true intereſt and honour of the provinces, that the French and Britiſh kings are prompted, and therefore they exhort you to adopt it only on the following conditions: firſt, that the king of Spain and the archdukes ſhall treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority; ſecondly, that, during the truce, you ſhall enjoy a free commerce both in Europe and in the Indies; and, thirdly, that you ſhall retain all the towns and territories which are at preſent in your poſſeſſion.

During this truce you will have leiſure to rectify the diſorders which have ſprung up during the continuance of the war, to pay your debts, to reform your government, to extend your trade, and, if you ſtudy to maintain internal union and tranquillity, this truce, it is probable, will terminate in a laſting peace, by which the advantages you have obtained will be perpetuated and ſecured: whereas, if at this time the war were to be renewed, we foreſee innumerable difficulties to which you will be expoſed; and perceive, that, in order to inſure ſucceſs, your friends muſt be much more liberal in their aſſiſtance, than is convenient for them in the preſent ſituation of their affairs.

You are diſſatisfied with the conduct of your adverſaries; but let not your reſentment prevent you from liſtening to the counſel of your friends. It is our intention to offer them the ſame counſel; and, if they refuſe to follow it, to acquaint them that the kings of France and Britain are determined to give you every proof of faithful friendſhip in

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in their power. But in return for this, theſe princes expect that you will not, by your obſtinacy, engage them in a war to which they are utterly averſe, and for which, if this truce can be accompliſhed, there is no neceſſity.

It will be difficult, we know, to obtain the conſent of the Catholic king to the preliminary articles; but, if that prince ſhall be found equally uncomplying and intractable, as you have hitherto experienced, and the treaty for a truce, like that for peace, ſhall, through his fault, prove abortive, you will be juſtified for again having recourſe to arms; and the princes too, whom we repreſent, will be juſtified for reſolving to exert themſelves with greater vigour in your behalf (*x*).

To this propoſal the ſtates general made no immediate reply, but that they would ſubmit it to the conſideration of the ſtates of the particular provinces.

It was ſoon after communicated to the marquis of Spinola, and the reſt of the archdukes commiſſioners, by whom it was received with all the ſatisfaction which might be expected from their well known averſion to the continuance of the war. But although they acknowledged how much pleaſure it would give them, if any means of an accommodation could be deviſed, they dreaded that the archdukes would be unable to perſuade the court of Spain to agree to the preliminary articles; and, for this reaſon, they laboured to perſuade Jeannin to omit the two firſt articles altogether, and to attempt to conclude a truce without any other condition but that both parties ſhould retain what they poſſeſſed. It had been with

(*x*) Jean. ii. 412.

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with the utmoſt reluctance, they repreſented, that the king of Spain had formerly conſented to acknowledge the independence of the ſtates, even when he expected thereby to gain ſome conceſſion from them in favour of the Catholic religion, and to exclude them from the Indian trade, had been his principal motive for deſiring to put a period to the war. To procure his conſent, therefore, either to the firſt or to the ſecond of the preliminary articles, would be attended with difficulties, which, there was ground to apprehend, would be found inſuperable; and no other agreement was like to be obtained but a ceſſation of hoſtilities, or a truce in the common form, during which both parties ſhould retain what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion.

JEANNIN was ſenſible of the truth of this repreſentation, and foreſaw the difficulties which the archdukes muſt encounter, if they liſtened to his propoſal; but, beſides that theſe princes were, above all things, ſolicitous to be delivered from a ruinous war, which filled their minds with perpetual diſquietude, and would employ all their influence to overcome the pride and obſtinacy of the court of Spain, he knew that the Spaniards were at preſent extremely ill prepared for the recommencement of hoſtilities, and hoped that on this account they might be induced to agree to terms, which, on another occaſion, they would have rejected with diſdain.

HE would not, therefore, have been inclined to withdraw the preliminary articles, even although he had found himſelf at liberty; but they were a part (he ſaid) of the archdukes commiſſioners propoſal to the ſtates, and the honour both of the French and Engliſh monarchs, in whoſe name this propoſal had been made, was now pledged

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pledged either to procure the acceptance of them by the archdukes and king of Spain, or to furniſh the ſtates with ſuch aſſiſtance as might be neceſſary for the proſecution of the war. This declaration he made to the archdukes commiſſioners in the moſt explicit terms; and added, that while it might be difficult to obtain the king of Spain's aſſent to the propoſed conditions, it was extremely doubtful whether theſe conditions were ſuch as would ſatisfy the people of the United Provinces; but the commiſſioners might firmly believe that nothing leſs than was contained in the preliminary articles would give ſatisfaction either to them, or to their friends.

OF the truth of this aſſertion, as far as it regarded the confederates, there was immediate proof in the difficulty which Jeannin encountered in perſuading them to agree to his propoſal. The greater part of the deputies of the particular provinces, being ſincerely ſolicitous for the eſtabliſhment of peace, were ſatisfied with the preliminary articles, and gave their opinion that the truce, with the conditions contained in theſe articles, ought not to be refuſed. But there were many, who, whether from motives of private intereſt, or a regard to the public ſafety, being deſirous of a continuance of the war, maintained that no agreement whatever ſhould be made, but on condition that the archdukes, and the king of Spain, ſhould grant the ſame ſolemn acknowledgment of the liberty and independence of the ſtates, to which they had formerly conſented in treating for a perpetual peace, including an explicit renunciation for ever of all their claims of authority over the United Provinces.

THE former of theſe parties was headed by Barnevelt, ſupported by the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors;

ambaſſadors; and the latter by prince Maurice, whoſe opinions was eſpouſed not only by the whole province of Zealand, over which his authority was almoſt without controul, but by the deputies of Amſterdam, and thoſe of ſeveral other cities in the province of Holland.

Parties for and againſt the peace.

The former endeavoured to perſuade the latter, that it was unreaſonable to expect the ſame liberal conceſſions from the enemy, in the caſe of a truce, as where a perpetual peace was to be eſtabliſhed; and that, while the ſtates were conſcious of being free and able to maintain their liberty, it was of no importance whether the Spaniards ſhould acknowledge, or refuſe to acknowledge, their independence; for it was ſufficient for every valuable purpoſe which they could have in view, if the Spaniards would treat with them as with a free people, and conclude an agreement upon equitable terms.

But theſe conſiderations had no weight with prince Maurice, or his partizans. They were averſe to the truce on other accounts, beſides their objection to the declaratory clauſe, and laboured to convince their countrymen that a truce, on whatever terms, at the preſent period, though it might be neceſſary for Spain, muſt prove pernicious and dangerous to the Dutch republic. They omitted no opportunity of inculcating their opinion, whether in public aſſemblies or in private ſocieties, and publiſhed innumerable letters and pamphlets, which being univerſally peruſed, became the ſubject of diſcourſe in every company. Of theſe writings ſome were of the moſt inflammatory kind, intended to inſtill ſuſpicions into the minds of the people, that Barnevelt and his friends, unable to reſiſt the allurement of Peruvian gold, had ſold their country to the Spaniards;

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ards; and even the French and Britiſh monarchs, it was inſinuated, by ſo earneſtly recommending the truce, intended rather to ſerve the court of Spain than the United Provinces. Their ſuſpicions on this head were heightened by the arrival at Paris and London of two ambaſſadors, who had been ſent on their preſent embaſſy by the Spaniſh miniſters, though under a different pretext, yet, probably, with no other view but to procure the good offices of James and Henry in the preſent negociation in the Netherlands.

No pains were ſpared by the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors at the Hague, to convince the Dutch that their apprehenſions were without foundation. Above all the reſt, Jeannin laboured aſſiduouſly for this end; and by giving the deputies of the ſtates the ſtrongeſt aſſurances that his maſter's friendſhip was inviolable, and that nothing could be more remote from his intention than to enter into an alliance with Spain to the prejudice of their republic, he ſeems, with regard to this matter, in which they were ſo deeply intereſted, to have ſet their minds at eaſe.

The averſion, however, of a great number of them to the truce, and their animoſity againſt ſuch of their countrymen as promoted it, were as ſtrong as ever. Their reſentment was principally directed againſt Barnevelt, who, by his eloquence and addreſs, his great abilities, and long experience, had acquired an entire aſcendant over moſt of the deputies: he appears, however, to have been too ſenſibly affected on this occaſion by the odium to which he found himſelf expoſed. Having one day bitterly complained, in an aſſembly of the ſtates, of the cruel treatment which he received in the libels daily publiſhed on the ſubject of the preſent controverſy, he appealed to the

the deputies, whether he had given juſt ground for ſuch injurious imputations as had been caſt upon him; and then left the aſſembly with a reſolution to retire from public life. But he ſoon recovered his tranquillity; and, at the earneſt deſire of the ſtates, he returned to the aſſembly, and afterwards continued to apply himſelf to the conduct of public affairs with the ſame indefatigable attention as before (*y*).

It would be injurious to the character of prince Maurice to ſuppoſe that he would demean himſelf ſo far as to be concerned in thoſe anonymous pamphlets and incendiary letters, replete with threats againſt Barnevelt and his adherents, which were publiſhed on this occaſion. He took no pains to conceal his reſentment, and openly inveighed againſt their conduct, as being calculated to involve the provinces in ruin. Having viſited ſeveral of the towns in Holland, he laboured to bring over the deputies to his opinion, and with the ſame intention he wrote a circular letter to all the other towns in the province.

What he ſaid and wrote on this occaſion was principally intended to inſpire the deputies with miſtruſt of the archdukes and the court of Spain, whoſe conduct, in the preſent negociation, he ſaid, had been inconſiſtent with their profeſſions in the beginning, and who could not have any reaſon for declining to grant the moſt explicit renunciation of their right of ſovereignty over the provinces, but that they ſecretly deſigned to aſſert that right when a more convenient ſeaſon ſhould arrive.

(*y*) Grotius, &c. lib. xvi.

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THEY would obſerve the truce only ſo long as they found it neceſſary for retrieving the ruinous condition of their affairs; and, mean while, the people of the United Provinces, deceived by a falſe appearance of tranquillity, would not only quit their arms, but would loſe their military ſpirit, and be induced to agree to whatever terms ſhould be preſcribed to them, rather than again expoſe themſelves to the dangers or inconveniencies of war.

THE Spaniards, it was evident, being utterly averſe to a perpetual peace, hoped to be able, during the truce, to apply ſome effectual remedies to the diſorders which prevailed in their finances; whereas the ſtates, having ſo great a number of frontier towns, where numerous garriſons muſt be maintained, would have nearly the ſame expences to defray as during the continuance of the war. It would, however, be infinitely more difficult, after their apprehenſions of immediate danger were removed, to perſuade the people to pay the taxes which it would be neceſſary to impoſe; and the enemy would, at the ſame time, practiſe on their fidelity, and ſow the ſeeds of diſcord among the different towns and provinces, of which they would not fail to avail themſelves, without thinking it incumbent on them to delay hoſtilities till the expiration of the truce.

As this reaſoning of prince Maurice coincided with the prejudices which the Dutch had, for many years, entertained againſt the Spaniards, it made a ſtrong impreſſion on the minds of many of the deputies; nor was it conſidered either by Barnevelt or Jeannin, as frivolous. On the contrary, they treated it with the reſpect which was due to the perſon by whom it was employed, although they, at the ſame time, laboured aſſiduouſly

ouſly to ſhow that the arguments on their ſide had greater weight; and Jeannin, in his own name and that of the other ambaſſadors, preſented a memorial to the ſtates, of the following purport, intended to remove the objections that were urged by Maurice and his adherents. Book III. 1608. Memorial of Jeannin preſented to the United States.

"The princes whom we repreſent, being deeply intereſted in your proſperity, and believing the truce propoſed, to be neceſſary, in the preſent ſituation of your affairs, are therefore much concerned to obſerve the oppoſition which it meets with from ſo many reſpectable members of your ſtate.

"You ought not, they alledge, to be ſatisfied that the archdukes and the king of Spain are willing to treat with you as with a free people, over whom they pretend to no authority, but you ought to require a declaration that they will conſider you in this light for ever afterwards, as well as during the continuance of the truce.

"But in the opinion of the princes, our ſovereigns, your liberty is equally well ſecured by the former of theſe declarations as by the latter; becauſe the former, not being limited to any particular time, but expreſſed in terms that are general and indefinite, it muſt be underſtood by all the world in the ſame ſenſe, as if the words "for ever" were ſubjoined. Beſides this conſideration, it is not of the king of Spain and the archdukes, that you are to hold your liberty. You have long maintained that you are already free, having aſſerted your liberty by a public ſolemn deed, founded upon reaſon and neceſſity, and bravely defended it for many years againſt your oppreſſors, by the force of arms. You ought, therefore, to reſt ſatisfied with that ſimple acknowledgment

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ledgment of it, which is implied in the declaration of being ready to treat with you as with a free people. You would be ſatisfied with ſuch an acknowledgment from any neutral or friendly power. You have equal reaſon to be ſatisfied when it is made by the archdukes, and the king of Spain. And you ought not, with ſo much ſolicitude, to require theſe princes to be more explicit, in declaring you to be free, leſt you be conſidered as thereby tacitly confeſſing that ſtill they have a right to your obedience.

" But, even allowing, that the king of Spain ſhould not think himſelf excluded by the form of words made choice of from his claim of ſovereignty, will he call you before a court of juſtice, do you ſuppoſe, in order to have his rights examined by the rules of law? It is not in this manner that ſovereigns aſſert their claims; it is only to the ſword that they appeal: and if you be able when the truce expires, to maintain your liberty as you have hitherto done againſt the force of arms, you will then, as well as now, with juſtice deſpiſe your enemy's pretenſions to dominion over you. It will be ſufficient then, as it is at preſent, to find yourſelves in actual poſſeſſion of your liberty. And, in whatever ſenſe the words of the truce may be underſtood by the king of Spain, you ought to be ſatisfied with the aſſurance which has been given you, and which we now repeat, that, by the princes whom we repreſent, whoſe friendſhip you have ſo long experienced, and on whoſe aſſiſtance you may with confidence rely, theſe words are conſidered as a clear and unambiguous declaration, that you are a free people over whom authority cannot ever be juſtly pretended by the king of Spain.

" It

"IT is farther objected by thoſe who oppoſe the truce, that it will afford leiſure to the catholic king to retrieve the ruinous condition of his finances, and to proſecute the war, after the recommencement of hoſtilities, with greater vigour. Nor can it be denied, that if he was to liſten to the advice of wiſe and faithful counſellors, it might be, in ſome meaſure, attended with this effect. But is it to be preſumed that a young king, at the head of a nation noted for reſtleſs and inordinate ambition, with miniſters inattentive to œconomy, when the exigencies of his affairs required it, will be more attentive when his ſituation renders it unneceſſary? Is it not rather to be preſumed, that his treaſure will, more than ever, become a prey to the avarice or profuſion of his miniſters? that it will be more than ever laviſhed on idle pomp and ſhow; or that, by quarrelling with his neighbours, he ſhall ere long be engaged in ſome ambitious and expenſive enterprize?

"IT is from your republic, and not from the king of Spain, that thoſe prudent meaſures may be expected, which are neceſſary to repair the miſchiefs that have been occaſioned by the war: you are equally diſtinguiſhed for your private and your public œconomy; and you are not leſs diſtinguiſhed for your induſtry, your activity, and enterprize. With theſe qualities, which you poſſeſs in ſo eminent a degree, your trade muſt every year be more extended; and, being carried on with ſmaller riſks, and at leſs expence, the profits ariſing from it will be greater than ever. You will thereby be enabled to diſcharge your public debts, to relieve your people from the load of taxes under which they groan, and, when the truce expires, to proſecute the war with leſs dependence on your allies, and a greater probability of ſucceſs.

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"IT will ſtill, indeed, be neceſſary for you to maintain garriſons in the frontier towns, and to retain a conſiderable proportion of your troops in pay, that, whether the truce be obſerved or violated, you may be always found in a proper poſture of defence.

"But at leaſt the one half of your army may be diſbanded. Your trade will, in the mean time, be carried on with much greater advantage than hitherto, and all thoſe loſſes by ſea and by land avoided, which you have ſo often repreſented to the kings, our maſters, as the cauſe why you were unable, of yourſelves, to defray the neceſſary expences of the war.

"BUT your enemies, it is alledged by the oppoſers of the truce, will have acceſs during the continuance of it, to carry on their intrigues among the people; to ſow diſſenſions among the towns and provinces, and to perſuade ſome of them perhaps to abandon the confederacy; while the people themſelves, delivered from the apprehenſions of immediate danger, will refuſe to pay the taxes which the ſtates ſhall find it neceſſary to impoſe.

"WITH regard to theſe objections, as we do not pretend to any certain foreſight of futurity, we will not affirm that they are entirely deſtitute of foundation. There is no ſtate of human ſociety that is not ſubject to inconveniencies and dangers; and there are dangers attending peace as well as war: but the dangers mentioned are ſuch as, with prudent precautions, it is in your power to avoid. The objections founded on the apprehenſions of them are equally applicable to a peace, as to a truce; and if they are ſufficient to deter you from liſtening to our propoſal of a truce, they

they ought to determine you to perſiſt in the proſecution of the war, till you have accompliſhed the utter ruin of your enemy. But you are too wiſe to propoſe to yourſelves an object inadequate to your ſtrength. And, therefore, unleſs you chuſe to live in perpetual war, which muſt much ſooner prove the ruin of your republic than of the Spaniſh monarchy, you muſt, ſooner or later, agree to bring the war to a concluſion, either by a peace, or by a truce. A peace on the terms which you require, is at preſent unattainable; and even although it were in your power to procure it, yet, in the opinion of many of your friends, a truce is more deſirable. For it is a ſort of medium between peace and war, and it might prove dangerous for you, before your political inſtitutions have acquired that ſtability which time alone can beſtow, to paſs at once from the one extreme to the other. It might occaſion too great a relaxation of the vigour which you have been ſo long accuſtomed to exert, and expoſe you an eaſy prey to the reſentment of your enemy.

"BUT during the continuance of the truce, you will look forward to the expiration of it. By keeping your fortifications in repair, and your troops under proper diſcipline, joined to a prudent adminiſtration of your finances, you will provide for that event; and thus, when the Spaniards ſhall perceive that you are well prepared for your defence, they will more eaſily agree to thoſe equitable terms of peace, which at this time their pride and their ſenſe of ſhame have determined them to reject.

"THE example of the Swiſs cantons, whoſe fortune ſo nearly reſembles your's, ought to engage you to liſten to the counſel which we offer. Like you, they had thrown off the yoke of their oppreſſors,

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oppreſſors, and their arms had generally been attended with ſucceſs; yet they agreed to a truce, when propoſed to them, on much leſs advantageous terms than thoſe which you are exhorted to accept; and, during the leiſure which it afforded them, they put their civil government and their military eſtabliſhments on ſo reſpectable a footing, as effectually determined their ancient maſters to lay aſide the thoughts of a farther proſecution of the war. From the ſame conduct it is likely that you will derive the ſame advantages. The king of Spain will more eaſily conſent on equitable terms, to a truce than to a perpetual peace, becauſe he may think that his dignity will ſuffer leſs from making temporary than perpetual conceſſions: but many circumſtances, it may be preſumed, will concur to deter him from a renewal of hoſtilities. His animoſity and reſentment will be abated; his ancient ſovereignty over you will be, in ſome meaſure, obſolete and forgotten: having taſted the ſweets of tranquillity, he will deſire to preſerve it undiſturbed: he will have experienced that it is the intereſt of his ſubjects at home, and ſtill more of thoſe in the Indies and America, to live at peace with you. And, as it will be impoſſible, unleſs you be greatly wanting to yourſelves, but that, ſome years hence, you muſt be poſſeſſed of greater reſources than at preſent, he muſt perceive the danger of engaging in war with you, after your power is eſtabliſhed and confirmed; when he conſiders, that in the very infancy of their ſtate, his moſt vigorous efforts to reduce you to obedience were of no avail.

"WHAT has been ſaid will be ſufficient, it is hoped, to evince that the objections againſt the truce, which have been urged by its oppoſers, ought not to deter you from agreeing to it, in caſe the

the conſent of the king of Spain can be procured to the terms propoſed. Theſe objections indeed are urged by ſome of the moſt reſpectable members of the ſtate, whoſe zeal for the proſperity of the republic is unqueſtionable. But the wiſeſt men are ſubject to error. It may be true, that ſome inconveniencies may ariſe from the truce, but it ſhould ſeem that much greater are to be dreaded from a continuance of the war. And, it is a firſt principle of prudence, of two evils to make choice of the leaſt. BOOK III. 1608

"BEFORE we conclude this memorial, it is neceſſary to remind you of two things, which deſerve your attention. Firſt, that it is not only the counſel, but the earneſt requeſt of thoſe princes, to whom you have been chiefly indebted for aſſiſtance, that you ſhould adopt the meaſure we have recommended: and, ſecondly, that ſo favourable a concurrence of circumſtances as the preſent, for obtaining equitable terms of accommodation, may never again occur. The archdukes are princes on whoſe fidelity you can with ſafety rely for the punctual performance of their engagements: they are fond of peace; at their earneſt intreaty, the king of Spain hath already made, and is ſtill likely to make more, ample conceſſions than could otherwiſe have juſtly been expected; and in conducting the treaty propoſed, you will have all the aſſiſtance that can be given you by two powerful monarchs, who conſider your intereſt as their own (z)."

THIS memorial did not immediately produce the deſired effect upon all the deputies. Several of

(z) Negociations de Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 9. Eſcrit fait par monſieur Jeannin, au nom de tous les ambaſſadeurs, jour treizieme Octobre, & mis és mains de meſſieurs Les Eſtats.

Book III. 1608. of the towns in Holland, and the whole province of Zealand, with prince Maurice at their head, ſtill remained as averſe to the truce as ever; and Maurice ſtill continued to employ his influence to confirm them in their reſolution of oppoſing it. By his emiſſaries, and his letters, he attempted to gain over the other towns and provinces to his opinion. He ſometimes talked as if both the French and Britiſh monarchs were purſuing their private intereſt, at the expence of the republic. He inſinuated, that, unleſs they ſhould drop the propoſal of a truce, and immediately agree to aſſiſt the ſtates more liberally than hitherto in proſecuting the war, the more diſtant parts of the provinces ought to be abandoned, and the territories of the republic contracted within ſuch narrow limits, as might be defended by the forces which the Dutch themſelves, without foreign aſſiſtance, were able to ſupport. He alledged, that no matter of ſo great importance as was at preſent under deliberation, could be adopted without the unanimous conſent of all the towns and provinces: and threatened, that the province of Zealand, if forſaken by the other provinces, would alone maintain the war againſt the Spaniards, till more ample conceſſions were obtained (*a*).

The French monarch could not avoid feeling ſome reſentment at his conduct, which he conſidered as equally violent and injurious. But Henry's candour would not ſuffer him to diveſt himſelf of that eſteem which he had long entertained for the prince's character; nor to believe the ſuggeſtions of his enemies, that he was actuated by ſome ſiniſter deſign. He ſtill wrote to him as to a friend whom he highly reſpected, ſparing no pains, and employing every argument to engage him to adopt his views.

Henry's

(*a*) Jeannin, tom. iii.

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HENRY'S endeavours were well ſeconded by Jeannin, who acted with the moſt conſummate prudence, and carefully avoided giving any perſonal offence to prince Maurice, while he exerted himſelf with great activity in counteracting his deſigns. By the eloquence and addreſs of Barnevelt, joined to the influence which he derived from his great experience, and the high opinion which was juſtly entertained of his public ſpirit and integrity, Amſterdam and all the other towns in Holland were reconciled to the truce, on the terms propoſed; and not long after, prince Maurice and the province of Zealand, with whom Jeannin and the Engliſh ambaſſadors, aſſiſted by deputies ſent thither by the other provinces, aſſiduouſly employed all their influence, were perſuaded to relinquiſh their oppoſition.

Reluctance of Philip, to acknowledge the independence of the United States.

THE archdukes were employing in the mean time their intereſt at Madrid to obtain the conſent of Philip; who, from the beginning, had diſcovered no leſs reluctance to Jeannin's propoſal than prince Maurice or the province of Zealand. Far from being averſe to a truce, this prince was exceedingly deſirous that it ſhould take place, provided it could be concluded on the ordinary condition of both parties retaining what was at preſent in their poſſeſſion. But to acknowledge the independence of his rebellious ſubjects, and formally to grant them his permiſſion to carry on their trade in India, were conditions with which he himſelf and many of his ſubjects thought it ignominious to comply.

The archdukes endeavoured to convince him, that in making theſe conceſſions, they would do nothing more than had been already done in conſenting to the ſuſpenſion of arms, and that no more important conſequences could ariſe from it.

They

Book III. 1608. They engaged to have the article relative to the Indian trade expreſſed in ſuch a manner, that it ſhould not materially affect the intereſt or the trade of Spain.

They repreſented, that the declaration ſo earneſtly required by the United States, could not do any prejudice to the king's right of ſovereignty, that it could not remain in force but while the truce ſubſiſted, and that the Hollanders would find it of no avail, after the renewal of hoſtilities, if his majeſty's arms were crowned with victory. They added that this was the opinion of the ambaſſadors of the mediating powers, and likewiſe of many members of the ſtates of the revolted provinces, who oppoſed the truce on account of the inſignificancy of the clauſe which contained the declaration of their liberty.

These conſiderations, urged by ſuch powerful ſolicitors, had great weight with Philip, who would have yielded his conſent, povided that ſome conceſſion could have been obtained in favour of the Catholic inhabitants of the United Provinces. And he had ſome ground, he thought, to entertain the hope of being able, in ſome meaſure, to accompliſh this object, in which he was more deeply intereſted than in any other, when he conſidered that the prince who was the chief mediator in the preſent negociation, was himſelf a Catholic. But the archdukes having informed him, that Jeannin, whoſe zeal for the Popiſh faith was unqueſtionable, had declared that it would be in vain to attempt to introduce any propoſal concerning religion among the preliminary articles, Philip doubted whether he could enter with a good conſcience into any treaty with ſuch determined heretics; and therefore heſitated, for ſome time, whether he

Religious ſcruples of Philip.

he ſhould not utterly reject the truce, whatever conſequences might follow. BOOK III. 1608.

In order to diſpel his ſcruples, the archduke ſent to Madrid his confeſſor, Ignatio Brizuela, a Spaniard of noble birth, eminently diſtinguiſhed for his piety and virtue, and of great experience in the affairs of the Netherlands.

BRIZUELA knew well how to make impreſſion on the timid, ſuperſtitious mind of Philip; and judiciouſly employed religion itſelf as a motive, which ſhould induce him to comply with the archdukes requeſt. If in the courſe of the treaty, ſaid he, any indulgence can be procured for the Catholic inhabitants, the French ambaſſador will exert his moſt ſtrenuous endeavours in their behalf; but it is neceſſary, he added, even for the intereſt of religion, that the truce ſhould be concluded, leſt, conſidering the difficulties under which the archdukes muſt labour in reſuming the war, inſtead of re-eſtabliſhing the Catholic faith in the rebellious provinces, it ſhall be expoſed to danger in thoſe which have been brought back to their allegiance.

To this reaſoning, Philip liſtened with great attention, and ſeemed to be in a great meaſure ſatisfied, that he ought not any longer to withhold his conſent; but choſe, as uſual, before he gave an explicit anſwer, to hear the opinion of his favourite the duke of Lerma. The duke had not, it ſhould ſeem, as yet formed a deciſive reſolution with regard to the part which it would be moſt prudent for him to act on the preſent occaſion. He had long experienced the moſt inſurmountable difficulties in furniſhing the neceſſary expences of the war; and he dreaded, if it were not ſpeedily brought to a concluſion, ſome great diſaſter might happen

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happen in the Netherlands, which would not be aſcribed to the marquis of Spinola, who had ſo often given the moſt unqueſtionable proofs of military prudence and capacity, but to him, by whom that general had been diſappointed in the ſupplies and reinforcements which had been promiſed him. For this reaſon, and perhaps too as was ſuſpected by his cotemporaries, from his jealouſy of Spinola, who had rendered himſelf of ſo great importance as to rival him, or at leaſt to enjoy too large a ſhare in the royal favour, he had from the beginning been extremely intent on the eſtabliſhment of peace. Obſerving, however, that both the pride of the Spaniſh nation, and Philip's ſuperſtition, were alarmed by the conceſſions demanded by the ſtates, he had not ventured to adviſe a compliance with their requeſts. But it would be much eaſier, he was perſuaded to reconcile the Spaniards to the truce, than to a peace, as the conceſſions to be made in the former were not to be perpetual; and Philip's religious ſcruples being in a great meaſure removed, by what the confeſſor had repreſented to him, he laid aſide that heſitation and reſerve with which he had hitherto acted; and uniting his influence to that of Brizuela, and of ſeveral other Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, who were devoted to his intereſt, he ſoon perſuaded Philip to grant his ratification of the preliminary articles. It was immediately tranſmitted to the archdukes, accompanied with a recommendation, to avoid, if poſſible, the conſenting to an expreſs permiſſion of the Indian trade; and, if poſſible, likewiſe to procure ſome indulgence for the Popiſh inhabitants in the United Provinces (*b*).

Philip ratifies the preliminary articles.

During

(*b*) Bentivoglio paſſim. Negociations de Jeannin tom. iii. p. 223, 224. & 329, 330. Grotius. Winwood, vol. ii. p. 338, 100, &c. Jeannin, tom. iii. p. 10. & tom. ii. p. 335.

DURING the confeſſor's ſtay at Madrid, the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors were employed in preparing at the Hague the ſeveral articles of the treaty. And as the archduke's commiſſioners had ſome months before, at the deſire of the ſtates, who dreaded their ſecret practices among the deputies, returned to Bruſſels, the negociations between the mediators and them had hitherto been carried on by letters.

BUT as this method of conducting it was attended with the moſt tedious delays, Jeannin in his own name, and that of the other ambaſſadors, propoſed to the archdukes that they ſhould ſend their commiſſioners to meet with them at Antwerp. This propoſal was readily complied with, and both parties arrived in that place in the beginning of February 1609.

THE ambaſſadors had brought with them a copy of the articles of the truce, of which they had obtained the approbation of the ſtates: and they had engaged, that unleſs the archdukes commiſſioners ſhould adopt it without any material alteration, within eight days after their arrival in Antwerp, they ſhould break off the conferences, and decline all further negociation on the ſubject. Both the archdukes and Spaniards, they knew, were at preſent utterly unprepared for the renewal of the war, and nothing, they believed, would contribute ſo much to quicken their reſolutions, as the dread of its being inſtantly renewed.

BUT when the reſolution of the ſtates was communicated to the Spaniſh or archdukes commiſſioners, they complained that their maſters were rather uſed unhandſomely, and repreſented that the time allowed was too ſhort for the diſpatch of buſineſs

BOOK III. 1609. buſineſs of ſo great importance. The ambaſſadors were ſenſible of the truth of what they ſaid, and obtained the conſent of the ſtates, to prolong the time; after which both parties began ſeriouſly to apply themſelves to the diſcuſſion of the ſeveral articles of the treaty.

AGAINST the fundamental article, which regarded the liberty and independence of the revolted provinces, the commiſſioners offered no objection, except to the title aſſumed in it by the ſtates, of High and Mighty Lords, which they ſo obſtinately oppoſed, that inſtead of the terms high and mighty, the ambaſſadors were obliged to ſubſtitute the word illuſtrious. An article relating to contributions, amounting yearly to 300,000 crowns, which had been paid to the Dutch, by the inhabitants of the open country in Brabant, in order to procure an exemption from being plundered, was the occaſion of much altercation. The ſtates very unreaſonably required that theſe contributions ſhould be continued during the truce. But the mediators, having repreſented to them the injuſtice of this requeſt, and that the levying of contributions was equivalent to a continuance of hoſtilities, they at length conſented that the article ſhould be expunged, and in return for this conceſſion, the archdukes agreed to yield to them ſome extenſive diſtricts adjoining to Bergen-op-zoom, Breda, and other places, in the poſſeſſion of the ſtates, upon condition that ſuch of the inhabitants of theſe diſtricts as were Catholics ſhould be indulged in the free exerciſe of their religion.

A PROPOSAL was made for a mutual exchange of towns, which the contending parties had lately conquered from each other; but as the conqueſts of the Dutch had been much more important than thoſe

thoſe of the archdukes, no expedient could be deviſed, to which the former thought it their intereſt to agree: and for this reaſon, it was at length determined that both parties ſhould retain the towns at preſent in their poſſeſſion. The Dutch were equally averſe to another propoſal, which was urged with much earneſtneſs by the Spaniſh commiſſioners, that all thoſe duties ſhould be aboliſhed, which were exacted in Zealand from ſhips entering the Scheld, in their way to Antwerp. They gave ſome ground however to expect that this matter might afterwards be amicably adjuſted: and the archdukes were the more eaſily perſuaded to drop their requeſt, as they hoped to be able in the time of peace to improve their poſts on the coaſt of Flanders, and thereby to rival the Dutch in thoſe branches of commerce which they had engroſſed during the ſubſiſtence of the war.

Contests about the Indian trade.

But of all the articles of the preſent treaty, the moſt difficult to be adjuſted to the mutual ſatisfaction of the parties, was that which regarded the Indian trade. The archdukes were aware that unleſs the Dutch were gratified in this point, no accommodation whatever could take place; nor were they or their ſubjects perſonally intereſted in refuſing to comply with their requeſt. But being well acquainted with the obſtinate and abſurd reluctance of the Spaniards againſt making any conceſſion on this ſubject, they ſtill ſuſpected, notwithſtanding their ſanguine hopes of the ſucceſs of Brizuela's application, that the king would never conſent to ratify the truce, if this conceſſion were explicitly expreſſed. They were, for this reaſon, extremely ſolicitous to perſuade the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors to agree to ſuch an indirect form of expreſſion, as might not alarm the pride or prejudice of the Spaniards, while it would

BOOK III. admit of being interpreted in favour of the Dutch. The ambaſſadors were not averſe to this expedient; and they afterwards prevailed upon the ſtates to conſent to it, by giving them a declaration in writing, that notwithſtanding the generality and obſcurity of the terms in which the article was couched, they underſtood it as containing a full permiſſion to the Dutch to carry on their trade in every part of India, that was not under the dominion of the crown of Spain; and by engaging likewiſe in the name of the kings whom they repreſented, to guarantee this article relative to the Indian trade, as well as all the other articles of the preſent treaty (*c*).

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SUCH were the principal points diſcuſſed between the archdukes commiſſioners, and the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, in the conferences that were held at Antwerp. Soon after the confeſſor arrived at Bruſſels with Philip's ratification of the preliminary articles; and nothing now remained, but to ſettle ſome matters of ſmaller conſequence, and to give the treaty its juſt form, in order to its being ſigned by the contending powers.

IN conſequence of permiſſion from the archdukes, the Dutch commiſſioners formerly mentioned, who had hitherto remained at the Hague, repaired to Antwerp: and that no ſolemnity might be wanting to a deed of ſo great importance, an extraordinary aſſembly of deputies from all the provinces and towns of the union, was ſummoned to meet at Bergen-op-zoom, where they might be at hand to ratify the ſeveral articles of the treaty, as ſoon as they ſhould be digeſted by the commiſſioners

(*c*) Bentivoglio. Grotius, lib. ult. &c.

1609.

ſioners into proper form. As the confederates had not for many years been engaged in any matter in which they were ſo deeply intereſted, there were more than eight hundred deputies preſent in this aſſembly.

The commiſſioners, together with the French and Engliſh ambaſſadors, had meetings every day in the Hotel de Ville of Antwerp; and there was ſtill conſiderable diverſity of ſentiments among them with regard to certain articles of the treaty, and particularly with reſpect to the time during which the truce ſhould ſubſiſt. It was at length agreed, that it ſhould be concluded for twelve years from the preſent period; and as ſoon as this and the other points in diſpute were ſettled, and the treaty drawn up in the uſual form, it was tranſmitted to Bruſſels and Bergen op Zoom, to receive the ſanction of the archdukes and of the ſtates; and was finally concluded on the 9th of April 1609.

Treaty for a peace concluded.

It conſiſted of eight and thirty articles, the moſt important of which were thoſe which have been already mentioned. The reſt had been prepared by Barnevelt, and were equally calculated to promote the ſecurity and intereſt of individuals and of the ſtate (*d*). No individuals had merited

(*d*) Among other articles it was ſtipulated that, during the continuance of the truce, all hoſtilities ſhould ceaſe by ſeas, rivers, and land, between the ſubjects, inhabitants, and perſons reſident in the territories of the king of Spain and the archdukes, on the one hand, and the United States, on the other, without any exception of places or perſons whatever.

That either party ſhould retain ſafe and entire poſſeſſion of whatever provinces, cities, places, lands and principalities it then enjoyed; and that the ſame conditions ſhould be obſerved with regard to diſtricts, villages, and lands and territories thereon depending.

That

Book III. 1609. rited ſo highly from the republic as thoſe of the family of Naſſau; and all parties readily concurred in giving them proof on this occaſion of their reſpect

That the ſubjects, and perſons reſiding in the dominions of Spain and the archdukes, of the one part, and of the United States, of the other, ſhould mutually cultivate good-will and friendſhip.

That all reproach, reſentment, and revenge on account of paſt hoſtilities and injuries ſhould ceaſe; and that there ſhould be a free and equal trade between the ſubjects of the contracting parties by rivers, ſeas, and land.

That it ſhould not be lawful to ſtop or lay hands on merchants, proprietors of ſhips, ſhipmaſters, or their crews, or the ſhips, or merchandize, or goods of any kind, on any pretence: but that juſtice ſhould have its uſual courſe for the recovery of debts, and in criminal proſecutions.

If any judgments or ſentences had been paſſed againſt the adherents of either party, on the footing of contumacy, and that ſuch perſons had been condemned without being defended, either in civil or criminal cauſes, ſuch judgments or ſentences were not to be carried into execution during the truce, either againſt the perſons or goods of individuals ſo condemned.

Such perſons, or their heirs and executors, as had ſuffered the loſs of their property through the rage of party, or the violence of war; by the rapine and injuſtice of individuals, and without the authority of the magiſtrates, and the countenance and protection of the laws; ſuch perſons were to be reinſtated, in virtue of the preſent treaty, in the full poſſeſſion and enjoyment of their effects and eſtates, even although they ſhould have actually paſſed into the condition, and aſſumed the appearance and nature of goods confiſcated: whether they might have been depoſited as pledges, given away as donations, or alienated and transferred by any ſpecies of bargain, tranſaction, or renunciation.

If the goods or eſtates ſhall have paſſed out of the exchequer, and been diſpoſed of to private poſſeſſors, then it was ſtipulated, that intereſt ſhould be paid to the right owners of the goods, or eſtates, at the rate of $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. per annum. And if this payment ſhould be delayed, it was agreed, that the proprietors ſhould be paid out of the ſtock or capital. But if the diſpoſal or tranference of ſuch goods and eſtates, by the exchequer, had been accompanied with ſuch ſolemnities as conſtitute legal deeds, and the names of the right owners been eraſed and ſuperſeded, by ſuch legal formalities as conſtitute legal rights and claims, yet even in that caſe, it was provided,

reſpect and gratitude. By one article of the truce it was provided that none of the deſcendants of William, the firſt prince of Orange, ſhould be liable for the debts which that prince had contracted from the year 1567 till his death. And by another, that ſuch of his eſtates, within the territory of the archdukes, as had been confiſcated, ſhould be reſtored, and his heirs permitted to enjoy them unmoleſted during the continuance of the truce (*e*).

THE

provided, that their eſtates, rights, and properties ſhould be reſtored to the right owners, they refunding to any perſons that might be at that time in poſſeſſion, the bona fide price (where any had been given) which ſuch perſons might have paid on purchaſing any of the ſaid lands or properties ſince the confiſcation, within the ſpace of a year from the date of the preſent treaty.

That no length of time, not even the whole ſpace from the very beginning of the commotions in 1567, ſhould be conſidered as having conferred a preſcriptive right to property.

Perſons who, during the courſe of the preſent war, had retired into the dominions of neutral powers, were to be comprehended, and have the full benefit and advantage of the treaty: they were to return, if they were ſo inclined, to the places of their former abodes, or to ſettle in whatever place they ſhould chuſe, provided always, that they ſhould comply with eſtabliſhed manners, laws, and cuſtoms.

It was declared, in general terms, that all confiſcations, and diſinheriſons, and tranferences of property that had originated in the violence of civil war, and the bitterneſs of party-zeal, ſhould be broken, cancelled, and to all intents and purpoſes, null and void.

(*e*) Beſides theſe proofs of attachment to the family of the prince of Orange, the ſtates had, ſome time before the concluſion of the truce, reſolved that prince Maurice's appointments, as admiral and captain-general, ſhould not ſuffer any diminution from the reduction of the forces. They even gave him an additional revenue, as a compenſation for his ſhare of the prizes and contributions; and they likewiſe augmented the appointments of prince Henry, Frederic, and count William Lewis of Naſſau. Such was the concluſion of that negociation, which, for more than two years, had employed the attention, not only of the contracting parties, but likewiſe of moſt of the other princes and ſtates in Europe.

BOOK III. 1609.

THE archdukes engaged that theſe and all the other articles ſhould, within the ſpace of three months, be ratified by the king of Spain; and the king's deed of ratification was accordingly delivered to the ſtates a few days before the expiration of that term, to transfer to his brother and his children the ſeveral high employments which he held at whatever period he ſhould think fit. Theſe reſolutions of the ſtates ſeem to have originated from the French monarch, and were formed at the inſtance of Barnevelt, whom Jeannin had engaged to enter into his maſter's views. No perſon queſtioned that prince Maurice's family were well entitled to every mark of favour which the ſtates could beſtow; it was rather unfortunate however for the prince's character that, after ſo violent an oppoſition to the truce, his acquieſcence in it was ſo quickly followed by pecuniary rewards. But although his enemies were diſpoſed to inſinuate that theſe rewards were rather to be conſidered as the price of his ſilence, than as rewards for his former ſervices, there is nothing to juſtify theſe inſinuations in the numerous letters extant in Jeannin's negociations, either of the king or the miniſters of France.

THE Dutch were henceforward conſidered as a free and independent people. Having gained immortal honour by the magnanimity which they had diſplayed during the continuance of the war, they were now conſidered as having obtained the reward which their virtue merited, and were every where reſpected and admired. Their miniſters at foreign courts were now received with the ſame diſtinction as thoſe of other ſovereign powers; and their alliance was courted by nations who had formerly regarded them as rebels, that muſt

must speedily submit to the yoke which they had shaken off. BOOK III. 1609.

On the other hand, the reputation of the Spanish nation received a mortal wound; and their power ceased to be regarded with the same dread as formerly. They had been foiled by a handful of their own subjects, and would not, it was supposed, any longer pretend to give law to other nations. The high spirited nobility, and the people in general, were secretly mortified by the concessions which the Dutch had been able to extort; and were ready to ascribe the humiliation which the nation had suffered, not so much to any insurmountable difficulty in the contest in which it had been so long engaged, as to misconduct and want of vigour on the part of government.

THE

HISTORY

OF THE REIGN OF

PHILIP THE THIRD,

KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK IV.

THE Spaniſh nation was now at peace with all the world, except the piratic ſtates of Barbary; and it might juſtly have been expected that the king and his miniſters would have inſtantly applied themſelves to the healing of thoſe wounds which the monarchy had received during the continuance of the war. But their incapacity for government, joined to their bigotted zeal for the Catholic ſuperſtition, prevented them from availing themſelves of the tranquillity which they enjoyed, and determined them to engage in a new enterprize, which, although their endeavours were attended with greater ſucceſs, than had accompanied their attempt to ſubdue the United Provinces, proved no leſs pernicious to the national proſperity. The Spaniſh arms had been unſucceſsfully employed againſt foreign nations, for more than half a century; and all ranks of men had felt the neceſſity of putting a period to the war; yet no ſooner was peace eſtabliſhed, than it was reſolved to expel from the boſom of the kingdom ſeveral hundred thouſands of its moſt induſtrious inhabitants.

THE

BOOK IV. 1609. Account of the Moreſcoes.

THE Moreſcoes had lived in Spain for more than eight hundred years; and ſtill, after ſo long a period, remained a ſeparate people, diſtinguiſhed from the Spaniards by their language, their religion, their character, and their manners.

THE preſent race were the deſcendants of thoſe fanatic warriors, who, iſſuing forth from the deſarts of Arabia, actuated with the wild ambition of compelling mankind to embrace the Mahometan ſuperſtition, had, with the moſt aſtoniſhing rapidity, reduced under ſubjection to their caliphs Perſia, Syria, Paleſtine, and Egypt, and had afterwards extended their conqueſts as far as the Straits of Gibraltar along the coaſt of Africa. From Africa they tranſported an army into Spain, where in leſs than two years they expelled the Chriſtian inhabitants from all the open and more fertile parts of the kingdom, and obliged them to take ſhelter in the mountainous regions of Aſturia, and the other northern provinces.

SPAIN had, about three centuries before, been conquered by the Goths, who had not only embraced the religion, but had likewiſe, as far as could be expected from ignorant Barbarians, adopted the language of the former inhabitants, and the diſtinction between the conquerors and conquered had long been loſt. Their language was that corrupt dialect of the Roman tongue, with a mixture of the Gothic, which is ſtill the language of Caſtile; and their religion was the Chriſtian mingled with the ſuperſtitions of the church of Rome. They held the religion of their invaders in great abhorrence, and being at the ſame time zealouſly attached to their own, great numbers of them choſe, rather than be guilty of apoſtacy, to abandon the fertile provinces which they had ſo long inhabited, and to fly, with

with their wives and children, to thoſe uncultivated parts of the kingdom, where, amidſt caves and rocks, they might maintain their religion and their liberty. 1609.

THE Moors, in the mean time, eſtabliſhed their dominion in Portugal, in the greater part of Caſtile, Murcia, Andaluſia, Valencia, and Granada. Their kings made choice of Cordova for their place of reſidence; and, as numerous ſupplies of people every year arrived from Africa, they ſoon attained ſuch a degree of ſtrength as convinced the Chriſtians, that no attempt to recover their poſſeſſions could prove effectual.

A PREDATORY war however was begun, within half a century after the conqueſt, and the Chriſtians, excited aud conducted by Pelagio, and other deſcendants of their ancient kings, gave many ſignal proofs of heroic bravery; but their ſucceſs did not fully correſpond to their exertions, till a conſiderable time afterwards, when various cauſes concurred to render the conteſt leſs unequal.

THE Moors, naturally prone to eaſe and pleaſure, had loſt much of that warlike ſpirit, which they had derived from the ſanguinary genius of their religion. Their kings were weak men diſſolved in luxury, had been from the beginning extremely ill obeyed by their viceroys, and at length theſe viceroys, on whom their kings, agreeably to the oriental manners of government, devolved too great a ſhare of their authority, ſhook off their allegiance, aſſumed the titles of kings themſelves, and erected their governments into ſeparate and independent ſtates. They were often engaged in war againſt each other, or the king of Cordova, from whom they had revolted. Their ſtrength was thereby much impaired; and they could

Their character.

Book IV. could ſeldom act in concert againſt their common enemy.

1609.

It was long before the Chriſtians could rightly improve the opportunities which were thus afforded them. For they too were divided into ſeveral unconnected ſovereignties; and, for many years, through miſunderſtandings, joined to the diſtance at which they lay from one another, they found it no leſs difficult to act in concert than the Moors. But, at length, ſeveral of theſe little ſovereignties being united under one head (*a*), the war was carried on with greater vigour than ever on the part of the Chriſtians. The Mahometans were, in numberleſs rencounters, overpowered. They were expelled from many parts of the open country, of which they had long held poſſeſſion, and had much reaſon to apprehend that, if they did not correct the errors in their government, or conduct, which had occaſioned their misfortunes, they muſt ere long ſink under the growing power and ſuperior bravery of the enemy.

Their downfal was long retarded by the folly of the Chriſtians, who, on numberleſs occaſions, ſuffered equally with the Moors, from the want of concord. Far from taking warning from the misfortunes of the Moors, they were almoſt continually at war with each other, and often ſeemed to be no leſs intent on one another's deſtruction, than on that of their common enemy. It often happened that, by the conqueſts which they obtained over each other, ſtates of a conſiderable magnitude were formed, the ſovereigns of which, if they had acted wiſely, muſt have proved an overmatch for the Moors. But theſe ſtates were no ſooner formed than they were again diſſolved, through the

(*a*) Under Sancho, an. 1035. Mariana, lib. viii.

the pernicious practice adopted by the kings, of dividing their dominions among their children. This practice, of which there are many instances in the history of Spain, was, at different periods, a copious source of animosity and discord. It proved equally pernicious to the people, and to the families of the kings, and long rendered it impossible for them to make any considerable effort against the infidels.

THEIR exertions, however, were generally much more vigorous and successful than those of their opponents; and before the end of the thirteenth century, they had acquired the kingdoms of Castile, Navarre, Arragon, Murcia, and Valentia. Their intestine divisions still arose, at times, to the same height as formerly; and the Christian, as well as the Mahometan parts of Spain, exhibited, almost every year, some new scenes of bloodshed and devastation; till towards the end of the fifteenth century, when, by the marriage of Ferdinand with Isabella, the crown of Castile was united to that of Arragon: an event which, while it in a great measure secured internal tranquillity to the Christians, gave them a decided superiority over their ancient enemies.

At this period, the only Moorish kingdom which remained unconquered was that of Granada, which contained a great extent of fertile country, and several of the strongest towns in Spain. From the situation of some of the chief of these towns on the sea coast, the Moors could easily receive assistance from their friends in Africa; and Ferdinand was, on this account, the more solicitous to deprive them of so important a possession.

THIS artful prince was seldom at a loss to find pretexts to colour his ambitious enterprizes; and

BOOK IV. 1609. the preſent juncture was the moſt favourable to his deſign which could juſtly be expected. There were two competitors, at this time, for the crown of Granada, Albohardill, and his nephew Boabdilla: and the whole kingdom was torn in pieces by the contending parties, who often ſatiated their vengeance in each other's blood.

FERDINAND could not ſuffer ſo favourable an opportunity to eſcape: he firſt entered into an alliance with the nephew againſt the uncle, under the cover of which he made war upon the latter, and expelled him from his territories; and ſoon afterwards, he turned his arms againſt his ally, made himſelf maſter of the city of Granada (*b*), and all his other fortified places; and, although he ſtill affected to treat him with reſpect, he ſoon rendered it neceſſary for him to abandon his dominions, and retire to Africa.

IN the proſecution of the war, Ferdinand gave proof of great abilities, as well as of the moſt conſummate artifice. Notwithſtanding which it was protracted to the unuſual length of ten years; and, from the difficulty which he encountered in his operations againſt a people ſo much weakened by inteſtine diviſions, it is probable that he would not have been able to compleat their ſubjection, if their whole force united had been employed in repelling his attacks. Their kings had, in a great meaſure, loſt their affection by their folly and miſconduct; and, for this reaſon, they were not ſo reluctant, as they would otherwiſe have been, againſt transferring their allegiance: but they required, and Ferdinand judged it expedient, to grant them ſuch conditions as they thought would put them nearly on the ſame footing with his other ſubjects.

OF

(*b*) An. 1492.

OF theſe conditions it was one that they ſhould be permitted the free exerciſe of their religion; and for the firſt ſeven years after the conqueſt, no violence was offered them on that account. Ferdinand expected, that after the abolition of their government, they might eaſily be converted to the Chriſtian faith. But, finding that the inſtructions of the eccleſiaſtics on this head were not attended with the deſired effect, he reſolved, notwithſtanding his engagement confirmed by an oath, rather to employ compulſion, than any longer to indulge ſo great a proportion of his ſubjects in the exerciſe of a falſe religion.

HE made choice of the celebrated Ximenes, archbiſhop of Toledo, to carry his deſign into execution; and, for this purpoſe, ordered him to repair to Granada, with full power to employ whatever meaſures he ſhould judge to be moſt expedient. Ximenes began with careſſing, and making preſents to ſome of the leading men among the Moreſcoes, and thus perſuaded ſome of them to ſubmit to be baptized. But, making little progreſs in this way, and his natural impatience and ſeverity quickly prompting him to have recourſe to other methods, more agreeable to his diſpoſition, he threw all ſuch of their leaders as refuſed to comply with his requeſt, into priſons and dungeons, where they were treated as if they had been guilty of the moſt atrocious crimes.

The Moreſcoes perſecuted by the Spaniards.

THE people, highly incenſed againſt him, on account of this violent procedure, took up arms, and having ſurrounded his palace, demanded that their leaders might be releaſed. But having no perſon among them inveſted with authority to conduct their operations, they were quickly diſperſed by the count de Tendilla, the governor of the citadel; immediately after which Ferdinand,

by

BOOK IV. 1609. by the advice of Ximenes, ſent judges to Granada, and by theſe judges the people were found guilty of rebellion againſt his government. It was declared by theſe judges that the whole Moreſcoes in Granada, though only a ſmall part of them had been concerned in the inſurrection, were yet, on that account, liable to be capitally puniſhed; and the king was well prepared with his army to carry the ſentence into execution. But having offered them a pardon, on condition of their embracing the Chriſtian religion; upwards of fifty thouſand of them, all citizens of the town of Granada, ſubmitted to be baptized.

THE inhabitants of the country were treated with equal violence; for they too, upon receiving intelligence of what had paſſed in Granada, had begun to put themſelves into a poſture of defence. The count de Tendilla was ordered to march againſt them with an army of veteran troops; and this general, in order to intimidate them, put all the inhabitants of one of their towns, men, women, and children, to the ſword. Still, however, they refuſed to lay down their arms, till Ferdinand himſelf, at the head of a numerous army, having reduced all their fortified places, the greater part of them conſented to purchaſe their lives at the expence of their religion; and the reſt, upon paying ten dollars each of them, as a ranſom, were permitted to tranſport themſelves to Barbary.

From this time, the Granada Moreſcoes were conſidered by the Spaniards as Chriſtians, although it can hardly be ſuppoſed that any of them were ſincerely converted to the Chriſtian faith. They were ſtyled the New Chriſtians, in contradiſtinction from the Spaniards, who were called the Old. They were not admitted to the enjoyment of any office,

office, either in the church or ſtate. But when they diſcovered, on any occaſion, an attachment to Mahometaniſm, they were treated by the inquiſition as apoſtates; and great numbers of them were, every year, condemned by that tribunal, and committed to the flames. BOOK IV. 1609.

By this treatment, which was equally impolitical and unchriſtian, their prejudices againſt the catholic religion, and the Spaniſh government, were ſtrengthened and confirmed. Their ill humour, however, ſhewed itſelf only in murmurs and complaints: and the Moreſcoes in Granada are ſcarcely mentioned in the Spaniſh hiſtory, till the reign of Philip II. when, in conſequence of freſh oppreſſion, having made an unſucceſsful attempt to vindicate their liberty, moſt of them, as formerly related, were tranſplanted into Caſtile, and other inland provinces.

It is not to be doubted that Philip would have treated the Moreſcoes of Valentia, in the ſame manner as thoſe of Granada, had he not been deterred by his experience of the expence and danger with which the reduction of the latter had been accompanied. The Mooriſh kingdom of Valentia had been conquered by James I. king of Arragon, before the middle of the thirteenth century; and this prince had been extremely ſolicitous to have the people converted to the Chriſtian faith. He had, for this purpoſe, erected ſchools, where the eccleſiaſtics might learn the Arabic; and, in obedience to his commands, ſeveral Dominicans and other friars, had applied themſelves to the ſtudy of that language, after acquiring which, they had entered on the office of miſſionaries among the Moreſcoes. But whether they were not ſufficiently acquainted with that language, to be able to teach in it, or had not ſufficient patience for ſo

BOOK IV. 1609.

arduous a taſk as that of combating the religious prejudices of a people noted for their bigotry, they ſoon began to repreſent the Moreſcoes as obſtinate infidels, whom it was in vain to expect to convert by inſtruction. Even miracles, they pretended, had been wrought among them without ſucceſs, and, therefore, compulſion was now the only expedient that could prove effectual.

AT the inſtigation of theſe eccleſiaſtics, Pope Clement, the fourth of that name, having adviſed the king to expel the Moreſcoes from his dominions if they ſhould ſtill refuſe to be converted, James would readily have embraced this council, if he could have perſuaded his cortes to conſent. But, by the free conſtitution of the government of Arragon, to which Valentia was now annexed, the conſent of the cortes was requiſite; and, although the clergy and commons were willing to gratify the king, yet the barons, who foreſaw the ruin of their eſtates if the Moreſcoes, their vaſſals, were expelled, oppoſed the meaſure with ſuch inflexible obſtinacy, that James found it neceſſary to relinquiſh his deſign.

The tyranny of king Ferdinand reſtrained by the cortes.

FROM this period, to the conqueſt of Granada by Ferdinand, almoſt two hundred years had elapſed; and during all that time, the Valentia Moors had been indulged in the free exerciſe of their religion. But when the barons heard of the violence with which Ferdinand had treated the Moors of Granada, they dreaded an extenſion of his tyranny to their vaſſals in Valentia; and, in order to prevent it, they required, and, though with ſome difficulty, obtained his aſſent to a law paſſed in the cortes, in the year 1510, where it was enacted that no Moreſco, within the kingdom of Valentia, ſhould either be expelled from the kingdom,

kingdom, or compelled to embrace the Chriſtian faith. BOOK IV. 1609.

NOR were the barons ſatisfied with taking this precaution; but, in order to prevent the court or the eccleſiaſtics from reviving their deſign, in any future reign, they reſolved to make it henceforth a part of their king's coronation oath, that, on no pretence whatever, he ſhould attempt to expel the Moreſcoes from Valentia, or employ force to engage them to embrace the Chriſtian religion; that he ſhould never attempt, directly or indirectly, to procure a diſpenſation from this oath, nor even accept of a diſpenſation, in caſe it ſhould be offered him.

THIS oath was ſworn, a few years after, by Charles V. at his acceſſion; and the barons ſeemed then to poſſeſs the utmoſt ſecurity which they could deſire againſt any future oppreſſion of their vaſſals. But they ſoon experienced, how ineffectual the wiſeſt precautions ſometimes prove againſt the events of fortune. A bloody war having broken out between the commons and nobles of Valentia, in the year 1520; the former, actuated partly perhaps by religious bigotry, but principally by revenge againſt the latter, publiſhed a manifeſto, requiring all the Moreſcoes, under the penalty of death, immediately to embrace the catholic religion. The nobles were, at that time, unable to afford them protection againſt their enemies; and as the Moreſcoes were themſelves ſufficiently acquainted with the violent character of the commons, they knew that it would be in vain to offer any remonſtrance on the ſubject. Without delay, therefore, almoſt the whole of them conſented to be baptized, in the hopes that, when tranquillity ſhould be reſtored, no advantage would be taken by the court of this deed of

BOOK IV theirs, which was known to be the effect of lawleſs force and violence.
1609.

BUT no ſooner were the civil commotions of the kingdom compoſed, than Charles, having convened an aſſembly of the clergy, to conſider of the validity of that baptiſm, to which the Moreſcoes had been obliged to ſubmit; it was determined by this aſſembly, that although they ought not to have been compelled to ſubmit to be baptized, yet the character thereby impreſſed upon them was indelible, they were henceforth to be conſidered as Chriſtians, and in the caſe of a defection from the catholic religion, to be treated as apoſtates; that the name of God, as is ſubjoined in the decree, may not be blaſphemed, nor contempt brought upon the Chriſtian profeſſion.

THE Moreſcoes, conſcious of a ſincere attachment to the Mahometan faith, and being at no loſs to underſtand, that by this decree it was intended they ſhould henceforth be ſubject to the juriſdiction of the inquiſition, they had no other expedient left to ſave themſelves from the cruelty of that barbarous tribunal, but to aſſert (which great numbers of them did) that they had not been baptized; and as, amidſt the confuſion of civil diſcord, no regiſter of their baptiſms had been kept, it was impoſſible in moſt caſes to diſprove their aſſertion.

OF this difficulty the eccleſiaſtics gave information to the emperor; and about the ſame time, a diſpenſation from his coronation oath was ſent him by the pope (*c*). Charles had acquired a great acceſſion of power by his ſuppreſſion of the late rebellion; and the power of the nobles had ſuffered

(*c*) Clement VII. Vide Geddes.

suffered a proportional diminution. Being no longer afraid, therefore, of any oppoſition which he might receive from the Valentia barons, and being delivered from his religious ſcruples by the pope's diſpenſation from his oath, he firſt (*d*) gave orders to the clergy to apply themſelves to the inſtruction of the Moreſcoes in the Chriſtian faith, commanding the barons to require a punctual attendance from their vaſſals, on the inſtructions that ſhould be given them; and in the following year, he ordered all the Moreſcoes, who denied their having been formerly baptized, either immediately to ſubmit to that initatory rite, or to quit the Spaniſh dominions, under the penalty of perpetual ſervitude. 1609.

THE Moreſcoes of Pianaguazil refuſed to accept of this alternative, and had recourſe to arms in their defence; but theſe men having been eaſily reduced to obedience, it was believed that, after the year 1526, there was hardly a ſingle Moreſco in Spain who had not ſubmitted to the rite of baptiſm.

THERE was no reaſon however to ſuppoſe that any conſiderable number of them were ſincerely converted to the Chriſtian faith; and, as it is impoſſible for men who act a fictitious part uniformly to conceal their real ſentiments, the hiſtory of Spain, during the reign of Charles and that of his ſucceſſor, is filled with complaints againſt them (*e*), on account of their infidelity. Frequent councils were held at Madrid, to conſider of the proper means of effectuating their converſion. Orders were repeatedly ſent from thence, requiring the clergy to exert themſelves with greater activity in inſtructing them; and the inquiſition every

(*d*) An. 1525. (*e*) The reader will remember that the Moreſcoes here ſpoke of, are thoſe of Valentia.

BOOK IV. 1609. every year exerciſed againſt great numbers of them its wonted rigour and ſeverity.

STILL, however, it ſhould ſeem that their attachment to the Mahometan ſuperſtition, as well as to their ancient manners and cuſtoms, remained as ſtrong as ever.

Nor will this appear ſurpriſing, if it is true that men are commonly attached to a falſe religion in proportion to its abſurdity; becauſe, not being accuſtomed to employ their reaſon on the ſubject of religion, they are incapable of being convinced by reaſon. But, beſides this conſideration, there were other cauſes which concurred in producing that inconquerable obſtinacy which the Moreſcoes diſcovered in their adherence to Mahometaniſm. They were proud of profeſſing a religion, which was the religion of all thoſe mighty empires that had been founded by their anceſtors.

The attachment of the Moreſcoes to the Mahometan religion accounted for

THEY had often entertained the hopes of being reſcued by means of the Turks, and other Mahometans, from the Spaniſh yoke, and could not reſolve entirely to abandon a religion which they expected, ſooner or later, to be at liberty to profeſs. Their hereditary hatred of the Spaniards, which had been nouriſhed by an uninterrupted courſe of hoſtilities during ſeveral centuries, had been riveted, ſince the conqueſt, by the ſeverity with which they had been uſed; while their averſion to the catholic worſhip was heightened by the appearance which the uſe of images in that worſhip gave it of idolatry, againſt every ſpecies of which all Mahometans are actuated with the moſt irreconcileable averſion. When to theſe conſiderations we add how little qualified the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtic were to inſtruct them in the principles of Chriſtianity, and that moſt of the Moreſcoes lived detached

tached from the Spaniards in towns and villages, and diſtricts by themſelves, ſeldom aſſociating with any but thoſe of their own perſuaſion, and ſpeaking a language of which the eccleſiaſtics, as well as the people, were extremely ignorant; when all theſe circumſtances are conſidered, it will not be ſo ſurpriſing, as at firſt ſight it might appear, that ſo ſmall a number of them ſhould have been converted to the Chriſtian faith. BOOK IV. 1609.

IT muſt, at the ſame time, be acknowledged that their infidelity afforded juſt ground for uneaſineſs to the Spaniſh monarchs, who could hardly expect to gain the affections of a people, differing ſo widely from themſelves, and from their Spaniſh ſubjects, in matters regarded as the moſt important and eſſential. The moſt inveterate enemies of Spain had for many years been the Turks, and the Moors of Barbary; and it could ſcarcely be ſuppoſed, that, in the caſe of an invaſion by theſe powers, the Moreſcoes would be averſe to exchange their preſent maſters for others, whoſe religion, cuſtoms, and manners, were ſo nearly ſimilar to their own.

GOOD policy, therefore, required that no pains ſhould be ſpared, on the part of the kings of Spain, to accompliſh the converſion of their Moreſco ſubjects. Nor does it appear that theſe princes were at any time neglectful of an object which they juſtly deemed ſo highly deſerving of their attention. They had inſtituted ſchools, as already mentioned, for teaching the Arabic tongue. They had often inculcated upon the clergy, to whom the inſtruction of the Moreſcoes was intruſted, the neceſſity of greater diligence in their endeavours to reclaim them. The royal commands on this head had, on different occaſions, been inforced by the Roman pontiffs; and, in order to engage men,

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men, properly qualified, to apply themſelves to this important work, they had augmented the church livings in many of thoſe parts of the kingdom where the Moors reſided.

THESE were perhaps the only means which the religious prejudices of the people, and the maxims or genius of the Spaniſh government, would permit to be employed; and if the Moreſcoes had, at the ſame time, been uſed with greater kindneſs, or even with greater lenity and forbearance, it is probable that, ſooner or later, theſe means would have been attended with the deſired ſucceſs. But, beſides that, the faith which the Spaniſh princes had pledged to them when they ſubmitted to their authority had been often violated, they had been from the beginning treated with every mark of jealouſy and ſuſpicion; they had been excluded from all the honours, and from every important office in the ſtate; encouragement had been given to the moſt minute and malignant inveſtigation of their private conduct; and after the power of the barons, who had long acted as their protectors, was reduced, they were expoſed a defenceleſs prey to the avarice and cruelty of the Inquiſition. (*e*).

THE kings of Spain were too deeply tinctured with the bigotry of the Romiſh church, and their maxims of government too deſpotic, to allow them to perceive the abſurdity of theſe meaſures, ſo extremely ill calculated to promote the purpoſe for which they were deſigned. Charles the Fifth, however, and Philip the Second, two princes noted for their political diſcernment, being aware of the prejudice which the kingdom would ſuſtain, if the Moreſcoes, who formed ſo great a proportion

(*e*) Carta de Don Pedro de Valentia, MS. No. 1.

tion of their ſubjects were expelled, had given no ground to ſuſpect that they would ever conſent to their expulſion; nor does it appear that the clergy, who earneſtly wiſhed that this meaſure might be embraced, ever attempted to recommend it either to Charles or his ſon. But, ſoon after the acceſſion of the preſent king, they conceived the hopes of being able to accompliſh their deſire; becauſe both Philip and his miniſter, they thought, would be influenced more by religious than political conſiderations; and, in caſe they could be perſuaded that the intereſt of religion was concerned in the expulſion, would be eaſily reconciled to the political inconveniencies that might attend it.

THE motives which determined the eccleſiaſtics in their conduct on this occaſion were not merely ſuch as were ſuggeſted by religious zeal or bigotry. The obſtinacy of the Moreſcoes in adhering to Mahometaniſm had been generally aſcribed to the remiſſneſs or negligence of thoſe who had been employed to inſtruct them (*f*); and the clergy were ſenſible that much greater pains were requiſite for this end than they were willing to beſtow. Beſides which, their revenues had been taxed for augmenting the Moreſcoe vicarages, and for building and endowing an additional number of churches for their inſtruction. They were, on both theſe accounts, inflamed againſt the Moreſcoes with a peculiar hatred; and, in order that they might at once avoid the labour neceſſary for converting them, and the cenſure which they muſt incur in caſe of their declining it, they earneſtly deſired their expulſion; and, in order to effectuate it, were perpetually inveighing againſt them as an incurable race of infidels, of whoſe

(*f*) By a brief from the pope, Gregory XIII. an. 1576.

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whoſe converſion, without a miraculous interpoſition of Divine Power, no hopes could juſtly be entertained.

OF all the eccleſiaſtics, the perſon who diſcovered the moſt unrelenting hatred againſt this unhappy people was Don John de Ribera, patriarch of Antioch, and archbiſhop of Valentia, an aged prelate, who was held in high veneration by his countrymen for his piety and learning; and, in different hiſtories of his life, publiſhed in Spain and Italy, is celebrated as one of the brighteſt ornaments that ever adorned the Chriſtian church.

BUT there is nothing for which the hiſtorians have been ſo liberal in his praiſe as the flaming zeal which he diſplayed in his unwearied exertions for the expulſion of the Moreſcoes, in which they ſuppoſe him to have been animated by a patriotic concern for the ſafety of Spain, and a pious ſolicitude for the preſervation of the Catholic faith.

IT has been queſtioned, however, whether his motives were in reality ſo pure as his admirers would have us to believe; for there is ground to ſuſpect, that, after the Pope, at the requeſt of Philip II. impoſed a new tax of between three and four thouſand dollars yearly on the revenues of his archbiſhopric, for augmenting the ſalaries of the curates employed in inſtructing the Moreſcoes, his zeal for their expulſion became more violent than ever. This tax, it is ſaid, neither he, nor any of the clergy in his dioceſe, ever paid; and although the king, in order more eaſily to reconcile the Moreſcoes to Chriſtianity, had
An. 1569. obtained from the Pope an edict of grace in their favour, containing a plenary pardon for all their

paſt

paſt offences, on condition, that, within the ſpace of four years, they ſhould make confeſſion to certain commiſſioners, to be appointed by Ribera and the other biſhops, yet this edict was not publiſhed, nor any commiſſioners appointed, till after two years and a half, when Philip III. interpoſed his authority for that effect.

IN defence of the archbiſhop's conduct in theſe inſtances, it may be alledged, that, from long experience, and many fruitleſs trials, he believed the infidelity of the Moreſcoes to be incurable, and that he would not have thus ventured repeatedly to diſobey the orders of his ſpiritual ſuperior, had he not known that the ſovereign pontiff, having the ſame opinion as himſelf of the vanity of all farther attempts for their converſion, did not ſeriouſly deſire to have his orders carried into execution. But whatever were the motives of this prelate's conduct, and though it juſtly expoſed him to the imputation of wiſhing rather to have the Moreſcoes expelled than converted, no perſon had greater influence on this occaſion with the king and his miniſters in recommending the meaſure that was afterwards embraced.

Memorials to the king of Spain againſt the Moreſcoes.

FROM the arguments which he employed in two memorials on the ſubject, preſented to the king, the reader will be better able to judge of the motives by which both he and the court of Spain were determined. In his firſt memorial, dated in the year 1602, his principal deſign was to ſound their inclination, and to awaken in them a ſenſe of the danger to which the kingdom was expoſed.

" AFTER all the pains, he ſaid, which had been beſtowed in attempting to convert the Moreſcoes to Chriſtianity, they were ſtill as ſtrongly as ever attached

BOOK IV. 1609. attached to the Mahometan ſuperſtition. In the kingdom of Valentia, the biſhops, the rectors, and preachers, had in vain uſed their moſt ſtrenuous endeavours to perſuade them to avail themſelves of the Pope's edict of grace, which had been lately publiſhed. In reaſoning with their leading men, it had been obſerved, that, as often as they were put to ſilence by the arguments employed to convince them, they changed colour, and were ſo inflamed with indignation as evidently ſhewed how much they deſired to be able to employ force in defence of their opinions. They correſponded with thoſe of their own ſect in the moſt diſtant parts of the country, and ſent their emiſſaries every where, to encourage the people to perſevere in their infidelity. They all ſpoke with one mouth, and had the ſame anſwer to return to their inſtructors, that they were already Chriſtians; that they had already confeſſed all the ſins, of which they were conſcious, to their reſpective prieſts; and that, being occupied with their proper buſineſs, they had not leiſure to attend to the conduct of others, and therefore knew not of any perſons who practiſed the rites of the Mahometan religion. They had often been convicted of falſhood; but on theſe occaſions they were either ſilent, or they repeated the ſame reply to the queſtions that were put to them. Since the publication of the edict of grace, they had celebrated the feſtivals of their religion with greater ſolemnity than before; and, with much effrontery, had carouſed together, on receiving intelligence of the unſucceſsful iſſue of the expedition of his majeſty's forces againſt Algiers.

"FROM this conduct of the Moreſcoes, continued Ribera, which I have repreſented with my wonted impartial regard to truth, two important conſequences follow, which require your majeſty's moſt ſerious attention.

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THE firſt is, that the biſhops, and other paſtors of the church, are laid under the painful neceſſity of doing what many learned doctors of the church think unlawful, the adminiſtering of the ſacrament of baptiſm to thoſe who they know will, ſooner or later, become apoſtates from the faith; for there is a moral certainty that every Moreſco child, whom we baptize, will, through the example and inſtruction of his Mahometan parents, become himſelf a Mahometan. And this we are taught to expect, not only by reaſon and experience, but by the ſpirit of God, who, in ſpeaking of the infidelity of Rehoboam, makes twice mention, in one chapter, that he was the ſon of Naama, a Gentile; which is equivalent to declaring that to be the child of a mother who is an infidel, and to be educated by her, is a certain means of making the child an infidel.

"IN baptizing the Moreſco children, therefore, our conſciences are greatly diſturbed with the apprehenſion that we are guilty of violating the commandment of our Lord Jeſus Chriſt, who has prohibited the giving of holy things to dogs, and the caſting of pearls before ſwine.

"NOR is this the only unhappy conſequence ariſing from the incurable infidelity of the Moreſcoes. But the kingdom of Spain is, therefore, expoſed to the greateſt riſk of becoming an eaſy prey to the hoſtile deſigns of our enemies. This kingdom was ruined in former times by the intrigues of a ſingle perſon, count Julian, by whoſe inſtigation it was invaded and ſubdued by the Saracens, when they had no friends within the kingdom to ſecond their attempt. And from thence may be perceived how great occaſion there is for the moſt diſquieting apprehenſions at this time, when there are eſtabliſhed in the kingdom ninety

BOOK IV. 1609. ninety thouſand men fit to carry arms, and all of them actuated with the moſt irreconcileable averſion to the preſent government. The Turks and Moors are the inveterate enemies of Spain, becauſe ſhe is the principal bulwark of Chriſtendom; the French, from jealouſy, or envy of her greatneſs; and the Engliſh, on account of her zeal for maintaining the purity of the Catholic faith; is there not juſt ground to dread that theſe our foreign enemies, allured by the hopes of aſſiſtance from thoſe whom we nouriſh in our boſom, ſhall unite their forces, and undertake the ſubverſion of the monarchy? Eſpecially when it is conſidered that, with the powerful aſſiſtance they would receive from the Moreſcoes, a ſmall number of troops would be ſufficient, and no extraordinary preparations or expence required.

"The Moreſcoes, in Granada alone, had withſtood the whole force which the late king could muſter againſt them, although, beſides his Spaniſh troops, he had ſent for into Spain a numerous reinforcement of Germans and Italians. But, if all the Moreſcoes in the different parts of the kingdom were to take arms, which it is unqueſtionable they would do, if either the Turks, or French, or Engliſh, were to attempt an invaſion, our condition would then be the moſt deplorable and deſperate, and, like our anceſtors, we muſt reſolve either to yield our necks to the yoke of conquerors, or to take ſhelter, as they did, among the rocks or mountains of Aſturia.

"As often as I have reflected on the imminent danger to which this mighty monarchy ſtands expoſed, I have thought it unaccountable, that, during the long reigns of two ſuch wiſe and powerful monarchs, as the emperor, and the late king, no ſufficient ſecurity againſt it was provided.

Nor

Nor can I account for their negligence in this respect, but on the supposition that God, who rules the hearts of kings, thought fit to reserve this important work, so worthy of your royal breast, on purpose to adorn the annals of your pious reign; as he reserved the deliverance of his chosen people for Moses, their entrance into the promised land for Joshua, the conquest of the Philistines for David, and the inflicting of vengeance on the Amalekites for Saul. BOOK IV. 1609.

"EITHER this has been his intention, or he hath so long prevented the Spanish monarchs from perceiving the necessity of delivering Spain from so great a danger, that, by means of the Moriscoes, he may punish us for our sins. But, in my opinion, one of the greatest of these is the permitting of so great a number of inveterate enemies of the church and state for so many years to retain their power of doing mischief; nor is it reasonable to expect success in foreign enterprizes, till the kingdom shall be purged of its domestic foes.

"In the year 1588, when the great Armada was destroyed, I was emboldened by my zeal for the interest of religion and my country, to represent to your royal father, that, after having long and carefully enquired why it had pleased God to permit so great a calamity to befall us, I was persuaded that he intended thereby to instruct the king, that, till he had extirpated heresy from his own dominions, he ought not to have suffered his attention to be diverted by any thing that passed in foreign states. And, in like manner, confiding in your majesty's clemency for forgiveness of the liberty which I take, I must declare that, after the most mature consideration, it appears to me, that no other account but this can be given of the late failure of your expedition against Algiers,

BOOK IV. giers, in which there was nothing omitted which human prudence could ſuggeſt to inſure ſucceſs.
1609.

"IT is the will of heaven, that your majeſty ſhould firſt provide for the ſafety and tranquillity of your own dominions; and, in order to accompliſh this end, it is neceſſary that your domeſtic enemies, thoſe apoſtates from the faith, who are equally enemies to the ſtate and to our moſt holy religion, ſhould be deprived of the power of diſturbing your repoſe. No object, ſurely, can be more deeply intereſting; and, therefore, I truſt I ſhall be pardoned for preſuming, with due humility, to exhort your majeſty to require your miniſters, without delay, to apply themſelves to the conſideration of it, with all that ſerious attention which it ſo highly deſerves, excluding from all the councils which ſhall be held for that purpoſe, all thoſe perſons whoſe private intereſt may hinder them from perceiving what is conducive to the public good (*f*)."

THIS memorial was moſt graciouſly received by the king and the duke of Lerma, both of whom wrote letters of thanks to the patriarch for the wholeſome counſel which it contained, and required him to give them his opinion with regard to the proper means of obviating that imminent danger, to which it appeared, from his memorial, the kingdom was expoſed. In compliance with this requeſt, and emboldened by the confidence repoſed in him, Ribera ſoon after preſented another memorial, of which the purport was, partly to perſuade Philip that no other means could prove effectual for the utter extirpation of the Moreſcoes; and partly to take off the force of ſuch objections, as either religion or humanity might ſuggeſt,

(*f*) Vita de Ribera.

ſuggeſt, to deter him from having recourſe to this expedient. BOOK IV. 1609.

IN ſacred writ, he ſaid, there was no precept ſo often repeated to the choſen people of God as that of rooting out from among them thoſe infidel nations whom they found in poſſeſſion of the promiſed land. A ſtrict obedience to this precept was particularly inculcated on the kings and rulers of the people; and the firſt king, whom God himſelf had appointed to rule over them, incurred the divine diſpleaſure, and was deprived of his kingdom, merely on account of his diſobedience. The pernicious conſequences of permitting the Moreſcoes to remain in Caſtile and Arragon were the ſame as thoſe which the children of Iſrael experienced from their communication with the idolatrous heathens; for the faithful in Spain were in equal danger from the infection of their example, and the extirpation of theſe infidels was therefore equally incumbent on the catholic king, as that of the heathens on the kings and captains of the Jews.

IN following the example of David, and other good kings of Iſrael, Philip would likewiſe imitate the conduct of ſome of the beſt and greateſt of his predeceſſors; by whom the Jews had, at different periods, been expelled from Spain, though their provocations had never been ſo great as thoſe of the Moreſcoes; for they were not heretics and apoſtates as they were, and were never accuſed of holding correſpondence with the enemies of the ſtate.

HIS illuſtrious grandfather, Charles V. the wiſeſt and greateſt prince of the age in which he lived, had publiſhed an edict, requiring the Moreſcoes either to ſubmit to be baptized, or to de-

BOOK IV. 1609.

part from Spain; expecting that by ſubmitting to be baptized they would become both Chriſtians and friends. It now appeared how much he was miſtaken in this expectation; but, from the tenor of his edict, it was manifeſt how much he thought it his duty, and how neceſſary he believed it for the ſafety and proſperity of his people, to extirpate infidels from his dominions.

THE pernicious effects of tolerating apoſtates from the faith, had been ſeverely felt by the French monarchs, whoſe kingdom had thereby been reduced to the loweſt ebb, and their Catholic ſubjects expoſed, for almoſt half a century, to all the miſeries of civil war; whereas, if they had acted conformably to the meaſures of the church, and either put to death their heretical ſubjects, or expelled them from the kingdom, all theſe unhappy conſequences might have been prevented, and the purity of the faith preſerved.

THE temporal as well as the ſpiritual intereſt of the king's Catholic and loyal ſubjects, required that the Moreſcoes ſhould be expelled; becauſe, if they were not, there was much ground to apprehend they would ere long become maſters of all the riches in the kingdom. They were not only induſtrious, but frugal and parſimonious to exceſs. They could labour for much lower wages, and were ſatisfied with much ſmaller profits in trade than were requiſite for the ſubſiſtence of the Spaniards; great numbers of them were thus excluded from both trade and labour, and thereby reduced to indigence. The Spaniſh villages, all over Caſtile and Andaluſia, had fallen into decay; while thoſe of the Moreſcoes increaſed and flouriſhed; and the Spaniſh farmers were unable to pay their rents, though they cultivated the moſt fertile parts of the country; while the Moreſcoes,

coes, who generally lived in the moſt barren parts, after paying the third part of their crops to the proprietors of their farms, were not only able to ſupport themſelves and their families, but annually to increaſe their ſtock. BOOK IV. 1609.

In conſequence of this their number had of late been greatly augmented; and there was ground to dread that, if ſome remedy were not ſpeedily applied, the natives would in a few years be outnumbered and overpowered. But no remedy whatever, he believed, would be found effectual, while the Moreſcoes were permitted to continue within the kingdom. The king's humanity, he ſuppoſed, would revolt at the thoughts of putting ſo many hundred thouſands to the ſword, and therefore the only expedient which remained, was to tranſport them into foreign parts.

He did not however think it adviſeable to expel them all at once; for, as thoſe of Valentia lived in a great meaſure detached from the Chriſtians, in villages and diſtricts by themſelves, there was little danger from the infection of their example; beſides that the Moors of thoſe parts practiſed various uſeful arts, which were unknown to the Chriſtians, but were extremely neceſſary for the comfort and convenience of life. If all theſe Moors were to be at once expelled, thoſe arts would be entirely loſt, and a great part of the country would become wild and deſolate. But although for theſe reaſons it might be judged expedient to delay their expulſion, they ought, in the mean time, to be loaded with taxes for the maintenance of an army, ſufficient to prevent any prejudice that might ariſe from permitting them to remain; their numbers ought, as quickly as poſſible, to be diminiſhed, by ſending annually

Book IV. 1609. ſome thouſands of their young men to the gallies and the mines, and Chriſtians, acquainted with their arts, ought gradually to be ſubſtituted in their room.

But a different courſe, he thought, ought to be purſued with regard to the Moreſcoes in the other provinces, who were, on many accounts, much more formidable than thoſe of Arragon and Valentia. They had every where intermixed with the Chriſtians; their example was conſequently more infectious; and the churches and altars were profaned by their hypocritical and mock compliances with the holy rites of the true religion. They ſpoke the Caſtilian language; their minds were more cultivated and improved; they were better acquainted with the ſtate of Spain, and much more capable of giving dangerous intelligence to her enemies; beſides which, great numbers of them, having ſerved in the royal navy, were thereby not only qualified to act as ſpies, but to afford aſſiſtance to the enemy, in the caſe of an invaſion or attack, or to any foreign enemy, by whom the kingdom ſhould be attacked.

By theſe conſiderations he was induced to believe that the preſervation of the kingdom, as well as the intereſt of religion, required that all the Moreſcoes in Spain, thoſe of Arragon and Valentia excepted, ſhould be inſtantly expelled. They were all to be conſidered as obſtinate heretics, or as apoſtates from the faith, whom the king, if he thought fit, might juſtly puniſh with death; and there could be no room therefore to doubt of the lawfulneſs of tranſporting them to foreign countries, which was the mildeſt puniſhment that, conſiſtently with the ſafety of his kingdom, he could inflict.

Their

THEIR children, under ſeven years of age, might be detained, in order to be educated in the Chriſtian faith; and the king might, without any ſcruple of conſcience, compel any number of thoſe who were grown up, to ſerve on board his gallies, or in the mines of America; while, for the benefit of his exchequer, he might ſell the reſt for ſlaves to his Chriſtian ſubjects in Spain and Italy. It could not be unjuſt to puniſh men in this manner, who by their crimes had forfeited their lives; and if it was juſt to puniſh them either with ſlavery or death, the ſimply expelling them from Spain, and tranſporting them to other countries, where their own religion was profeſſed, could not be conſidered in any other light but as an act of clemency and mercy on the part of the king.

IT might be difficult, he acknowledged, to effectuate their expulſion, without endangering the internal peace of the kingdom; but God, he truſted, would enlighten the minds of the king's miniſters, and enable them to diſcern the moſt proper means of carrying ſo laudable a deſign into execution; for, as the counſel he had offered was equally dictated by his regard to the ſpiritual and to the temporal intereſt of the kingdom, he could not doubt that it was acceptable to God; and when he reflected on his great age, his natural temper and diſpoſition, and the habits which he had long indulged of a retired and ſequeſtered life, he could hardly ſuppoſe that the zeal and reſolution with which he felt himſelf inſpired in his addreſs to the king, on the preſent occaſion, could proceed from any other cauſe but the ſecret and all-powerful influence of the ſpirit of God upon his mind (*g*).

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(*g*) Vida de Ribera, p. 388. Por Eſcriva.

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THE reaſoning in this memorial was admirably fitted to make impreſſion on the ſuperſtitious and timid temper of the king; nor was its efficacy leſſened by the patriarch's vain pretenſion to divine illumination. But although both Philip's religious ſcruples, and his apprehenſions of impending danger, were eaſily excited, his natural diſpoſition, which was gentle and humane, rendered him extremely averſe to a meaſure ſo replete with cruelty, as that which Ribera had exhorted him to adopt. He could not therefore reſolve to comply with the counſel that was given him, and his irreſolution was encreaſed by a memorial which was ſoon afterwards preſented to him by the barons of Valentia.

The effect of the reaſoning of Ribera on the mind of the king.

THEY had received intelligence from ſome of their friends at court of the patriarch's two memorials. They knew that he had adviſed the king to permit their vaſſals to remain for ſome time longer, which they aſcribed to his dread of their reſentment; but they believed that the expulſion of the other Moreſcoes, would be quickly followed by that of thoſe in Valentia, and for this reaſon they were equally alarmed as if he had counſelled the whole to be expelled.

IN order to deter the king from liſtening to his propoſal, they unanimouſly remonſtrated againſt the expulſion, as a meaſure that would be attended with the moſt pernicious conſequences; for the Moreſcoes were not only a frugal, temperate, and induſtrious race of men, but they were the moſt ſkillful farmers, and the moſt ingenious manufacturers in Spain. There were ſeveral manufactures, equally neceſſary for internal conſumption and foreign trade, with which they alone were acquainted; and without their ſkill and labour, it was an unqueſtionable fact, that a great part

Remonſtrance of the barons of Valentia againſt the expulſion of the Moreſcoes.

part of the kingdom would lie waſte, and innumerable families of the higheſt rank, who entirely depended on the rents of their lands, be reduced to indigence. BOOK IV. 1609.

IT had been affirmed that they were all Mahometans, but no ſufficient evidence had been produced to prove the truth of this aſſertion. They had all been regularly initiated, by baptiſm, into the Chriſtian church; they all profeſſed themſelves to be Chriſtians; and although many of them, perhaps, were not able to give a ſatisfactory account of the doctrines of the Chriſtian faith, yet the ſame thing might be ſaid of innumerable other Chriſtians of the lower rank, beſides the Moreſcoes.

BUT if many of them were in reality ignorant or unbelieving, this could not juſtly be imputed to them, ſo much as to thoſe to whom their inſtruction had been committed. Sufficient pains to inſtruct them, and proper methods of dealing with them, had ſeldom been employed. They had, at firſt, been dragged into the church by force and violence, and had afterwards been treated with inhumanity; as if bitter invectives, corporeal puniſhments, and the confiſcation of their effects, were the proper means of enlightening their underſtandings with the knowledge of the truth. In order to engage them to liſten to inſtruction, it was neceſſary that their inſtructors ſhould ſtudy to conciliate their affections. This end could be obtained only by gentleneſs and forbearance: and if the king would be pleaſed to take effectual care to prevent them from being treated more like brutes than men, and ſtill more, if, as a reward for their relinquiſhing the Mahometan ſuperſtition, he would grant them acceſs to the ſame immunities and privileges that were enjoyed

Book IV. 1609. enjoyed by his other ſubjects, there would be no ground to deſpair of their converſion.

THEY had been accuſed of holding a treaſonable correſpondence with the enemies of the ſtate; but ought a vague and general aſſertion to be held as a ſufficient evidence of their guilt? was not this crime of ſuch a nature, that it muſt neceſſarily be confined to a few? ought the guilt of a few to be imputed to ſo great a number? ought even the few who had been guilty, to be condemned without a hearing, without a trial, and without the ſmalleſt evidence?

THIS imputation had been often caſt upon the Moreſcoes, by ſpeculative and ſequeſtered men, who had no acceſs to know the truth of their aſſertion, but were prompted by their zeal and prejudices to believe it. It had always been diſregarded by the wiſeſt of the king's predeceſſors; and juſtice, they hoped, would determine the king to imitate ſo laudable an example, till ſome proof or evidence was adduced. This remonſtrance, which the barons preſented in a cortes or parliament held in the year 1604, was not altogether without effect. In compliance with the intention of it, Philip reſolved to delay the expulſion of the Moreſcoes for ſome years longer, and, in the mean time, to make a further trial, whether it was poſſible to effectuate their converſion to the faith; and for this purpoſe, he procured a brief from the pope, impoſing a tax on the eccleſiaſtical revenues, a part of which he was authoriſed to employ in building and endowing a Moreſco college; and in order to induce men of abilities to accept of curacies among the Moreſcoes, he was impowered, from the ſame fund, to augment the ſalaries of the curates.

Its effect.

Paul V.

BUT

BUT no greater regard it ſhould ſeem was paid to this than to the other brief above mentioned. The college was not endowed, and the church livings remained the ſame as before: from whence there was but too much ground for the ſuſpicion which was entertained, that the king had neither been able to intereſt the pope nor the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics in the execution of his plan. 1609.

THE latter laboured aſſiduouſly to convince both the pope and the king, that every thing had been already done for the converſion of the Moreſcoes, that was in the power of man to perform. The archbiſhop of Valentia preſented a third memorial to the king, containing, as he pretended, a full reply to what had been aſſerted by the barons, but conſiſting principally, either of invectives againſt the Moreſcoes, or of denunciations of divine judgments, which muſt ere long overtake the kingdom, if they were not ſpeedily expelled. (*b*).

RIBERA was powerfully ſeconded by ſeveral other eccleſiaſtics, and particularly by Bleda, a Dominican friar, diſtinguiſhed for his acquaintance with the learning of his time, and equally noted for his activity, his zeal, and bigotry; who compoſed ſeveral bitter invectives againſt the Moreſcoes, and, dividing his time between Rome and Madrid, employed all his eloquence to perſuade the pontiff and the king of the neceſſity of their expulſion.

BUT

(*b*) Some prodigies are recorded by Ribera in his memorial, and by other writers, as clear and certain indications of the will of heaven on the preſent occaſion. Such as that the church bell of Villila rung of itſelf for ſeveral days, &c. But it does not appear, whether arguments of this kind, were deſpiſed or regarded by the king.

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But the archbiſhop's moſt powerful aſſociate, was Don Bernardo de Roias y Sandoval, brother to the duke of Lerma, who was the cardinal-archbiſhop of Toledo, inquiſitor-general and chancellor of Spain. This prelate approved and ſeconded every part of Ribera's memorials, except where he adviſed the king to retain ſuch of the Moreſco children as were under ſeven years of age, and to ſuffer the Moreſcoes in Valentia, to remain till their place could be ſupplied by Chriſtians; for it was more adviſeable this cardinal maintained, to put them all, men, women, and children to the ſword, than to have the Spaniſh blood contaminated, as it would be, if either of theſe exceptions were admitted by a mixture of the polluted blood of infidels.

The duke of Lerma, who, from the beginning of his adminiſtration, had ſtudied, with great aſſiduity and ſolicitude, to ingratiate himſelf with the court of Rome and the Spaniſh eccleſiaſtics, readily eſpouſed his brother's ſentiments; and, as the duke was at this time in the unrivalled and full poſſeſſion of the royal favour, nothing now was wanting to fix the reſolution of the king (*i*).

Expulſion of the Moreſcoes.

It was accordingly reſolved, that all the Moreſcoes in Spain, thoſe in Valentia as well as thoſe in the other provinces, ſhould be expelled. The cardinal-archbiſhop went himſelf to Rome, with the deſign, it is believed, to perſuade the ſovereign pontiff to grant his ſanction to the expulſion by ſome public deed: but, if this was the intention of his journey, it did not produce the deſired effect. The pontiff, probably, choſe that the odium which muſt attend a meaſure ſo barbarous and ſo unprecedented, ſhould rather fall on the court of Spain

(*i*) Fonſeca Traycion de Moreſcoes, p. 196.

Spain than on the holy ſee; and, therefore, we do not read of any other papal bull or brief publiſhed on the preſent occaſion, but one addreſſed to the biſhops of Valentia, commanding them to aſſemble together, in order to conſider whether any method of converting the Moreſcoes could be deviſed. This bull was dated in the year 1606, a few months before the cardinal-primate ſet out for Rome, but was not publiſhed till after his return, in 1608. It was publiſhed in the month of April of that year; and, in compliance with it, the biſhops ſoon after met together, and ſpent ſeveral months in deliberating on the ſubject. But, as if the deſign of their meeting had been to condemn the Moreſcoes, and not to conſider of the means of converting them, they at length pronounced the following ſentence: "That the Moreſcoes of the kingdom of Valentia were all apoſtates from the Chriſtian faith, and were, beſides, ſo obſtinate and inflexible in their infidelity, that, whatever means ſhould be employed, no hopes could juſtly be entertained of their converſion. Book IV. 1609.

This ſentence, having been tranſmitted to the court, contributed to confirm the king in the reſolution which he had formed. It was agreed, however, that the expulſion ſhould be deferred till a more convenient ſeaſon; and that, in the mean time, the ſtricteſt ſecrecy ſhould be obſerved. It was judged neceſſary to keep the deſign ſecret, leſt the Moreſcoes ſhould, either of themſelves, or inſtigated by the barons, have recourſe to arms; and, as no court was ever more diſtinguiſhed for maintaining the moſt inviolable ſecrecy in its councils than that of Spain, it ſhould ſeem that no ſuſpicion was entertained, either by the Moreſcoes or barons, of the king's determination in a matter wherein they were ſo deeply intereſted, till Bleda, p. 503.

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till every neceſſary preparation was made for carrying it into execution.

THE court having determined to begin with the expulſion of the Valentian Moreſcoes, orders were ſecretly given to the naval commanders in Spain, Portugal, and Italy, to receive a certain number of troops on board their ſhips, and to rendezvous, in Auguſt, 1609, at Alicant, Denia, and other ſea-ports in the Mediterranean, on the coaſt of Valentia. About the ſame time, Don Auguſtin Mexia, an old experienced officer, governor of Antwerp, was ſent to the city of Valentia to concert with the viceroy, the marquis of Cararena, and others, concerning the meaſures neceſſary to be taken within the kingdom to prevent a tumult or inſurrection. The pretext employed for aſſembling the fleet was an expedition againſt the Moors in Barbary. But the barons, obſerving that frequent conferences were held, by night and by day, at the viceroy's, with regard to the ſubject of which they were kept entirely in the dark, and being informed that the archbiſhop (who aſſiſted at theſe conferences), as if he expected to be beſieged, had conveyed into his palace an extraordinary quantity of proviſions, beſides ſome troops and arms, they ſoon came to ſuſpect what was the real purpoſe of the naval armament; and having, conformably to a privilege which belonged to them by the conſtitution of Valentia, ſummoned one of thoſe aſſemblies of their own number, termed the Military Arms, they ſent deputies to the viceroy, requeſting him to acquaint them with the deſign of the preſent preparations. To this enquiry, the viceroy, without pretending ignorance of the king's intention, replied, that, whatever it was, the barons might reſt aſſured that no reſolution could be formed, either by the king, who had ever regarded them as his moſt faithful vaſſals,

vaſſals, or by the duke of Lerma, their countryman, whoſe eſtates were intermingled with theirs, which in the iſſue would not be found conducive to the true intereſt of Valentia.

By this anſwer the barons were confirmed in their ſuſpicions; and, as they could not but ſuppoſe that the viceroy would have choſen, had it been in his power, to diſpel their apprehenſions, they could no longer doubt that the object of all the preparations which had been made was the expulſion of their vaſſals. They inſtantly convened again, and drew up a remonſtrance to be preſented to the king; of which the purport was, that Valentia would be entirely ruined if the Moreſcoes, by whom moſt of the work in that kingdom was carried on, were expelled.

At the deſire of the viceroy, who dreaded that this ſtep might give an alarm to the Moreſcoes, the juſtiza, or chief juſtice in criminal matters, having attempted in vain to divert them from their purpoſe, was ſo violently agitated with grief and rage, that he dropt down dead in the aſſembly. This accident prevented them from coming to an immediate deciſion; but next morning they had another meeting, in which they appointed deputies to carry their remonſtrance to the king.

Remonſtrance of the barons of Valentia againſt the expulſion of the Moors.

It was expreſſed in the ſtrongeſt terms, dictated by a deep conviction of the melancholy truth which it contained; but the deputies, though received by the king and his miniſter with much diſtinction and reſpect, were told, that the king's reſolution, having been formed after the moſt mature deliberation, was unalterable; that the Barons had been too late in preſenting their petition; and that the edict of expulſion was already publiſhed.

A STRONG

BOOK IV. 1609. A STRONG body of Caſtilian troops had actually entered Valentia, about the time of the arrival of the deputies at Madrid; and the Moreſcoes were now acquainted with their fate.

IN the edict of expulſion, which was publiſhed with the uſual formalities, by the viceroy, in the beginning of September, 1609, they were all commanded, men, women, and children, under the penalty of death, to be ready within three days to repair to the ſea-ports appointed for their embarkation, and there to go on board of ſhips prepared for carrying them into foreign parts.

It was ordained, under the ſame penalty, that they ſhould all remain in the places where they were at the time of publiſhing the edict, till the commiſſaries appointed to conduct them to the ſea-coaſt, ſhould arrive; that if any of them ſhould, before the arrival of the commiſſaries, preſume to change the place of their abode, they might be carried by any perſon before a judge; and, in caſe they ſhould make reſiſtance, might inſtantly be put to death.

It was enacted, that all their effects ſhould belong to the lords whoſe vaſſals they were, except ſuch as they could carry along with them; and, that in caſe they ſhould conceal or deſtroy any part of their effects, they ſhould be puniſhed with death.

For the preſervation of the ſugar works, granaries of rice, drains or aqueducts, and, in order that the Chriſtian inhabitants might be inſtructed in the works and manufactures which had hitherto been carried on by the Moreſcoes, it was declared that ſix families, to be named by the barons, out of every hundred, might remain.

IT

It was ordained, that all children under four years of age might remain, provided their parents or guardians ſhould conſent; that children under ſix or ſeven, one of whoſe parents was an old Chriſtian, might remain, and the mothers with them, though they were Moreſcoes; but if the fathers were Moreſcoes, and the mothers Chriſtians, that the fathers ſhould be expelled, while the children might remain with their mothers; that all ſuch of the Moreſcoes might remain, who, for any conſiderable time, had demeaned themſelves as Chriſtians, who could produce certificates from the pariſh-prieſts of their having received the ſacrament, by permiſſion of their reſpective biſhops, or who had not for two years attended any of the Moreſco religious meetings.

They were all permitted to depart into any country, not ſubject to the crown of Spain, provided they ſhould leave the kingdom within the time ſpecified; and an aſſurance was given them, that no violence or injury ſhould be offered them, by thoſe who ſhould be employed in tranſporting them to Barbary, or any other country they ſhould make choice of (*k*).

The ſeveral conceſſions contained in this edict were conſidered by the eccleſiaſtics and the court of Spain as proofs of extraordinary clemency on the part of the king; but they could not be regarded in the ſame light by the Moreſcoes. They were equally overwhelmed with aſtoniſhment, and with anguiſh and diſtreſs. They were ſurrounded with enemies on every hand. The king, they perceived, though they had been taught to believe his diſtinguiſhing character to be gentleneſs and mercy, was their irreconcileable and mortal

(*x*) Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 3.

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tal enemy; and their hearts ſunk within them, when they reflected on the miſery which they were doomed to undergo. They were not only diſquieted with ſo near a proſpect of the loſs of their moſt valuable poſſeſſions, joined to that of perpetual baniſhment from their native country; but they violently dreaded that they were all to be butchered as ſoon as they were put on board the ſhips appointed for tranſporting them to foreign parts (*l*). They had never had any friends to whom they could look for aſſiſtance, except their patrons the barons, whoſe intereſt was inſeperably linked with theirs; but the barons, they knew, were unable to afford them protection on the preſent occaſion, and all the good offices which they had interpoſed in their behalf had been without avail. They had little reaſon, therefore, to expect that any thing which they themſelves could do to avert the impending ſtorm would prove effectual. That nothing, however, in their power might be omitted, their leading men, having met together privately in the city of Valentia, drew up a petition, and ſent a deputation of their number to preſent it to the viceroy; in which, after ſolemnly aſſerting their innocence of the crimes imputed to them in the edict, they offered, in caſe the king would be perſuaded to recall it, to maintain a certain number of gallies for the protection of the coaſt againſt the corſairs; to build ſeveral new forts, and to ſupport the garriſons not only of theſe, but of ſuch as were already built; to redeem all the Chriſtians of Valentia who ſhould ever be taken captives by the Moors; and, beſides, to furniſh the king with a conſiderable ſum of money (*m*). But the viceroy

(*l*) Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 8. (*m*) MSS. of Cottington's letters in lord Hardwick's poſſeſſion. Mad. 8th Oct. 1609.

roy, though he was himſelf extremely averſe to the expulſion, without taking time to deliberate on their propoſals, immediately replied, that there was now no room left for any petition or remonſtrance; that the king was unalterably determined to put his edict into execution, and they muſt inſtantly prepare themſelves, however reluctant, to ſubmit (*n*). BOOK IV. 1609.

WHEN this anſwer was reported by the delegates to the aſſembly in Valentia, their minds were variouſly agitated with grief, deſpair, and indignation. It was propoſed by ſome of them that they ſhould inſtantly have recourſe to arms; for it was better, they maintained, to die fighting like men for their property and lives, than tamely to ſuffer themſelves to be ſtript of their poſſeſſions, and afterwards, perhaps, to be butchered like ſheep, by an implacable and cruel enemy, to whom they had never given any juſt occaſion of offence; beſides, that it might not be impoſſible for them to defend themſelves in the mountainous parts of the country, till ſome foreign power, friendly to them, and hoſtile to the Spaniards, ſhould come to their relief. But this propoſal was rejected as deſperate and impracticable by a great majority of the aſſembly, who repreſented that, as they were not provided either with arms or military ſtores, had no practice in war, and had been utterly unaccuſtomed to military diſcipline, it was impoſſible they could hold out for many weeks againſt ſo potent an enemy. The Spaniſh regular forces, under the moſt experienced officers, were already diſtributed all over the country, and were every where prepared to attack them on the firſt appearance of oppoſition or reſiſtance. No time would be allowed them to put themſelves into a poſture

(*n*) Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 7.

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of defence. They would inſtantly be either cut to pieces, or reduced to ſlavery, and an opportunity would be thus afforded to the Spaniards of gratifying at once, ſtill more than by their expulſion, their avarice and their cruelty. It could not be ſuppoſed that the king would have incurred the expence, which his preparations for exporting them muſt have coſt him, had he intended to deſtroy them on their paſſage, ſince he could have done it more eaſily without incurring ſo great an expence; beſides, that ſo uſeleſs and ſo wanton a piece of treachery would cover his name with indelible diſgrace. They might with confidence therefore expect to be ſafely conveyed to Barbary, and this was ſurely preferable either to death or to ſlavery in Spain. But while, for theſe reaſons, all thoughts of reſiſtance ought to be laid aſide, they ought not to accept of either of the two offers that were made to them in the edict of expulſion. Neither their children under age, nor the ſix families out of every hundred who were permitted to remain, ought to be left behind. The Spaniards intended, by theſe conceſſions, to ſerve themſelves, and not the Moreſcoes, and the latter ſhould, for that reaſon, unanimouſly reſolve to reject them with diſdain.

The Moreſcoes reſolve to defend themſelves.

This reſolution was warmly embraced by the whole aſſembly; and not by them only, but by all the other Moreſcoes in the kingdom of Valentia, except thoſe, who, inhabiting certain mountainous parts of the country which they deemed impregnable, formed the deſperate reſolution of maintaining their poſſeſſions by force of arms. Before the meeting of Valentia, great numbers of thoſe who lived in towns, and in the more fertile parts of the country, had earneſtly ſolicited the barons to procure them to be named among the families who were to be permitted to remain; but

but no ſooner were they made acquainted with the determination of their leaders, than, with one heart, and one voice, they declared that no conſideration ſhould now induce them to ſtay behind their kinſmen and companions. BOOK IV. 1609.

THIS declaration was a matter of deep concern to the barons, who had, in ſome meaſure, been reconciled to the expulſion by the promiſe which had been given for ſix families out of every hundred to remain, and now dreaded the utter ruin of their eſtates, if the Moreſcoes ſhould perſevere in their preſent reſolution. Of all the barons the duke of Gandia was likely to prove the greateſt ſufferer, as his eſtate chiefly conſiſted of thoſe manufactures with which the Moreſcoes alone were acquainted. By employing all his influence with them, and making them the moſt advantageous offers, he at length obtained their conſent, on condition that they ſhould be allowed the free exerciſe of their religion. The duke ſolicited the viceroy to grant them this indulgence, till the Chriſtians ſhould be inſtructed in the manufactures, which would not require more than two or three years at moſt; but was told by the viceroy, that, agreeably to his orders from the king, it could not be granted for a ſingle day (*n*). This anſwer being communicated to the Moreſcoes, there was not one perſon of more than a hundred and fifty thouſand who could be perſuaded to remain.

NOR were they leſs inflexible in refuſing to leave their children behind them that were under

(*n*) The viceroy received a letter of thanks from Philip on this occaſion, beginning thus: Yo os aggradeſco mucho lo que reſpondiſtes, y el parecer que days, que no por una hora ſi conſienta que es muy conforme a lo que de vueſtra mucha Chriſtianidad, ſe podia eſperar, &c. Fonſeca, lib. iv. cap. 8.

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ſix years of age. They were well aware, as they ſaid to the eccleſiaſtics who applied to them on this head, of the great inconveniencies and dangers to which ſo many thouſand children, with their mothers and nurſes, none of whom had ever been at ſea, muſt be expoſed from being crowded together on board the ſhips and gallies; but they were unalterably determined to carry them along with them to whatever part of the world they themſelves ſhould go, and choſe rather to ſee them periſh before their eyes than leave them in the hands of a people by whom their parents had been treated with ſo much cruelty (*o*).

THE army having been diſtributed into the ſeveral ſtations, where they might moſt effectually prevent any diſturbance or inſurrection, and the ſhips of war and tranſports, fully equipped for their intended voyage, the viceroy, without any farther delay, began to carry the royal edict into execution, by ſending commiſſioners, with a ſufficient body of troops, to collect the Moreſcoes in different quarters together, and to conduct them to the coaſt. The vaſſals of the duke of Gandia, amounting to more than twenty thouſand men, were the firſt who embarked, and, after a proſperous voyage, they were ſafely landed at Oran, a Spaniſh fortreſs on the coaſt of Barbary.

AT

(*o*) The eccleſiaſtics, however, and ſome religious women of rank, detained a conſiderable number of the children, partly by ſtealth, and partly by compulſion; believing that, in doing ſo, they performed a meritorious ſervice in the ſight of God, and ſaved the ſouls of the children from perdition. Fonſeca, p. 233. Dio principio a eſte ſanto latrocinio, Donna Iſabel de Velaſco Virreyna de aquel Reyno, la qual dio orden que le traxeſſen a caſa algunas Moriſquillas, aunque fueſſe hurtandolas a ſus curadores, como ſe hizo, &c.

AT Oran they were well received by the count of Aguilar, the governor of the fort, and, on his application to the viceroy of Tremezen, which ſtands at the diſtance of two days journey from Oran, leave was granted them to come to take up their reſidence in the former of theſe places. In their journey thither they were deeply affected, and few of them could reſtrain their tears, when they compared the deſart barren plains, through which they paſſed, with the fertile and delightful regions of Valentia. It afforded them, however, no ſmall conſolation in their diſtreſs to reflect that, as the dread which they had entertained of being murdered by the way had proved groundleſs, they had now found a prince of their own religion, diſpoſed to grant them his protection. Upon their arrival at Tremezen, they were ſuffered to retain all their wealth which they had brought along with them, and admitted to all the ſame liberties and privileges as the natives of the place.

AN account of the treatment which they received having been carried to Spain, by ten perſons who were ſuffered to return for that purpoſe, it contributed, in ſome meaſure, to reconcile the other Moreſcoes in Valentia to their fate; and, as the winter ſeaſon was faſt approaching, when they muſt encounter greater difficulties in their paſſage, they even diſcovered a degree of impatience to be permitted to embark (*p*).

No time was unneceſſarily loſt on the part of the viceroy. The Moreſcoes, conducted by his commiſſaries and the royal troops, and many of them accompanied, from compaſſion and humanity, by the barons whoſe vaſſals they had been, were

(*p*) Fonſeca.

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were every where in motion, and haſtening in crowds, with their wives and children, to the coaſt. The ſhips which had been provided for tranſporting them, having been found extremely inadequate to the purpoſe, many more were collected from the ſea-ports in Spain, Majorca, and Italy. Of theſe many were hired by the Moreſcoes themſelves, who deſired, as ſoon as poſſible, to emancipate themſelves from the power of the Spaniards; while the greater number went on board the ſhips provided by the king. And in a few weeks about a hundred and twenty thouſand men, women, and children had embarked.

MANY of theſe were perſons of ſubſtance and condition; ſome of them, on account of their early profeſſion of Chriſtianity, had been raiſed to the rank of nobility, by the emperor Charles V. And the elegance and beauty of the young Moreſco women is highly celebrated by a contemporary Spaniſh hiſtorian, whoſe bigotry often prompts him to exult in their diſtreſs.

Humanity of the barons of Valentia.

WIDELY different from the ſentiments of this biggotted eccleſiaſtic were thoſe of the Valentia barons; who gave their vaſſals, on this melancholy occaſion, every proof of generous compaſſion and humanity. By the royal edict they were entitled to all the property belonging to their vaſſals, except what they were able to carry about their perſons: but the barons, deſpiſing this right which the edict beſtowed on them, allowed the Moreſcoes to diſpoſe of whatever part of their effects could be ſold for money, and likewiſe permitted them to convey their moſt valuable furniture and manufactures on mules and in carriages to the ſhips. Many of them accompanied their vaſſals in perſon to the ſhore, and ſome of them,

them, having embarked along with them, saw them safely land on the coast of Africa (q). BOOK IV. 1609.

But this kind attention of the barons served only for a little time to mitigate their distress. Their exile from their native country, which justly excited in them the most bitter regret, and gave them so much ground for anxiety with regard to their future fortune, was soon succeeded by still greater calamities. Great numbers were shipwrecked on their passage, and never reached the African coast; while many others were barbarously murdered at sea, by the crews of the ships which they had freighted; this latter calamity befel only those who had chosen to transport themselves in private ships, and instances are recorded of such inhuman cruelty exercised against this harmless, persecuted, and defenceless people, by the owners and crews of these ships, as equals any thing of the same kind of which we read in history. The men butchered in the presence of their wives and children; the women and children afterwards thrown alive into the sea; of the women, some, on account of their beauty, preserved alive for a few days to satiate the lust of the inhuman murderers of their husbands and brothers, and then either slaughtered or committed to the waves; such were some of the horrid deeds

Hard fate of the Moresoes.

(q) Of the barons who thus distinguished themselves by their tenderness and humanity on this occasion, and who remained at the sea-ports during the whole time of the embarkation, employing all their interest to protect the Moriscoes from injury, and to procure them the best accommodation possible on board the ships, Fonseca has recorded the names of the following, adding that there were many others whom he has not named: the duke of Gandia, whose great estate was almost entirely ruined; the marquis of Albayda, the count of Alaguas, the count of Bunol, the count of Anna, the count of Sinarcas, the count of Concentayna, and the duke of Maqueda who went over in the first embarkation to the port of Oran.

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deeds of which theſe barbarians were convicted upon their trial, to which they were brought, in conſequence of quarrelling with each other about the diviſion of their prey; and ſuch, if we may credit a contemporary hiſtorian, was the unhappy fate of a great number of the Moreſcoes (*r*).

NOR was the fate of the greater part of thoſe who reached the coaſt of Barbary leſs deplorable. They had no ſooner landed on this barren inhoſpitable ſhore, than they were attacked by the Bedouin Arabs, a wild banditti who live in tents, and ſupport themſelves by hunting and by plunder. The Moreſcoes, unarmed, and incumbered with their wives and children, were often robbed by theſe barbarians, who came upon them in numerous bodies, amounting ſometimes to five or ſix thouſand men; and, as often as the Moreſcoes attempted, with ſtones and ſlings, their only arms, to make reſiſtance, put great numbers of them to the ſword. Still greater numbers periſhed of fatigue and hunger, joined to the inclemencies of the weather, from which they had no means of ſhelter, during their tedious journey through the African deſarts, to Moſtagan, Algiers, and other places, where they hoped to be permitted to take up their reſidence. Few of them ever arrived at theſe places. Of ſix thouſand, who ſet out together from Conaſtal, a town in the neighbourhood of Oran, with an intention of going to Algiers, a ſingle perſon only, of the name of Pedralvi, ſurvived the diſaſters to which they were expoſed; and of the whole hundred and forty thouſand, who were at this time tranſported to Africa, there is ground to believe, from the concurring teſtimony of perſons who had acceſs to know the truth, that more than a hundred

(*r*) Fonſeca.

dred thouſand men, women, and children, ſuffered death in its moſt hideous forms, within a few months after their expulſion from Valentia (*s*). Book IV. 1609.

Compared to the dreadful fate to which this unhappy people were doomed by the Spaniards, it would have been an act of mercy on the part of the king, had he either commanded them to be put to the ſword, or committed to the flames; as their miſery would, in this caſe, have been of ſhort continuance. The knowledge of what had befallen them ought, at leaſt, to have deterred him from expoſing the reſt of his Moreſco ſubjects to the like calamities.

But the ſentiments of humanity in the eccleſiaſtics and court of Spain were overpowered by thoſe of the moſt illiberal ſuperſtition. They conſidered that inexpreſſible miſery, which they themſelves had brought on the Moreſcoes, as a ſignal divine judgment againſt that unhappy people, which ſerved to juſtify the cruelty which they had exerciſed, and to prove that what they had done was acceptable in the ſight of God. Far from feeling remorſe or ſorrow for what had happened, they rather triumphed and exulted in it, and were confirmed in their reſolution of expelling all the Moreſcoes in Spain without exception, and without thinking it incumbent on them to make proviſion for their reception in any of thoſe countries to which they were about to be conveyed.

But before they proceeded to the expulſion of the Moreſcoes in Caſtile and other provinces, it was judged neceſſary to reduce to obedience all ſuch of the Moreſcoes in Valentia, above mentioned,

(*s*) Fonſeca, Gonſalez Davila, p. 146.

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oned, as had retired to the mountainous parts of that kingdom, with the reſolution of ſtanding on their defence. Their number, including men, women, and children, amounted nearly to thirty thouſand. Having collected together a conſiderable quantity of proviſions of all kinds, they had begun, while the viceroy was employed in tranſporting their countrymen, to fortify themſelves as well as they were able, and to block up the narrow paſſes by which the Spaniards muſt approach. But, beſides being utterly deſtitute of military ſkill, they were extremely ill furniſhed both with arms and ammunition; and the folly of their attempt quickly appeared in the feebleneſs of every effort which they made to repel the attacks of the enemy. The viceroy having ſent againſt them the flower of the regular forces, under the command of Don Aguſtin Meſica, who had acquired conſiderable military experience and renown in the wars of Flanders, a great part of them were compelled to ſurrender, through the want of water, from which Meſica had found means to cut them off; and ſoon after the reſt were beaten from their intrenchments, and put to flight.

In the purſuit no mercy was ſhewn, either to the aged or to the women and children, though rolling in the duſt, and imploring mercy, by the ſavage conquerors. Upwards of three thouſand periſhed (*t*). The number of thoſe who had ſurrendered

(*t*) Fonſeca, p. 310.—From the ſtyle of this author in this and many other paſſages, there is little ground for doubt, that with pleaſure he would have acted the ſame bloody part which he deſcribes.

Fueron Signiendo la vittoria, los nueſtros, matando ſin excecion, quantos alcançavan, viejos, moços, grandes, pequenos, hombres y mugeres, por mas que arrodillados ellos, y ellas con los braços a biertos, les pedian miſericordia, no mereciendola los que ſiempre uſaron mall della.---Fonſeca, 310.

rendered was two and twenty thouſand, who were all ſoon after tranſported to Africa, except the children under ſeven years of age, whom the ſoldiers were permitted to ſell for ſlaves. The king decreed, that, after a certain number of years, they ſhould be ſet at liberty; but, as many of them were ſent to foreign countries, there is ground to ſuſpect that the decree was not attended with the deſired effect (*u*).

ANOTHER order of the king, which he publiſhed at this time, proved more effectual. Beſides the Moreſcoes who were killed or taken priſoners, a conſiderable number, diſtruſtful of the Spaniſh faith, or prompted by an inconquerable attachment to their native country, had diſperſed themſelves among the woods and rocks, where they hoped to elude the notice of the Spaniards. Philip put a price upon the heads of theſe unhappy men, and the ſoldiers were ſent out to hunt

(*u*) The viceroy and the archbiſhop of Valentia differed widely in their opinion with regard to the proper method of diſpoſing of the children. The former repreſented to the king, that all of them, who were under fifteen years of age, might be ſafely permitted to remain in the hands of the Chriſtians, to whom they had been ſold by the ſoldiers, as there would be no Mahometans in the kingdom by whom they could be perverted from embracing the principles of the Chriſtian faith. Beſides, that as moſt of their parents and other relations had periſhed in the late inſurrection, it would be leſs cruel to put them all to the ſword, than to land ſo great a number of helpleſs young creatures on the coaſt of Barbary. The archbiſhop, on the other hand, declared that, after a certain age, no Moreſco could poſſibly be converted; and that, if the Moreſco children, at fifteen, at twelve, at ten, or even ſeven years of age, were ſuffered to remain, the whole kingdom of Valentia would again be peopled with Mahometans before the end of the ſecond, or at moſt, of the third generation. The king, deſirous to gratify both the viceroy and the archbiſhop, but leaning more to the ſide of the latter, gave his permiſſion, as above mentioned, for retaining only ſuch of the children as were under ſeven years of age.

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hunt for them, as for beaſts of prey. Hardly any of them were able to eſcape. Some of them choſe rather to die of cold and hunger than ſurrender themſelves to the Spaniards; and at length their leader, who with his wife and children had concealed themſelves in the moſt inacceſſible parts of the mountains, was taken and carried alive to Valentia, where, after ſuffering much mockery and inſult for having allowed himſelf to be elected king of the inſurgents, he was, by a ſolemn ſentence, condemned and put to death.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK V.

ABOUT the end of the fifteenth century, the ſeveral kingdoms of Spain formed one powerful monarchy, containing above twenty millions of inhabitants. It was well cultivated, abounded in flouriſhing manufactures, and was governed with equal vigour and prudence by the joint authority of Ferdinand and Iſabella. Theſe princes, agreeably to the natural progreſs of ambition, extended their united power, by the ſuperiority of their policy and arms, in Europe, while the inventive and daring genius of Columbus opened to their aſpiring views an immenſe field of conqueſt by the diſcovery of a new world. An object ſo animating, by its novelty as well as grandeur, nouriſhed thoſe ſeeds of ambition which had taken root in the court of Spain, and rouſed a ſpirit of enterprize among the people. A ſucceſſion of bold leaders, followed by numerous adventurers, allured to their ſtandards by the love of change, or the hope of plunder, united to the Spaniſh empire almoſt the whole of thoſe vaſt regions which extend from the Gulf of Mexico to the Streights of Magellan.

Ambition of Spain accounted for.

THE

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THE collected treaſures of America, over which the cortes had not any controul, enabled Charles V. to trample on the liberties of his own ſubjects, and to threaten neighbouring ſtates with univerſal dominion. The ambition of the emperor deſcended, together with his immenſe reſources, to his ſon, Philip II. and engaged him in projects beyond his abilities. The monarch was governed by a luſt of power, and the people were ſeized with a ſpirit of emigration. The energy of the nation was diverted from domeſtic induſtry, the true ſource of national wealth and grandeur, and turned to diſtant enterprizes of colonization and of war. The monarchy became faint through the loſs of its blood and treaſure; and the power, on which its vaſt ambition had been originally founded, was ſubverted. But ideas of uncontroulable dominion were by this time deeply impreſſed on the Auſtrian race; and Philip III. with exhauſted reſources, and a feeble mind, faintly purſued the ſame ambitious plan that had been formed or adopted by his predeceſſors on the Spaniſh throne, not more formidable for their extenſive revenues, than for the vigilance, vigour, and perſeverance of their nature.

IT is ſo natural for ſovereign princes to exert every nerve to reclaim the obedience of revolted ſubjects, that the continuance of the war in the Netherlands till the late truce, ought not, indeed, to be accounted any proof of extraordinary ambition; and the expulſion of the Moreſcoes, a people induſtrious in an indolent climate, ſeemed an act by which the Spaniſh crown voluntarily ſought its own degradation. The ambitious ſchemes, however, of the court of Madrid, though better concealed, and apparently ſuſpended, were not wholly abandoned. The aggrandizement of the houſe of Auſtria was ſtill the firſt object in the

the counſels of Spain. But her power corre- Book VI.
ſponded not with her inclination; and her purſuit of greatneſs was ſullied by thoſe machinations which are the uſual reſources of impotent ambition, and which mark declining empire. 1609.

The peace of Vervins reſtored the appearance, but did not eſtabliſh the confidence of friendſhip between two great and rival kingdoms. The court of Spain continued to encourage and ſupport the enemies of the crown of France; and the French monarch, in return, encouraged and ſupported the enemies of Spain. Thus the ancient antipathies of theſe neighbouring kingdoms were ſtill kept alive by reciprocal injuries. But, while the intrigues of Philip were dark and treacherous, the hoſtilities of Henry were ennobled by the occaſions on which they were exerciſed, and the part which ſound policy required him to act, was conſonant to the natural generoſity of his temper. This magnanimous prince, enraged at the repeated injuries he had ſuffered from the ambition of the Spaniards, apprized of their intrigues and influence with the diſcontented nobles of France, and alarmed at the dangers which threatened both his life and his crown, conceived a project of uniting different powers in a league againſt the encroachments of a nation which ſeemed ſtill to aim at univerſal monarchy. His ultimate deſign, in the formation of ſuch a confederacy, was to eſtabliſh among the nations of Europe a new ſyſtem, and to fix a durable balance of power, by the exaltation of other ſtates on the ruins of the houſe of Auſtria (*a*).

Jealouſies continue between the courts of France and Spain.

Great plan of Henry IV.

At

(*a*) See Sully's Memoirs.—The ſcheme, which was aſcribed to Henry, of uniting all Chriſtendom in one great republic, for the promotion of general happineſs, and the eſtabliſhment of general tranquillity, has afforded matter of great

BOOK V. 1609.

At this time religion was the moſt powerful band of union among men; and, conſequently, religious ſympathies and antipathies were the great engines that governed the world. The Auſtrians gloried in patronizing the church of Rome. Henry, from the moſt urgent motives of policy, had changed the profeſſion of his faith, and embraced the catholic religion, but ſtill poſſeſſed and deſerved the confidence of the Proteſtants. The French monarch, of courſe, in a conteſt with the houſe of Auſtria, could depend on the good wiſhes of all, as he was aſſured of aſſiſtance from moſt of the princes and ſtates of the reformed religion. With England he entered

great ſpeculation and conjecture. Although it is impoſſible to penetrate into the receſſes of the minds of princes, and that hiſtory is more ſucceſsfully employed in tracing the conſequences than in exploring the ſprings of events and actions; yet, in every deſign of ſo great a man as Henry IV. we are deeply intereſted, and it is with difficulty that we can refrain from indulging conjectures concerning whatever appears myſterious or doubtful in his conduct.

The project of uniting the Chriſtian powers into one general republic, as it was not unworthy, ſo neither was it too great for the mind of Henry. It was the perfection and juſt completion of his plan. Nor is it improbable, that at certain times, he amuſed his fancy with the contemplation of ſo grand an object. But, on the other hand, it is almoſt certain that it was not the contemplation of this great end that firſt ſuggeſted the idea of the confederacy, and firſt rouſed him to action. A more natural or probable account of his original motives, in his intended enterprize, there cannot be given than what we have in Sully's Memoirs. "Henry IV. recollecting the intrigues of Spain, ſaid, I ſee theſe people will never let me alone while it is in their power to diſturb me. And that the different jealouſies of honour, of reputation, and of the intereſts of ſtate, render all confidence and harmony between France and Spain impoſſible. Other foundations of ſecurity muſt be ſought for than words. They will conſtrain me to do what I never intended. But I ſwear by God, that if I had once put my affairs in order, and raiſed money and all neceſſary ſupplies, I will make them repent that they have rouſed me to arms." Vol. iii. p. 33. duodecimo, Paris, 1663.

tered into a league for the mutual defence of that kingdom and of France. The United Provinces of the Low Countries, the Proteſtant princes of Germany, the greater part of the imperial towns, were ready to take an active part in his intended enterprize. And Denmark and Sweden, although from their remote ſituations they were not ſo nearly intereſted in his deſigns, if they ſhould be involved in the flames of a general war, it was eaſy to foreſee, would eſpouſe the cauſe of their Proteſtant brethren.

BUT the catholic powers were not in like manner diſpoſed to favour the houſe of Auſtria. For neither was the veneration for the ancient equal to the zeal which appeared for the new doctrines and forms of worſhip, nor were political motives wanting, which in certain catholic governments counterbalanced thoſe of religion. The princes and ſtates of Italy, who generally looked up to Henry as their protector, favoured his views ſecretly. But the Venetians entered openly into a league offenſive and defenſive, with a monarch through whoſe mediation they had been enabled to maintain the civil authority of the republic in oppoſition to the ſpiritual juriſdiction of the pope, and whom they regarded as a bulwark againſt the encroachments of the Spaniſh governors of Milan. The Swiſs cantons too, catholic as well as proteſtant, either actuated by a dread of the power of Auſtria, or, as other hiſtorians affirm, induced by a promiſe of Franche Compté, Alſace, and Tirol, embarked in this confederacy (*b*). The duke of Savoy alſo, a catholic prince, but who never profeſſed an inordinate zeal for the Romiſh faith, Henry drew over to his ſide, by a promiſe of his eldeſt daughter in marriage to the

(*b*) Mezeray Abrege Chronologique, 1600.

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prince of Piedmont, and by holding up to his ambition the ſovereignty of Milan. That ſovereignty the duke had in vain expected to receive in partage with Catherine, a daughter of Spain; a mortification the more ſevere, that the joint authority of the archduke Albert and the infanta Iſabella governed the Auſtrian Netherlands.

The high eſteem in which Henry held this new ally, appears from the terms on which he purchaſed his alliance. The general voice of admiration had beſtowed on both theſe princes the title of great: and their reſpective talents and virtues, ſo formidable to each other when in a ſtate of mutual hoſtility, inſpired them now with reciprocal confidence.

While Henry thus prepared to carry his intentions into execution, an event happened which, according to his uſual good fortune, gave him an opportunity of covering his real deſigns, under the veil of redreſſing injuries, and ſupporting the cauſe of juſtice.

Succeſſion of Cleves and Juliers.

John William, duke of Cleves and Juliers, having died without children, the right of ſucceſſion to the ſovereignty of thoſe ſtates was claimed by different princes. The moſt powerful of theſe prepared to maintain their pretenſions by arms. But the emperor Rhodolphus II. as well to ſupport his own authority, as to prevent the calamities of war, ſummoned the ſeveral competitors to appear before him, to explain the nature of their particular claims. In the mean time, he ſequeſtered the fiefs in diſpute, the adminiſtration of which he beſtowed on his brother Leopold, biſhop of Straſbourg and Paſſau. The adminiſtrator, ſeizing Juliers, levied troops, and began to extend his territories around that city.

Two

Two of the competitors, the marquis of Brandenburgh, and the count Palatine of Neuburgh, proteſtant princes, alarmed at the conduct of the emperor, agreed to make a fair partition of that ſovereignty to which they ſeverally made pretenſions, until their differences ſhould be terminated in an amicable manner by arbitration. Book V. 1609.

The count Palatine took the field with an army, and aſſembling the ſtates of Cleves and Juliers at Duſſeldorp, engaged them to acknowledge himſelf and the elector of Brandenburgh as the lawful hereditary ſovereigns of Cleves, and all the other principalities that had been poſſeſſed by John William beyond the Rhine. Alarmed at theſe proceedings, the Catholic princes of the empire formed a league for the defence of the ancient faith, and ſent deputies to demand aſſiſtance from Madrid and from Rome. The princes of Brandenburgh and Neuburgh, on the other hand, endeavoured to fortify themſelves in the ſtates of which they had taken poſſeſſion, by adding to the ſupport they received from the princes of the evangelical union, the powerful aid of the king of France. The ſtates of Cleves and Juliers annexed to the Auſtrian Netherlands, on which they bordered, would have extended the dominions of Spain beyond the Rhine, and bridled the power of the ſeven United Provinces. It was not therefore with difficulty that the Proteſtant princes prevailed on Henry to eſpouſe their cauſe. To the prince of Anhalt, whom they had ſent to Paris, he readily replied, and in the moſt obliging manner, that he would not only aſſiſt them with all his ſtrength, but would himſelf march for their protection at the head of his army. This army conſiſted of thirty thouſand foot, and ſix thouſand horſe, a great proportion of which troops were veterans, commanded by officers formed

Book V. 1610. for war under his own ſtandard. He had a train of artillery ſuperior to any that had ever before been brought into the field, and provided with ammunition for ſixty thouſand round of ſhot. And ſo great and judicious had been the œconomy of Henry, that he poſſeſſed treaſures ſufficient to keep on foot ſo great a military force for ten years, without the leaſt oppreſſion or injury to his ſubjects (*c*). Beſides this, there was an army in Dauphiny, of twelve thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, under the command of the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, ready to join the duke of Savoy in an attack upon the Spaniſh dominions in Lombardy. Europe had not ſeen military preparations ſo great, or known a juncture apparently ſo big with revolution. The wealth of Venice, the valour of the Swiſs, the impetuoſity of the Savoyards, the juvenile ardour of the United Provinces, the active zeal of the Proteſtant princes and ſtates of Germany, the diſciplined bravery of France, the good wiſhes of all who profeſſed the reformed religion: theſe, in the hands of a warlike and political prince, formed an engine fitted to ſubvert kingdoms, and to change the face of the world. The force of the means he poſſeſſed, and the grandeur of the end he had in view, were a ſource of delight to the martial and ſanguine diſpoſition of Henry. Sometimes he would take pleaſure in reviewing his troops, at others, in trying the arms he deſigned to wear in the day of battle. He ſlept but little, was conſtantly in motion, and converſed much with the miniſters and officers in whom he moſt confided. He burned with impatience to exchange the luxury of a palace for the dangers and hardſhips of the field, and was eager to retaliate on the marquis of

(*c*) Duke of Rohan's Diſcourſe on the Death of Henry the Great. Memoires de Sulli. Mezeray.

of Spinola, the advantages that had been gained over himſelf by the duke of Parma. He had already ſtrengthened the garriſons in his frontier towns, and his troops began to file off in ſeparate diviſions towards the general rendezvous in Champagne. He acquainted the archduke Albert at Bruſſels of his intended march through part of his territories, and deſired to be informed whether he ſhould be received as an enemy or as a friend. Nothing detained him in Paris but a deſire to be preſent at the coronation of Mary de Medicis, his queen, whom he had appointed during his abſence regent of France. 1610.

THE houſe of Auſtria, againſt which this gathering ſtorm was directed, beheld it with aſtoniſhing indifference. The emperor, Rhodolphus, more intent on obſerving the motions of the heavenly bodies, than on watching the movements of his enemies, indulged a natural love of ſcience, the only paſſion that is able to extinguiſh the pride of power in the breaſts of princes. He had given up, with little reluctance, to his brother Matthias, the government of Hungary, Moravia, and Auſtria, and ſoon after he alſo reſigned that of Bohemia. With the title of emperor, he lived a private man. It is matter of greater wonder that the king of Spain, in whom the paſſion of religion did not eradicate all the ſeeds of ambition, appeared unconcerned at the warlike preparations of an inveterate enemy. Whether the miniſters of Spain truſted to the ſucceſs of thoſe plots they had formed againſt Henry in his own palace; or, that with the ſuperſtitious credulity of the age in which they lived, they confided in the completion of thoſe predictions that about this time were ſo frequent in the mouths of Catholics concerning the ſudden death of the king of

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of France (*d*); or that they weakly imagined this monarch had no other object in view than the expulſion of Leopold from the ſtates of Juliers; or from whatever ſecret cauſe, it is certain, that amidſt a general and anxious ſuſpence, the court of Madrid diſcovered not any ſymptoms of alarm. The world, ſtruck with the mighty preparations of France, wondered at the ſerenity of Spain, when an event happened which proved how much human affairs are governed by cauſes beyond the reach of princes; which fruſtrated the well laid deſigns of the great Henry, and ſupplied the want of vigilance and wiſdom in the counſels of Philip.

Death of Henry IV. of France.

On the eve of the day fixed for the coronation of Mary de Medicis, Henry IV. was going in his coach to the arſenal, to converſe, according to his cuſtom, with the duke of Sully, ſuperintendant

(*d*) This conjecture may appear at firſt ſight, to certain readers, wholly abſurd and groundleſs. Nevertheleſs it will not ſeem altogether extravagant, if we reflect on the power of univerſally received prejudices on even the ſtrongeſt minds.

About this time, and even long after it, the ſcience of judicial aſtrology was ſtudied by philoſophers of the higheſt reputation, with great gravity, and, as they firmly believed, with great ſucceſs. There is in the univerſity of Peterſburgh, a very able mathematician, who is making great progreſs in judicial aſtrology at this very day. It is certain that the duke of Lerma was a firm believer in the doctrines of this ſcience. See Anecdotes du Miniſtere du Compte duc D'Olivarez.

Men of ſenſe, of the preſent times, ſtruck with that mixture of genius and extravagance which diſtinguiſhes the writings of antiquity, are at a loſs how to reconcile ſo much reaſon with ſuch great extravagance; and ſuſpect that many of the opinions delivered in thoſe writings were not real, but popular and affected. There is not a doubt but poſterity will entertain ſimilar doubts concerning ſome of the doctrines of the ſeventeenth and even eighteenth century. Men are ever changing their opinions, yet ever wondering that the world did not always think as they do now.

tendant of the finances, and grand maſter of the artillery, when he received two ſtabs with a knife, one of which pierced through the great canal which conveys the blood from the heart to the other parts of the body. The king fell dead on the duke of Epernon, who was on one ſide of him, and in whoſe ear he was whiſpering when he received the firſt wound. This parricide was committed by Francis Ravaillac, a native and ſchoolmaſter of Angouleme, on the 14th day of May, 1610. The miniſters of France conceiving that this execrable deed might have been the effect of ſome ſecret conſpiracy, put Ravaillac to the torture, not only as a puniſhment due to his crime, but as a means of diſcovering his abettors and accomplices. But that miſerable fanatic had no accomplices; and his only abettors were the prieſts of the Catholic ſuperſtition, whoſe writings and diſcourſes had fully perſuaded him that by murdering the protector of the Proteſtants, and the enemy of the pope, he would ſave his own ſoul from perdition, and obtain, as a reward, eternal life.

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Effects of the death of Henry.

The tragical end of Henry filled one half of Europe with exultation, and the other with horror. The houſe of Auſtria rejoiced at the deſtruction of a formidable enemy; and the votaries of that religion which they patronized, applauded the pious zeal of Ravaillac, which they compared to whatever is moſt heroic in the lives or deaths of ſaints, martyrs, and confeſſors. But a general conſternation ſeized not only the Hugonots of France, but every ſtate profeſſing the reformed religion. The whole Proteſtant world deplored the untimely fate of the patron of religious toleration; and nations differing in matters of religion, united in bewailing the loſs of the illuſtrious guardian of the liberties of Europe. They indulged

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indulged the melancholy recollection of his amiable and heroic virtues; his compaſſion, to which, on different occaſions, he had ſacrificed his ambition; the boldneſs and vigour of his genius, which diſdaining the windings of ſubtlety and refinement, purſued the paths that led directly to ſucceſs; his courage, which never forſook him in the moſt depreſſing circumſtances; his bravery in the field, which by a powerful contagion inſpired throughout his whole army irreſiſtible intrepidity; his patience under hardſhips, and affability in every fortune, which ſo won the hearts of his ſoldiers, that they ſerved him not only with the loyalty of ſubjects, but the affection of friends. But the celebrated Benjamin, duke of Rohan, not contented with mingling his own with the groans of nations, found a melancholy ſatisfaction in pouring forth the ſentiments of his heart in a pathetic compoſition, and tranſmitting to poſterity a memorial of his devotion to his beloved ſovereign. This elegy, written in a ſtrain of paſſion which nothing could have inſpired but the deepeſt ſorrow, is a lively picture of the grief and conſternation which followed the death of Henry, and exhibits a conſpicuous proof of that aſcendant which he had acquired over the greateſt minds (*e*).

After

(*e*) I deplore, ſays Rohan, among other expreſſions of extreme and vehement grief, I deplore in the loſs of our invincible king, that of France, and from the bottom of my ſoul grieve at the manner of his death. Our own experience will ſoon inform us how fit a ſubject he is for our tears: the people are alarmed and filled with melancholy preſages of future calamities; the towns are guarded as if they expected a ſiege; the nobility ſeek their ſafety amongſt the moſt eminent of their own order, whoſe factions rather threaten them with danger, than conſole them with any hopes of ſafety. Together with the loſs of his perſon, I bewail that of his courteſy and affability, his ſweet and obliging converſation, the honour he did me, the admittance he deigned to grant me even to his moſt private receſſes, obliged me

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me not only to mourn for him, but even not to love myſelf in thoſe places where the ſight of my good prince once afforded me ſuch infinite happineſs. I regret the diſappointment of the moſt noble and heroic enterprize that was ever yet conceived. It is not credible that a military force of thirty thouſand foot, ſix thouſand horſe, a train of artillery of ſixty guns, and ammunition for ſixty thouſand round of ſhot, beſides the army then in Dauphiny, ſhould be deſtined for the ſiege of Juliers, which was ſince undertaken with eight thouſand foot, and one thouſand horſe. Have I not good reaſon to lament the loſs of ſuch an opportunity of proving my courage, zeal, and fidelity to my king? One puſh of a pike given in his preſence, would have been a greater ſatisfaction to me, than I ſhould have now in obtaining a victory. Much more ſhould I have valued the leaſt praiſe in that art of which he was the greateſt maſter of his time, than the approbation and applauſe of all other captains now alive. I grieve at the manner of his deplorable death: a prince compoſed of ſweetneſs and clemency; who never condemned an innocent perſon to death; whoſe victories were never ſtained with blood; who having once reclaimed his enemies to their duty, cheriſhed them as friends, and loaded them with favours. Who that ever lived under this moſt auguſt prince, as I have done, can take pleaſure in theſe preſent times? I will therefore divide my life into two parts, and call that part of it I have already paſſed, *happy*, ſince it was employed in the ſervice of Henry the Great; and that which is yet to come, *unfortunate*, and ſpend it in lamentations, tears, ſighs, and complaints: and out of the honour which I owe to his memory, I will devote the remainder of my days (the kingdom of God being preſerved entire) to the ſervice of France, becauſe it was his kingdom; to the king, becauſe he is his ſon; and to the queen, becauſe ſhe was once his dear companion and ſpouſe.

(*f*) Spes addita ſuſcitat iras. Virgil.

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(*f*) Spes addita ſuſcitat iras. VIRGIL.

Book V. 1610. to rally the broken forces of the league, and to unite them once more into a compact and formidable body.

Character of the dukes of Savoy.

The houſe of Savoy, one of the moſt illuſtrious in Europe on account of its antiquity, is more nobly diſtinguiſhed for wiſdom of policy, and valour of arms. Environed by the dominions of the empire, France, and Spain, the princes of Savoy are under a conſtant neceſſity of watching the balance of power among their ambitious neighbours, and of penetrating early into their deſigns, that, by affording timely ſupport to the weaker againſt the ſtronger party, they may be enabled to preſerve their own independence. And, if Providence has placed this family in a ſituation in which it is neceſſary to guard againſt the encroachments of ſuperior power; the nature of their country, bold, abrupt, and ſublime, inſpires that confidence which is neceſſary effectually to reſiſt them. The faſtneſſes and narrow defiles of the Alps, together with a hardy race of men inhabiting a mountainous and ſnowy region, encourage the dukes of Savoy boldly to enter on war, whenever the complexion of the times demonſtrates its expedience. Thus natural have conſpired with moral cauſes to form that illuſtrious character which the race of Savoy has juſtly obtained in the world.

Character of Charles Emanuel.

Charles Emanuel did not diſgrace, but, on the contrary, added luſtre to the dignity of his birth. Nature, which had formed this prince of a weakly conſtitution of body, adorned his ſoul with a ſplendid variety of talents and virtues; and theſe the parental care of Philibert, renowned for his victory over the French at St. Quintin, exalted and matured by a learned and liberal education. The writings of antiquity, ſo full of heroic actions and

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and rapid conqueſts, nouriſhed the natural ardour of his mind, and inſpired an emulation of the ancient heroes of Italy. Together with that intrepidity of ſpirit which delights in purſuing great deſigns, he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree thoſe qualities which are requiſite in order to carry them into execution; political conduct, and military proweſs. His courage was not of that calm and equal kind which is connected with firmneſs of nerves, and which characterizes the warriors of the North. But, being derived from that vigour of imagination, and ſenſibility of frame peculiar to ſouthern climates, it was ardent and impetuous. His genius alſo like that of the warmer climates, was fertile even to exceſs, and prone to ſubtlety and refinement. From a temper ſo ſanguine, and an imagination ſo luxuriant, he derived an elaſticity of ſpirit that roſe under misfortunes; whence, though ſometimes defeated, and often diſappointed, he was never diſcouraged. His reſources were endleſs: for there could not be a conjuncture in which the ſuperiority of his genius could not find ſome favourable opportunity of practiſing on the paſſions, and managing the hopes, and fears, and follies of men. So various were his ſtratagems of policy and of war, that the moſt penetrating of his cotemporaries profeſſed themſelves unable to form any probable conjecture concerning his deſigns. Something, however, of the vaſt and unbounded characterized his conduct, the ardour of his inventive genius, engaging him not unfrequently in projects beyond his utmoſt power to accompliſh (*g*). Nor were the powers of his capacious mind wholly abſorbed in ſchemes of ambition. Whatever was elegant or great touched his ſoul, and he was prone to the pleaſures

(*g*) Vaſtus animus immoderata, incredibilia, nimis alta ſemper cupiebat. Salluſt.

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pleaſures of ſociety and love. He was a friend to men of letters, a patron of all the arts, an enthuſiaſtic admirer and bountiful rewarder of merit of every kind. And the greatneſs of his mind was ſo happily tempered with benignity and grace, that the engaging affability of his noble deportment alleviated in the breaſts of his ſubjects the hardſhips which they ſuffered through his reſtleſs ambition. On the whole, it is difficult to conceive that qualities ſo oppoſite ſhould co-exiſt in the ſame perſon: ſo great boldneſs with ſuch deep deſign; ſuch loftineſs of ſpirit, with ſuch ſweetneſs of demeanour; ſuch ardour of mind with ſo much ſubtilty, and ſuch profound diſſimulation (*b*).

Charles Emanual endeavours to revive the league againſt the houſe of Auſtria.

This prince, who had opened his mind to the greateſt deſigns, and whoſe natural ambition had been encouraged and fortified by confidence in Henry, did not abandon them after he was deprived by death of ſo great an ally. His penetrating eye had diſcovered the languid ſtate of the Spaniſh monarchy, and he entertained a contempt for the counſels by which it was now governed (*i*). He did not, therefore, yet deſpair of being able to extend his dominion over that fair territory which had awakened his ambition. Should he be able to reunite the ſcattered forces of the league, ſucceſs would be certain: even if France ſhould remain neutral, he hoped to maintain a conteſt with the Catholic king, both with glory and with advantage.

(*b*) In this ſingular character there is not a trait unſupported by the teſtimony of cotemporary hiſtorians, who, all of them, mention this prince with an admiration which could not have been excited but by the moſt amazing talents. See Bellum Sabaudicum, &c. Alfonſo Loſchi; Battiſtia Nani; Siri Memoire recondite; Le Mercure Francois, Hiſtoire de la Regence de Marie de Medicis, &c. &c.

(*i*) Batt. Nani, lib. i. Siri Memorie recondite, tom. iii. p. 242.

tage. He, therefore, endeavoured to revive a powerful combination againſt the houſe of Auſtria, whoſe power he repreſented as exceſſive and dangerous. He attempted to eſtabliſh an alliance with France, by obtaining from the new regency a confirmation of the promiſe that had been made by Henry of giving his eldeſt daughter in marriage to the prince of Piedmont. But, after the death of the French monarch, all the maxims of his policy were ſubverted, and the ſchemes he had projected abandoned. The parliament of Paris, intimidated by the menaces of the duke of Epernon, who commanded the regiment of guards, committed an involuntary act of uſurpation (*k*), by declaring Mary de Medicis ſole regent of France during the minority of her ſon, an infant only in the ninth year of his age. This queen, uniting in her character the refinement of an Italian, with the feebleneſs of a woman, and the ſuperſtition of a good Catholic, was governed by maxims directly contrary to thoſe which had been adopted by the manly and liberal genius of Henry. She ſought to eſtabliſh her authority, by exciting jealouſies among thoſe who wiſhed to ſubvert it; and armed her enemies againſt herſelf by conceſſions intended to conciliate their favour. She had obtained the regency without oppoſition, but not without envy. The princes of the blood, highly offended at the advancement of a ſtranger, though a queen of France, to a dignity to which they themſelves made pretenſions, retired from court, and were followed by their numerous adherents. It was the policy of Mary to raiſe up in oppoſition to her domeſtic enemies a faction among the reſt of the nobility, and to acquire friends by a profuſion of penſions, offices, and governments. The treaſures which the late king had amaſſed in order

Character of Mary de Medicis, queen regent of France.

(*k*) The right of electing a regent had hitherto belonged to the general eſtates of the kingdom.

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order to overawe his enemies, ſhe employed in ſoothing reſentment, and allaying diſcontent. All the aſſiduities, and intreaties, and remonſtrances of Charles Emanuel to a princeſs, whoſe conduct was directed by theſe principles, were fruitleſs. Far from joining a confederacy againſt the houſe of Auſtria, ſhe hearkened with pleaſure to a propoſal, that had been rejected by the late king, of a double marriage between the dauphin of France and the eldeſt infanta, and of the prince of Spain with Elizabeth, the eldeſt daughter of France. This project was firſt ſuggeſted to the court of Madrid by the Pope, who believed that by means of theſe intermarriages the houſe of Auſtria would acquire ſuch an influence in the councils of France, as would in the end exterminate that hereſy which had ſo obſtinately reſiſted all other efforts.

IMMEDIATELY after the death of Henry, the court of Madrid, having firſt diſcharged the duties of decorum by going into mourning, and by the ſtrongeſt profeſſions of condolence, renewed to the regent queen the propoſition of that double alliance, which had met with her fondeſt approbation before that tragical event which led to the power with which ſhe was now inveſted. That event did not produce any change in the inclinations of Mary towards an union with Spain; on the contrary, if that union appeared formerly deſirable, it now ſeemed neceſſary, in order to ſupport her authority, in ſo much danger of being overturned by the turbulence of faction.

1611. Project of intermarriages between the royal families of France and Spain.

In the month of April, 1611, the king of Spain and the queen regent of France formally expreſſed their conſent to the intermarriage of their ſons and daughters by their reſpective ambaſſadors. On this occaſion they alſo entered into a defenſive league,

league, engaging to give each other mutual aid in case of either inteſtine commotions or foreign invaſion. The Spaniards endeavoured to improve and conſolidate this union, by engaging the French in a league, offenſive as well as defenſive; but to this the queen, whoſe utmoſt ambition was to maintain, not to extend her power, refuſed, in poſitive terms, to conſent (*l*). 1611.

Thus not only was the houſe of Auſtria delivered from the attacks of that confederacy which had been formed againſt her, but ſhe acquired an acceſſion of ſtrength by an aſcendant in the counſels of that kingdom which ſo lately appeared her moſt formidable enemy. In vain did Charles Emanuel, ſeconded by the importunities of the Pope (*m*), ſolicit the Venetians to join in an offenſive and defenſive league againſt the ambitious Spaniards. The conduct of France determined that of Venice. The ſenate, having learned the deſigns of Mary de Medicis, replied to the duke of Savoy, that it was indeed the intereſt of all the ſovereign powers of Italy to maintain a good correſpondence among themſelves, and to provide for the common ſafety; but it was to be feared, they added, that ſuch a league as had been propoſed by his highneſs would ſerve only to excite the jealouſy of Spain, a nation which, of all others, had the ſtrongeſt motives to cultivate peace with all her neighbours. To his holineſs, whom they ſuſpected of a verſatility of character, which might ſoon lead him to relapſe into the views of that court, againſt which he now declaimed, they anſwered, that they could not be perſuaded that his apprehenſions concerning the views of Spain were well

(*l*) Siri Mem. recond. tom. ii. p. 524. Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis. Hiſtoire des Dernieres Troubles en France. Malingre.

(*m*) Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii.

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well founded. But Charles Emanuel, not diſcouraged by the defection of both France and Venice, purſues a thouſand ſchemes, and extends his intrigues all over Europe. He held a cloſe correſpondence with the diſcontented lords in France. He inflamed the jealouſy and the reſentment of the Proteſtant princes of Germany. He propoſed to king James a marriage of the prince of Wales with the princeſs of Savoy, and of the prince of Piedmond with a daughter of England. The myſterious character of Charles, in the opinion of ſome writers, renders it doubtful whether he believed he ſhould, or deſired he might, ſucceed in this project; and whether it was not his only object, by exciting a jealouſy among the great Catholic powers, of his connection with a Proteſtant prince, to diſſolve the treaty of the double alliance between France and Spain, and to obtain the eldeſt daughter of one of theſe crowns in marriage to the prince of Piedmont (*n*). Whatever

(*n*) The conjectures of theſe writers, which mark ſo ſtrongly the general opinion that was entertained of the duke of Savoy, appear rather refined. I find in Chamberlayne's Letters, among Dr. Birch's Collection in the Britiſh Muſeum, that the duke, on this occaſion, ſhewed every mark of ſincerity and earneſtneſs. To the Engliſh ambaſſador at Turin, he was highly munificent. He conſulted the temper of the Engliſh monarch, by ſending, as his embaſſador to the court of London, a perſon who concealed the moſt profound penetration under the maſk of diſſipation, mirth, and pleaſantry. "Fabrito, ſays Chamberlayne, in his Letters, anno 1612, ſpends his time merrily with the king, and is never from him."—"The Savoyard ambaſſador, ſays he again, gives himſelf buono tempo, notwithſtanding that the match grows cold, and frequents good company."—King James, as is well known, had a paſſion for hunting, and delighted in a collection of wild beaſts. The duke of Savoy, who knew this, as a mark of attention to his majeſty, ſent him a preſent of an ounce and a leopard. The animals were fetched from London to Theobald's, where the king reſided. The leopard had almoſt committed an unpardonable fault, for he fixed on a red

ver were his views, they were fruſtrated by the mean vanity of the Engliſh monarch, who concealed not from the world his opinion that any alliance, below that of a great king, was entirely unworthy of the heir apparent to the crown of England.

In the mean time, the Spaniſh troops that were on foot in the Milaneſe, thoſe of Savoy in Piedmont, and the French army, under Leſdiguieres, in Dauphiny, were ſubjects of various jealouſies and apprehenſions. The Spaniards ſeemed ready to pour into Piedmont, and the Savoyards threatened an incurſion into Milan; while an army, commanded by a Proteſtant general, excited an uneaſineſs in the queen regent herſelf, as well as other Catholic princes.

In this ſituation of affairs, the Pope interceded with Mary de Medicis to diſband the troops in Dauphiny, and importuned the king of Spain and the duke of Savoy to diſmiſs thoſe troops which were a ſource of ſo much anxiety and dread to France as well as to Italy. The influence of his holineſs eaſily prevailed on the queen to diſband an army, commanded by a general in whoſe fidelity ſhe did not repoſe entire confidence, but did not operate ſo quickly on the minds of Philip and Charles Emanuel. The former inſiſted that the duke of Savoy ſhould lay down his arms firſt, and make ſatisfaction for this engagement with the late king of France. The latter alledged, on the contrary, that the weaker party ought to ſtand

a red deer's calf, nurſed up at Theobald's by a woman entertained for that purpoſe, and much ado there was to ſave the poor ſuckling. Theſe circumſtances, however trifling, are proofs that the duke of Savoy had ſtudied the diſpoſition of James, and that he wiſhed to gain his affections.

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upon his guard when he ſeemed to be threatened by a more powerful neighbour (o).

THE ſatisfaction which Philip demanded of the duke of Savoy was, that he ſhould aſk pardon for his ſecret treaty with France to the prejudice of the crown of Spain; and that he ſhould ſend one of his ſons to Madrid, to remain there as a pledge of his father's fidelity.

The duke of Savoy obliged to make ſubmiſſions to the king of Spain.

CHARLES EMANUEL, deſerted by all the world, was under a neceſſity of complying with theſe mortifying conditions. Prince Philibert, of Savoy, ſet out from Turin to Madrid on horſeback; and, while he purſued this long and tedious journey, he had a foretaſte of thoſe ſevere mortifications which he was to experience after it ſhould be accompliſhed; for he received not, in any of the Spaniſh towns through which he paſſed, the leaſt mark of attention or reſpect from the king his uncle. Philip, however, received his nephew, at the firſt interview, with a decent civility: not a word, indeed, was ſaid of the duke, but the kindeſt enquiries were made concerning the princes and princeſſes of Savoy. But the ſecond audience was not ſo agreeable to this ſtranger: he was now to make ſatisfaction to the king of Spain in name of the duke of Savoy. The prince, accordingly, had framed an addreſs to his Catholic majeſty, ſufficient, as he imagined, to ſatisfy the pride of Spain on the one hand, but, on the other, ſuch as was not unworthy the independent dignity of the duke his father. This addreſs he delivered with a noble grace, and with all thoſe demonſtrations of reſpect which can have place in an intercourſe between ſovereign princes. With this appearance of his nephew, the mild temper

(o) Siri Memorie recondite, tom. ii. p. 335.

temper of the king was inclined to be contented; but in the air and manner of Philibert, as well as in the ſentiments he expreſſed, there appeared to the Spaniſh miniſters ſomething not ſufficiently humble and ſubmiſſive; wherefore they drew up a new form of ſubmiſſion, breathing the ſupplications of a ſubject proſtrate before his offended ſovereign. The prince, yielding to neceſſity, rehearſed theſe haughty dictates with indignant reluctance. Book V. 1611.

Philip now ordered his troops to withdraw from the Milaneſe; but Charles Emanuel, provoked even to madneſs at the indignities with which the court of Madrid had inſulted him in the perſon of his ſon, refuſed to diſband his army in Piedmont. He threatened to diſavow the ſubmiſſion that had been made in his name to the king of Spain, againſt whom he declaimed with indignation and rage; and, by various movements, indicated an intention of revenging his cauſe either on that monarch, or his new ally, the queen regent of France. Theſe confederates he attempted by various arts to divide; but all his efforts were fruitleſs; and the united authority of the Pope, Philip III. and Mary de Medicis, compelled him at laſt to lay down his arms (*p*).

The ſtorm that threatened the houſe of Auſtria being thus finally diſpelled by its authority rather than power, Spain, purſuing the ſame pacific ſyſtem, ſtudied to maintain her dignity by the arts of policy, not the terrors of war. In the month of Auguſt, 1612, the duke of Paſtrana was ſent to Paris to conclude and confirm a matrimonial contract between Elizabeth of France and the prince of Spain; and, about the ſame time,

Contract of marriage between Elizabeth of France and the prince of Spain.

(*p*) Hiſtory of the Reign of Lewis XIII. by Levaſſor, vol. i. anno 1611.

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time, the duke of Mayenne arrived in Madrid, in order to ſettle and ratify a treaty of marriage between young Lewis and the infanta Ann. The two princeſſes renounced every right of ſucceſſion to any of the ſtates of their native kingdoms; and their dowries were equal, being each five hundred thouſand crowns. But theſe contracts were not performed till an interval had elapſed of more than three years (*q*).

COTEMPORARY writers relate, with a minute circumſtantiality, the feſtivity and magnificence that was diſplayed by the courts of France and Spain on occaſion of theſe intermarriages, and deſcribe, with equal exactneſs, the ceremonies that conſtituted and accompanied them. They obſerve, with a ſort of ſatisfaction, that the year 1612, in which the parties were mutually betrothed, was juſtly ſtyled the year of magnificence. For this year, alſo, Matthias II. being raiſed to the imperial throne in the ſtead of his deceaſed brother, Rhodolphus, all Germany, as well as France and Spain, reſounded with the voice of gladneſs and exultation (*r*). So naturally do men ſympathize with the great, and ſo ſincere is their joy at their proſperity! This diſpoſition ſufficiently accounts for thoſe copious details of anecdotes, circumſtances, and facts, which we find in the journaliſts of thoſe times; but would not apologize for a recital of them in a narrative addreſſed to another age. Such particulars, however, as ſerve to paint characters and manners are intereſting at all

(*q*) Hiſtoire de Louis XIII. durant la Regence de la Reine Marie de Medicis. Malingre.

(*r*) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. et de principaux Evenemens arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du Monde. Hiſtoria de Don Felippe IV. por Don Gonçalo de Ceſpedes, libro. i. capitulo 2. Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis. Mercure François, 1612.

all times, and, therefore, ought not to be wholly omitted. BOOK V. 1612.

WHEN the duke of Mayenne took leave of the court of Madrid, before his return to Paris, he entreated the infanta to honour him with ſome commiſſion to the king his maſter. "Tell him, ſaid the infanta, that I am very impatient to ſee him." This anſwer of the princeſs overwhelmed her governeſs, the counteſs of Altamira, with ſhame and confuſion. "Ah, madam, cried this lady, what will the king of France think when the duke ſhall report to him that you have ſo great a paſſion for marriage?" "You have taught me, replied the infanta, with great livelineſs, that one muſt always ſpeak the truth." After this frank declaration on the part of Ann, Lewis could do no leſs in return than expreſs, in like manner, an impatience to ſee and to receive his bride. Accordingly, as ſoon as he was informed that the infanta had arrived in France (*r*), he 1615. ſent a letter to her, by his favourite Luynes, fraught with expreſſions of reſpect and of love. The queen-regent alſo wrote an affectionate letter to her daughter-in-law. Ann replied to the young monarch's addreſs, in a manner that could not offend the delicacy of even the counteſs of Altamira. Having firſt expreſſed great ſatisfaction in the accounts ſhe had received of his majeſty's health, ſhe profeſſed a deſire of arriving at a place where ſhe might have an opportunity of ſerving the queen, her mother, and where ſhe would be freed from the langour of her preſent ſolitude (*s*).

THE

(*r*) This did not come to paſs until the month of November, 1615.

(*s*) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

"Sennor,

"Mucho

Book V.

1612—15.

The gallantry and honour of the Spaniſh nation accounted for.

THE Arabian conquerors of Spain had introduced into that kingdom an hoſpitality, generoſity, and refinement, unknown before in the Weſt (*t*). The court of Cordova was the moſt elegant and polite in the world; and thither generous ſpirits reſorted from all parts of Europe. Together with the mechanical, the Saracens cultivated the liberal arts; and while an external magnificence appeared in their buildings, furniture, and dreſs, their poetry and muſic, conſecrated to heroiſm and love, diſplayed an inward generoſity and elegance of mind ſtill more noble and affecting. Hence the Spaniſh nation poſſeſſed a taſte for grandeur, a generoſity of diſpoſition, and a delicacy of ſentiment, which in the period under review were unequalled, and which have not yet been exceeded in any other nation. Accordingly in that competition of courteſy and gallantry, which aroſe, on occaſion of the intermarriages, the Spaniards far outſhone the French. Not only did they exhibit greater ſplendour in their equipages, proceſſions, and ſhews, but a more delicate taſte, and a higher ſtyle appeared in their manners. The munificence of the grandees to the princeſs of Spain and the ladies of her court, to the young queen of France and her attendants, and alſo to the queen-regent, was unbounded. The French ambaſſador, in his way to Madrid, received a ſumptuous entertainment at the manſion

" Mucho me he holgado con Luynes con las buenas nuevas, que me ha dado de la ſalud de V. M. youengo con ella, et muy deſſeoſa de llegar donde pueda ſervir a my madre. Y anſi me doy mucha Prieſſa a caminar por la ſoledud que me haze y bezar a V. M. la mano a quien dios guarde come deſſeo. Beza las manos a V. M. Anna."

(*t*) A very amuſing as well as philoſophical account of the cauſes that formed this national character, is given by Mr. Richardſon in his Diſſertation on the Languages, Literature, and Manners of Eaſtern Nations.

on of the prime miniſter of Spain. This entertainment was ſo contrived that it appeared to have been given, not by the duke, but at the expence of the inhabitants of the town of Lerma, tranſported with joy at the preſence of a ſtranger ſo honourably diſtinguiſhed. In Burgos, Segovia, Madrid, and other towns of Spain, in which the prince had occaſion to appear, the citizens celebrated his nuptials with fire-works, illuminations, triumphal arches, balls, maſquerades, muſical and dramatical performances, and other ingenious diverſions (*u*).

AT this time, there did not appear in the Spaniſh dominions any ſymptoms of declining trade, or exhauſted wealth. The face of the whole empire was gay and magnificent. But ſo expenſive a diſplay of loyalty was not approved by the duke of Oſſuna, viceroy of Naples, a man of wit, whim, and fancy, and in every reſpect himſelf the moſt extravagant perſon ſubject to the crown of Spain. The men of rank in Sicily (*x*), with a ſtrange mixture of obſequiouſneſs and vanity, preſented a petition to Oſſuna, humbly praying that they might be permitted to ſolemnize the publication of the double marriages as well as the other ſubjects of the empire. They propoſed, at the ſame time, to levy a tax upon themſelves for this purpoſe. The duke greatly applauded this deſign, which he encouraged, by contributing himſelf to its execution with equal frankneſs and liberality; but, after the money of the Sicilians was all put into one bank, the viceroy, in the plenitude of his tranſcendant power, gave orders that not one maravedie ſhould be waſted in idle pomp

(*u*) Mercure François, 1612. Hiſtoria de Don Felippe IV. por Don Gonçalo de Ceſpedes, libro i. capitulo 2.

(*x*) The Titoladi. Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii p. 377.

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pomp and ſhew; but that it ſhould be diſtributed among certain poor virgins of honourable deſcent; adding withal, that, in his opinion, the money would be better employed in the multiplication, than in the ſolemnization of marriages. The ſubſequent conduct of this ſingular perſon will recall this anecdote to the mind of the reader, and incline him, perhaps, to conjecture that this judicious diſpoſal of the Sicilian treaſure, did not originate either in a diſapprobation of waſte, or in mere regard to the Sicilian damſels.

The political ſchemes of Spain diſordered by the reſtleſs ambition of the duke of Savoy.

THE Spaniards had now leiſure to breathe after the toils of war; and the authority of the Spaniſh name being in ſome meaſure reſtored by the ſubmiſſion of the duke of Savoy, and an advantageous connection with France, they endeavoured, for the preſent (y), to maintain it by policy, rather than to extend it by a hazardous appeal to arms. But the ambitious ſpirit of Charles Emanuel, incapable of reſt, and impatient of diſgrace, ſoon obliged them to quit that ſhade of ancient authority and renown, under which they attempted to conceal the real ſtate of Spain, and to prove its ſtrength or its weakneſs in the field of battle. The duke of Savoy, being deſcended from the imperial houſe of the Paleologi, poſſeſſed ancient pretenſions to the ſovereignty of Montferrat, which was alſo claimed and enjoyed by the family of Gonzaga. In order to compoſe the differences which frequently aroſe from this conteſted claim, a marriage was concluded between Francis, duke of Mantua, and Margaret of Savoy; Charles Emanuel, in favour of this alli-

ance,

(y) There are writers who affirm that at this time the Spaniſh miniſters were ſo elated at the alliance with France, that they conſidered it as the ſure forerunner of the reduction of the revolted provinces.

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liance, having reſigned to his daughter and her children his right of ſucceſſion to the marquiſate in queſtion. Francis died in the month of December, 1612, leaving behind him an only child, a daughter, in the fourth year of her age. Ferdinand, cardinal of Gonzaga, brother to the late duke, was, beyond all doubt, heir to the duchy of Mantua; but the ſovereignty of Montferrat, which was not a fief-male, deſcended upon his niece, the young princeſs Maria. In theſe circumſtances the duke of Savoy conceived the deſign of reviving his pretenſions to that ſtate. His right to the marquiſate he did not conſider as diminiſhed, but rather ſtrengthened by that of his grandchild; and the guardianſhip of this infant would give him an entire power over that inheritance, which he claimed in her name, as well as his own. And, that the cardinal might not derive any advantage over him, in the conteſt that was likely to enſue, by immediate ſucceſſion, he had recourſe to one of thoſe ſtratagems of which his genius was ſo ſingularly fruitful. His daughter Margaret, the widow of the deceaſed duke of Mantua, as well as all his other children, returned the fondneſs of his parental affections with a tenderneſs and filial reverence that knew no bounds. This lady he eaſily perſuaded to declare that ſhe was pregnant; and ſoon after, he ſent the prince Victor Amadæus to Mantua, on pretence of conſoling his ſiſter, but, in reality, in order to conduct her to Turin, if that could be accompliſhed, or to Milan, or to Montferrat. "It is not fit, ſaid the prince of Piedmont to the court of Mantua, that a mournful widow ſhould paſs her days in a place where every thing around her renews her grief, by recalling to her imagination the object of her ſorrow; nor is it decent that ſhe ſhould remain longer under the eye of a perſon jealous of the ſucceſſion to Mantua. And whitherſoever my

The duke of Savoy revives his pretenſions to the ſovereignty of Montferrat.

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my ſiſtes goes, continued the prince, thither it is reaſonable that the young princeſs ſhould accompany her. Nature herſelf recommends children to the care of their parents: and, what nature unites by the deareſt ties of affection, it would be impiety to ſeparate." But the cardinal, well knowing the end of this diſcourſe, replied, that it would be improper to remove the ducheſs from Mantua, while ſhe carried in her womb the important pledge of the happineſs of the Mantuan ſtate. "If the ſight, ſaid he, of my deceaſed brother's palace be afflicting to his widow, others are not wanting, whither ſhe may retire with ſafety, and where ſhe may live with comfort."

In the mean time Charles Emanuel, the better to effect his deſigns, endeavours to engage in his cauſe the influence and authority of the crown of Spain. The Spaniſh governor of Milan at this time was John Mendoza, marquis of Inoioſa, who had formerly ſignalized his valour in the military ſervice of the duke of Savoy, and who had been rewarded with the marquiſate of St. German. By this ſubſtantial mark of favour, and perhaps not leſs by thoſe honours and aſſiduities with which he cultivated the friendſhip of Mendoza, Charles Emanuel had acquired an aſcendant over his mind that ſeemed almoſt the effect of ſuperior and inviſible power. This man he perſuaded to ſend the prince of Aſcoli, accompanied by a numerous retinue, to Mantua, to demand the perſons of the ducheſs and her daughter in the name of the king of Spain; not doubting that, if they ſhould once be brought to Milan, he would afterwards be able to find means of conducting them to Turin. But the cardinal refuſed to let the princeſſes go; a reſolution in which he was confirmed and ſupported by the emperor, the queen-regent of France, and the republic of Venice.

Venice (z). At length, after an interval of three months, the ducheſs Margaret, having declared that ſhe was not pregnant, was allowed to return to her father's houſe; but all her tears could not obtain permiſſion to take along with her her infant daughter. Ferdinand, having aſſumed the title and power of duke of Mantua, ſent the biſhop of Dioceſarea to Milan to apologiſe for his diſobedience to the orders of Spain, from a regard to the decree of the emperor, who had adjudged to him the tutelage of his niece; farther enjoining the prelate to paſs on to Vercelli, to conſole Margaret who lived there, and at the ſame time to inſinuate a propoſal of a marriage between that princeſs and the cardinal duke, as the only means of quenching the flames of diſcord, and uniting the houſes of Savoy and Gonzaga both by blood and affection.

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THE biſhop, diſcharging his truſt with fidelity and zeal, preſſed the duke of Savoy to conſent to an accommodation of differences. The duke diſcovered a readineſs to converſe on that ſubject, which inclined the Mantuan envoy at firſt to conclude that his embaſſy would not be fruitleſs. But Charles, ſtill riſing in his demands, in proportion to the importunity of the biſhop, had nothing elſe in view than, by amuſing this eccleſiaſtic with frequent conferences, to gain time for ripening a project as bold as any that had ever been conceived by any politician or hero. Before his eyes there lay the ſtate of Montferrat, to which he had ancient pretenſions, and which interſected and broke the ſtrength of Piedmont, on one ſide extending itſelf even to the Alps, and on another ſtretching well nigh to Turin. This ſtate,

(z) Batt. Nani, lib. i. 1613. Siri Mem. recond. tom. iii. Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii.

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ſtate, defended only by the lamentations and complaints of its preſent poſſeſſor, lay naked and expoſed to the ſudden attack of any hoſtile invader. The princes of Italy, enervated by luxury, would not eaſily be awakened from that profound ſleep into which they had been lulled by long habits of indolence, ſubordination, and peace. The emperor, on that ſide of the Alps, ſcarcely poſſeſſed the ſhadow of power. The kingdom of France was torn in pieces by inteſtine diſcord; and the power of Spain, though formidable, was diſtant. The Milaneſe, lately diſarmed, was deſtitute of military ſtores and proviſions; and, what was a great encouragement to Charles Emanuel, it was governed by his confident Mendoza, whoſe mind he might regulate with his uſual addreſs; or, if he ſhould prove unmanageable, which poſſeſſed not thoſe maſterly powers which are requiſite to act a ſucceſsful part in new and difficult ſituations. The deliberative genius of Spain would not act with an unuſual celerity on an occaſion, when a fear of drawing the French into Italy, would naturally recommend cautious circumſpection: or, if the perſonal hatred of the duke of Lerma ſhould prevail in the breaſt of that favourite, over reaſons of ſtate, before the hands of Inoioſa could be ſtrengthened by a reinforcement from Spain, the power of Savoy might be eſtabliſhed in Montferrat. Of all conſiderations, that which gave the duke of Savoy moſt uneaſineſs, was the vigilance of the Venetian ſenate, to whom no revolution in their neighbourhood ever appeared an object of indifference. But he hoped that however they might interpoſe their counſels, they would not haſtily exchange the bleſſings of peace for the calamities of war. On the whole, while diſtant ſtates were ignorant of his ſchemes, and before the princes of Italy, involved in clouds of mutual

tual jealouſy, diffidence, and doubt, would unite either in power or deſign to oppoſe him, he reſolved to carry into Montferrat the thunder of his arms, and to anticipate reſiſtance by deciſive conqueſt and firm poſſeſſion. Book V. 1613.

The duke of Savoy invades Montferrat.

HAVING ſecretly aſſembled his troops, while the biſhop of Dioceſarea yet waited for a definitive anſwer to the propoſals he had made for reconciliation and peace, Charles Emanuel iſſued forth from Vercelli in the ſilence of the night that followed the 22d day of April; and diſtributing his army into three diviſions, poured into Montferrat the terror and devaſtation of war. There was not any thing in that marquiſate capable of ſuſtaining his impetuous force; Caſal, the capital, in which the duke Vincenzo had planted a ſtrong fortreſs, only excepted. And this alſo would have quickly fallen into his hands, if Gonzaga, duke of Nevers, who happened at that time to be in Italy, had not ſuddenly thrown himſelf into it, with a ſmall force which he haſtily raiſed on the coaſt of Genoa. By garriſoning and fortifying ſuch of the towns he had taken, as were moſt important for their ſituation and ſtrength, he formed a chain of poſts which opened a communication between thoſe rich and fertile countries that are extended along the courſes of the Tanarus and the Po: and in theſe he hoped to maintain his army by contributions and plunder (*a*).

The duke of Savoy endeavours to ſecure his conqueſts.

IT was now the duke of Savoy's object to ſecure his conqueſts, and, for this purpoſe, he endeavoured either to appeaſe thoſe powers whom he well knew the violence of his conduct had offended,

(*a*) Mercure François, 1613. Batt. Nan. Hiſt. lib. i. 1613. Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

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fended, by ſubmiſſive profeſſions of reſpect, and inſidious conceſſions; or, to divert their attacks from himſelf, by making them objects of jealouſy to one another. The queen regent of France, being informed of the irruption of the Savoyards into Montferrat, was not untouched by the ſituation of her nephew the duke of Mantua. In the firſt fervour of paſſion ſhe declared her reſolution to ſupport the cauſe of Gonzaga, both with her influence and arms. Accordingly ſhe immediately ſent the ducheſs of Nevers to Grenoble, to engage the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, who commanded the troops on the confines of Savoy, ſpeedily to march with a powerful army to check the progreſs of that prince in Montferrat, and to chaſtiſe his preſumption. But Charles Emanuel wrote a letter full of reſpect to the Queen, and, in order to ſoothe the firſt tranſports of her reſentment, offered to ſubmit his pretenſions to her arbitration, and to reſign into her hands, in the mean time, the places he had taken in Montferrat, as a pledge of his deference to her authority and her juſtice. At the ſame time he inſtructed his partizans at the court of Paris, where he had found means of conciliating the good-will of the favourites, the mareſchal and marchioneſs D'Ancre, to repreſent to the queen the impolicy of truſting a great army in the hands of a Proteſtant general; and the deſperate imprudence of rouſing the jealouſy, and inviting the reſiſtance of the king of Spain. The nuncio too, and the Spaniſh ambaſſador having, from obvious motives, urged the ſame arguments, the queen determined to countermand the orders ſhe had ſent, or rather the application ſhe had made to Leſdiguieres, and to employ in behalf of her nephew only her good offices at the court of Madrid (*b*).

In

(*b*) Batt. Nani. Hiſt. lib. i. 1613. Hiſtoire du Connetable de Leſdiguieres, lib. viii. ch. 4 & 5. Siri Memoire recondite, tom. iii. p. 92, 93.

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In order to divert the reſentment of Spain, or to ſuſpend its effects, Charles Emanuel employed greater art than that which had managed the court of France, but with leſs ſucceſs. He diſpatched his confeſſor to the governor of Milan, humbly to apologize for his invaſion of Montferrat, without the knowledge and conſent of the king of Spain. This meſſenger was, ſoon after, followed by the prince of Piedmont, and the prince of Piedmont by multitudes of other ambaſſadors in rapid ſucceſſion. Theſe were all of them charged with offers ſo various and incompatible, that the mind of Inoioſa, diſtracted and confounded amidſt ſo great a variety of views, knew not which to purſue, and remained in a ſtate of inactivity and irreſolution. Thus the duke endeavoured to prevent a conteſt with his friend Mendoza in arms, by ſtorming as it were the ſeat of his affections and paſſions, whence alone flow all the operations of war and of peace; and by making, in the language of the celebrated Nani, a war of wit upon his mind. But the ingenious ſubtlety of Charles Emanuel, not ſatisfied with preventing Inoioſa from acting at all, attempted to make him act in ſuch a manner, as to advance the intereſts of Savoy in Italy, and wholly to ruin thoſe of Spain. The ſtratagem by which he hoped to effect this bold deſign was ſpecious. He propoſed that the governor, in the name of the king of Spain, ſhould, with his aſſiſtance take poſſeſſion of the metropolis, the only place of conſiderable ſtrength in Montferrat, but that every other part of that marquiſate ſhould be annexed to his own dominions. At the ſame time, that the authority of the Spaniſh monarch might be paramount over the whole province, he propoſed farther, that the towns which he had taken, being garriſoned by Savoyards, ſhould have the arms of Spain affixed to all their gates.

But

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But Mendoza, who wanted deciſion rather than penetration, was not enſnared by this inſidious propoſal. For he was aware, that ſhould the Spaniards ſeize a part of Montferrat, while the pageantry of their name blazed over the whole, a jealouſy would be excited among all the neighbouring powers, which the policy of Charles Emanuel, at a time when the Milaneſe were almoſt wholly diſarmed, would uſe as an engine to ſubvert the Spaniſh power in Italy.

The duke of Savoy's conduct a ſubject of mortification to Spain.

The deep alarm which the invaſion of Montferrat ſpread throughout all the Italian ſtates, was a ſevere mortification to the lofty ſpirit of Spain, as it implied a ſuſpicion, that the power of that kingdom might not be ſufficient to controul the ambitious deſigns of the duke of Savoy. The Catholic king, reluctant to enter on war, endeavoured at firſt to ſubdue the turbulence of that prince with menaces and frowns; and, by the mere authority of Spain, to quiet the fears and reſtore the peace of Italy. The ſecretary Vargas was diſpatched from Madrid to Milan, with orders to the governor to announce to Charles Emanuel, that it was the will of Philip that he ſhould withdraw all his troops from Montferrat, and to threaten force in caſe of diſobedience.

The Spaniſh miniſters in Italy, in like manner, laboured to maintain the authority of their nation by raiſing their language to the moſt majeſtic tone. The marquis of Inoioſa encouraged the Italian princes to truſt in the protection of the king of Spain, rejected with diſdain the idea of admitting any aſſociate with that monarch in compoſing the differences of Italy, and attempted by various artifices to prevent Coſmo, duke of Tuſcany, from ſending aſſiſtance to his relation the duke of Mantua. Don Alphonſo de la

Queva,

Queva, the Spaniſh ambaſſador at Venice, aſſured the ſenate, "that, without any noiſe or trouble, Charles Emanuel ſhould be puniſhed, and Ferdinand reſtored to his rightful inheritance; that there was no reaſon to be fearful of any event, or to dread the turbulent ambition of any prince, while the undiminiſhed goodneſs and power of the great potentate whom he ſerved, would not ſuffer any innovation in Italy, nor any diſturbance of that peace which was ſo happily enjoyed under his authority (c)." 1613.

Artifices of the duke of Savoy.

BUT, although he was thus threatened by Spain, although the emperor denounced the imperial ban, and his adverſary was directed and ſupported by the counſels and wealth of Florence and of Venice; yet the duke of Savoy remained undaunted, and ſteadily purſued his object by policy and arms. In order to alarm the jealouſy of Spain, he threatened to call to his aid the troops of France. When the Pope exhorted him to peace, he proteſted that he would overwhelm Italy with an inundation of heretics. He diſmiſſed the Venetian ambaſſador with orders to inform the ſenate, that if they ſhould perſiſt in affording ſuccour to the duke of Mantua, he would cover the Adriatic with Turkiſh pirates. But while he thus ſtudied to work on the fears of his adverſaries, he neglected not to uſe any means by which he might conciliate their favour. He offered to depoſite in the hands of the Spaniards his rights to Montferrat, and the places he poſſeſſed in that province, on condition that the princeſs Mary ſhould be brought to Milan, and remain there along with her mother; a propoſition by which he intended at once to ſhew his own deference to the king of Spain, and to ſow the ſeeds of jealouſy

(c) Batt. Nani. Hiſt. lib. i. 1613.

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louſy between that monarch and the duke of Mantua. Nor was his deſign diſappointed; for to the meaſure which he had propoſed the governor of Milan cordially agreed. But Ferdinand utterly rejected it, with bitter complaints againſt Inoioſa, who preſumed, without his knowledge, to diſpoſe of the blood of Gonzaga.

CHARLES EMANUEL, having thus thrown the blame of diſobedience to the will of Spain on Ferdinand, endeavoured to improve the advantage he had gained by ſending Victor Amadeus to repreſent to the court of Madrid, how much the duke, his father, inclined to do what ſhould be agreeable to their deſire. Of this, he ſaid, he had given a ſignal proof, by committing into their hands the heir of his dominions as a pledge of the obedience of his whole houſe.

ON the ſtrength of all this merit with the court of Spain, the duke, having haſtily thrown a garriſon of four hundred men into Ponteſtura, under the colours of Spain, marched onward with his army to Nizza de la Paglia, and began to batter it from three different places. This town, which was but weakly fortified, was, however, effectually defended by the fidelity and valour of its governor, Manfrino Caſtiglione, who, by rigorous diſcipline, and by frequent ſallies, gained time for its relief.

The governor of Milan checks the ambition of the duke of Savoy.

THE governor of Milan, who had by this time reinforced his army, rouſed by a general clamour, and conſtrained by the orders of Spain, reſolved effectually to curb the troubleſome ambition of his friend, the duke of Savoy. He ſent the prince of Aſcoli with five thouſand men to join the prince Vincenzo, who waited their arrival with three thouſand more in the ſervice of the duke of

of Mantua. The ſlowneſs of Aſcoli's march ſeemed to indicate an intention to hearken to a propoſition that had been made for a ſuſpenſion of arms; but the Mantuans urging him to advance without delay, the united army at laſt approached to Nice. The Savoyards, no longer doubting the intention of Inoioſa to raiſe the ſiege, on pretence of reſpect to the enſigns of Spain, retreated in good order without being purſued. The duke of Savoy now offered to ſurrender all that he poſſeſſed in Montferrat, and peace was made on this condition. But this pacification did not remove the apprehenſions of the princes of Italy; for the duke of Savoy had uniformly contended for an act of oblivion in favour of count St. George, and other ſubjects of Mantua, who had taken up arms to ſupport his claim to Montferrat; and the duke of Mantua, on the other hand, had as conſtantly inſiſted on their puniſhment, and alſo on reparation of damages.

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These mutual pretenſions appeared to the ſagacity of the Italian ſtates the embers of a war, ready to flame out with increaſed fury. There was evidently a colluſion, they thought, between Charles Emanuel and the marquis of Inoioſa, ſome ſecret deſign which would ſoon tranſpire: for though the duke evacuated the towns he had taken, he did not diſmiſs, but, on the contrary, reinforced his troops; and the governor, though he ſeemed to have accompliſhed the deſign of his military preparations, remained ſtill in arms. Their conjectures were not without foundation; for Ferdinand would not pardon the partizans of a competitor for the ſovereignty of any part of his dominions, and ſtill inſiſted on reparation of damages. And Charles publiſhed to the whole world, in writing as well as diſcourſe, that the governor promiſed him that no farther mention

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ſhould be made of damages, and that the exiles of Montferrat ſhould be reſtored to their eſtates, and all the privileges of other ſubjects; a condition from which he was determined never to depart.

In this conteſt the marquis of Inoioſa took a decided part in favour of Savoy, and in the moſt haughty ſtrain threatened Ferdinand with all the rage of war, if he ſhould refuſe to agree to the terms which he had preſcribed. He inſtantly diſpatched Antonio Pimentelli, general of the Milaneſe light-horſe, to bring the young princeſs from Mantua to Milan. This Pimentelli would have done, even by force, if, having been conducted into the apartments of the child, he had not been convinced, that, from illneſs, ſhe was not in a condition in which ſhe could be removed.

The award of Spain reſpecting the diſpute concerning Montferrat,

Upon this the duke of Mantua ſent an envoy to Madrid with his excuſe for not giving up the princeſs, and another to France to ſolicit the good offices of the queen-regent with the Spaniſh monarch, which ſhe readily granted. The miniſters of Spain at laſt declared the will of Philip to be, "That the differences between the dukes of Savoy and Mantua concerning reparation of damages, and the pardon of the rebels, ſhould be referred to the arbitration of the pope, the emperor, and himſelf; that the princeſs Mary ſhould be brought to Milan; that the ducheſs Margaret ſhould marry Ferdinand; and that both dukes ſhould diſarm their forces, thoſe of the king being ſufficient to execute whatever ſhould be neceſſary for relieving the oppreſſed, and ſubduing the obſtinate."

The marquis of Inoioſa, at the ſame time that he ſent Pimentelli to Mantua, in order to preſerve the appearance of impartiality, diſpatched Sanchio

chio del Luna, governor of the caſtle of Milan, to Turin, to ſignify to the duke of Savoy that he muſt lay down his arms. Charles was now ſenſible that his conteſt with Ferdinand had no other tendency than to reduce himſelf, as well as that prince, under the dominion of Spain: unwilling, therefore, to diſband his army, the only pledge of his ſovereign independency, he immediately ſet about framing excuſes, and inventing ſtratagems. He repreſented to the Spaniſh miniſters at Milan, that in the province of Dauphiny there was an army, commanded by the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, which waited only the queen-regent's orders to pour into Piedmont; it was, therefore, neceſſary for him to ſtand on his guard. Inſtead of diſbanding, he inſiſted on leave to reinforce his army; and, as a pledge of his fidelity to the king, and his diſpoſition towards peace, he deſired that ſome Spaniſh regiments might be quartered in Piedmont. This, he ſaid, would be doing him an eſſential ſervice; becauſe, his country being defended by the arms of Spain, he would be at liberty to march whitherſoever the neceſſity of his affairs ſhould call him. But the Spaniards were by this time too well acquainted with the artifices of Charles to fall eaſily into his ſnares. They perceived that it was his aim to excite the jealouſy of France, and to produce a rupture between that kingdom and Spain. He doubted not, that if he could draw the Spaniſh troops into Piedmont, he would eaſily prevail on the mareſchal Leſdiguieres to croſs the Alps in order to expel them. Hoſtilities, once begun, would not ceaſe with the retreat of the Spaniards into their own dominions; and, amidſt the contentions of his enemies, he might find ſome means of his own aggrandizement. Such was the refined project of the duke of Savoy!

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ABOUT this time, the ſecretary Vargas, in his return to Spain, paſſing by Turin, demanded of the duke a categorical anſwer to the queſtion, whether he would diſband his troops or no? Charles heſitated not a moment to ſhew his reſpect to the Catholic king by anſwering in the affirmative. He immediately made a ſhew of diſbanding his army in the preſence of the Spaniſh miniſter; but he took care to keep on foot his foreign troops, having diſmiſſed only his militia, which might be quickly re-aſſembled.

Effect of the award of Spain on the minds of the dukes of Savoy and Mantua.

THE determination of the Catholic king, and his peremptory tone reſpecting Montferrat, filled Ferdinand with reſentment, and Charles with indignation. Nevertheleſs, Ferdinand declared that he was willing to accept all the other terms preſcribed by the court of Madrid, provided they would not inſiſt that the young princeſs ſhould be carried to Mantua; a condition to which they agreed without difficulty. But Charles Emanuel, to all the foreign miniſters reſiding at his court, poured forth the bittereſt invectives againſt the pride of Spain, which he repreſented as a juſt ground of general apprehenſion. "If the Spaniſh monarch, ſaid he, ſhall be ſuffered to impoſe his imperious commands upon me; the princes of Italy, deluded by treaties, or ſubdued by arms, will thenceforth lie at his feet, fearing puniſhment and aſking pardon. If the preſent juncture ſhall prove the ſervility of our diſpoſitions, we ſhall quickly be ſtripped of the ſhadow of that power which we wanted wiſdom to preſerve the reality."

Reception of the prince of Piedmont at the court of Madrid.

THE indignation of the duke was ſtill more inflamed when the prince of Piedmont gave him an account of his treatment at Madrid. He had no ſooner arrived in Catalonia than he received

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an order to remain in that province, until it ſhould be known whether his father would yield obedience to the orders of the king; and, if he was at laſt received at court, it was with coldneſs and with ſcorn. The prime miniſter ſpoke of the duke of Savoy with diſdain and with hatred, and threatened the ſevereſt chaſtiſement if he ſhould not ſubmit, without reſerve to the authority of his Catholic majeſty.

Courageous reſolution of Charles Emanuel, duke of Savoy.

THIS narrative of his ſon fixed the reſolution of Charles. He inſtantly declared his firm purpoſe to maintain his independence with his ſword, or to periſh in the attempt. Accordingly he levies freſh troops, and exerts every nerve again to form a confederacy againſt that imperious race, whoſe incurable ambition ſtill aimed at the ſovereignty of Europe (*d*). He ſtill kept up a cloſe correſpondence with the prince of Condé and the diſcontented lords in France, hoping to find employment for the arms of Philip in ſupporting the authority of Mary de Medicis. And in ſpite of the poſitive orders of the queen-regent, Leſdiguieres found means to paſs ſeveral thouſands of French ſoldiers from Dauphiny into Piedmont, who greatly reinforced the Savoyard army (*e*).

CHARLES alſo inſinuated himſelf, on this occaſion, into the confidence of Maurice, prince of Orange, and engaged in his ſervice ſome troops under count John of Naſſau. But, what encouraged him moſt, was the hope of aſſiſtance from the republic of Venice, which, he doubted not, would readily unite their arms with his for the purpoſe of removing from their confines, or at leaſt

(*d*) Mercure François, 1614. Siri Memor. recon. tom. iii. p. 722. Memoires de la Regence de Marie de Medicis. Batt. Nan. lib. i. 1614.

(*e*) Hiſtoire du Conneſtable de Leſdiguieres, lib. viii.

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leaſt of humbling the power of an imperious neighbour. He therefore diſpatched to Venice John James Piſcina, a man of diſtinguiſhed abilities and powerful eloquence, to propoſe to the ſenate a league, defenſive and offenſive, for the preſervation, or rather, the recovery of the liberties of Italy. Piſcina painted, in glowing colours, the dependent condition of the Italian princes, and the inordinate ambition of the court of Spain. He offered to refer to their arbitration the difference between the houſes of Savoy and Gonzaga; implored their aid and their advice; declaring, at the ſame time, that whatever counſels other ſtates ſhould follow, the duke of Savoy was determined to die with his ſword in his hand, rather than to live in ſubjection to the tyranny of any power on earth.

THE Venetians admired the noble ſpirit of the duke, and found the higheſt ſatisfaction in reflecting, that the natural guardian of Italy (*f*) poſſeſſed all that courage and foreſight which that important character required. Nevertheleſs, being unwilling to involve themſelves in war, while there was a ray of hope that the liberty of Italy might be united with its peace, they declined to interfere in the diſpute concerning Montferrat, as that matter, they ſaid, had already been referred to the arbitration of the emperor and the king of Spain. They adviſed Charles to accommodate all differences with the duke of Mantua, and to yield to the ſuperior power of Spain whatever ſatisfaction might not be unbecoming the dignity of a ſovereign prince. At the ſame time they aſſured him of their affection and good offices,

(*f*) "Al cui Senno, al cui Petto, alla cui Deſtra
Commiſe il Ciel la Cura
Delle Italiche Mura."

ces, and that they would not remain idle ſpectators of injuſtice and oppreſſion. BOOK V. 1614.

FAITHFUL to their promiſe, the Venetian ſenate exerted their influence in all the courts of Europe in favour of the duke of Savoy. To the Spaniſh miniſters, particularly, both at Madrid and Milan, they repreſented the calamities and the dangers of war, and expatiated on the advantages of concord and peace. But the deep wound which the boldneſs of the duke of Savoy had given to the pride of Spain was fomented by lenitives, and to be cured only by the ſharp remedies of fire and ſword. The Spaniards provoked, not pacified, by the interceſſion of the Venetians in behalf of Charles Emanuel, proudly rejected every condition that might wear the complexion of treating that prince on a footing of equality, or even of honouring him with a capitulation. The duke of Savoy favoured by the Venetian ſenate.

INOIOSA, although his own inclinations were wholly towards peace, in obedience to the poſitive and reiterated commands of the court of Madrid, ſent an ambaſſador to Turin with orders to Charles to lay down his arms; to require a promiſe, in writing, that he would not moleſt the territories of the duke of Mantua; and to inform the duke, at the ſame time, that the king of Spain would not be bound by any conditions but ſuch as ſhould be dictated by his own moderation. The duke of Savoy liſtened to this meſſage with a ſerene countenance, and without making any reply; but he ordered the ambaſſador inſtantly to leave his dominions; and, tearing from his neck the enſign of the Golden Fleece, he returned it into the hands of that miniſter, deſiring him to deliver it to the king, and to tell him that he ſcorned to wear a badge of honour conferred

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ferred by a prince who threatened him with chains. The duke haſtened to Aſti to collect his forces (*g*).

The governor of Milan takes the field againſt the duke of Savoy.

Inoiosa, whoſe army, lately reinforced with troops from Spain, conſiſted of thirty thouſand foot and three thouſand horſe, croſſed the Seſia, and took up his quarters at Careſana, not far from Vercelli, in the hope that Charles would humble himſelf before ſo great a military force, and yield to the renown of the Spaniſh arms. But the duke, with an army in numbers greatly inferior to that of Inoioſa, paſſing over to the other ſide of the Seſia, let looſe on the Milaneſe all the rage of war; and, having ſurpriſed and burned ſeveral towns and villages, returned within his own confines with priſoners, plunder, and troops inſpirited by ſucceſs. The Spaniards, ſeeing the Milaneſe thus invaded, and knowing that it was naked and expoſed to the frequent attacks of their vigilant and enterprizing enemy, having ſet fire to Careſana and La Mota, abandoned their poſts in Piedmont, and retired within their own territories.

The governor of Milan, in order to make up, in ſome meaſure, the loſs and diſadvantage he had ſuffered in this conteſt with the duke of Savoy, encamped near Vercelli to cover the building of a fortreſs within the Spaniſh bounds, but ſo advantageouſly ſituated as to protect the Milaneſe by ſhutting up a paſſage through which it was open to hoſtile invaſion, and at the ſame time to curb the power of the Savoyards in the adjacent quarter of Piedmont. This fortreſs was a mile in circuit, and, in honour of the duke of Lerma, called Fort Sandoval. The Spaniards had long

(*g*) Mercure François, 1614. Bart. Nan. lib. i. 1614.

long meditated this deſign, but hitherto deferred its execution, being unwilling to excite any jealouſies in the princes and ſtates of Italy. In this undertaking ſeveral weeks were ſpent; mean while the ſeaſon elapſed that was fitteſt for action. Book V. 1614.

The rage of the Spaniards againſt the duke of Savoy.

When the news of the ravages committed by the duke of Savoy in the Milaneſe reached Madrid, the Spaniſh miniſters were aſtoniſhed at his boldneſs, and being unaccuſtomed to reſiſtance in Italy, were inflamed with the higheſt degree of reſentment. They vowed his deſtruction, execrated his name, and reproaching the governor of Milan with ignorance, or want of ſpirit, excited him to revenge the diſhonour that had been done to the territories of Spain, and to the royal ſtandard. The reſentment of Spain was farther vented in a manifeſto, devolving to king Philip all the eſtates of Charles Emanuel which were fiefs of Milan; and the imperial ambaſſador (*b*) denounced againſt Charles the ban of the empire, if he ſhould not inſtantly diſband his army (*i*).

Againſt thoſe attacks of the pen, Charles Emanuel defended himſelf with the ſame weapon. That none of his eſtates were fiefs of Milan, he proved from records of hiſtory. To his imperial majeſty he wrote a reſpectful letter, giving an elaborate and circumſtantial detail of the reaſons he had to be diſſatisfied with the conduct of Spain, of the ravages of the Spaniſh troops, and the neceſſity he was under of keeping up a force to oppoſe them. In concluſion, he intreated the emperor to revoke the interdict he had iſſued againſt him; and farther, that he would employ his influence with the king of Spain, in order to engage

(*b*) At Milan. (*i*) Batt. Nan. Hiſt. lib. i. 1614.

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gage him to diſband his troops (*k*). The other Spaniſh miniſters in Italy, perceiving that the lofty ſpirit of Charles Emanuel was ſtill unbroken, complained of the remiſſneſs of Inoioſa, and expreſſed to that commander a ſuſpicion that the Spaniſh arms had loſt their character of invincible (*l*). In order to retrieve their reputation, they ſent a powerful naval force, part of a fleet which had been fitted out to watch the motions of the Turks, to make a deſcent on the coaſts of Piedmont.

Oneglia taken by the Spaniards.

THE marquis de Croix, who commanded this armament, finding that he had not a force ſufficient to take Nice, turned his arms againſt Oneglia, a maritime town of Savoy, environed by the confines of Genoa, except where it is ſeparated from Piedmont by the Appenine mountains. Diſembarking his troops on the territories of the Genoeſe, he placed within their bounds his battering cannon, which played upon Oneglia with ſucceſs. To this place Charles Emanuel could not ſend any ſuccours, without the conſent of Genoa, which was refuſed. This act of hoſtility he revenged by reducing Zuccarello, a fief of the empire, under the protection of that republic. Oneglia was defended five days, by the valour of the marquis of Dogliani. Having ſurrendered this town on honourable terms, this commander brought a part of the garriſon into Marro, a caſtle ſituated on a rock, a little more inland, and which commands ſome vallies full of villages. This fortreſs was alſo ſoon after reduced by the Spaniſh forces, increaſed to the number of five thouſand, by the arrival of ſeveral gallies from Sicily.

THE

(*k*) Hiſtoire du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy du France, et des principaux Evenemens arrivez pendant ce Reigne dans tous les Pais du Monde. Merc. François.

(*l*) Batt. Nan. lib. i. 1614.

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THE governor of Milan, urged by the reproaches and importunities of his countrymen, in order to ſupport this naval expedition, put his army in motion, though weakened by ſickneſs, and afflicted in their march, by thoſe exceſſive rains which at that ſeaſon overflowed all the country. Having croſſed the river Tanarus, not without a gallant oppoſition from the duke of Savoy, he found himſelf in a ſituation full of embarraſſment: for the advanced ſeaſon did not admit of the ſiege of Aſti, and to canton his troops in the open country, would expoſe them a prey to the vigilance and rapid movements of Charles Emanuel. He, therefore, judged it prudent to retire to the country about Alexandria.

Treaty of peace between the Spaniards and duke of Savoy.

IN the ſpring following, the hoſtile armies were reinforced, and on both ſides great preparations made for war. But in the city of Aſti, and preſence of Charles Emanuel, a treaty was framed by Julius Savelli, nuncio at Milan, and the marquis of Rambouillet, ambaſſador extraordinary in Italy from France, the chief articles of which were, that the duke of Savoy ſhould diſband his troops, keeping on foot only his uſual garriſons; that within fifteen or twenty days after, Inoioſa ſhould alſo diſband his army, and give his word to the pope and the king of France, that he would not commit any act of hoſtility againſt the duke of Savoy; that the priſoners and places taken on either ſide ſhould be mutually reſtored; that the jewels and dowry of Margaret ſhould be returned; and that an act of indemnity and oblivion ſhould be paſſed in favour of ſuch ſubjects of Montferrat, as had taken up arms in oppoſition to the duke of Mantua. Theſe conditions were not altogether ſatisfactory to Charles Emanuel; nevertheleſs, having in vain endeavoured to rouſe other powers to arms againſt Spain, and being deſirous of conciliating

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ating the favour of the pope and France, who offered to guarantee the treaty they propoſed, he declared his readineſs to accept them. It is alledged by ſome writers, that this prince would not have agreed to this treaty, while he had no other enemy to contend with than Inoioſa, if he had not imagined that it would be rejected by the Spaniſh miniſters. If this was his conjecture, he was not deceived; for when Rambouillet and Savelli preſented it to the governor of Milan, in full confidence that he would ſign it, he told them that he was deprived of all power of making peace with the duke of Savoy, by a late order from Madrid.

War in Germany.

THE reſolution of the Spaniards to maintain the predominancy of their power over the princes of Italy was heightened and confirmed by the ſucceſs of their arms in Germany.

PRINCE MAURICE, aſſiſted by troops from France and England, on the firſt of September 1610, made himſelf maſter of Juliers, which, with all its dependencies, immediately ſubmitted to the marquis of Brandenburgh, and the count Palatine of Neuburgh, known at that time by the title of the princes in poſſeſſion. Theſe princes lived upwards of two years in the ſame caſtle, and governed the ſtates of Cleves and Juliers by their joint authority. But having quarrelled at laſt, as might have been expected, they broke through the agreement that every thing ſhould be done in concert, and iſſued edicts, not conjointly, but ſeparately. Their mutual friends, in order to heal this rupture, adviſed them to cement a friendſhip by marriage (*m*). But this advice, widened the difference it was deſigned to compoſe. For the

(*m*) Intereſts des Princes par Monſieur de Rohan, part. i. diſc. iv.

the prince of Neuburgh, having, in conſequence of this counſel, gone to demand the daughter of Brandenburgh in marriage, at a feaſt, when his blood was warm, and his ſpirits high with wine, let fall ſome expreſſions, which ſo exaſperated the elector that he gave him a box on the ear. This effectually cured the young ſuitor's paſſion for his daughter. Henceforth the princes in poſſeſſion became avowed enemies, and thought of nothing but fortifying themſelves againſt each other by ſtrong-holds, troops, and allies. The count Palatine, by various acts of obedience, courted the favour of the emperor; and, in order to conciliate that of the Catholic league, the prince of Neuburgh married the ſiſter of the duke of Bavaria, and the elector of Cologne. The marquis of Brandenburgh, on the other hand, called to his aid the military power of the ſtates general of the United Provinces. It is probable, that when this infant republic conſented to employ its arms in defence of Brandenburgh, it apprehended not any oppoſition from thoſe of Spain. That monarchy, about five years before, had betrayed its inability to proſecute war, by its eagerneſs for peace. Since that time, it had exhibited a ſtriking token of improvidence and langour, when it beheld without concern, at leaſt without any exertion, the mighty preparations of Henry the Great; and the duke of Savoy had inſulted it in Italy, as yet with impunity. Prince Maurice, therefore, without any apprehenſion of reſiſtance from the Spaniards, on pretence of carrying relief to the marquis of Brandenburgh, prepared to extend the boundaries of the United Provinces by new conqueſts in the duchies of Cleves and Juliers. Having gained the governor of the caſtle of Juliers, he poured into that fortreſs a ſtrong Dutch garriſon, without oppoſition. He afterwards came to fort Schenck with an army of eighteen thouſand men; and

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and penetrating into Germany, took Emmerick on the Rhine, where he placed a garriſon, and many other places in the duchy of Cleves, and the county of la Marck.

Prince Maurice oppoſed by the Marquis of Spinola.

The acceſſion of the ſtates of Cleves and Juliers, to thoſe of the United Provinces, would, in the iſſue, have extended the dominion of that republic over all the Auſtrian Netherlands, had not the rapidity of prince Maurice's conqueſts received a check from the judicious and quick movements of the marquis of Spinola. This penetrating genius, who had ſtrenuouſly ſupported the pacific counſels of Prince Albert at the court of Madrid, now perceived the neceſſity of having recourſe to arms. He convinced the archduke Albert, and alſo the miniſters of Spain, that the preſent was the proper time to oppoſe the views of that youthful ſtate, whoſe ſucceſsful ſtruggle with the power of Spain had inſpired ideas of ambition and new conqueſts. It was better, he ſaid, at this juncture, to commit their cauſe to the fortune of war, and to contend for what remained of their ſovereignty in arms, than to remain inactive until the power of the revolted Provinces, in the Low Countries, ſhould be irreſiſtible. On pretence of reſtoring the ſupremacy of the emperor and the pope over the Proteſtants of Aix la Chapelle, who had depoſed the Catholic magiſtrates of that city, and baniſhed the Jeſuits and Romiſh prieſts, Spinola, aſſembled an army of thirty thouſand men, and provided a great train of artillery. By ſecrecy and celerity he ſurpriſed Aix la Chapelle, where he reeſtabliſhed the papal juriſdiction and imperial power. Thence he bent his courſe to the north-eaſt, and by this movement ſeemed to indicate an intention of laying ſiege to Juliers. But, wheeling ſuddenly about, he

he croſſes the Rhine two leagues below Cologne, and, joining the trooops of Neuburgh, enters Molſheim, falls down the Rhine, reduces Orſoy, and proceeds onward to Weſel, which he inveſts with part of his forces. The inhabitants of this place, by a conſtant and heavy fire, repulſed the aſſailants with great ſlaughter. But Spinola, having brought up his whole army, formed his intrenchments with ſo much judgment, that his troops, covered from the fire of the enemy, made their approaches with celerity and with ſafety. And, having planted three batteries of eight cannons, he kept up ſo hot a fire, that within leſs than two hours, one of the city gates, and all that could oppoſe an entrance by that way, was reduced to aſhes. The beſieged, underſtanding that prince Maurice and the marquis of Brandenburgh were coming to their relief, determined to make a vigorous reſiſtance. But the women mounting the walls with their children in their arms, with tears and cries entreated them to ſurrender. The men, melted by the ſuppliant voices of their wives and ſcreaming infants, ſent deputies to Spinola to aſk a favourable capitulation. This was readily granted: it was ſtipulated on the one ſide, that no change ſhould be introduced in the religion or government of the city; that the military officers of Brandenburgh ſhould march out of the city with their baggage, arms, and warlike ſtores; and that the citizens ſhould have liberty to retire and ſettle wherever they pleaſed. On the other hand, Spinola only demanded that he ſhould be allowed to introduce into Weſel a garriſon of a thouſand men, there to remain until the Dutch garriſon ſhould be withdrawn from Juliers. As ſoon as he entered this place he began to ſtrengthen its fortifications, and by all means to ſecure its poſſeſſion. He built three hundred barracks near the walls, and obliged the inhabitants to furniſh beds and

Siege of Weſel.

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other neceſſary furniture. He alſo increaſed the garriſon of Weſel with two thouſand foot, and three hundred horſe, under the command of Velaſco. The inhabitants in a ſtrong remonſtrance repreſented to Spinola, that, according to the terms of capitulation, he was to introduce a garriſon of one thouſand men. Spinola ſternly replied, that it was indeed agreed that he ſhould bring into Weſel one thouſand men; but that he had never promiſed that he would at no time increaſe their number (*n*). Having obliged the inhabitants of Duyſburg, a city between Weſel and Duſſeldorp, to admit a ſtrong garriſon, he paſſed the Rhine, and approached ſo near the camp of Maurice that the centinels of the oppoſite armies frequently converſed, and ſometimes drank together. The prince of Orange ſent a meſſenger to Spinola, to know in what prince's name he entered the ſtates of Cleves and Juliers. Spinola anſwered, by putting a ſimilar queſtion to the prince.

Theſe illuſtrious antagoniſts lay near to one another for a conſiderable time; but neither found an opportunity of attacking the other with advantage. And, without breaking the truce, or incurring the uſual calamities of war, they had fallen on a very convenient method of making conqueſts, by a kind of tacit compact, to divide between them the ſtates they pretended to protect. The United Provinces, alarmed at the ſucceſs, and apprehenſive of the future enterprizes of Spinola, at laſt engaged France, England, and certain Proteſtant princes in Germany to mediate a reconciliation between the princes in poſſeſſion. A conference was held for this purpoſe at Santhen, a town which in this quarrel had remained neutral, but

Convenient method of making conqueſts.

(*n*) Intereſts des Princes par M. de Rohan. partie ii. diſcourſ. v. Hiſtoire du Regne de Louis XIII. et des principaux Evenemens, &c.

but without effect. The articles of agreement propoſed by the mediators of peace, though they would in all probability have been accepted by Brandenburgh and Neuburgh, were only a ſubject of cavil to both Maurice and Spinola, who ſought not to compoſe the differences of theſe princes, but to fix themſelves in the places they had taken. Thus ends this ſingular campaign, which is not diſtinguiſhed by bloody battles and ſplendid victories; but whoſe origin and iſſue convey important political inſtruction. For thence it appears that conceſſions to a hoſtile people naturally invite them to repeat their attacks; that the only proper time for a nation to make peace, is when the enemy deſires it; and that no ſtate can admit within its bounds the arms of a ſuperior power, without endangering its own independence.

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A LITTLE good fortune is ſufficient to revive the projects of mortified ambition. The court of Madrid elated by the ſucceſsful career of Spinola in Germany, felt their reſentment more and more inflamed againſt that daring prince who firſt expoſed the Spaniſh weakneſs in Italy; and not leſs againſt his feeble opponent the marquis of Inoioſa. A letter was intercepted from the king of Spain to the governor of Milan, in which he upbraided him with the remiſſneſs of his former conduct, and gave orders from that inſtant to make an irruption into Piedmont, before the duke of Savoy, or any others of the enemies of the monarchy, could collect their forces, diſperſed in winter-quarters, to oppoſe him. The governor, who had received repeated orders to the ſame purpoſe, as ſoon as the ſeaſon of action arrived, took the field at the head of an army of thirty thouſand men. To this formidable body of veteran Spaniards the duke of Savoy oppoſed an army

The ſucceſs of the Spaniards in Germany inflames their reſentment and ambition.

Duke of Savoy takes the field againſt the governor of Milan.

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army of ſeventeen thouſand men, French, Swiſs, and Savoyards, and thoſe noble efforts of courage and conduct with which he was wont to encounter danger, and to raiſe himſelf above misfortune. The conteſt which enſued proved how much the ſucceſs of an army depends on the genius of one man; and how vain are the greateſt military preparations, if they are committed to the conduct of an unſkilful commander.

The firſt movements of the Spaniards, in the preſent campaign, indicated an intention of ſurpriſing Cortemiglia, the poſſeſſion of which would lay open to their incurſions the ſtates of Piedmont on the ſide of Aſti, Seve, and Canelli. Into this place, therefore, Charles Emanuel immediately throws three regiments of French, and eight hundred Swiſs, under the command of the count of St. George. The duke himſelf, haſtening from Turin with ſeven thouſand men, comes up with the marquis of Mantua, in his route to Cortemiglia, at the head of five or ſix thouſand, at Biſtagno, a fortreſs of Montferrat, ſituated upon a height, commanding a highway from the ſea to the confines of Milan. The thick and ſolid walls of Biſtagno, and the frequent and bold ſallies of the garriſon, rendered all the efforts of the duke of Savoy to reduce it under his power fruitleſs. In the hurry of his march he had not been able to bring up to this place more than two ſmall cannon. He attempted therefore to ſcale the walls, and attack the garriſon ſword in hand. He was perſevering in this deſperate and mad attempt, when he was informed that Inoioſa was on his march for the relief of Biſtagno, at the head of a powerful army. He therefore immediately raiſed the ſiege, retreated in good order to Canelli (o), and thence to Aſti, having perceived

(o) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

perceived that thither the Spaniards bent their course. This place, before the arrival of the duke, was garriſoned with four thouſand foot, and a conſiderable number of cavalry, under the command of prince Thomas. Here the whole forces of Charles Emanuel were now collected; and the iſſue of the ſiege of Aſti, was likely to decide the fate of the houſe of Savoy. But the city being of large extent, and the walls in many places infirm, the duke determined to meet the enemy at the river Verſa, on the banks of which Inoioſa appeared with an army of twenty-four thouſand men. The reſt of his forces he had thrown into St. Damiano and Ulpiano (*p*), towns of Montferrat, the firſt not far from Aſti, and the ſecond on the verge of Turin. The duke of Savoy, with fifteen thouſand foot, and fifteen hundred horſe, oppoſed the paſſage of the Spaniards over the Verſa in vain. And Inoioſa, having croſſed this river with his whole army, endeavoured to gain the heights of an hilly tract which ſtretched in a winding courſe to Aſti. This ſtation he haſtened to occupy, that he might thence be enabled not only to cut off the duke's retreat to that city, but to drive him out of the adjacent plain. But Charles, having penetrated his deſign, immediately fell back to two poſts in that ſtrong ground, which he had already ſlightly fenced by ſmall trenches. Theſe poſts he committed to his French and Swiſs troops, forming together about two-thirds of his army, with ſome pieces of cannon. The Savoyard infantry he reſerved to act as neceſſity might require, and with the cavalry he flanked his two poſts in a plain immediately below them. The firm order, and deliberate valour of the Spaniſh troops ſuſtaining the furious aſſaults of the Savoyard cavalry, and preſſing up the

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Engagement between the duke of Savoy and the Spaniards under the marquis of Spinola.

Inoioſa

(*p*) Batt. Nan. Hiſt. della Republica Veneta, lib. i. 1615.

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the hill which was occupied by the French, gained at laſt an eminence, the poſſeſſion of which decided the conteſt. For two pieces of cannon played from thence on the enemy with ſuch effect, that they retreated, with ſuch confuſion and trepidation to the ſecond poſt, as ſtruck a panic into the Swiſs, and threw them alſo into a diſorder that was ſoon after followed by a precipitate flight. The duke of Savoy, on this important day, which ſeemed pregnant with the fortune of his houſe, appeared reſolute to maintain his ſovereign power, or at leaſt to prove that he deſerved it. Performing the duty both of an able commander and gallant ſoldier, he directed the fight, brought relief to the oppreſſed, animated the weary, rallied the faint hearted, and poured on thoſe that fled the bittereſt reproaches. But the terror that had ſeized multitudes being more contagious than the courage of an individual, though a general and ſovereign prince, every effort of Charles to withſtand the ſteady valour of the Spaniards was ineffectual. At laſt, yielding to adverſe fortune, but not deſpairing of better, by the moſt extraordinary exertions of courage and of art, he carried off from the ſcene of action five field-pieces, and part of that baggage which had been left by the Swiſs.

Nothing was now wanting to make Italy tremble, but either the duke of Savoy at the head of the Spaniſh army; or the Spaniſh army under the colours of the duke of Savoy. The governor of Milan knew indeed how to fight; but not how to direct a campaign, or to improve a victory. He ſuffered the enemy to march unmoleſted to Aſti. And, inſtead of laying ſiege to that city, fortified himſelf againſt the attacks of his antagoniſt, by the moſt extenſive lines of circumvallation, and every poſſible method of defence.

fence. The diſtant and ineffectual bombard- BOOK V.
ments of Inoioſa, the ſkirmiſhes which followed between the Savoyards and Spaniards, and the deſperate but unſucceſsful aſſault that was made by the former on the camp of the latter, might demand a particular deſcription, were it neceſſary farther to illuſtrate the courage which was exhibited this campaign by the duke of Savoy, or that incapacity which diſgraced the conduct of the governor of Milan. The Spaniſh troops lay for ſix weeks in the open air, on the hills near Aſti; and the exceſſive heat, the unripe fruits, and the impurities of the camp, producing diſeaſes, there enſued a great mortality both of men and cattle. Although the army had been reinforced with the troops at Sandoval, and others that arrived by ſea, it was not half ſo ſtrong as when it ſat down before Aſti. Charles, on the other hand, though he enjoyed more commodious quarters, experienced ſuch frequent mutinies among his foreign troops, that it was difficult for him to determine whether they were of greater ſervice or diſadvantage. Thus both parties were in ſituations which inclined them to hearken to terms of peace. A capitulation was drawn up by the marquis of Rambouillet, and effectually recommended to the acceptance of the governor and the duke, by the Venetian and Engliſh ambaſſadors. This was not materially different from the treaty which had been framed by the pope's nuncio and the French ambaſſador, in the name of their reſpective courts, towards the end of the preceding year, in the city of Aſti. Only, it gave greater ſecurity to the duke againſt the attacks of Spain. For it was guaranteed by the republic of Venice; and, in caſe of its being violated by the Spaniards, a power was conſigned to the duke of Savoy, of ſummoning to his aſſiſtance, in the name of the king of France, 1615.

the

Book V. 1615. the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, and all the governors of provinces bordering on his dominions. The French ambaſſador, thinking he had now accompliſhed the object of his embaſſy, returned to Paris. But no ſooner had he left Piedmont than Ferdinand, whoſe thirſt of vengeance was in proportion to the narrowneſs of his capacity, began to let looſe all the fury of his reſentment on his revolted ſubjects. And Charles, on the other hand, only made a ſhew of diſbanding his troops (*q*), being juſtly apprehenſive that the late agreement between him and the governor of Milan would be diſavowed by the court of Madrid. The treaty of Aſti was equally violated on both ſides.

1616. Inoioſa ſuperſeded in the government of Milan by the marquis of Villa Franca.

When the court of Madrid was informed that Inoioſa had concluded a diſgraceful war by a diſhonourable peace, they were moved with great indignation. But the man whoſe wrath on this occaſion blazed forth with the greateſt fury, was Don Pedro de Toledo, marquis of Villa Franca, diſtinguiſhed even in Spain by an haughty boldneſs, and a zeal for the glory of the monarchy. His temper was vehement, yet his underſtanding was at once ſubtle and ſolid, and his courage both exalted and conſtant. Such a character would have appeared a fit inſtrument for inflicting the vengeance of Spain on the duke of Savoy; although he had not been allied by blood to the houſe of Mantua. This man, therefore, was choſen by Philip to ſucceed the marquis of Inoioſa in the government of Milan, and the conſenting

(*q*) He very formally diſbanded his French troops, but took care that they ſhould be all of them incorporated into his Savoyard companies. As to the Swiſs they could not be diſcharged without payment, concerning which there aroſe innumerable delays and difficulties.

ſenting voice of the Spaniſh nation applauded his choice (*r*). BOOK V. 1616.

THE duke of Savoy, diſſembling his ſuſpicions of the hoſtile deſigns of Spain, ſent a gentleman of his bed-chamber with two letters to Toledo, in one of which he congratulated him, according to the cuſtom of Italian princes, on his ſafe arrival at Milan, and in the other he deſcribed, in a pleaſing manner, the mutual advantages of faithfully fulfilling the treaty of Aſti. To the firſt of theſe letters the governor, with becoming politeneſs, replied, by returning his moſt humble thanks to the duke for the honour he had done him, and declaring that he would not fail to acquaint the court of Madrid with the reſpect and affection his highneſs had expreſſed for the Catholic king. To the other he anſwered, "that the true way to regain the favour of Philip, and to preſerve laſting concord, was, not to think any longer on what was to be done, when both parties

(*r*) A famous Italian hiſtorian (Bat. Nani), and others in deference to his authority, ſuppoſe that Inoioſa would have been recalled ſooner, had not the duke of Lerma been afraid, by too great military ſucceſſes in Italy, to defeat the project of the double marriages, which were not conſummated (as has already been obſerved) till the end of the year 1615. But when we reflect on the great military force committed to Inoioſa, which was nearly double that of Charles; on the repeated orders he received from his court to act with expedition and with vigour; and of the attempts he made in conſequence of theſe orders; that conjecture appears rather refined than ſolid. The regency of France wiſhed for the final accompliſhment of the double marriages as ardently as the court of Spain: and if they had been averſe to that meaſure, an unſucceſsful ſtruggle on the part of Spain with the duke of Savoy would not have been the means of reconciling them to it. The appointment of the marquis of Villa Franca, at this time, to the government of Milan, ſeems to have been the natural reſult of the feelings of the Spaniſh miniſtry, on an occaſion that wounded their pride, and excited their reſentment.

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ties had their ſwords in their hands (*s*)." This anſwer, had it needed any comment, would have been ſufficiently explained by the governor's common diſcourſe, and ſtill more by his actions. It was his common talk that the peace of Aſti was a mere colluſion between his predeceſſor and the duke of Savoy, and that a powerful king could not be tied down to the obſervance of a treaty with an inferior prince, by any other bands than thoſe of his own moderation. In the mean time he did not leave Charles in any uncertainty concerning what he had to expect from his Catholic majeſty's moderation; for he every day made new levies, and reinforced his army with a great number of Swiſs, Germans, and Italians.

The menaces of Don Pedro did not eſcape from that wary politician through any intemperance of diſcourſe. They were intended to bend the lofty ſpirit of Charles to an humble ſubmiſſion to the crown of Spain, and to prepare his mind to catch at the bait by which he hoped to govern his ambition. He inſinuated to his envoy at Milan, that if the duke his maſter would aſk pardon of Philip, and ſubmit his pretenſions wholly to his arbitration, that monarch would add to the dominions of Savoy the city of Geneva. But Charles Emanuel was not unacquainted with the artifices of the Spaniſh court. It was but lately that they had attempted to incite the prince of of Piedmont to riſe in rebellion againſt his father, and that Toledo himſelf had entered into a treaty with the governor of Zuccarello to deliver that place into the hands of the Spaniards. The duke, provoked equally at the pride and inſidious policy of Spain, rejected with indignation the offer of Toledo,

(*s*) Siri Mem. recond. tom. iii. p. 409, 410.

Toledo, and prepared to maintain his independency and honour by force of arms. He repreſented to the guarantees of the treaty of Aſti the conduct and the deſigns of Toledo, and immediately ſummoned to his aid the mareſchal de Leſdiguieres, in virtue of that authority with which for this purpoſe he had been inveſted by the king of France. Toledo, on the other hand, inveighed againſt the obſtinacy of the duke, and ſolicited Lewis to compel him to diſband his troops, and to deliver the places and priſoners he had taken, into the hands of the king of Spain, promiſing that this monarch ſhould afterwards take every ſtep, not inconſiſtent with the dignity of his crown, to remove all jealouſy of his arms. Lewis had already ſent the count de Bethune, a man of capacity and ſingular addreſs, into Italy, in order to accommodate thoſe differences which diſturbed the repoſe of that country. He now ſends the mareſchal Leſdiguieres to join his influence to that of Bethune, hoping, that Toledo would yield to the preſence, and reputation, and power of the mareſchal, what he might otherwiſe find means to evade. Leſdiguieres without delay went to Turin, where, in conjunction with Bethune, he framed a treaty of accommodation, which being propoſed to the conſideration of the governor and the duke, both parties agreed to a ceſſation of arms. The mareſchal, having aſſured the duke of Savoy of his warmeſt ſupport, if it ſhould be found neceſſary, departed from Turin, and returned to Dauphiny (*t*).

The king of France reſolved to maintain the treaty of Aſti.

MEAN while the duke of Monteleon, the Spaniſh ambaſſador in France, aſſured the court of Paris, that the views of Philip in Italy were not thoſe of ambition, but of juſtice and peace. And this

Intrigues of Spaniards at the court of France.

(*t*) Hiſt. du Connet, de Leſdiguieres.

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this aſſurance being accompanied by arguments that ſpoke directly home to the wants of ſome courtiers, and the avarice of others, effectually changed thoſe reſolutions which had been taken in favour of Charles Emanuel. The ſtricteſt orders were iſſued that no troops ſhould be levied in France, without the expreſs commiſſion of the king. The deſign of theſe orders was, either to oblige the duke of Savoy to give his conſent to an accommodation, on terms dictated by Spain, or to render him unable to carry on a war with that nation, ſhould he refuſe it.

BUT the duke found firmer ſupport in the wiſdom and fortitude of the Venetian ſenate, than was to be expected from the feeble and fluctuating counſels of France. That republic levied for his ſervice a conſiderable body of French troops, and contributed beſides, a ſupply of ſeventy-two thouſand ducats a month, for the purpoſe of maintaining his army in Piedmont. The orders of the young king of France were in vain oppoſed to the gold of Venice, the authority of Leſdiguieres, the duke of Mayenne, and other chiefs who encouraged all ſoldiers of fortune to croſs the mountains, and to join the ſtandard of the duke of Savoy. But above all Charles was encouraged by the proſpect of the duke of Nemours pouring down into the plains of Milan from the mountains of Savoy, at the head of an army of ſix thouſand men. He was ignorant that the military preparations of this duke, was that which chiefly nouriſhed the hope of victory in the breaſt of Toledo.

The duke of Nemours joins the Spaniards againſt the duke of Savoy.

HENRY, duke of Nemours, chief of a branch of the houſe of Savoy eſtabliſhed in France, had been amuſed by Charles Emanuel with the hope of marrying a princeſs of his family, for not a leſs ſpace of time than ſix or ſeven years. The diſap-

diſappointment made a deep impreſſion on his mind, and filled him with reſentment. Don Pedro, having learnt theſe circumſtances, conceived the project of fixing Nemours in the intereſts of Spain, by operating at once on his ambition, and that ſpirit of revenge which was then his domineering paſſion. He inſinuated to his rankling mind, through the dukes of Guiſe and Monteleon, that on condition of his taking up arms on the ſide of Spain againſt his relation Charles Emanuel, the Spaniſh monarch would reward his ſervices with the inveſtiture of the duchy of Savoy. The duke of Nemours did not heſitate to cloſe with theſe terms. Counterfeiting an ardent deſire to maintain the independency of that ſovereign family whence he derived his origin, he raiſed a force of ſeven thouſand men (*u*), which he was about to lead into the heart of Savoy, while Toledo with a powerful army was ready to penetrate into Piedmont. But Charles Emanuel, having diſcovered the deſigns of Nemours, inſtantly ſent orders to the governor of Savoy to ſecure thoſe places which had been deſtined for the reception of the troops of Nemours. And the prince of Piedmont haſtening to the northern paſſes of the Alps, ſeized the poſts on the route which a body of troops was to take, that had been levied by the Spaniards in Franche Compté and Burgundy. 1616.

In the mean time the duke of Nemours had taken the field, and penetrated through lofty mountains, by rugged and difficult ways, into the valley of Sizeri. This ſmall diſtrict yielded to the ſuperiority of his power, without much reſiſtance. He was preparing to improve the advantage he had gained, and to preſs forward upon the other territories

(*u*) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. anno 1616.

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territories of Savoy, when part of his troops deſerted him, carrying along with them the greater part of both the proviſions and ammunition. The troops that remained, being few in number, and weakened exceedingly by hunger and thirſt, ſerved as paſtime to the ſhepherds of the mountains, who harraſſed and hunted them from one place to another. In this extremity the duke of Nemours implored the ſuccour of Spain, that he might be enabled to ſave the remains of his army from inevitable ruin by croſſing the Rhone; but the Spaniards were deaf to his prayers. They even refuſed to ſend him a ſupply of bread and ammunition, and debarred him from the liberty of lodging his troops in Franche Compté, a province which in thoſe days belonged to the crown of Spain. In this deſperate ſituation he found relief in the generoſity of Charles Emanuel. That magnanimous prince, at the interceſſion of Leſdiguieres, and other chiefs of France, pardoned his revolt, and, on the diſbanding of his troops, reſtored him to the poſſeſſion of his eſtates in Savoy (*w*).

Operations of the new governor of Milan.

THE governor of Milan, in expectation that the irruption of the duke of Nemours into the dominions of Charles would diſtract his mind, and divert his arms, drew near with thirty thouſand men to the fromtiers of Piedmont. And, having thrown bridges over the Tanarus and the Seſia, and fortified and garriſoned them at either end, he waited for a favourable opportunity of entering that country, his head quarters being fixed at Candia and Villata. The duke of Savoy, on the other hand, lodged in Careſana and la Motta, in the province of Vercelli, with an army not exceeding

(*w*) Mercure François 1616. Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

ceeding twenty thouſand. After various ſkirmiſhes with the troops of Savoy with various ſucceſs, Toledo, having ſeparated his army into two diviſions, ordered one of theſe to paſs the Seſia at Gattinara, and to join the other, which he was to conduct himſelf, near Creſentino, a town on the Po, on the confines of the principality of Vercelli and Montferrat. It was Don Pedro's deſign, by this movement, to incloſe his enemy by the Seſia with fortified bridges and fort Sandoval on the eaſt, by the Po with Creſcentino on the ſouth, and by taking and garriſoning St. Germano, a fortreſs equidiſtant from both theſe rivers. Charles was now poſted in Sigliano, a place environed with lakes and moraſſes, and acceſſible only by one narrow entrance. This ſtation the duke had choſen, as being very convenient for the relief of Vercelli, the reduction of which ſeemed the object to which all the ſteps of his adverſary ultimately tended. As ſoon as he perceived that Toledo directed his courſe to Creſcentino, he mounted two thouſand muſqueteers behind an equal number of cavalry, and paſſing by the Spaniards with great ſpeed, threw ſuccours into that town ſufficient for its protection. The Spaniſh general in revenge ravaged the villages of Piedmont, and Charles, from a like motive, thoſe of Montferrat. BOOK V. 1616.

THE autumnal rains now overflowed the country on all ſides, and the hoſtile armies lay for ſome days inactive, the Savoyards in Creſcentino, the Spaniards in Livorno and Bianze, towns of Montferrat. The waters having ſubſided, Toledo, aided by the treachery or cowardice of the governor, made himſelf maſter of St. Germano, the poſſeſſion of which was a conſiderable ſtep towards the reduction of Vercelli. This important place was ſtill his aim, though, in order to obtain it,

Book V. it, he made a feint of marching to Creſcentino. The duke conſtantly harraſſed his troops in flank, that by interrupting the march of his enemy, he might be enabled himſelf to preoccupy the plain of Apertole, where he might make ſuch arrangements as would put it in his power either to give battle, or to ſtand upon the defenſive. The ſubtlety of the Spaniſh commander, on this occaſion, practiſed a ſucceſsful ſtratagem againſt the artful Charles Emanuel. Toledo made ſuch a diſpoſition of his troops as ſeemed to indicate an intention of obſtructing the march of the Savoyards, even at the expence of a battle. Upon this the duke brings forward the flower of his army into the van, expecting every moment to be attacked in front by the enemy. But the Spaniards, with ten thouſand foot and ſome cavalry, ſuddenly made an attack on his rear, conſiſting of four thouſand French infantry and ſome cavalry, when they were filing through a wood. The Savoyards, ſtruck with ſurprize and terror, began to retreat in the greateſt confuſion; but the duke ſaved his diſmayed forces, if not from the diſgrace, yet from the ſlaughter that commonly purſues a flying army. He diſpatched the intrepid count of St. George to check the purſuit of the victorious enemy, with a ſelect band of five hundred muſketeers. The brave reſiſtance of the count, and the quick approach of night, enabled the French troops in the ſervice of Savoy to retreat with ſafety to the main body of the army.

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The duke, whoſe ſanguine temper contemplated the bright ſide of every object, comforted himſelf under this misfortune, by reflecting, that it would revive the ancient animoſities between the Spaniards and the French, and that this laſt nation, enraged at their late diſcomfiture, would retrieve at once his loſs and their own honour.

With

With theſe ſentiments he retired to Creſcentino. The ſeaſon was now far advanced; and Toledo, having in vain attempted to ſurpriſe Creſcentino, and finding that keeping the field ſerved only to diminiſh the number and impair the health of his troops, abandoned the poſts he poſſeſſed in Piedmont and Montferrat, having left garriſons only in Trino, St. Germano, and Gattinara. This laſt was a town which commanded a paſſage over the Seſia, and which had been reduced under the power of the Spaniards by Don Sancho del Luna, governor of the caſtle of Milan (*x*). Book V. 1616.

1617. Illneſs of the duke of Savoy.

The duke of Savoy, through exceſſive fatigue and agitation of mind, about this time contracted an illneſs, which, concurring with the rigour of the advanced ſeaſon, ſeemed to promiſe on his part a reſpite from all hoſtilities. He could not take the field in perſon, and was even unable to walk abroad. In this irkſome confinement the activity of his mind amuſed the tedious hours by forming various projects and ſtratagems of war. And, under his preſent infirmities, he felt a ſenſible conſolation in the capacity, bravery, and filial affection of four illuſtrious ſons, who were ready to execute with fidelity and alacrity whatever he ſhould command then to perform. The duke of Nemours having been conſtrained to lay down his arms, the prince of Piedmont repaſſed the mountains by the valley of Aoſta, and conducted his troops to Ivrea. Here he received orders to lead them againſt Gattinara, in which was a Spaniſh garriſon of four thouſand men. The prince did not heſitate to carry the orders of the duke his father into execution. But yielding to the remonſtrances of his moſt experienced officers, he exchanged an enterprize which appeared to be impracMovements of the prince of Piedmont.

(*x*) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. 1616. Levaſſor. tom iii. Merc. Franc. 1616.

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impracticable, for another which might be accompliſhed without difficulty, and which was not of leſs importance.

THE principality of Maſſerano is bounded on the eaſt by the river Seſia, and in every other quarter by the territories of the duke of Savoy; a circumſtance which naturally placed it under the protection of Spain. Toledo, with a view to ſtrengthen that chain by which he deſigned to inveſt and ſtraiten Vercelli, had made an offer to the prince of Maſſerano to garriſon his capital, and alſo the fortreſs of Crevalcor with Spaniſh forces. The prince, aware of the danger of ſuch a meaſure, choſe rather to undergo the hazard of an irruption from Piedmont than to reſign the ſinews of his power into the hands of Toledo. He returned the governor thanks for his proffered aid, but expreſſed a hope that it would not be neceſſary. Toledo had in the mean time marched his troops to the banks of the Seſia, and ſeemed ready to pour into the territories of Maſſerano. In this ſituation of affairs the prince of Piedmont, by a concealed and forced march, ſurpriſed and inveſted the capital of that ſmall ſtate, which opened its gates without reſiſtance. He now marched againſt Crevalcor, with eight thouſand foot and four hundred horſe. He appeared before the walls of that place on the 27th of January, and having ſeized all the avenues by which it might receive relief, he ſoon made a breach in the walls, and took the town by aſſault. The terrified inhabitants fled before the ſlaughtering ſword, directing their trembling ſteps towards the caſtle. Multitudes were trodden to death in this ſcene of confuſion and horror, and in the eager conteſt to enter through that narrow gate which was the only avenue of life. A very few made their way into the

the caſtle. The reſt were either taken priſoners or ſlain by the ſword. Book V. 1617.

The prince of Maſſerano, as ſoon as he learnt the hoſtile deſigns of Victor Amadeus, had implored that aid which he had formerly rejected. And the governor of Milan had immediately diſpatched to his relief Don Sancho del Luna, with two thouſand foot and three hundred horſe; but in the mean time the caſtle capitulated. And, in too late an attempt to relieve it, Don Sancho, with many officers and private men, loſt his life (*y*). Thus the duke of Savoy contended with the power and the art of the marquis of Villa Franca not without advantage. It is however probable that all the efforts of Charles Emanuel would have been repelled in the end, by the valour, diſcipline, and ancient renown of the Spaniſh arms, directed by the genius of Toledo, if they had not been ſupported by the magnanimous reſolution of the mareſchal Leſdiguieres equally to conſult his own and the glory of France, in ſpite of the allurements and the threats of the miſled princes, by whom it was at that time governed.

Although fortune ſometimes raiſes the worthleſs and the weak to the higheſt offices, yet it muſt have been ſingular merit that, in times productive of great characters, could exalt a private gentleman of a very narrow fortune, to the firſt dignity of a great kingdom that can be enjoyed by a ſubject. Francis de Bonne, with a patrimony of fifty crowns a year, roſe to the ſtation of conſtable of France, in oppoſition to many rivals of noble birth and great power. He was of an agreeable aſpect, a mild temper, and eaſy manners; qualities which were not indeed very ſhining in themſelves,

Character of the mareſchal Leſdiguieres.

(*y*) Batt. Nani, lib. ii. 1616. Merc. Franç. 1617.

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ſelves, but which contributed not a little to raiſe the mareſchal Leſdiguieres to ſituations in which he had opportunities of diſplaying the greateſt talents and virtues (z). His underſtanding was manly and ſolid; he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree the virtues of political and martial courage; and, though he was ſuſceptible both of friendſhip and love, his ruling paſſion was ambition. The duke of Savoy cultivated the friendſhip of this man with uncommon attention, and practiſed with unwearied diligence all his addreſs in order to gain ſo important an acquiſition. To the mareſchal Leſdiguieres he ſhewed all the reſpect due to a crowned head. If he received him at Turin it was with the utmoſt pomp and magnificence. If he addreſſed him in writing, he beſtowed on him the endearing and flattering appellations of "good neighbour, and faithful friend." He conſulted him on every occaſion: and the mareſchal returned his confidence and aſſiduities with the ſincereſt fidelity and affection. The attachment of Leſdiguieres to Charles Emanuel was well known to the court of Spain, and they endeavoured to counteract its effects by operating on his natural ambition. The king and queen of France, at the inſtigation of the Spaniſh ambaſſador, attempted to ſeduce him from the intereſts of Savoy, by calling him to court in order to be inveſted with the privileges and rank of a duke and peer. And, that he might be enabled to ſupport the magnificence of that character, the king of Spain offered him any ſum of money he ſhould be pleaſed to demand, to be paid in any part of Europe. Theſe allurements failing of ſucceſs, a ſupply of money was offered ſufficient to raiſe and maintain for a year, an army of forty thouſand men, with a ſuitable train of artillery, to be

(z) Amelot de la Houſſaie.

be employed in making himſelf maſter of Savoy. Of this duchy the duke of Monteleon, in name of the Spaniſh monarch, offered him the inveſtiture, on condition of his aſſiſting the Spaniards to conquer Piedmont. This temptation having been alſo reſiſted, Monteleon engaged Louis to tranſmit to the mareſchal the moſt peremptory orders to abſtain from levying troops, and on no pretext whatever to move to the aſſiſtance of the duke of Savoy. Theſe orders were in vain reiterated and enforced, at the deſire of the feeble court of Paris, by the authority of the parliament of Grenoble. Leſdiguieres, in a letter to the king, repreſented to his majeſty, in a firm though reſpectful tone, that his duty called him to reſtore the dignity of France in Italy, by fulfilling the engagements of that kingdom to the duke of Savoy, and chaſtiſing the perfidy and inſolence of Spain. And he added, that, however treacherous counſels might beguile the good intentions of his majeſty for a time, he did not deſpair of his preſent conduct meeting one day with the approbation of his ſovereign (*a*).

Magnanimous reſolution of Leſdiguieres.

On the nineteenth day of December 1616, the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, exhibiting a ſignal proof of the greatneſs of his own mind, and the weakneſs of the crown of France, ſet out from Grenoble, at the head of an army of ſeven thouſand foot and five hundred horſe, raiſed in Dauphiny by his own authority, and at the expence of the republic of Venice. Having croſſed the Alps in the midſt of winter, he arrived at Turin on the third day of January. Reinforced by ſo conſiderable a body of gallant troops, and encouraged by the preſence, reputation, and aid of a great commander, whoſe natural abilities were matured by long

(*a*) Hiſt. du Connetable de Leſdiguieres, lib. ix.

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long experience in the military art, the duke of Savoy was elated with the hope of vindicating his own independence, and inflicting ſevere vengeance on that haughty court which threatened him with ſubjection. The united forces of Leſdiguieres and the duke were irreſiſtible. St. Damiano, Alba, and Montiglio, with other places of inferior importance, reduced under the power of Charles, with a rapidity correſponding to the ardour of his mind, nouriſhed his hopes of making other conqueſts ſtill more important. The reduction of Montiglio is eminently diſtinguiſhed, not by any noble diſplay of generoſity or courage, but by an incident extremely humiliating to man, as it reminds him how much he partakes of the nature of thoſe ferocious and noxious animals which are the conſtant objects of his hoſtility and abhorrence. A conteſt having ariſen concerning the garriſoning of that fortreſs between the French and the Savoyards, the fierce diſputants, enflamed by their engagement with the common enemy, directed their unſettled fury and reeking ſwords againſt each other. Upwards of a hundred had fallen on either ſide, before the authority of the general, the count of St. George, was able to prevent a mutual and complete maſſacre. The ſavage thirſt of blood being now excited, and incapable of being ſuddenly quenched, loudly demanded an inhuman gratification, and found it in the ſlaughter of the garriſon that had capitulated on favourable terms (*b*).

Reduction of Montiglio, and a memorable incident that happened on that occaſion.

The blindneſs of ambition.

THE diſcontents in France had now drawn to a criſis which threatened the crown with all the violence of civil war. Theſe diſcontents Charles Emanuel, as above related, had aſſiduouſly nouriſhed with his uſual dexterity and addreſs. But the moſt

(*b*) Batt. Nani. Hiſt. lib. iii. 1617.

moſt enlightended genius ſees not far into futurity, and often the moſt ſagacious ambition blindly labours for its own deſtruction. The inteſtine diſcords and commotions of France obliged the king to recall Leſdiguieres; and inſtantly the marquis of Villa Franca, who yielding to a torrent which could not be reſiſted, had reſolved to confine his troops within narrow limits, and to act wholly on the defenſive, renewed his attacks on the duke of Savoy, commencing his operations with the ſiege of Vercelli. He ſat down before this important place towards the end of May, with a ſtrong army and a very great train of artillery. When Charles was informed that the governor of Milan had begun to put his troops in motion, he was not at a loſs to diſcover his intention; and, with a view to diſappoint it, having ſpeedily increaſed the garriſon of Vercelli to the number of four thouſand, he determined to march his army from Gabbiana, and, by reducing the fortreſs of Ponteſtura, to oppoſe, with advantage, the progreſs of the Spaniſh army. But, while he meditated this ſcheme, he diſcovered that other dangers threatened him than the ſiege of Vercelli.

May. Siege of Vercelli.

DON PEDRO, conſtrained to relinquiſh for a time all open attacks on the ſtates of Charles Emanuel, had employed the natural ſubtilty of his active mind in laying plots againſt that prince's perſon and family. Different perſons were ſuborned to cut off the duke by aſſaſſination or by poiſon; and a conſpiracy was formed by certain French officers of the garriſon of St. Ja to ſeize the prince of Piedmont, who commanded that fortreſs, and to deliver him into the hands of the Spaniards. The diſcovery of theſe ignominious plots (*c*) diverted the deſign of the duke againſt

(*c*) It is remarkable, that, although there never was a people more diſtinguiſhed than the Spaniards for honour and fidelity,

Book V. againſt Monteſtura, by ſummoning his attention to cares more immediate and urgent. The conviction and puniſhment of conſpirators and aſſaſſins employed that critical time which would otherwiſe have been occupied in preventing the ſiege of Vercelli, or, by plentiful ſtores of proviſions and ammu-

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lity, yet there is not any period in the hiſtory of any nation more diſgraced by plots and conſpiracies than that which forms the ſubject of this narrative. When reſentment, ambition, or other paſſions, cannot find gratification openly, and by the direct road of ſuperior force, they have recourſe to ſtratagem, as fully appears from the hiſtory of nations as well as individuals. Perhaps, too, ideas of ſuperior dignity have a tendency to blunt the ſenſe of injuſtice committed againſt inferiors. The different prices or compenſations for wounds, and even for murder, that took place about eight hundred years ago in ſo many nations of Europe, is a ſtriking proof how much this iniquitous ſentiment naturally prevails in the human mind. There is as great injuſtice in wantonly maiming, or otherwiſe torturing, or putting to death a dog, a horſe, or other animal, as there would be in wounding or deſtroying a man; yet there are but few whoſe conſciences would be ſtung with remorſe at the commiſſion of ſuch crimes; a matter which is to be accounted for only from that immeaſurable diſtance which our fancy, ſtill more than nature, interpoſes between men and the inferior animals, and which precludes his ſympathy. A nation accuſtomed to think itſelf vaſtly ſuperior in dignity to all others, and to arrogate to itſelf an excluſive privilege of dominion, fancies it has a right of aſſerting that privilege by all means, however inconſiſtent with juſtice. The inhabitants of Calais were ſaved from the furious reſentment of Edward III. of England by the tranſcendent virtue of ſix of their fellow-citizens, who devoted themſelves to certain deſtruction for the ſake of their relations, friends, and companions: the condition required by that haughty and cruel conqueror. Theſe ſix heroic burgeſſes were ſaved from death, not by the generoſity of Edward, but by the importunity and tears of his queen. Yet this prince was profuſe enough in his civilities to the French officers, who, about the ſame time, had fallen into his hands, although their bravery was not to be compared with that of the burgeſſes. Had ſix knights appeared before him in the guiſe of malefactors, inſtead of ſix citizens, he would have been ſhocked at the idea of ordering them to be led to execution, and have been full in his praiſes of their ſignal patriotiſm and reſolution.

ammunition, to prepare it for a vigorous reſiſtance.

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The ſiege had not been continued above ſixteen days, when the Savoyards were reduced to the neceſſity of ſupplying the place of iron balls and lead with tin and ſtones. The quantity of their powder alſo was inſufficient; nor could all the efforts of Charles encourage the gallantry of the beſieged by a freſh ſupply. Two hundred and fifty cavalry, with ſacks of powder of twenty-five pounds each, were waylaid in their concealed march to Vercelli, through the vigilance of Toledo; and the fire of the Spaniards having been communicated to ſuch inflammable materials, only thirty of that number made their way into the place of their deſtination. Two hundred and twenty horſes, with their riders, miſerably periſhed in one ſudden conflagration; yet the beſieged made a gallant defence, and repulſed the Spaniards, in different ſallies, with great ſlaughter. The aſſailants made a furious effort to carry the place by a general aſſault; but, if the valour of the Spaniards was animated by the love of glory and the hope of plunder, the Savoyards, anticipating in their imaginations the calamities and horrors that awaited themſelves, and objects ſtill dearer to them than life, in caſe of defeat, were rouſed with the fury of deſpair. The ſteady bravery of the beſiegers gave way on this occaſion to the rage which impelled the beſieged; and, in the firſt moment of their retreat, a hundred cuiraſſiers, ſallying with their ſwords in their hands into the ditch, made a dreadful carnage. Fifteen hundred men periſhed on the ſide of Spain; on that of Savoy not a hundred. The duke of Savoy, being informed of the deſperate intrepidity of his faithful garriſon, was filled with all thoſe emotions which the fidelity, bravery, and danger of

Book V. 1617. of men ſuffering in his cauſe, were naturally fitted to produce in his generous mind. He attempted, a ſecond time, ſecretly to convey ammunition and proviſion into Vercelli; but loſt by that fruitleſs effort four hundred men. At laſt, exaſperated by repeated diſappointment, he drew near to the Spaniſh camp by night, by ſtorming, or even making a faint of ſtorming which, he hoped to be able to ſuccour Vercelli. Having ranged his troops along the banks of the Seſia, he ſent a ſtrong detachment over that river, in ſeparate parties, under the marquis D'Urfe, who was repulſed by a body of Spaniſh horſe with the loſs of ſix hundred men. This bold meaſure of the duke was not wholly without ſucceſs; for while the Spaniards haſtened to oppoſe the Savoyards in that quarter where D'Urfe directed his attack, a thouſand men, loaded with ammunition, made their way into Vercelli by another. But this ſcanty ſupply was far from being ſufficient; and, beſides this circumſtance, the garriſon was now greatly diminiſhed by the accidents of war and the fatigues of duty. In this ſituation were the beſieged, when Toledo, on the 25th of July, which, being the feſtival of St. James, was deemed fortunate for Spain, made a general aſſault, and effected a lodgment in a baſtion, againſt which, from the commencement of the ſiege, he had principally directed the fury of his artillery. The garriſon, at that inſtant, demanded and obtained honourable terms of capitulation; their baggage, and arms, and all the honours of war. Toledo, having garriſoned Vercelli, and levied very high contributions on the inhabitants, marching his army along the courſe of the Tanarus, reduced, under the power of Spain, Soleri, Felician, and Anona, with other places, the poſſeſſion of which he hoped would pave the way to the execution of

of an enterprize he meditated againſt the important city of Aſti (*d*). Book V. 1617.

An unexpected and tragical event in France interrupted the career of Toledo in Italy. Concino Concini and Eleanor Galigai, afterwards the mareſchal and the lady mareſchal D'Ancre, made their firſt appearance at the court of Paris in the train of Mary de Medicis, on her firſt arrival in that city from Florence. Their abilities and addreſs, aided by that ſympathy which men feel for their compatriots, however humble their rank of life, when in the courſe of Providence they accompany or meet each other in foreign lands, ſo gained on the favour of the indulgent queen, that ſhe raiſed them to a degree of power intolerable to the nobles, and odious to the people. Depending on the queen-regent, they depended alſo on Spain, the great prop of her power, and were naturally devoted to the intereſts of a crown, which, by ſupporting Mary's, ſupported alſo their authority. In order to prolong the period of their borrowed power, they diverted the thoughts of Lewis, now of age, from matters of ſtate, by encouraging him in the purſuit of thoſe youthful amuſements which had hitherto occupied all his time, and engroſſed all his attention. The more effectually to fix his mind in an indifference towards all political objects, they provided him with companions of his own age, whoſe ſociety, they imagined, would amuſe his leiſure, and heighten, by ſympathy, his reliſh for thoſe pleaſures to which he was addicted. Among theſe, Charles Albert de Luines, a young gentleman of Avignon, was diſtinguiſhed for the handſomeneſs of his perſon, the gracefulneſs of his air, and the obliging politeneſs of his behaviour. He gained

Tragical fate of the mareſchal and lady mareſchal D'Ancre.

Albert de Luines becomes the favourite of the king of France.

(*d*) Bat. Nan. lib. iii. Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

Book V. 1617. gained by degrees the affection and confidence of his young ſovereign, and was indulged, at all times, with familiar acceſs to his perſon. Concini perceived the aſcendant this young favourite had acquired over the king; and, in order to attach him to himſelf, preferred him to the government of Amboiſe. But Luines, prompted by his own ambition, and encouraged by the murmurs and diſcontents that pervaded the kingdom, gave ſuch an account of the conduct and deſigns of his benefactor, as filled the inexperienced mind of his prince with horror, and perſuaded him that the preſervation of his own life, as well as his power, depended on the death of the mareſchal D'Ancre. Vitri, captain of the guards, undertook and accompliſhed the bloody purpoſe of ſacrificing the life of the mareſchal to the ſuſpicions of the king. On the 20th of April the unfortunate Florentine careleſsly entered within the gate of the royal palace of the Louvre, which was inſtantly ſhut behind him, and was walking towards the apartments of the queen-regent, reading a letter as he went, when the captain of the guard arreſted him, in the name of the king, and beckoned to his accomplices, who ſtood by him in anxious expectation of that ſignal. Three aſſaſſins, at that inſtant, poured the contents of their fire-arms into his body, which, after he had fallen dead on the ground, they ſpurned, and cut in different parts with their ſwords; but the populace, greedy of every opportunity of giving vent to the animal ferocity of their nature, and zealous on all occaſions to avenge on the powerful and great the unequal diſtributions of fortune, dug up the mangled corpſe of Concini, which had been ignominiouſly buried, and dragged it in horrid triumph along the ſtreets of Paris. They afterwards, having cut it in ſmall pieces, roaſted and inhumanly devoured it; and happy was the man

man who could obtain the ſmalleſt morſel of the ſavage ſacrifice (*e*). Book V. 1617.

The wretched Galigai was condemned to death, on pretence of ſorcery. She exerted on her trial, and in her laſt moments, a conſtancy and ſtrength of mind, which the melting ſpectators compared with the fortitude of Socrates, and contraſted with thoſe tears which, not many years before, diſgraced the exit of the intrepid duke of Biron.

The authority of the queen-regent was annihilated by the ſtroke which cut off the mareſchal D'Ancre; and Luines, who ſucceeded to all the power of that ſtranger, agreeably to the common conduct of new miniſters in all nations, departed at firſt from the maxims, and vehemently arraigned the conduct of his predeceſſor. He particularly exclaimed againſt that uniform deference which had been ſhewn by the former adminiſtration to the counſels of Rome and Madrid (*f*). In this temper was the court of France when news arrived of the ſurrender of Vercelli. Immediately it was reſolved to ſuccour the duke of Savoy. Leſdiguieres once more croſſes the mountains with twelve thouſand foot, and two thouſand horſe. In his train were many lords and gentlemen of France, volunteers, among whom was the great duke of Rohan, at the head of three ſquadrons of cavalry. The orders of the mareſchal were ſtrenuouſly to aid the duke of Savoy in his efforts to recover his own dominions, but

Leſdiguieres marches to the aſſiſtance of the duke of Savoy.

(*e*) Bernard Hiſtoire de Louis XIII. Siri Mem. recon. tom. iv. Relation de la Mort du Mareſchel d'Ancre. Journal de Baſſompiere. Memoires de Deageant Amelot de la Houſſaie.

(*f*) Siri Mem. reond. tom. iv. p. 68. Relation de la Mort de Mareſchal d'Ancre. Memoires de Rohan. lib. i.

Book V. 1617. but not to involve the court of France in a war with Spain, by inſulting either the territories of Milan or Mantua. But Leſdiguieres had grander objects in view than to expel Don Pedro from the coaſts of Savoy. The military reputation of the Spaniſh commander, inſtead of repreſſing the courage of the mareſchal, filled him with an ardent deſire to take the field againſt an antagoniſt whoſe genius and vigour would give full exerciſe to all his abilities and experience, and over whom a victory would be truly glorious. However, making a ſhew of reſpect to his majeſty's command, he ordered his troops to lay aſide, for a while, the colours of France, and to wear thoſe of Savoy.

Don Pedro de Toledo, after the reduction of Vercelli, had diſtributed his army, for the purpoſe of refreſhment, in different towns and villages of Montferrat, but chiefly in thoſe of the province of Alexandria. In the midſt of all his quarters lay the village of Feliziano, which was ſlightly barricadoed, and defended by two thouſand men. The experienced eye of Leſdiguieres quickly perceived, that by ſurpriſing this centrical ſtation, he would deprive the Spaniards of the moſt proper place of rendezvous in their poſſeſſion, and prevent a junction of their divided forces. He communicated theſe ideas to Charles Emanuel. The duke was at firſt ſtruck with the danger of attempting an enterprize againſt a place ſurrounded by the poſts of the enemy; but Leſdiguieres inſiſted that by a nocturnal, rapid, and unexpected march, it would not be difficult, but, on the contrary, a very eaſy matter to make the duke maſter of Feliziano, from which centre he might turn his ſucceſsful arms againſt the other quarters of the Spaniards with great glory and advantage. Charles acquieſcing in the reaſoning,

or

or yielding to the authority of the mareſchal, an expedition was concerted againſt Feliziano. Thither the combined army began to march, as ſoon as the darkneſs of the night favoured the enterprize, in three diviſions. The van was led by the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, the main body by the duke of Savoy, and Shomberg, marſhal of the camp, brought up the rear with the artillery. But Charles Emanuel, taught by the reduction of Vercelli to reſpect the valour of the Spaniards, and the abilities of the marquis of Villa Franca, bethought himſelf, after the troops under Leſdiguieres had moved, that the ſituation and motions of the Spaniards rendered the expedition on which he had entered extremely dangerous; he therefore ſent a courier to the mareſchal, adviſing him to return on his ſteps. The mareſchal, who, in an advanced age, poſſeſſed all the fire of youth, replied to the meſſenger with much emotion, "I have followed the profeſſion of arms above fifty years without having ever turned my back on the enemy: an honour of which I am determined my conduct on this day ſhall not deprive me. There is more ſhame in retreating than danger in going on." Having ſaid this, he jumped out of the litter in which he had hitherto been borne; and, notwithſtanding ſome feveriſh ſymptoms that were about him, mounted on horſeback, placed himſelf at the head of his troops, and continued his march (g). He arrived at Feliziano about the dawning of the day; and the duke of Savoy having joined him ſoon after with the main body of the army, which he conducted by a private way with aſtoniſhing celerity, the place was immediately inveſted, and taken by aſſault. All the common ſoldiers, and many

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(g) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. et des Evenements Prinpaux, &c.

Book V. 1617. many of the inhabitants, were put to the ſword. The officers were made priſoners. Not a man of Feliziano eſcaped with his liberty and his life (*b*). Quatordeci, Renfracora, Anona, Rocca, and Nice, were alſo quickly ſubdued by the united arms of Charles Emanuel and Leſdiguieres, the rapidity of whoſe conqueſts, in the ſpace of a week, weakened the Spaniſh army by a loſs of more than five thouſand men. Don Pedro now abandoned his deſign of beſieging Aſti, and retreated from Soleri into the Milaneſe; all his force, vigilance, and art, being neceſſary to put that country in a poſture of defence againſt the threatened irruptions of the duke of Savoy. But the duke of Monteleon having aſſured the king of France that Vercelli ſhould be reſtored, and the treaty of Aſti executed with fidelity and promptitude on the part of Spain, Leſdiguieres was recalled in the full career of victory. The mareſchal, having in vain remonſtrated that the preſent juncture preſented a glorious opportunity for recovering the Milaneſe to the crown of France, yielded obedience to the reiterated commands of his ſovereign. Toledo agreed to a ceſſation of arms, and promiſed to uſe his utmoſt endeavours to effectuate an entire accommodation, and, particularly, came under an engagement to Bethune, at Pavia, the 9th of October, that, on condition of the duke's diſbanding his army, and reſtoring the places he had taken in the courſe of the current month, he on his part would give up Vercelli with the other places he had ſeized, and diſarm his troops, in November. This agreement being made, the mareſchal marched back to Grenoble (*i*). But the miniſters of Spain, not ſatisfied with the return of the French troops into

(*b*) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. 1617. Mem. de Rohan. liv. i.
(*i*) Hiſt. du Connetable de Leſdiguieres, liv. ix.

to Dauphiny, remonſtrated to the court of France, that the keeping on foot ſo great a force, ſo near the confines of Savoy, would be an infraction of the treaty of Aſti. They declared that Vercelli would not be delivered up to Charles Emanuel, while the Swiſs troops hovered in the county of Vaux, and his friend, Leſdiguieres, was ready, on the ſhorteſt notice, to march to his aid at the head of an army. Lewis, who was willing to maintain the independency of Savoy, but averſe to any violent rupture with the Catholic king, not only diſbanded his own troops in Dauphiny, but alſo urged Charles to preclude Toledo from every pretext of war, by laying down in good earneſt his arms; aſſuring him of his warmeſt ſupport and protection, in caſe the Spaniards ſhould attempt, either by open force or ſecret artifice, to elude the execution of the treaties of Pavia and Aſti. The promiſe of the king having been warranted, at his majeſty's deſire, by the ſuperior authority and credit of the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, Charles Emanuel diſbanded his army. Upon this the French ambaſſadors, Modene and Bethune, went from Turin to the governor of Milan to aſſure him of this fact, and to engage him to imitate the duke's pacific example. They ſoon perceived, from his affected difficulties and evaſions, not only that he had no mind to reſtore Vercelli, but that it was his intention to make freſh attacks on the duke of Savoy.

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The governor of Milan averſe to peace.

LEWIS, who, in the ſolitude of rural ſcenes and amuſements, had hitherto concealed an elevated courage, was moved with equal indignation and ſurprize at the treacherous conduct of Toledo. "I am not at a loſs, ſaid he to the Spaniſh ambaſſador, to conjecture the cauſe to which I ought to aſcribe the delays of Spain to

Book V. give ſatisfaction to the duke of Savoy. The king,
1617. your maſter, thinks I dare not go out of my kingdom without leaving it full of diſtractions; but I wiſh him to know, that it is not altogether in ſo bad a condition as he imagines it to be; and, if my kingdom ſhould be ruined, and my ſovereignty annihilated by my abſence, I am determined to croſs the mountains, and, at the hazard of my life and of my crown, to fulfil my promiſe to the duke of Savoy, and to oblige the king of Spain to make good his word to me." The voice, the looks, and geſtures of the young king, made an impreſſion on the mind of Monteleon, which he communicated to the court of Madrid. Orders were forthwith diſpatched from thence to the government of Milan, to execute with promptitude and good faith all the articles
1618. of the treaties of Aſti and Pavia (*k*). But the court of Spain found that it was as hard taſk to incline the marquis of Villa Franca to peace. as it had been to rouze Inoioſa to arms. His firſt excuſe for not diſbanding his troops was, that the Swiſs regiments, lately in Piedmont, had not returned to their own country, but halted in the country of Vaux, ready to obey the nod of the duke of Savoy, from whom they ſtill drew their uſual pay. Bethune proteſted, in writing, that the troops of the duke were diſbanded, and charged Toledo with all the calamities that might ariſe from his diſbelief of a matter of fact, of which he might eaſily obtain the moſt undoubted evidence. The governor, driven from this ground, privately offered the duke of Savoy the greateſt advantages, if he would abandon his connections with Venice and France, and unite his intereſts with thoſe of Spain. Provided that Vercelli ſhould

(*k*) Diſcourſe de ce qui s'eſt paſſé dans le Piedmont et l'Etat de Milan, &c. Apud Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII.

ſhould remain in the hands of the Spaniards, and that Caſal ſhould alſo be added to the ſtate of Milan, he promiſed to extend the dominion of Charles over all the reſt of Montferrat. This artifice having failed of ſucceſs, he endeavoured to perſuade the duke of Mantua to inſiſt on a compenſation for damages, and on, what he had always ſo much at heart, the liberty of puniſhing ſuch of the ſubjects of Montferrat as had eſpouſed the cauſe of his adverſary. But neither did this ſtratagem ſucceed. He next had recourſe to a contrivance which he deemed infallible. He attempted to excite the jealouſy of the duke of Savoy by circulating whiſpers, that, when Ferdinand ſhould be reſtored to the ſovereignty of Montferrat, the houſe of Gonzaga would give it up to Spain, in exchange for other poſſeſſions. But Charles having diſregarded theſe falſe reports, Don Pedro deviſed yet another expedient, which might ſubdue the wary but ſpirited duke, by provoking his indignation. His ſecretary, Carone, who was then at Milan along with the French ambaſſadors, Toledo haughtily ordered inſtantly to leave the territories of Spain, and to go about his buſineſs. By this artifice he ſurpriſed the mind of Charles, and gained an advantage over his underſtanding through the agency of his paſſions. The high-ſpirited duke, not adverting that Toledo was now practiſing ſuch ingenious ſtratagems on his own mind, as he himſelf had employed when he carried on a war of wit on that of Inoioſa, inſtantly ſuſpends the evacuation of the places he had taken, and ſends advice to Modene and Bethune to return from Milan. The ſubtlety of the Spaniard (ſuch is the advantage of making an attack!) would have triumphed over that of the Savoyard, which was equal, if not ſuperior, had not the French ambaſſadors conjured the latter not to make ſport to the former,

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mer, who ſought nothing elſe than a pretext for reviving hoſtilities. The duke, admoniſhed by the prudence of theſe miniſters, reſtored, on the 6th of April, all the places he poſſeſſed in Montferrat: he alſo evacuated Zucarello, Anona, and Maſſerano, and every other fief he had ſeized of the empire. His priſoners he delivered into the hands of the French ambaſſadors. News having arrived of all theſe things at Milan, the governor, equally ſurpriſed and chagrined, exclaimed, "It appears that the treaty of Aſti muſt at laſt be executed, ſince heaven and earth will have it ſo (*l*)." He releaſed his priſoners, and evacuated St. Germano, but ſtill held faſt poſſeſſion of Vercelli.

The court of Madrid, in the mean time, had ſent repeated and poſitive orders to fulfil all the conditions, without exception, of the treaty of Aſti; and, in order to give the world a ſtriking proof how much they diſapproved the conduct of Don Pedro, they determined to recall him, and to appoint the duke of Feria his ſucceſſor in the government of Milan. This intention was not kept a ſecret from Don Pedro, yet he perſevered in the invention of new evaſions. "It is not conſiſtent, ſaid he, with the honour of the monarchy to reſtore Vercelli, while the French ambaſſadors remain at Milan. The reſtitution of that place muſt not ſeem to be extorted by the threatenings of France, but to be, as it in reality is, a voluntary deed on the part of Spain." This pretext was removed by the immediate departure of Modene and Bethune. "Before I give up Vercelli, ſaid Don Pedro, once more, I inſiſt that Gareſio, (a town of Montferrat, belonging to the count de St. George, but now garriſoned

(*l*) Bat. Nan. Hiſt. lib. iii. anno 1618.

riſoned by the troops of Savoy) ſhall be reſtored to its right owner." Gareſio was reſtored; and Toledo, all his artifices being now exhauſted, began, with proud reluctance and by ſlow degrees, to carry away from Vercelli the ammunition and the arms. But, after this operation was begun, he bethought him of yet another pretext for gaining time. He required a new promiſe from Charles Emanuel, that he would not give any occaſion of offence to the duke of Mantua; but the miniſters of Ferdinand, impatient of theſe multiplied delays, and more ſuſpicious of Toledo himſelf than of any of the princes of Italy, declared in writing, to the great vexation of Toledo, that they required not any other aſſurances of the pacific intentions of the duke of Savoy, than thoſe they had already obtained. 1618.

Men's aſtoniſhment at the public conduct of the marquis of Villa Franca was heightened when they remarked its coincidence with that of the duke of Oſſuna.

Don Pedro Giron, knight of the Golden Fleece, and a grandee of the firſt claſs of Spain, inherited from a long line of anceſtors the pride of noble birth, and the command of a princely fortune: circumſtances which are ſometimes indeed found in conjunction with meanneſs of ſentiment, but which foſtered that natural ſublimity of imagination that carried Oſſuna to purſue grand deſigns by extraordinary means. His temper was uncommonly fervent, and his fancy lively even to extravagance. Hence, though his underſtanding was quick and penetrating, his conduct was neither regulated by the common maxims of policy and prudence, nor his demeanour, in the intercourſes of life, by the rules of propriety and decorum. In the preſence of his ſovereign, Character of the duke of Oſſuna.

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ſovereign, he would talk with a gaiety and boldneſs unknown in the courts of kings, and which appeared to the ſage gravity of his compatriots to border upon madneſs. But his converſation in all companies, and on all occaſions, was adorned with a brilliancy of wit, which, in the eyes of moſt men, would more than compenſate many levities and indiſcretions. This duke is juſtly cenſured by grave hiſtorians for his gallantries, which were not veiled or palliated by delicacy of ſentiment; but, on the contrary, ſenſual, open, and licentious. Yet that groſſer ſpecies of love was attended with this advantage, that it left his mind free and diſengaged, and did not interfere in any reſpect with his projects of ambition (*m*). He had ſerved in the army in the war with the United Provinces, in a high rank, and with great glory: and his merit, as a ſoldier, was either the cauſe, or, as oftener happens in courts, the pretext for his preferment to the important ſtation of viceroy of Naples. In this ſtation he amazed the world with the ſingularity of his character, and diſturbed its repoſe by the boldneſs of his ambition (*n*).

Hiſtory of the Uſcocchi.

When the race of Ottoman extended their conqueſts from the Black Sea to the gulf of Venice, a number of the ancient inhabitants fled from the terror of their irreſiſtible arms, to the foreſts and mountains on the frontiers of the countries now known by the name of Turkey in Europe. And, having acquired, from their wandering and unſettled manner of life, a ferocity of character, they

(*m*) What was ſaid of Sylla is applicable to Oſſuna. Voluptatum cupidus, gloriæ cupidior, otio luxurioſo eſſe, tamen a negotiis nunquam voluptas remorata.

(*n*) Batt. Nan. Hiſt. della Republica Veneta, lib. iv. 1620. Hiſtoria de Don Felippe IV. Rey de las Eſpanas por Don Gonçalo de Ceſpedes. Lib ſegundo, capitulo ſeg.

they gradually became careleſs of their herds and flocks, and ſubſiſted chiefly by hunting and by rapine. The Uſcocchi, for that is the name by which thoſe fugitives were diſtinguiſhed, were no longer that effeminate race which yielded without reſiſtance their fertile poſſeſſions to the invaſions of their enemies. Impelled by the hardſhips and the courage of barbarians, they made frequent inroads into the ſettlements of their conquerors, and ſatisfied their wants by plunder, while they gratified their revenge by devaſtation. In this vagabond ſtate they lived for many years, wandering from place to place, ſtill directing their courſe to thoſe wild and rugged abodes which proſperous nations avoid, but which the unfortunate court as the ſeats of freedom. The Auſtrian coaſts on the confines of Iſtria, broken by the operation of the elements into a thouſand rocks and creeks, and ſmall iſlands of difficult acceſs, appeared a fit habitation to the Uſcocchi: and the emperor, Ferdinand, deſirous by all means, to form a barrier againſt the irruptions of the Turks into Hungary, beſtowed on this fierce and warlike people, the ſtrong town of Segna, which became their capital. In the neighbourhood of theſe fugitives lay the territories of a people ſimilar in their origin, but more proſperous in their fortune (*o*), whoſe wealth both on ſea and land, invited the rapacity of men who had no other profeſſion than that of robbers and pirates. The Uſcocchi, inſtead of puniſhment for theſe offences, received protection from Ferdinand, archduke of Gratz, within whoſe government Segna was ſituated. This produced a war between the Auſtrians and the Venetians. The menaces of the Turks,

War between the Auſtrians and Venetians.

(*o*) The Venetians found an aſylum from the fury of Attila, in the inſignificancy ſtill more than the natural ſtrength of the fens and moraſſes.

Book V. Turks (*p*), and the proſpect of an expenſive election to the crown of Bohemia, ſoon inclined Ferdinand to hearken to terms of accommodation with the republic, whoſe army, powerfully reinforced by ſoldiers of fortune from Holland, had inveſted the capital of Goritia, and reduced it to the greateſt extremity of diſtreſs. The Spaniards would have willingly furniſhed the means of carrying on a war againſt a people that on every occaſion ſtrenuouſly oppoſed their domineering ſchemes in Italy. But their conteſt with Charles Emanuel fully employed all their reſources, and prevented a disjunction of their forces. Yet, whatever could be done in favour of Ferdinand and the Uſcocchi, was performed by the duke of Oſſuna and the marquis of Villa Franca. Amidſt the heat of the campaign in Piedmont, Toledo kept up a conſiderable military force near the Venetian borders, and made other preparations which ſeemed to threaten a diverſion in favour of the Auſtrians. This, the truce with the duke of Savoy brought about by the mareſchal Leſdiguieres, enabled him afterwards to accompliſh. While Don Pedro, by his menaces, and by his attacks on the Venetians by land, endeavoured to relieve the Auſtrians; Oſſuna, by various operations at ſea, and with great ſucceſs, laboured for the ſame end. By his orders, a Spaniſh fleet cruized in the Mediterranean, in order to intercept any ſuccours that might be ſent to the republic by that channel; while another interrupted the ſources of their wealth and power, by ſeizing their merchant ſhips in the Adriatic. Theſe were brought in triumph into the port of Naples, which became the rendezvous of corſairs and pirates. Here, ſuch of the Uſcocchi as had been driven from

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(*p*) Winwood's Memoirs, vol. iii. A letter from ſir Dudley Carleton, dated Venice, 27th February, 1612.

from their ſtrong holds on the Auſtrian coaſt, found freedom of trade and perſonal protection. The profuſe genius of Oſſuna did not afford ſhelter to the Uſcocchi and other pirates that he might ſhare in their plunder, but that he might collect a ſufficient number of deſperate men for the execution of any daring enterprize. In the mean time, the Neapolitan merchants found means of repreſenting to the court of Madrid, that the piratical trade which was now carried on at Naples, had ruined fair commerce, and of courſe diminiſhed the royal revenues. Happily for the Neapolitans, their complaints coincided, both in time and intention, with the remonſtrances of France. An order was diſpatched to all the Spaniſh miniſters in Italy to ſuſpend hoſtilities, as a negociation was now on foot for a general peace between Savoy and Spain, and the Venetians and Ferdinand of Auſtria.

THE marquis of Bedmar ſoon after paid his compliments to the Venetian ſenate on its happy concluſion (*q*); and Toledo withdrew the troops he had ſent into the ſtates of the republic, into the territories of Milan. But Oſſuna, enraged at the very name of peace, ſends a fleet into the Adriatic, under the command of the famous admiral Rivera, and denounces immediate death againſt the man who ſhould dare to complain to the court of Madrid of the interruption of commerce. Both this fleet and that which was ſent to oppoſe it from Venice, after a ſlight encounter,

(*q*) It was agreed that the Venetians ſhould reſtore their conqueſts without reſerve: and on the part of the Auſtrians, that they ſhould reſtrain the piracies of the Uſcocchi; baniſh their ring-leaders, and alſo the banditti of the republic that lived among that people; that they ſhould change the governor of Segna, and bridle that place by a German garriſon; and finally, that they ſhould give up all the captures of Oſſuna.

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ter, were diſperſed by a ſtorm. The Spaniards took ſhelter in Brundiſium, the Venetians in St. Croce, a port which they had occupied for ſome time, with a view to prevent Oſſuna from fortifying, as he threatened, ſeveral rocks on the confines of Raguſa, a ſmall republic protected by the Turks. The Raguſans, a commercial people, were naturally diſpoſed to give every encouragement to a power that diſputed the empire of the Adriatic with a nation whom they had long conſidered as their oppreſſors: accordingly, they had received, at different times, Oſſuna's fleets into their harbours, and both refreſhed them with proviſions, and recruited them with ſailors. The Venetians now chaſtiſed this avowed partiality for their enemies; and the Raguſians complained of their conduct, and repreſented their deſigns as dangerous to the Ottoman port. A military force was immediately ſtationed along the coaſts of Dalmatia and Albany; and Oſſuna, taking advantage of this circumſtance, endeavoured to ſpread, throughout all the Italian ſtates, the terror of a Turkiſh invaſion. The beſt poſſible expedient on this alarming occaſion, he ſaid, would be to ſtrengthen his hands with ſuch a naval force as might be ſufficient to defend the liberties of Europe, and raiſe, among the Infidels, the name of Chriſtians. But the vigilance of the Venetian ſenate, diſcovered that at this very time Oſſuna was practiſing on all the paſſions which uſually determine the public conduct of the Porte, in order to draw the fury of their arms upon the iſland of Candia, at that time ſubject to the dominion of the republic. This fact, announced to all the courts of Europe, confounded the ſubtlety of Oſſuna, and left him, for a ſhort time, without the reſource of a ſingle ſtratagem. The Spaniſh fleet in the mean time, and numbers of privateers, continued to plunder the

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the ſhips, and to ravage the coaſts of Venice. The pope, and the ambaſſadors of France, interpoſed their good offices with Oſſuna, in behalf of the republic, in vain. Philip himſelf, by letters written with his own hand, commanded him to abſtain from all hoſtilities, and to reſtore all that he had taken from Venice. His Catholic majeſty had not better ſucceſs than his holineſs and the count de Bethune. Oſſuna offered, indeed, in conſequence of the orders of the king, to reſtore the empty veſſels, but declined to give back their valuable freights. He continued his piracies and depredations, deigning, however, to cover his diſobedience to the commands of the king, by thoſe excuſes which the various courſe and accidents of war readily ſuggeſt to the imagination of an ingenious commander. "It is not fit, he would ſay, at one time, that I ſhould ſit ſtill, while the Venetians are fortifying the harbour of St. Croce." "I will perſiſt, he would exclaim with vehemence at another, in my preſent conduct ſo long as the Venetians ſhall retain in their pay the moſt inveterate enemies of the king my maſter." When he was ordered to deliver an account of the merchandize he had ſeized, he ſeemed to ſport with the orders of Philip, by giving an inventory ſo imperfect as the Venetian ambaſſador refuſed to accept, and even complained of the mockery. The Venetians, thus plundered, and inſulted, equipped a fleet, which retaliated on the Spaniards all the piracies and depredations of the viceroy of Naples: but, at the ſame time, the ſenate regretted the neceſſity they were under of defending themſelves by making ſuch repriſals. To the marquis of Bedmar, the Spaniſh ambaſſador, they complained of the never-ceaſing hoſtilities of Oſſuna, and profeſſed themſelves at a loſs to reconcile the actions of the viceroy of Naples with the declarations of the

Book V. 1618. the king of Spain. The ambaſſador, in reply, touched with an impoſing delicacy on the irregularity of Oſſuna's diſpoſition, and inſinuated that the conduct of that duke was neither under the controul of the king, his maſter, nor of any fixed principles or regular ſyſtem of action. In reality, the behaviour of Oſſuna ſeemed to furniſh matter for ſuch an apology, while he directed the Spaniſh arms, in ſpite of repeated orders from his ſovereign, againſt a ſtate with whom he had not declared war; and conſtantly meditated hoſtile deſigns, of which he talked without reſerve to all around him, although, from their nature, the utmoſt ſecrecy was neceſſary to their execution. His converſation turned wholly upon ſurpriſing the Venetian ports in Iſtria, plundering their iſlands, and even making a deſcent on Venice. He had himſelf carefully ſtudied the plan of that city, and he now deſcribed it with infinite accuracy to all who poſſeſſed his confidence. He contrived flat-bottomed boats, with machines to facilitate their motion, and made daily experiments of the weights which the ſeveral depths of water were capable of bearing, according to the different conſtructions and dimenſions of veſſels. To the Venetians, tranſactions ſo open and avowed, were a ſubject of laughter, and gave weight to the defence of the marquis of Bedmar. They were ignorant that the hoſtilities, of which they complained, proceeded from the ſecret machinations of this miniſter himſelf, which were more effectually concealed by the extravagance and apparent folly of the duke, than they could have been by the moſt ſtudied ſecrecy and circumſpection (*r*).

The

(*r*) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. 1617. Conjuration des Eſpagnols, &c. par M. L'Abbé St. Real.

THE princes and ſtates of Italy, enervated by luxury, or employed in commerce, committed themſelves to the protection of mercenaries (*s*), diſtinguiſhed by the name of Leaders of Bands (*t*). The tranſition was not unnatural from mercenary ſoldiers to private aſſaſſins. The military and generous ſpirit of ancient Rome was ſubdued by deſpotiſm and by luxury; and throughout the whole of Italy, broken into innumerable principalities by the diſſolution of the Roman empire, the petty ſovereigns had recourſe on all occaſions to ſtratagems and plots, not the valour of arms. And, as cuſtoms and manners always deſcend from the higher to the lower ranks of men, plots and aſſaſſinations became common among the people as well as their princes. Conſpiracies, together with other practices and arts, were diffuſed from Italy over other parts of Europe; and eſpecially over thoſe countries between which and Italy there was a cloſe intercourſe and connection (*u*).

Frequency of plots and aſſaſſinations accounted for.

It

(*s*) Nichol. Machiavelli, Hiſtoria Florentina, lib. i.

(*t*) Condottieri.

(*u*) It is confeſſed, that plots and aſſaſſinations are to be found in the hiſtory of all nations: yet it will readily be allowed, that theſe are more frequent in that of modern Italy than in the accounts we have of any other country, if the reign of Philip III. of Spain does not form an exception to this poſition. As writers commonly chuſe for the ſubjects of their productions, things not wholly unknown, but which they ſuppoſe to need new proofs and illuſtrations, ſo the famous Machiavel did not interweave into his political ſyſtem, thoſe diſhonourable artifices which ſet all juſtice and fidelity at defiance, from a miſchievous originality in his own mind. He laid down rules for conſpiracies, becauſe conſpiracies were in every body's mouth, and every where practiſed. To plan and accompliſh an ingenious plot, formed, in his time, a branch of political education. Archbiſhop Spotſwood, in his Hiſtory, relates, that when he viſited the earl of Gowrie, who formed a conſpiracy againſt James VI. king of Scotland, he found him reading a Latin book de Conjurationibus. The earl had been a profeſſor of philoſophy in Italy, from whence he had juſt returned.

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It is the nature of every paſſion to tend as directly as poſſible towards its object (*v*). The love of power, and the deſire of revenge, wait not the ſlow proceſs of conſpiracies, nor truſt to their uncertain iſſue, when they can gain their end by the plain and direct road of ſuperior force. It was a proof of the decline of Spain, that ſhe adopted a practice, founded in fear and weakneſs. But of all the conſpiracies or plots which were formed or connived at by the Spaniſh miniſters, in this or any other period, that which was framed againſt the republic of Venice, by Don Alphonſo de la Cueva, marquis of Bedmar, was the moſt remarkable, and the moſt important, whether we have reſpect to its end, or to that complicated machinery by which it was to be accompliſhed. That the marquis was a perſon of very extraordinary abilities ſufficiently appears from this circumſtance, that, at a time when the cabinet of Madrid had an option of diſtinguiſhed abilities, he was appointed ambaſſador in ordinary at Venice, of all the courts of Europe the moſt refined in its politics and determined in its counſels. From an intimate acquaintance with ancient as well as modern hiſtory, which he read with the eyes of a philoſopher and ſtateſman, and much obſervation on the ſcene of human life, in which he was at once an important actor and judicious ſpectator, he acquired a ſagacity to which the council of Spain looked up with an almoſt ſuperſtitious veneration. To a deep inſight into the nature of political affairs, he added thoſe qualities that are ſo requiſite in a practical politician; a facility of ſpeaking and writing with inexpreſſible grace; a quick diſcernment of characters; an air and manner always frank and unreſerved; and at the

Spaniſh conſpiracy againſt Venice.

Character of the marquis of Bedmar.

(*v*) Unde feritur eò tendit geſtitque coire. Lucret.

the ſame time ſuch force of mind, that under the moſt trying feelings of the heart, and the ſevereſt agitations of the paſſions, he betrayed not the ſmalleſt ſymptom of perturbation, but on the contrary retained the moſt unequivocal appearance of perfect ſerenity (*w*). With theſe qualities, which diſtinguiſhed his character, he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree another, which is common to all Spaniards; a zeal for the glory of the monarchy and the honour of the Spaniſh name. This had of late undergone an eclipſe, and the marquis was willing to revive its luſtre by the total ruin of a power that had contributed ſo greatly to its decay, the republic of Venice. He was invited to attack this ſtate by various circumſtances: the war with the Auſtrians had drained Venice both of arms and men; the fleet was confined to Iſtria, the ſeat of the war; the land army was equally diſtant; the exigencies of war had occaſioned the moſt oppreſſive taxes, which, as the people ſuſpected, were not wholly applied to the public uſe: the marquis, therefore, perſuaded himſelf that the revolution he had planned would not only be practicable, but to the generality of the people, acceptable; nay, of the nobility, not a few were diſcontented with the government, and rejoiced in all the misfortunes of the ſtate, as the effects of meaſures which they had diſapproved. The more neceſſitous of that order, the marquis knew by experience, might be prevailed on, if not to act a part in the tragedy, yet to give ſuch intelligence as might in reality promote the cataſtrophe of Venice. Another ground of encouragement was, that the flower of the Venetian army conſiſted of Hollanders and Walloons, mercenaries, whoſe officers he truſted might be ſeduced by the powerful allurements of gold, to betray the cauſe of Venice,

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(*w*) Conjuration des Eſpagnols, &c. St. Real.

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nice, and to eſpouſe that of Spain. The fleet of the republic was indeed formidable, but there too he hoped to make dreadful havoc with the ſame weapons he propoſed to employ in weakening the Venetian army. It only remained, that he ſhould attach to his perſon, and to the terrible object he had in view, a ſufficient number of determined confidents, by means of whom he might combine the efforts of thouſands in a ſcheme, with the nature of which they were not to be entruſted until the moment of execution. He imparted his project to the marquis of Villa Franca, and the duke of Oſſuna. Theſe miniſters were delighted with the novelty and the boldneſs of his ideas, and without heſitation promiſed to contribute all in their power towards its accompliſhment. It does not appear that he communicated his deſign to the court of Madrid; but he was ſufficiently acquainted with the ideas of ambition that ſtill reigned in the council of Spain, to know, that if the project ſhould be carried happily into execution, of which he did not entertain any doubt, it would meet with their hearty applauſe and admiration. But while this project was ripening by degrees, the court of Spain was obliged, by the vigour of the young king of France, to make gradual advances towards a general peace in Italy. This would have diſarmed the troops of Spain, and deprived the conſpirators of thoſe inſtruments with which they hoped to ſubject to the monarchy the ſtates of Venice. Hence the various artifices of Toledo and Oſſuna to prolong the war, and to prevent a final accommodation of differences. The marquis had by this time entered into the moſt intimate correſpondence and confidence with a number of men, who, confiding in the tranſcendent powers of his mind, and contemplating the mighty rewards that were exhibited to their view, were ready to execute his orders

ders with promptitude and alacrity. Theſe men were highly diſtinguiſhed from the multitude, by conſtancy in the moſt trying ſituations, by unſhaken fidelity to their engagements, and by a bold and daring courage. Nothing was wanting to entitle them to the higheſt degree of praiſe, but the exertion of theſe virtues in a worthy cauſe.

THE principal arrangements in this conſpiracy were theſe: fifteen hundred veteran troops, choſen from the Spaniſh army in Milan, by Don Pedro himſelf, were to be introduced into the city of Venice, not in a body, but a few at a time, and unarmed. They were to receive arms from the marquis of Bedmar. But leſt any unforeſeen accident ſhould marr the intentions of Toledo, five thouſand Hollanders, who lay at the Lazaretto, not above two miles diſtant from the city, were ready to be introduced, man by man, at firſt, and afterwards, in the tumult and confuſion that was expected to enſue, in a body. Brigantines and barks were to be ſent from Naples into the channels and ports of Venice, having on board ſix thouſand men. A number of large ſhips were afterwards to caſt anchor on the ſhores of Friuli. Under the countenance of the latter, and amidſt the confuſion and horrors to be excited by the former, the conſpirators were to act their ſeveral parts in the intended tragedy: one was to ſet fire to the arſenal, others to different parts of the city; ſome were to take poſſeſſion of the mint; ſome to ſeize the principal places of ſtrength; and the part allotted to many, was, to annihilate the conſtitution of Venice by murdering the ſenators. Artillery was to be drawn up to the higheſt eminences, for the purpoſe of laying the city in ruins, in caſe the inhabitants ſhould attempt reſiſtance. Field pieces were to be diſpoſed in different quarters of the city, pointing into the principal ſtreets.

BOOK V. 1618. And as it was neceſſary to be in poſſeſſion of ſome inland town in the territories of the republic, which might ſerve as a barrier againſt the return of the Venetian land army, if called to Venice to oppoſe the conſpirators, and as a magazine for the Spaniſh army, Don Pedro held a cloſe correſpondence with certain officers of the garriſon of Crema, who were to betray that town into the hands of the Spaniards. Another plot was yet neceſſary to give full effect to the grand conſpiracy. A port was to be occupied in the Venetian gulf, which might receive the Spaniſh fleet, if, by any accident, it ſhould be obliged to ſeek a retreat, when employed in that ſea. There is a place of conſiderable ſtrength, called Marano, in an iſland bordering upon Iſtria, with a harbour capable of receiving a large fleet. The officer ſecond in command in the garriſon of Marano engaged to aſſaſſinate the governor, whenever he ſhould receive orders from Toledo, and to hold the town in the name of the Spaniards (*x*).

SUCH was the complicated ſcheme formed for the deſtruction of the renowned city and republic of Venice: a ſcheme which involved in its nature whatever human ingenuity could plan, or the courage of man dare to execute, but which failed of ſucceſs from ſome of thoſe unforeſeen accidents that ſo often happen to intimidate the hearts of aſſaſſins, and to diſconcert the projects of conſpirators (*y*).

A CON-

(*x*) Conjuration des Eſpagnols, &c. St. Real. Conſpiration & Trahiſon admirable des Eſpagnols, &c. en 1618. Hiſtoire du Connetable de Leſdiguieres, liv. ix. Batt. Nani, Hiſtoria della Republica Veneta, lib. iii. 1618.

(*y*) The abbé St. Real ſays, that the conſpiracy was diſcovered by one of the conſpirators, who was ſtruck with horror and remorſe as the intended ruin and bloodſhed: Battiſta Nani,

A conspiracy ſo important in its end, and at the ſame time ſo various in its means, does not oocur in hiſtory. That of Cataline againſt the Roman republic, pointed to equal horrors, and to ſtill greater revolution; but the means by which he hoped to accompliſh it were more ſimple, and conſequently leſs abſurd than thoſe employed by the bold imagination, rather than the ſolid judgment of the marquis of Bedmar. It was probably in imitation of that circumſtantial and intereſting narrative which the Roman hiſtorian has given of the Catalinarian conſpiracy, that the eloquent and profound Saint Real compoſed his beautiful account of the Spaniſh conſpiracy againſt Venice. This copious narrative, though heightened in ſome inſtances by the colourings of poetry, and the circumſtantiality of fiction, is yet true in the moſt material particulars, and ſerves, in the words of the author to diſplay the "power of prudence over human affairs, and the dominion of fortune; the extent of the limits of the human mind, its greateſt ſtrength, and its ſecret frailties; the numberleſs conſiderations to which the politician muſt attend, who aſpires to govern his fellow men; and the difference between true and falſe refinement." It is this laſt reflection which perpetually recurs to the reader, and ſtrikes him with peculiar force. Nothing but the extravagance of hope, and the blindneſs of paſſion, could have ſeduced the judgment of Don Alphonſo de la Cueva, to believe that he ſhould be able, by any efforts of genius, to combine into one harmonious machine, ſo many and ſuch various ſprings. The various ideas and correſponding emotions and paſſions which riſe in the mind on different occaſions, and in different circumſtan-

Nani, that it was diſcovered by two French gentlemen, who had come to the knowledge of it, relations of mareſchal Leſdiguieres.

Book V. 1618.

ces, render the views and deſigns of men fluctuating and uncertain. The ſmalleſt incident in health or fortune, is ſufficient to ſhake a reſolution big with danger and death. The minds of men are ſo delicate, refined, and variable inſtruments, that a thouſand accidents diſturb their operation. The moſt fortunate adventurers in life, are thoſe who do not pretend to form, but who have vigilance and ſagacity to improve conjunctures. Political revolutions are not to be effected by the ſubtleties and refinements of a genius profound and metaphyſical; but by the boldneſs and dexterity of a Cæſar or a Cromwell, who know to ſeize the important moment of deciſive execution.

But if ſo vaſt a project as the conſpiracy againſt the city and republic of Venice, had not been altogether beyond the reach of human abilities, it might poſſibly have been accompliſhed by the united efforts of Toledo, Oſſuna, and the marquis of Bedmar. Though the revenues of Spain were greatly diminiſhed, and a manifeſt langour and irreſolution appeared in her counſels, her military genius was yet entire and unbroken; nor in the hiſtory of any people is there to be found a greater compaſs of political ability and art than at this time diſtinguiſhed the Spaniſh nation. While the miniſters of Spain in Italy, by the moſt extraordinary efforts to ſupport or retrieve the glory of the monarchy, ſignalized at leaſt their own ingenuity and courage, the abilities of her ambaſſadors generally managed the courts at which they reſided with equal dexterity and ſucceſs. The ties of intereſt and blood, which united the two branches of the houſe of Auſtria, obſcure the praiſes that are due to the abilities of the Spaniſh miniſters at the courts of Ferdinand and Matthias. But in France, Monteleone knew how to adapt his tone to the timidity of Mary, the high ſpirit of Lewis,

Character of the Spaniſh nation.

Lewis, and the different paſſions and views of their reſpective favourites. And in England, Gondomar gained mightily on the favour of the pedantic, ſocial, and impolitic king, by talking falſe Latin (z), with other facetious humours, and by amuſing him with the hope of a marriage between the prince of Wales and the ſecond infanta (a). Book V. 1618.

Digreſſion concerning the character of the Spaniards.

A WAR with the Saracens, prolonged, with few intervals, for eight hundred years, nouriſhed in the Spaniards a vigour of character, a love of their country, and a paſſion for glory. The neceſſity of continually engaging, formed as many heroes as there were men in each city: military renown was the great object of their vows; and the tombs of the deceaſed were adorned with a number of obeliſks equal to that of the enemy they had ſlain in battle (b). While they lived expoſed to continual dangers they acquired that gravity of deportment, that deliberate valour, that perſeverance and vigilance which ſtill diſtinguiſh the

(z) Mr. Arthur Wilſon, in his Life of King James, informs us, among other curious anecdotes of that good-natured monarch, that "Gondomar in his merry fits would tell the king that his majeſty ſpoke Latin like a Pedant, but that he himſelf ſpoke it like a gentleman." The king, we may preſume, accepted this as an high encomium. There was nothing in which James exulted ſo much, as in that ſuperiority which he undoubtedly poſſeſſed over moſt of his courtiers, in literature. "Sir Edward Conway, ſays Mr. Wilſon, governor of the Brille, one of the cautionary towns, was made by king James, ſecretary of ſtate: a rough unpoliſhed piece for ſuch an employment! But the king, who wanted not his abilities, would often make himſelf merry with his imperfect ſcrawls in writing, and hacking expreſſions in reading, ſo that he would break into laughter, and ſay, had ever man ſuch a ſecretary, that can neither read nor write?" Gondomar had perfectly underſtood the character of the king: and he practiſed on his weakneſſes with infinite dexterity.

(a) Franklyn, p. 71. (b) Johannes Geneſius Sepulveda de Rebus Geſtis, Caroli V. lib. i.

BOOK V. 1618. the Spaniſh nation. Before the ambitious and warlike reigns of Ferdinand, the emperor, and Philip II. the ſagacity and vigilance of the Spaniards appeared formidable to the other nations of Europe (*c*). Theſe reigns continued to call forth and exerciſe the ſpirit of the nation, and to ſupport, if not to heighten, that national character which had been formed by the wars with the Moors. And this national character ſtill ſhone forth with undiminiſhed luſtre after the imprudence of the court, and exhauſted reſources, had undermined the foundations of the grandeur of the empire. As proſperous war rouſes the genius of a nation, the glory of letters would have correſponded to that of the Spaniſh arms, had not the progreſs of taſte and knowledge been checked by the tyranny of the inquiſition, and that deſpotiſm which was introduced into the government. But although theſe circumſtances have prevented among the Spaniards the growth of ſound philoſophy, in their poetry, hiſtory, romances, and even their commentaries on the ſacred ſcriptures, as well as on Ariſtotle, whoſe metaphyſical notions were deemed ſo orthodox by the Catholic church, we recognize that boldneſs and invention, that ſubtlety and refinement which were conſpicuous for ages in the military and political conduct of Spain.

THUS, that power of genius and valour among his ſubjects, which at once adorned and diſgraced the feeble reign of Philip III. ſeems deducible from

(*c*) Machiavel ſays, in his Account of the State of France, that the French were afraid of the Spaniards on account of their ſagacity and vigilance. It is true, that this account was written after Ferdinand had begun to reign: but it was before the exertions of that prince could have ſtamped on the minds of his ſubjects, a national character.

from a train of moral cauſes, as obvious in their exiſtence as powerful in their nature. But when the reader revolves what is left on record concerning ancient Spain, he will be inclined perhaps to ſubſcribe to the opinion of an ingenious writer, that the characters of nations as well as families, are influenced by accidents antecedent to birth (*d*), and particularly by climate, acting either immediately with powerful energy on the fabric of their being, or as a local circumſtance leading to a variety of action in the œconomy of civil life. At all times, valour and genius have ennobled the character of the Spaniards. Not the robuſt German, impelled by the fury of a ſavage religion, diſplayed ſuch enthuſiaſm in arms and contempt of death, as ſhone forth in the invincible reſolution of the inhabitants of Numantia, Aſtapa, and Saguntum. A greater hero than Viriatus is not to be found in the hiſtory of ancient Rome (*e*). Between the times of the Scipios and thoſe of Auguſtus, there intervened a period of two hundred years. During this long ſpace, Spain maintained a conteſt with the policy and diſciplined valour of Rome: and it ſeemed uncertain which maſters the world was to obey, the Spaniards or the Romans. The deſtiny of Rome to give law to the nations finally ſubdued all reſiſtance, and Spain had the glory of being the laſt that yielded to the Roman yoke. But it was the fortune of the vanquiſhed to receive literature and refinement from the conquerors of the world: and in return, Trajan added luſtre to the Roman purple; and the names of Quintilian, Martial, Mela, Seneca, Lucan, and Florus, appeared in the liſt of Latin authors.

ALL

(*d*) Eſſay on the Hiſtory of Mankind, &c. by Dr. Dunbar.

(*e*) This man, who had reſiſted the Roman arms for twenty years, and who was deemed invincible, was at laſt inſidiouſly cut off by the Romans, who bribed his body guards.

BOOK V.

1618. The duke of Savoy and the Venetians maintain their indepence.

ALL the valour and artifices of Spain were found unable to ſubdue the independence of the duke of Savoy and the Venetian republic. And the diſcovery of Bedmar's conſpiracy was quickly followed by the reſtoration of Vercelli to the duke, and that of their ſhips and merchandize to the Venetians. The court of Madrid, at the deſire of the ſenate, recalled de la Cueva; but a commiſſion to act as firſt miniſter in the Netherlands, a department which the ſituation of affairs in Germany rendered equally difficult and important, proved how much they approved his deſigns, as well as confided in his abilities.

THE HISTORY OF THE REIGN OF PHILIP THE THIRD, KING OF SPAIN.

BOOK VI.

THE aſtoniſhing efforts of that extraordinary triumvirate Bedmar, Oſſuna, and Villa Franca, to reſtore the predominancy of Spain in Italy, was an eruption of that ardent ſpirit which had been bred in times of national enterprize and proſperity. The monarchy, drained of its blood and ſpirits by emigrations, and by war, was in a ſtate of languor which naturally ſought for repoſe. To maintain the dignity of the Spaniſh nation in that languiſhing ſtate, was the arduous taſk devolved by the feeble hands of Philip on the duke of Lerma. That pacific and prudent miniſter, unwilling to expoſe the weakneſs of the empire, avoided as much as poſſible all appeals to arms, and it was not without reluctance that he drew the ſword which he had ſheathed at Antwerp, in the diſpute concerning the ſucceſſion to Juliers, and in the conteſt with the duke of Savoy. It was his chief ſtudy to ſupport the authority of Spain by intrigue, and by external magnificence and profuſion. The court of Madrid was the moſt brilliant in Europe: and a veil of pomp and ſplendour thrown around all the departments

Book VI. partments of government concealed from the vulgar eye the ſymptoms of its decay. The duke alſo made ſome attempts to recruit the vigour of the ſtate, as well as to hide its infirmities, by reviving agriculture, and protecting commerce.

1618. Internal policy of Spain.

The frequent examples of immenſe and rapid fortunes, made in the Indies, inſpired a contempt of tillage, the profits of which, though certain, were both ſlow and inconſiderable. Until the fatal year 1609, Spain poſſeſſed a remedy againſt this evil. The Moreſcoes, excluded by the laws from America, and from the profeſſion of arms, were not only expert manufacturers, but ſkilful and induſtrious huſbandmen; but their expulſion was followed by a ſtill more general neglect of agriculture, and a ſcarcity of the neceſſaries of life puniſhed the people for the bigotry of the court, and their own indolence. The duke of Lerma, in order to repair the loſs of the induſtrious Saracens, iſſued an edict, offering an order of nobility (*a*) to every man who ſhould give proofs of induſtry and ſkill in agriculture. It is remarkable that this meaſure, the propriety of which ſeemed to be founded in the national paſſion for lofty titles, was altogether fruitleſs. An exemption from all military ſervice was then promiſed to all induſtrious men; but neither had this proffered indulgence any conſiderable effect. A great part of the land ſtill lay waſte, and in the ſucceeding reign, ſtrangers were invited to cultivate the fields of Spain, with ſeveral advantages of great importance.

The commerce of the Spaniards in the Mediterranean having been diſturbed by the corſairs of

(*a*) The title and rank of Eſquire. Les Delices d'Eſpagne & de Portugal.

1618.

of Barbary, Don Lewis de Faxarado received orders to build a ſtrong fort on the gulf of Marmora. This was happily effected in the month of Auguſt 1613, and contributed not a little to ſcour the ſea from pirates (*b*). But commerce ſtill languiſhed as well as manufactures and agriculture, and the exactions of a government profuſely expenſive, were ſeverely felt by the oppreſſed people. Nor were the exigencies of the public the only ſource of thoſe taxes which afflicted the nation. The miniſter amaſſed an immenſe fortune from the ſpoils of the people. From the iſland of Sicily alone he drew an annual revenue of as much wheat as, being converted into money, amounted to ſeventy-two thouſand ducats. This he obtained from his eaſy maſter, in the name of a reward for his important ſervices. Even the good qualities of the duke multiplied the oppreſſions of his adminiſtration. His love of ſplendour and magnificence, his liberalities to his ſervants, his dependants, and to all men who had recourſe to his bounty, rendered his paternal inheritance wholly inadequate to his conſtant profuſion, which he ſupported at the expence of the public. The great offices of ſtate too, he either ſeized himſelf or beſtowed on particular favourites. And although caution and prudence are qualities generally and juſtly aſcribed to the duke of Lerma, in the diſtribution of offices he was not always governed by motives of policy, but ſometimes thoſe of perſonal attachment. But of all his favourites the chief was was the famous Don Roderigo de Calderona, whoſe ſingular fortune and fate demand particular attention. He was the ſon of a poor ſoldier of Valladolid, and Mary Sandelen, a native of Flanders. He poſſeſſed fine talents, and there was

Don Roderigo de Calderona.

(*b*) Summarium de Rebus Hiſpaniæ. Mariana.

BOOK VI. 1618.

was ſomething highly intereſting and engaging in his manner. He entered on the career of ambition in the character of a menial ſervant to the duke of Lerma, then marquis of Denia, and gained over the mind of his maſter ſuch an aſcendant as that favourite poſſeſſed over the mind of the king. Having riſen through all the principal offices in the houſehold of the duke, he was advanced by the unbounded favour of his patron to places of great power and truſt in the ſtate, created firſt count of Oliva, then marquis of Siete Igleſias, and acquired an eſtate of a hundred thouſand crowns a year. Agreeably to the natural progreſs of human wiſhes, Calderona conſidered all the favours of fortune only as ſo many ſteps to farther preferment. He openly aſpired not only to a vice-royalty, but to the rank of a grandee of Spain. He was at firſt aſhamed of the meanneſs of his deſcent, and affected to conceal it: a frailty to which he afterwards ſhewed himſelf far ſuperior, by receiving his father into his family, procuring for the old ſoldier offices of emolument as well as honour, and treating him throughout life with the greateſt tenderneſs and reſpect. Though he had riſen from the loweſt rank of life, there was nothing in his behaviour unworthy of the higheſt birth. The dignity both of his ſentiments and manners was ſuch as might beſeem a prince. The vanity of Calderona which had made him aſhamed of his father, was now converted by an exceſs of proſperity into a haughty boldneſs and overbearing pride. His temper, naturally violent and impetuous, was unreſtrained by any of thoſe condeſcenſions and regards, which were ſo neceſſary in his ſituation, to ſoothe jealouſy and diſarm the rancour of envy. He mingled in all the intrigues at court; he delighted in the exerciſe of power; his favour was the ſureſt road to preferment, and this

this he diſtributed, for the moſt part, according to his own fancy and caprice, and without any regard either to merit or natural pretenſions. He had audiences as if he had been a ſovereign prince, held frequent conſultations, and ſhared, in one word, the adminiſtration of public affairs with the duke of Lerma. The haughtineſs and impetuoſity of Don Roderigo was contraſted by that decent moderation which appeared in the whole conduct and deportment of his father. This man frequently told his ſon, that his bark, which had ſo little ballaſt, if he ſhould continue to croud ſail, would infallibly be overſet in a ſtorm: a prediction which was afterwards fatally verified (*c*). BOOK VI. 1618.

THE nobles of Spain, whoſe power and influence had been reduced in the two preceding reigns, from the higheſt to the loweſt pitch, were called to the court of Philip III. and many of them enjoyed important political ſtations. But during thoſe reigns the order of nobility, if it was depreſſed by the vigour and the tyranny of the court, had not the mortification to ſee any ſubject exalted ſo far above them in the royal favour as to poſſeſs in reality the power of the ſovereign. To the grandees of Spain, a favourite was a hateful novelty, and the immoderate aggrandizement of Calderona ſeemed a ſtudied inſult on nobility of blood. Nor was the preſent adminiſtration diſtinguiſhed by any proſperous events which might drown the general murmurs of diſcontent in the voice of applauſe and acclamation. The prime miniſter was accordingly a general ſubject of ſatire and invective, both in diſcourſe and in writing. The complaints of the nation ſerved as an

(*c*) Gonçales de Ceſpides, lib. i. capitulo vii. Amelot de la Houſſaie Diſcours Hiſtorique, p. 142. Las Memorias, &c. con Eſcolios de Don Jnan Vitrian, 11. 13.

Book VI. 1618. an engine in the hands of his enemies to effect his downfal, which was embittered by this cruel circumſtance, that his power was ſubverted by thoſe very men who were the moſt bound, by the ties of blood, or of gratitude, to ſupport it.

Fall of Lerma. HAVING riſen to the higheſt power attainable by a ſubject, and having no farther object of ambition, the duke of Lerma only laboured to eſtabliſh the authority he poſſeſſed in the councils of Spain, on the firmeſt foundations, and to perpetuate it, if poſſible, in his family. With this view he introduced his ſon, the duke of Uzeda, at proper times, into the preſence of the king, and uſed every art to recommend him with effect to the royal favour. And, well knowing that the influence he poſſeſſed on the mind of Philip might be either ſtrengthened or overcome by any argument that ſhould make its appearance in the guiſe of religion, he brought Lewis Aliaga, a monk, from his convent to court, and advanced him to the office of confeſſor to the king. Aliaga was a man of a narrow capacity, and the duke entertained a high opinion of his probity. From a character of this kind he imagined he had nothing to apprehend. And, as the monk owed every thing to his favour, he truſted that he would be entirely devoted to his intereſt. Uzeda was one of thoſe inſignificant characters, whoſe underſtandings are below mediocrity, and who are neither remarkable for vice nor virtue. But he poſſeſſed in an eminent degree the poliſhed manners of a court, and by his conſtant aſſiduities to pleaſe, ſoon obtained as high a place in the affections of the king as Lerma ſtill maintained in his eſteem. The bewitching ſmiles of ſovereignty, equally diſſolving filial reverence and paternal tenderneſs, occaſioned a rivality between the father and the ſon, which terminated in an animoſity

animoſity that proximity of blood ſeemed only to irritate. Aliaga perceived the power which this diſſenſion placed in his hands, and deliberated whether he ſhould caſt the balance in favour of Lerma or Uzeda. The alternative he embraced is worthy of attention, not only on account of its political conſequences, but as it ſeems to prove that there is in the mind of man a diſpoſition to expect, in his own behalf, a higher degree of virtue from others than he is conſcious of poſſeſſing himſelf. Friar Aliaga, equally unmindful of that creative bounty which the generoſity of a patron ſo readily extends to the perſon whom he has already obliged, and of the treachery and ingratitude of his own heart, determined to abandon his benefactor, and to unite his intereſt with that of Uzeda, imagining that he had more to expect from a miniſter on whom he had conferred, than from one to whom he owed the greateſt obligations. The duke of Lerma endeavoured to counterbalance the growing influence of his ſon, by raiſing up a rival to him in the affections of the king. For this purpoſe he now laboured to inſinuate into the royal favour his ſiſter's ſon, the count of Lemos, a nobleman of high ſpirit and ſublime genius. He hoped to excite ſuch movements of jealouſy and envy between the count and Uzeda, as that he himſelf ſhould be equally neceſſary to both, and be able to hold in his own hands the balance of power between the contending rivals. But the pliant mind, and gentle manners of Uzeda, were more congenial to the nature of Philip than the erect and independent ſpirit of Lemos. The king was conſtantly attended by his new favourite and his confeſſor, and ſurrounded with numbers of diſcontented nobles, with whom theſe men kept up a cloſe correſpondence.

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IN the midſt of theſe intrigues the duke of Lerma ſolicits and obtains the rank of a cardinal, hoping that this religious dignity would prove the means of prolonging his power over the mind of the pious king, or at leaſt, that it would place him above the malice of his enemies and the enquiries of juſtice. But it was the fortune of this duke to undermine his own power by thoſe very meaſures which were intended to ſupport it. The indolent Philip was diſpleaſed to be under the neceſſity of exchanging the eaſe of former familiarity for thoſe ceremonies of reſpect which were due to the purple. The regard that had been every where ſhewn to the duke of Lerma was well pleaſing to the king, ſo long as all that he enjoyed was derived from his own bounty. The reſpect that was paid to the creature of his power he conſidered as an homage done to himſelf. But all his affections for the duke ceaſed the moment he attained to an equality with kings, and derived the ſplendour of his character from another ſource than the grace of his ſovereign. The preſence of the cardinal was uneaſy to him, and if he received him with formality, he received him alſo with coldneſs.

THE eſtrangement of the king from his old miniſter was not unobſerved by the eager eyes of the courtiers. The enemies of the cardinal duke, who had hitherto conducted their attacks by regular and ſlow approaches, now reſolved to carry that fortreſs, which had ſo long defended him, and in which he ſtill fondly confided, by aſſault. Upon the plauſible pretext of zeal for the ſervice of the king, and affection for his perſon, they repreſented the nation as one ſcene of oppreſſion, diſorder, and diſcontent, and threw the blame of the whole on the duke of Lerma. That miniſter, they affirmed, beſtowed the moſt important

portant offices on perſons who poſſeſſed not any other merit than that of being agreeable to his fancy, and the creatures of his power. And as the appointment to offices was a matter that depended ſolely on his favour, ſo the exerciſe of the power he beſtowed was determined by his will: for he over-ruled the freedom of deliberation in the different councils eſtabliſhed for the conduct of public affairs, and aſſumed the prerogative of dictating on every ſubject. The judges, in all caſes where he choſe to interfere, being obliged to give ſentence according to his orders, the very tribunals of juſtice were organs of his pleaſure. On the diſtreſſes of the people they inſiſted with peculiar zeal, lamenting, that the poor of a whole nation ſhould be deſpoiled of the few things they poſſeſſed, and even deprived of the neceſſaries of life, for the purpoſe of ſupporting the magnificence and mad extravagance of one man: a man who by various impolitic meaſures, and particularly by the circulation of braſs money, had contributed ſo fatally to the decline of manufactures, the ruin of commerce, the depopulation and impoveriſhment of the kingdom. Paſſing beyond the limits of Spain, they reviewed the conduct of the duke in the dependencies of the monarchy. The revenues of Sicily he had converted into a private eſtate. The war in Piedmont, ſo unavoidable in its progreſs, and in its iſſue ſo diſhonourable to the Spaniſh name, might have been cruſhed in its beginning by force of arms, or prevented by a timely attention to the ſituation and deſigns of foreign ſtates. As in war an able commander makes it his chief ſtudy to divide the forces of his enemy, ſo the art of government conſiſts not in reſiſting, but in preventing confederacies. Wars which, even if ſucceſsful, cannot be advantageous, ought never to be undertaken. The lion, ſaid they,

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in the proverbial manner of Spain, is not honoured by a victory over the lamb. A ſuperior power, if not greatly efficient in foreſight, can never be at a loſs to reſtrain the turbulence of an inferior, without coming to an open rupture, and reſting its authority on the doubtful events of war. From Italy they turned the eyes of the king to the ſeven United Provinces, once a part of that fair inheritance to which he had ſo juſt a claim as the heir of the duke of Burgundy. The truce with Holland; the formalities and ſolemnities with which that treaty had beeen ratified, and particularly the pompous title that had been given in that contract to the rebels, they mentioned with particular marks of indignation. They contraſted the virtue and the ability of the penſionary Barnevelt, with the incapacity of the duke of Lerma, and his indifference to the proſperity and glory of the nation. Unable to conduct the war, the Spaniſh miniſter, they ſaid, ſought to eſtabliſh his own power in peace; a peace that was diſgraceful in its nature, and which involved in its conſequences a greater loſs to the monarchy than it had incurred during a war of forty-five years that preceded it! While the war continued in the Netherlands, the main force of the rebels, concentrated in thoſe provinces, acted only on the defenſive. But the ignominious treaty of Antwerp had let looſe that force on the widely ſcattered ſettlements of Spain in both the Indies, which were either torn from the monarchy, or demanded ſuch additional garriſons for their protection, as might have been employed with greater honour, as well as advantage, in proſecuting the war on the theatre of rebellion. If the Spaniſh crown, in a glorious conteſt to maintain its juſt rights, ſhould have proved unſucceſsful, nothing more diſaſtrous could have enſued than what had actually happened: while, on the

the other hand, to have continued the ſtruggle, would have ſupported the honour of the nation among foreign powers, and, in the end, might poſſibly have derived ſome advantage from the chance of war, or that change which is incident to the policy and the views of ſtates and princes. Theſe and many other charges againſt the duke of Lerma, were conſtantly ſounded in the ears of the king, by his confeſſor and his favourite, and confirmed by the teſtimony or the authority of all whom they permitted to have acceſs to his perſon.

THOUGH ſovereign princes, from the ſupereminence of their ſtations, be naturally capricious, and fickle in their attachments (*d*), it would be unreaſonable, after theſe remonſtrances, to aſcribe the fall of Lerma to any inconſtancy in his ſovereign. There never was a prince, however deſpotic, ſo ſecure againſt the reſentment, ſo inſenſible to the applauſe, or ſo unconcerned for the proſperity of the public, as to oppoſe, for the ſake of a favourite, the general voice of his people. The conſtant appointment to offices, in contradiction to the recommendation of Lerma, fully illuſtrated the nature of that reſerve, which had given that miniſter ſo much pain, and was an unequivocal proof that he had wholly loſt the royal favour. In this extremity he laboured to acquire the good graces of the prince of Spain, fondly hoping that the rays of the riſing would brighten up the gloom that attended the ſetting ſun. The count de Lemos, and Don Ferdinand de Borgia, a man of ſound underſtanding, and poſſeſſed of talents for buſineſs, both lords of the bedchamber to the prince, had been raiſed to

(*d*) Go, ſays Agamemnon to Achilles, if you have a mind; there are not wanting others who will ſhew me honour. First Iliad.

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(*e*) Su Altezza, ſo the prince was diſtinguiſhed.

ragon. The high-ſpirited count, deeming the diſ- BOOK VI.
grace of the officers, and the exile of his friend 1618.
from court, an affront and injury to himſelf, had the boldneſs to aſk the king his reaſons for removing Don Ferdinand from the ſervice of the prince, adding, that if Ferdinand ſhould be baniſhed from the court, he would accompany him to the place of his retirement. The king replied in an angry tone, that it was his pleaſure to treat Don Ferdinand as he had done; and that the count, if he were ſo minded, might accompany him in his exile. Lemos was mortified by ſo ſevere a reply; yet he made another effort to keep Borgia at court, and that almoſt in ſpite of the king. He engaged the council for Italian affairs, of which Borgia was preſident, to remonſtrate againſt the removal of a miniſter, who, of all men in the world, was the beſt informed with regard to the affairs of Italy. The king anſwered, that he would appoint as ſucceſſor to Don Ferdinand the count of Benavento, whoſe knowledge of Italian affairs was unqueſtionable. Upon this the count de Lemos retired from court, conſoling himſelf with the reflection that he had made no mean compliances to gain the royal favour, but had performed the duties of friendſhip, and in the whole of his deportment maintained the nobleſt propriety and dignity of character.

THE magnanimity of the count ſeemed to arraign the conduct of the duke of Lerma, who, even after the diſgrace of his friends, lingered about the Eſcurial, and manifeſted the moſt eager deſire ſtill to hold his office. The king, finding that no marks of his diſguſt, however ſtriking, were able to induce his old miniſter to prevent the diſgrace of a formal diſmiſſion, in a billet written with his own hand, ordered him in expreſs

BOOK VI. preſs terms to withdraw himſelf from Madrid; but permitted him to retire to whatever place he
1618. ſhould chuſe, and enjoy in peace the effects of his former bounty. In theſe circumſtances the duke condeſcended to appear as a ſuppliant at the feet of the treacherous Aliaga. He entreated the monk to intercede in his behalf with the king. It is ſuperfluous to inform the reader that this humble application was wholly fruitleſs. He then ſent a meſſage to his brother, the archbiſhop of Toledo, whom he had raiſed to the high dignity and opulence he enjoyed, and who at that time reſided at Madrid, earneſtly ſoliciting him to come to the Eſcurial, and to ſupport him with his countenance, his advice, and his influence with the king. The archbiſhop excuſed himſelf from undertaking that ungracious office, by alledging that he was in a bad ſtate of health; but he ſent to the aſſiſtance of his brother father Jerome, of Florence, a Jeſuit, a preacher for whom the king entertained a particular reſpect. Father Jerome, in his private diſcourſe with the king, endeavoured with great addreſs to revive in his mind ſentiments of favour and regard to the duke of Lerma. But Philip did not receive his favourite preacher with his uſual affability, nor liſten to his inſtructions with wonted attention. The Jeſuit, perceiving this alteration in the deportment of the king, did not perſevere in his commendations of Lerma, and only pleaded, in favour of that miniſter, for a ſhort reſpite, which was refuſed in poſitive terms.

THE duke of Lerma now ſummoned up all his fortitude, and by the propriety and dignity of his deportment atoned for the meanneſs of his former ſolicitations. On the 4th day of October 1618, being ſtill in his apartments in the palace, he was ready to take his journey to his paternal eſtate,

eſtate, with a train of attendants ſuitable to his high rank, when the prince of Spain, who happened to take a walk in the garden, came up to the door of his chamber, and calling him aſide, converſed with him a conſiderable length in the language of tenderneſs and complacency. The duke then went to take leave of his ſiſter, the counteſs of Lemos, firſt lady of the bed-chamber to the princeſs of Spain. Having bowed to that lady five times, with great reſpect, he went into his chariot, and repaired for the laſt time to the manſion of the king. On his approach, he alighted from his carriage, and viewing the royal apartments with an eager eye, he ardently poured forth his bleſſing on them, and on the royal family. Having performed this duty, he remounted his chariot, and drove ſtraight to Guadarrama, where he lodged all night. At this place he received a letter from the king, the contents of which were never revealed to the curious and ſpeculating world, with a preſent of a ſtag, ſlain by his own hand that day in the chace. Thus both the king and the prince of Spain, with a generoſity worthy of their exalted ſtations, mixed the bitter cup of Lerma with refreſhing ſpices: and as no miniſter ever deſcended from a greater height of power, ſo none was ever laid more ſoftly down (*f*), and few perhaps ever deſerved a gentler fall.

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THE duke of Lerma was a perſonage of a noble mien, gentle manners, and a beneficent diſpoſition. The natural benignity of his heart appeared

Character of the duke of Lerma.

(*f*) Hiſtoria de Don Felippe III. por Don Gonçalo de Ceſpides, lib. i. cap. 3, 4. lib. ii. cap. 1. 17. Anecdotes du Miniſtere du Condé duc d'Olivarez. Les Memorias de Comines con Eſcolias propios de Don Juan Vitrian. Amelot de la Houſſaie. Diſc. Hiſtor. Addiciones a la Hiſtoria de Malvezzi Hiſtoria d'Eſpagna.

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peared in the mildneſs of his aſpect, the tone of his voice, and innumerable acts of munificence and liberality. His promotions to public offices were chiefly determined by political motives and perſonal friendſhip. Yet, it may be ſafely affirmed, that during his adminiſtration, all the places of principal truſt and importance were filled with men of extraordinary abilities. The judgments of men are commonly influenced by their natural temper. Agreeably to the mildneſs of his own diſpoſition, and his love of magnificence, he was of opinion that the dignity of the Spaniſh monarchy was beſt maintained by peace, pomp, and parade (*g*). And though he might, perhaps, have purſued this plan with greater œconomy; as it is certain that his profuſion was not the main cauſe, ſo it is probable that all his ſavings, had he been ever ſo much inclined to frugality, would not have been able to alleviate in any conſiderable degree the diſtreſſes of the nation. Though his capacity was but moderate, his ſoul was elevated, and his mind was firm. If he deſcended from his natural dignity to humble applications, in order to preſerve the good graces of his prince, we ought not on that account too haſtily to ſtigmatize his memory with meanneſs of ſpirit. The greateſt political and military courage has ſunk under the deprivation of royal favour. Neither the reſolute Ximenes, nor the undaunted Albuquerque, was able to ſupport the frowns of his ſovereign. Notwithſtanding the invectives

(*g*) He was very careful to exact every mark of reſpect to the crown of Spain from neighbouring nations, and ſometimes diſcovered a jealouſy on this head which was unworthy of a great nation. I find in Chamberlayne's Letters MSS. anno 1616, in the Britiſh Muſeum, the following paſſage: "The Spaniſh ambaſſador complained to the king at Theobald's, that whereas we kept ambaſſadors at Venice and in the Low Countries, an agent ſerved the turn in Spain and with the archdukes.

invectives of Lerma's enemies, the moſt reſpectable Spaniſh hiſtorians (*b*) not only celebrate the beneficence of his diſpoſition, but do juſtice to the moderation of his power, and the prudence of his public conduct. Theſe indeed, were afterwards confeſſed by the whole nation, when the vaſt ambition, and ſublime but irregular genius of Olivarez, by ſtretching the ſinews of the empire beyond their utmoſt tone, threw it into convulſions, and only rendered the diſſolution of its ſtrength more violent and painful.

THE whole employments of the duke of Lerma devolved on his ſon Uzeda, except that of governor to the prince, which was conferred on Don Balthazar de Zuniga, a man of cultivated genius, and great experience in political affairs, particularly in embaſſies (*i*).

Tragical end of Don Roderigo de Caldero-na, count of Oliva.

Soon after the diſgrace of Lerma, the count of Oliva was arreſted by order of the king, and thrown into priſon, where he languiſhed for the ſpace of two years. His riſe from ſo low a ſtation to ſo great a height of power gave birth to an opinion that he was a ſorcerer, which his enemies were at great pains to propagate. He was charged with having poiſoned the queen, who died in 1612; a charge as improbable in itſelf, as it was found to be unſupported by any evidence; for Don Roderigo ſtood as high in the favour of that princeſs as the duke of Lerma did in the affections of the king. Many other groundleſs accuſations were brought againſt him: but at laſt he was found guilty of having been acceſſary to the murder of two Spaniſh gentlemen: a matter which, according to ſome hiſtorians, was never clearly proved; he was however condemned to death, and

(*b*) Gonçales de Ceſpides y Meneſes. Don. Juan de Vitrian, &c. (*i*) Gonçales de Ceſpides, lib. i. cap. 4.

Book VI. 1618. and his eſtate was confiſcated. The evidence on which he was convicted was not direct, but circumſtantial; and if we may judge from ſome of the circumſtances left on record, as the principal ground of his condemnation, we may infer, that the deficiency of the proof was ſupplied by the zeal of both his accuſers and judges. The trial and confinement of Calderona were prolonged for two years and ſix months; a meaſure calculated to keep alive the general odium againſt his patron the duke of Lerma, and to prevent the return of that ancient favourite to court, of which the new miniſtry were not a little apprehenſive. During all the time that Calderona lay in priſon, there was not one among the multitudes he had obliged, except the cardinal Don Gabriel de Trejo, whoſe name deſerves to be recorded, nephew to the counteſs his lady, who had the humanity and the courage to attempt his relief, or to afford him any comfort. The cardinal was no ſooner informed of the impriſonment of Calderona, than, impelled by a generous gratitude, he ſet out from Rome to pay his reſpects to his patron in a dungeon, and determined to move every engine that his utmoſt efforts could command in order to releaſe him. But the cardinal was neither permitted to viſit the court nor the priſon. He lingered, however, a long time in Spain, in anxious hopes of finding ſome fortunate occaſion of ſaving his friend; but, on the death of pope Paul V. which happened in February 1621, he returned, by order of the king, to Rome.

Don Roderigo bore confinement, ſolitude, and torture, with incredible patience. After his doom was fixed, he was viſited, at his own earneſt deſire, by the miniſters of religion. His great ſoul, which had braved all the rage of his enemies with ſuch ſingular conſtancy, diſcovered, on the

the approach of death, a nobler heroiſm in the moſt perfect reſignation to the will of God; and in the moſt candid confeſſion, and ſincereſt contrition for the errors of his life. The ardour of his mind was now diſplayed in the ſeverities of ſelf-mortification. He was covered with hair cloth: he watched and prayed night and day: he afflicted himſelf with faſting, and with ſtripes; and, had not his confeſſor interpoſed, he would, in all probability, have anticipated the ſtroke of the executioner, by an exceſs of voluntary pain. One the 19th day of October, 1621, the firſt year of the reign of Philip IV. he received intimation, that within two days he ſhould die. He received the meſſenger of this welcome news with a chearful countenance, and tenderly embraced him. He now abſtained from ſleep and food, and ſpent his time in acts of devotion. About eleven of the clock on the 21ſt of October, he came to the door of the priſon, encompaſſed by the officers of juſtice. Affliction had ſoftened the natural dignity of his looks and mien: and his grey hairs, his beard, and his dreſs, ſuited to the preſent ſad occaſion, conſpired with the expreſſion of his countenance to impreſs the ſpectators with ſentiments of veneration and love. He yet poſſeſſed ſufficient ſtrength to mount on a mule that waited for him at the priſon. This he did with great tranquillity, and paſſed through the ſtreets to the place of execution, embracing and adoring a crucifix which he held in his hands, amidſt the tears and lamentations of the ſurrounding multitude. The executioner held the reins of the mule, and, as he went along, proclaimed aloud the following words: "This is the judgment, which, by the orders of our ſovereign lord the king, is inflicted on this man for his having been the inſtigator of an aſſaſſination; and acceſſary to another murder; and divers other crimes which appeared on his trial:

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trial: for all of which he is to be beheaded, as a a puniſhment to him, and a warning to others." Having arrived at the ſcaffold, the reſigned ſufferer beheld with a ſerene countenance the inſtruments of his approaching death; the chair, the ſword, and the man whoſe office it was to uſe it. He converſed, for ſome time, with his confeſſor and other divines. And, having been received into the boſom of the church, he took leave of his attendants, and ſat down on the ſeat from which he was never to riſe. Before his hands and his feet were made faſt, he made a preſent to the executioner, and twice embraced the man, who was bathed in tears, as a token that he bore him not any ill will on account of the office he was about to perform. Then, making bare his neck, he yielded his limbs to be bound, with the utmoſt compoſure. The inſtant this operation was performed, he reclined himſelf backwards (*k*), and while he was in the act of recommending his ſoul to God, his head was in a moment ſevered from his body. As the laſt impreſſions are commonly the ſtrongeſt (*l*), men forgave and forgot the imperiouſneſs of his former conduct and behaviour, and thought and ſpoke only of that mixture of humility and fortitude, that patience and piety, which he diſplayed in the laſt ſtage of his life (*m*).

THE counſels of Spain had, for many years, been diſtinguiſhed by a ſingular union of a deſire of

(*k*) In Spain, traitors alone are beheaded with their faces downwards. The Spaniſh word, is degollar, couper la gorge. The executioner performs his office face to face with the ſufferer.

(*l*) Sed plerique Homines poſtrema meminere. Julius Cæſar, Ap. Sallus. (*m*) Saavedra Deviſas Politicas. Amelot de la Houſſaie. Diſc. Hiſt. Article Calderona. Hiſtoriade Don Fellippe IV. por Goncalo de Ceſpedes, lib. ii. cap. xxvii.

of power, with a love of peace: but it was found impoſſible to gratify at once thoſe oppoſite paſſions. The intrigues of ambition excited the violence of arms. The commotions of Italy were followed by thoſe of Germany. A war was kindled, the moſt ſignal and deſtructive in modern annals. Famine and peſtilence ſucceeded to the deſtroying ſword, and the direful power of hunger equally overcame the ſtrongeſt antipathies, and violated the tendereſt affections of nature: ſo bloody was that tragedy which concluded ſo happily for the liberties of Europe, in the famous peace of Weſtphalia!

Origin of the thirty years war in Germany, that terminated in the peace of Weſtphalia.

The male line of Maximilian II. having terminated in Matthias, Maximilian, and Albert, who were now advanced in years, without progeny, the ſucceſſion to the hereditary dominions of Auſtria in Germany, might have been claimed, on plauſible grounds by the king of Spain (*n*). But a natural love of tranquillity, the deſire of preſerving in his houſe the imperial crown, and the dread of that dignity devolving on the head of a heretic, determined Philip to comply with the requeſt of the Auſtrian princes, and to yield up his pretenſions in favour of thoſe of Ferdinand of Gratz, great grandſon of Ferdinand I. and diſtinguiſhed by his zeal for the Catholic religion. He, accordingly, made a ſolemn ceſſion of all his rights to the Auſtrian provinces, to Ferdinand and his brothers, and their iſſue male. But, if that ſhould fail, it was ſtipulated, that the provinces ſhould return to the houſe of Spain, of which the females were to be preferred before thoſe born in Germany. On this occaſion, Philip and Ferdinand entered into a family compact, the object of which was not only to maintain the ſtrength of their

(*n*) The ſon of Ann, daughter of the emperor Maximilian II.

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The confederacy between the two branches of the houſe of Auſtria, and the ſteps that had been taken to continue in that family the imperial dignity, inflamed the jealouſy that had long prevailed of Auſtrian ambition, and diffuſed among the proteſtants of Germany, a general alarm. Ferdinand had baniſhed from his dominions all who perſevered in the open profeſſion of the reformed religion: a ſeverity which prognoſticated all the cruelty of religious zeal, wherever his power ſhould be eſtabliſhed. The apprehenſions of men were increaſed, when they conſidered this ſtrict alliance with the Catholic king, with whom he was connected by blood, by religion, and by intereſt. As he depended for ſupport chiefly on the treaſures and arms of Spain, ſo it was probable, he would be governed chiefly by Spaniſh counſels, whoſe conſtant aim was to wreathe around the necks of mankind the yoke of religious and civil tyranny. As the power of the emperor would be ſtrengthened by an alliance, or rather a ſpecies of union with the vaſt monarchy of Spain, ſo his claims, it was dreaded, would be increaſed in proportion, and the enlarged prerogatives of the imperial crown, if the ſucceſſions to that dignity ſhould

ſhould not be interrupted on the death of Matthias, would deſcend as an inheritance to the lateſt poſterity of the family of Auſtria. Book VI. 1618.

But the man on whoſe mind theſe conſiderations made the deepeſt impreſſion, was Frederic elector palatine, a prince young, high ſpirited, and in power not inferior to any of the proteſtants, the duke of Saxony perhaps excepted. He viſited all the members of the electoral college, to whom he repreſented, that as the preſent conjuncture demanded, ſo it preſented a fit occaſion of forming a barrier againſt the progreſs of Auſtrian ambition. He entreated them, by a timely interpoſition, to check the growth of an authority which muſt otherwiſe become irreſiſtible; and by a ſpirited and judicious exerciſe of their privileges, to perpetuate them in their families. The Catholic electors, as he had expected, he found attached to the houſe of Auſtria: and theſe were four in number, while the proteſtants were only three. But, in order to over-balance this inequality of numbers, Frederic with the conſent and approbation of his proteſtant brethren, made a tender of the imperial crown to the duke of Bavaria, not doubting but the archbiſhop of Cologne, one of the Catholic electors, would intereſt himſelf in the fortunes of the duke, his brother, and be forward to promote his greatneſs. This plan, in which there was not any thing ſubtle or profound, was the more ſolid and judicious, that it was obvious and natural. But it was diſconcerted by a cauſe that was ſcarcely to be ſubjected. The duke of Bavaria rejected the proffered dignity of the imperial crown, and all that the policy and zeal of the palatine was able to effect, was a ſhort delay in the election of a king of the Romans (*o*).

The

(*o*) Batt. Nan. Hiſt. della Repub. Venet. lib. iv.

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THE ſparks of diſcord which in other parts of the empire had produced only murmurs, jealouſies, and intrigues, having fallen, in Bohemia, on more combuſtible matter, had, by this time, blazed into the flames of war. As that kingdom is the higheſt ground, the moſt mountainous, and by nature, the ſtrongeſt in Germany, ſo its inhabitants had at all times been diſtinguiſhed for the loftineſs of their ſpirit, and the vigour and ſucceſs of their ſtruggles for civil liberty and religious toleration. It is bounded on the eaſt, by Moravia and Sileſia, the countries of the ancient Quadi and Marcommanni; on the weſt by Bavaria, part of the ancient Noricum; on the ſouth by the ancient Pannonia, now Hungary, with other provinces of Auſtria; and on the north by Saxony. It is almoſt ſurrounded by the mountains of the famous Hyrcanian foreſt, whoſe ſides broken into many ſloping ridges, interſect this lofty and ſpacious amphitheatre, and form a landſcape, bold, various, and of great beauty. This country is remarkably fertile, and before the ſpirit of the inhabitants was broken, and their induſtry checked by deſpotic government, ſo populous, that it was computed to have contained above three millions of ſouls.

Deſcription of Bohemia.

THE Bohemiams of thoſe times are repreſented by cotemporary hiſtorians, as a people of a ruddy complexion, and of enormous ſtature and force of body, and in their diſpoſitions intrepid, fierce, proud, quick in reſenting injuries, of an haughty mein, lovers of a rude magnificence and pomp, and addicted to revels and intemperance. The native language of Bohemia is the Sclavonic, which appears to have been the mother tongue of the Tartars and their offspring the Turks; and of all the nations inhabiting thoſe regions which extend from the northern parts of Ruſſia

Ruſſia to Turkey in Europe (*p*). The metropolis is Prague, a city of large extent, ſtretching along the banks, and on either ſide of the river Mulda, adorned with many ſumptuous edifices, and particularly two ſtrong caſtles, one of which was the reſidence of the ancient Bohemian kings. The rich provinces of Sileſia, Moravia, and Luſatia, were dependent on Bohemia, and formed a great addition to its power and importance in the ſcale of nations.

Origin and progreſs of the reformation.

The authority of the church of Rome was never ſo great and univerſal as wholly to baniſh from the Chriſtian world a ſpirit of enquiry and a love of knowledge. During the thickeſt darkneſs of the middle ages, a ſtar appeared here and there in the firmament which reflected the light of ancient times, and formed a preſage, that although the ſun of ſcience was ſet, it would return to enlighten bewildered nations. So early as the eighth century, Claud, biſhop of Turin, ſowed the ſeeds of reformation in the vallies of Piedmont, whence they were gradually tranſplanted into other countries. In the thirteenth century, the Waldenſes, or Vallenſes, or Albigenſes, for by theſe and other names, the diſciples of Claud were diſtinguiſhed, had ſpread ſo far, and become ſo numerous, that the pope thought it neceſſary to exert his utmoſt efforts to ſuppreſs them. For this purpoſe, the firſt cruſade was proclaimed of Chriſtians againſt Chriſtians, and the office of inquiſitor was eſtabliſhed. Such a war as had been waged with the infidels, was now carried on againſt theſe unfortunate heretics. In France alone, if we credit the authority of Mede, (*q*) ten hundred

(*p*) Ruſſia, Poland with Lithuania, Hungary, Tranſylvania, Sclavonia, Croatia, Iſtria, Wallachia &c. &c.

(*q*) Vide Mede in Apocalypſin, p. 503.

Book VI. 1618. dred thouſand periſhed by the ſword. According to an author leſs liable to the ſuſpicion of aggravating the horrors of the inquiſition, the Valdenſes in that kingdom were either cut off by fire and ſword, or diſperſed into remote regions, or driven to the faſtneſſes of neighbouring woods and mountains. Some ſought an aſylum in the Alps adjoining to Provence, part withdrew into Calabria, part obtained refuge in Britain, and others turning to the eaſt, took up their abode among the Bohemians, and in Livonia and Poland (*r*). In Germany they grew and multiplied ſo faſt, that in the beginning of the fourteenth century, it is computed there were eighty thouſand of them in Bohemia, Auſtria, and the neighbouring provinces. And ſo greatly had their number increaſed in the ſpace of the next hundred years, that they avowed and maintained their religious tenets, in ſpite of the tyranny of the pope, ſupported by the power of the emperor. In 1410, Robert I. the count palatine being emperor of Germany, and Winceſlaus, who had been depoſed from that dignity, on account of his egregious miſconduct, king of Bohemia (*ſ*).

The

(*r*) Thuani præfatio ad Henricum IV. p. 7.

(*ſ*) Winceſlaus was continually immerged in debauchery, and in his fits of intoxication, frequently exerciſed the moſt enormous cruelties on people of all ranks. From a ſtrange mixture of cruelty, whim, and indecency, he contracted an intimacy with the public executioner, whom he honoured with the appellation of 'goſſip.' His cook having offended him, he gave orders that he ſhould be roaſted alive. On account of theſe irregularities, and his ſelling the rights of the empire, both in Italy and Germany, he was depoſed by the unanimous voice of the electors from the imperial throne. Winceſlaus was ſo little mortified at the news of his depoſition, that he ſaid with the moſt perfect acquieſcence, "We are overjoyed to be delivered from the burthen of the empire." He ſent a meſſage to the imperial cities, requeſting them to ſend him, as the laſt token of their loyalty, ſome butts of their beſt

The doctrines of the Albigenſes were maintained by the learning, eloquence, and irreproachable lives of John Huſs and Jerome of Prague. Theſe reformers were condemned to the flames by the council of Conſtance, and ſuffered with the uſual fortitude of martyrs. A civil war was kindled from their aſhes. The Bohemians revolted againſt the emperor Sigiſmond, who with many reſpectable qualities was a zealous bigot to the catholic religion, and under the conduct of Ziſca, defended their opinions not only with arguments, but arms. The emperor was defeated in ſeveral battles, by this bold leader, who gave law to the kingdom of Bohemia till his death, which happened in 1424. He gave orders that a drum ſhould be made of his ſkin, and what is equally extraordinary, his orders were faithfully carried into execution. Ziſca's ſkin, after undergoing the neceſſary preparations, was formed into a drum, which was long the ſymbol of victory. Procopius, a Catholic prieſt, converted by the writings of one of the diſciples of John Huſs, revived the ſpirits of the Bohemian brethren, many of whom, after the death of Ziſca, had retreated to caves and mountains. This champion, who uniting the military with the ſacerdotal character, ſupported the cauſe of his party with great courage and bravery, fell in a battle with the Catholics. Yet, ſo terrible had the name of the Huſſites become to Sigiſmond, that he allowed them the cup in the ſacrament of the euchariſt (the deprivation of which had been the main ſource of their complaints) together with a general amneſty, and a confirmation of their privi-

beſt wine. He afterwards ſhut himſelf up in the caſtle of Viſigrade in Prague, abandoning himſelf to the gratification of his appetites. Such a character was not likely to intermeddle in religious diſputes.

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leges. But verbal and even written promiſes are eaſily retracted, where there exiſts not any power of enforcing their accompliſhment: and a right avails nothing without a remedy. The diſperſed brethren ceaſed to be formidable. Sigiſmond renewed his tyranny. His immediate ſucceſſors on the imperial throne were, like him, zealous Catholics. And the reformed in Germany were languiſhing under the preſſure of an arbitrary government, when Martin Luther raiſed up nations to their aid, revived their drooping ſpirits, increaſed their numbers, and exalted their power.

HAD the whole Chriſtian word at the time when Luther began to preach againſt indulgences been devoted to the Romiſh faith, however abſurd the doctrines of the clergy, and however profligate their lives, it is impoſſible that he could have met with any conſiderable ſucceſs: ſo great is the power of eſtabliſhed authority, and univerſally received opinion! But the never-ceaſing conteſts between the popes on the one part, and the emperors with other ſovereign princes on the other, diminiſhed of themſelves the reverence for the papal juriſdiction; and alſo tended wholly to ſubvert it, by rouſing an enquiry into the grounds on which it was eſtabliſhed. This enquiry was facilitated by the revival of literature, which, fatally to the reigning church, explored the foundations both of its power and doctrines. The diſcoveries of grave theologians and antiquarians were followed by the ridicule of wit and humour. And the learned and pious labours of Savonarola, Berengarius, and Wickliff, were aided by the raillery of Dante, Petrarch, and Eraſmus. In the beginning of the 16th century, the primitive doctrines of Chriſtianity had taken root in moſt countries in Europe. The materials for reformation

mation were collected, and the foundations laid deep, before Luther and Calvin raiſed and completed the ſuperſtructure. The minds of men being thus prepared, the doctrines of theſe reformers ſpread far and near. In Bohemia with its dependent provinces, where ſimilar tenets had been already adopted, and where ideas of oppoſition to the emperor, and contradiction to the pope, were ſo familiar and common, their progreſs was unuſually rapid. And the number of Huſſites and Evangeliſts, (appellations which cotemporary writers ſeem to conſider as ſynonimous) ſoon equalled that of the Catholics, and was daily increaſing. From their numbers they derived power, and from power a ſpirit of perſecution. In Prague they committed many outrages on the property and perſons of the clergy. The archbiſhop was driven from the city. And it was evident from the whole tenour of their conduct, that they aimed at nothing leſs than the whole power of government, both civil and eccleſiaſtic. Their encroachments received a check from the firſt Ferdinand, who, uniting vigour of conduct with lenity and moderation, aſſerted the rights of the eſtabliſhed church, at the ſame time that he uſed not any other means for reclaiming the Proteſtants, than the influence of authority, and the power of perſuaſion. He entreated them to ſubmit to the deciſions of the Chriſtian fathers now aſſembled in council at Trent. And on the other hand, that the authority of the fathers might have greater weight, he took the liberty of exhorting that venerable order to take meaſures for reforming the lives of the clergy. He re-eſtabliſhed in Prague, the exiled metropolitan, with other Catholic prieſts; and ſent to their aid a ſtrong reinforcement of Jeſuits. The labours of theſe preachers, foſtered and encouraged by the countenance of the emperor, ſuſtained a while

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while the declining intereſts of the Romiſh faith. The memory of Maximilian and Rhodolphus, the immediate ſucceſſors of Ferdinand on the imperial throne, is ſtigmatized by Catholic writers with a coldneſs and indifference in matters of religion, which was extremely favourable to the growth of hereſy. This charge, as far as it concerns Rhodolphus, appears not to have been wholly groundleſs. For while the proteſtant party on the one hand required an extenſion of their privileges, and the catholic on the other, begged that the heretics might be laid under cloſer reſtrictions, the emperor declined at firſt to gratify the deſire of either. But a fortunate conjuncture gave weight to the applications of the proteſtants, and crowned them with ſucceſs. Matthias, who had already uſurped the government of Moravia, Auſtria, and Hungary, aſpired now to the crown of Bohemia; and in order to pay his court to the proteſtants, profeſſed the principles of toleration, and affected a zealous concern for all their rights and privileges. By theſe arts he effectually attached to his intereſt the leaders of that party, ſo formidable for its numbers, boldneſs and diſpoſition to action. His indulgence to the reformed religion covered the violence of his uſurpations with a ſpecious veil: and his proteſtant partizans were not aſhamed to ſupport his unjuſt pretenſions. Emboldened by the favour of Matthias and the juſtice of their cauſe, they took up arms, and in that hoſtile attitude, preſented anew their petition to the emperor, for a confirmation of ſundry privileges. Rhodolphus had hitherto exerciſed over Bohemia the power of a ſovereign; and though he had neither inclination nor ability to prolong that power by force of arms, he was not ſo wholly indifferent to the attractions of a crown, as to reſign it, if it could be retained by a few conceſſions reſpecting modes and

and doctrines of religion. The proteſtants accordingly obtained a royal edict, authorizing a free exerciſe of their religion in Bohemia and the adjacent provinces; a conſiſtory or council for eccleſiaſtic affairs, with other inſtitutions relating both to the government and defence of the churches of the reformation, and alſo to the eſtabliſhment of ſchools, colleges, and places of worſhip. It is reaſonable to ſuppoſe, that the utmoſt extent of this laſt conceſſion, was a permiſſion to the proteſtants to build churches on their own lands. But they, interpreting it in the moſt comprehenſive ſenſe, began to build religious edifices even on the eſtates of the eccleſiaſtics: a freedom which appeared to the whole Catholic party an exceſſive outrage. Complaints of theſe encroachments having been carried to Matthias, who by this time had ſucceeded to his brother Rhodolphus, both on the Bohemian and imperial throne, a letter of royal authority was inſtantly iſſued, prohibiting the erection of all proteſtant fabricks on lands belonging to the church. In conſequence of this proclamation, one or two meeting houſes were demoliſhed. And the proteſtants were thrown into the utmoſt ferment, their reſentment againſt the emperor being exaſperated by the recollection of thoſe deceitful promiſes with which he had beguiled them when a candidate for the kingdom. BOOK VI. 1618.-9

THE Bohemian proteſtants by means of their DEFENDERS, whoſe buſineſs it was to watch over the intereſts of the church, to ſpread an alarm in times of danger, and to concert meaſures for common defence, (*t*) were enabled to combine in any

(*t*) The DEFENDERS appear to have been the principal men of their communion, either in their ſeveral congregations, or in the different diſtricts of the country.

Book VI. 1618. any effort that might be deemed neceſſary for the preſervation of the true religion. Henry, count Thorn, perceiving the force of this great machine,, and alſo how eaſy it would be, in the preſent juncture, to ſet it in movement, conceived the bold deſign of turning it againſt the houſe of Auſtria. This nobleman was indeed of an enterprizing and turbulent diſpoſition: but in the part he acted on this occaſion, he was actuated not ſo much by any inquietude of temper, as by the paſſions of reſentment, fear, and religious zeal. Deprived of his paternal inheritance by the tyranny of the arch-duke of Gratz, on account of his ſtedfaſt adherence to the doctrines of the reformation, and driven from his native country, he found refuge among the proteſtants of Bohemia. His zeal and his ſufferings in the cauſe of the proteſtant faith, gained him the favour and confidence of this people, and the ſuperiority of his genius their eſteem. At the time when Matthias deemed it good policy to court the proteſtants, he affected a deſire to eſtabliſh the fortune of the count: and accordingly, when he ſeized the crown of Bohemia, he inveſted him with the command of Carleſtein, a fortreſs in which were depoſited the regalia of the kingdom. But when the power of Matthias was firmly eſtabliſhed by the death of Rhodolphus, he threw off the maſk of good-will towards the proteſtants, and openly patronized the faith in which he had been educated, and which was moſt favourable to regal power. The independent principles of count Thorn the emperor regarded with jealouſy and diſtruſt: for having determined to repreſs the pretenſions of the heretics, he foreſaw a conjuncture in which it would be dangerous to entruſt places of ſtrength in any other hands than thoſe of catholics. That nobleman was therefore deprived of the government of Carleſtein, which

which was beſtowed on count Martinitz, a devoted inſtrument of both eccleſiaſtic and regal authority. The ſucceſſion of Ferdinand to Matthias, afforded not to the exiled count any hope of preferment from royal favour: on the contrary, the bigotry of that ſevere prince threatened him with ſtill further oppreſſion. In theſe circumſtances, he ſaw no reſource but in civil commotion and revolution. Theſe were juſtified to the count by the enthuſiaſm of religion, and the ſame paſſion, as has been already obſerved, conſpired with others in rouſing him to attempt them (*u*). He flew to different quarters of the kingdom, and haſtening from place to place, laboured both in public aſſemblies and private ſocieties, to rouſe a ſenſe of danger, and a ſpirit of freedom. The boldneſs of his genius, and the fervour of his zeal, inſpired a like boldneſs and fervour in all with whom he converſed. The flame ſpread from breaſt to breaſt, formed a concert of wills, and united all ranks of men in a reſolution to defend their religious rights with their lives and fortunes. And at his inſtigation, the defenders, or chiefs of the proteſtants, called a general aſſembly of the ſtates of the kingdom, for the expreſs purpoſe of concerting meaſures for the redreſs of grievances.

The emperor, conſidering this ſpirit of aſſociation as the fore-runner of rebellion, iſſued a proclamation, debarring all aſſemblies of the ſtates,

(*u*) The principal authorities for this account of the origin of the troubles of Bohemia are theſe, Annales de L'Empire tom. ii. Heiſs. Hiſt. de l'Empire. Batt. Nan. Hiſt. Lib. iv. ann. 1618, & paſſim. Gonçalez de Ceſp. lib. prim. cap. v. et paſſim. Veritable Recit de ce qui s'eſt paſſe a Prague le 21 May 1618. Everhardi Waſſemburgii Embricenſis de Bello inter Imperatores Ferdinandos et eorum Hoſtes, &c. Wilſon's Hiſtory of king James.

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ſtates, untill he himſelf ſhould come among them in perſon, or ſhould give further orders to his miniſters. Notwithſtanding this prohibition, the Defenders, with numbers of other powerful barons, accompanied with armed ſervants and retainers, and a multitude of the inhabitants of Prague, convened at that city on the 20th day of May, and having heard a ſermon, and joined together in prayer, mutually pledged themſelves to defend their religion and their churches, not only in Prague, but in every part of Bohemia. It was alſo reſolved to publiſh to all the world an account of their preſent conduct and future views. A manifeſto was drawn up for this purpoſe. The exordium contained the ſtrongeſt expreſſions of loyalty to the emperor, as king of Bohemia. The general eſtates lamented the dangers which obliged them to take meaſures that appeared to ſuperſede an authority they wiſhed to preſerve inviolate. Their only deſign was to fruſtrate the pernicious projects of certain ſeditious and turbulent ſpirits, who had ſworn the ruin of their liberties, and of the fundamental laws of the kingdom; who had ſo far abuſed the confidence of the emperor and of Ferdinand, as to perſuade theſe princes to march againſt Bohemian ſubjects at the head of hoſtile armies; in order to ſeize Prague; to kill or impriſon the greater number of the nobles, and deputies of ſtates; to raze their churches; and to aboliſh the free exerciſe of their religion (*x*). This manifeſto being read aloud, was approved by the ſtates, and a general murmur of applauſe was heard among the people.

Manifeſto of the Bohemians.

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IN the midſt of theſe tranſactions, an order arrives from the imperial miniſtry, commanding the proteſtant leaders to diſperſe, and to retire to their reſpective habitations. Upon this, count Thorn, attended by a number of other barons on horſeback and in armour, ride up to the caſtle, and having ſecured its gates, proceed immediately to the hall, in which the miniſters of Matthias were aſſembled in council on the preſent important emergence. Invective and altercation was ſoon followed by blows: and the counts Martinitz, Slavata, and Fabritius, who held the principal offices of government, were thrown headlong out at the windows. Though they fell from an height of ſixty feet, and that ſeveral ſhots of muſquetry were fired at them as they fell, they eſcaped, not only with their lives, but free from any material harm. The Catholics conſidered this remarkable preſervation of theſe three men as a miracle wrought by heaven in ſupport of the Romiſh faith. Minute deſcriptions are accordingly given, in the writings of thoſe times, of the wall of the caſtle of Viſigrade, and of the tremendous precipice which intervenes between the bottom of the wall and the ditch. But proteſtant writers diſapprove the alledged miracle, by obſerving that the ſpot on which the Catholics fell, was covered deep with dung, and mud, and leaves of trees. 1618.

THE Bohemians, now involved in the guilt of rebellion, determined to perſevere, and to ſeek from their own valour and good fortune for that indemnity which they had but little reaſon to look for at the hands of Matthias, and ſtill leſs from thoſe of his ſucceſſor. Their minds opened to greater views than thoſe they had entertained on the firſt alarm of danger; and they now reſolved to vindicate by the ſword, not only their religious, Revolt of Bohemia.

+ The Proverb of S— which
occaſion: Vide Manianus, Lib. 6. Num. 3.

Book VI. 1618.

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1618.

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+ The Proverb of [illegible]

Book VI. 1618. religious, but their civil privileges. In this reſolution they were encouraged, whether they ſurveyed the internal ſituation of their own kingdom, or caſt their eyes abroad upon foreign ſtates. There was nothing in Bohemia to reſiſt their united force. Matthias, declining in health as in years, was not able, and perhaps would not be very willing to maintain, in oppoſition to the juſt pretenſions of a generous people, an arbitrary juriſdiction that muſt ſoon devolve to an ambitious rival and hated ſucceſſor. The country was naturally ſtrong and fertile, the people high ſpirited and warlike, and ready to encounter danger and death in defence of their religion. If paſſing from their own, they contemplated the ſtate of other kingdoms; circumſtances not leſs animating preſented themſelves to their view, and fanned that generous fire which glowed in their breaſts. The contagion of example, which more than reaſon governs the world, diſplayed its full force on this important occaſion. The Venetian republic, and the duke of Savoy, had of late maintained their independence in oppoſition to the pretenſions and power of that civil and religious tyranny, with which the Bohemians were now called to ſtruggle. The proteſtants of France formed of themſelves, as it were, a ſeparate ſtate in the midſt of a mighty kingdom. And the united provinces of the Netherlands, in ſpite of the veteran armies of Spain, and the gold of the weſtern world, had riſen from the loweſt and moſt diſtreſſing circumſtances that could be imagined, to the greateſt height of liberty and power. Theſe circumſtances were ever preſent to the minds of the Bohemian leaders, and formed the chief topics in their public harangues, as well as in their writings, which were circulated all over the kingdom by means of the preſs, and which were full of eloquence and vigour. And as di-

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vers ſtates animated the Bohemians by their example, ſo all proteſtant powers, it was probable, would ſupport them with ſubſtantial aſſiſtance. The ſympathy of religion would render theirs the intereſt of nations: and their companions at the altar would be their fellow ſoldiers in the field of battle (*a*).

The Bohemians having determined to inſiſt on the reſtoration of their ancient laws and conſtitution, expelled the old garriſon out of the caſtle (which was the royal palace,) and replaced it by another in which they could confide. They appointed thirty perſons to govern Bohemia, with the title of Directors. Theſe magiſtrates having, in the firſt place, taken an oath of fidelity and allegiance, from the magiſtrates of Prague, proceeded to the adminiſtration of government. The firſt act of their power was to baniſh the Jeſuits, and to confiſcate their effects. They raiſed an army of two thouſand horſe, and twelve regiments of foot, and gave the ſupreme command to count Thorn. They addreſſed a manifeſto to the emperor; to the ſtates of Sileſia, Moravia, Luſatia; to the whole provinces and ſtates of the empire; and to all the world; containing an account of their conduct, and invoking the aid of all the friends of religious toleration, and civil liberty.

Ernest, count of Manſveldt, was the firſt who eſpouſed the Bohemian cauſe, and the laſt of its adherents who abandoned it. He was a natural ſon of that count Manſveldt, whom Philip II. appointed governor of the Netherlands. In his early years, he attached himſelf, like his father, to

(*a*) Hiſtoria de Don Felippe, &c. por Gonçalo de Ceſpedes, lib. 1. cap. vi. Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1618.

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to the houſe of Auſtria. The court of Vienna was filled with a juſt admiration of his talents and virtues; and, in a tranſient fit of favour, promiſed to inveſt him with the rights of legitimate birth, and to put him in poſſeſſion of the eſtates of his family. But a regard to intereſt violated a promiſe that had been made merely from generoſity: and as the moſt violent reſentments are thoſe which ariſe from diſappointed confidence, count Manſveldt's hatred of Matthias was implacable. His averſion to the houſe of Auſtria he extended even to their religion. He renounced the Catholic faith, and openly profeſſed the doctrines of Luther. He abandoned the ſervice of the emperor, and entered into that of Charles Emanuel, the moſt active and enterpriſing of all the enemies of Auſtria. But the preſent ſituation of affairs in Germany, opened ſo full a career to the genius, the ambition, and the vengeance of Manſveldt, that he could not forbear expreſſing to the generous prince whom he now ſerved, an eager deſire of offering his ſword to the revolted ſtates of Bohemia. The duke of Savoy, who conſidered the diſturbances in Germany as the ſureſt pledge of his own ſecurity, not only applauded the views of the count, but permitted him to levy two thouſand men, and alſo engaged to keep them in pay for him, for ſeveral months (*b*). At the head of this ſmall force Manſveldt marched into Bohemia, where he was received with the utmoſt joy, and inſtantly honoured with the charge of general of the ordnance. Thus the forces of Bohemia were entruſted to commanders who were both of them foreigners, both men of deſperate fortunes, both breathing vengeance againſt the houſe of Auſtria, and both of them poſſeſſed in an eminent degree of military capacity

Count Manſveldt enters into the ſervice of the Bohemians.

(*b*) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1618.

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ty and political diſcernment. Yet between the characters of theſe men there was a remarkable difference. Count Thorn, who had the talent of rouſing, uniting, and wielding the minds of men, was the beſt fitted to govern a nation: Manſveldt, ſo brave, enterpriſing, inventive, and refined, the beſt qualified to conduct an army. The military talents of this extraordinary perſon ſhone forth, indeed, beyond thoſe of all his cotemporaries. Nor did ever any hero, in any age, exhibit greater boldneſs in encountering, or greater dexterity in eſcaping from danger. Theſe fierce commanders take the field at the head of ſeparate armies. The flag of rebellion is diſplayed throughout all Bohemia, and by a powerful contagion, incites a general inſurrection in Sileſia, Moravia, Luſatia, Hungary, and the Upper Auſtria (*c*).

Characters of the counts Thorn and Manſveldt.

THE news of this revolution, diſtracted the emperor with oppoſite paſſions. The idea, which ſo naturally preſents itſelf to monarchs in ſimilar circumſtances, occurred firſt to Matthias. But coercive meaſures might be as fatal to his own power, as to the liberty of Bohemia. He was not able to take the field in perſon: the command of an army would, of courſe, be claimed by Ferdinand: and ſo powerful an engine would place in the hands of that prince the whole authority of government. Moved by this conſideration, he wrote, in the ſtyle of the Catholics of thoſe times, a paternal letter, requiring the evangelical ſtates of Bohemia to lay down their arms, and diſband their troops, promiſing them, in caſe of obedience, indemnity and protection. This offer the revolted provinces regarded not as a mark of lenity, but as a proof of weakneſs (*d*). They deſpiſed

Embarraſſment of the emperor Matthias.

(*c*) Ruſhworth's Coll. vol. i. p. 7, 8.

(*d*) Hiſtoria de Don Felippe III. por Gon. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. vi.

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deſpiſed it ſo much, that they diſdained to anſwer it. Matthias then forbad all levies of troops in the empire, without the imperial permiſſion, and publiſhed to the world an elaborate account of the Bohemian revolt. A paper war enſued between that prince and his revolted ſubjects; and it was evident that the quarrel muſt be decided, as uſual in ſuch caſes, not by the pen, but by the ſword. Accordingly, with the aid of the princes, friends, and allies of his houſe, he raiſed in Germany an army of ten thouſand men. The king elect of Bohemia, as had been foreſeen, demanded the command of this force, and obtained it; but with ſuch reſtrictions, as betrayed the jealouſy of the old emperor, and left little more to the nominal chief than the ſhadow of power. Ferdinand declined the exerciſe of ſo limited an authority, and this the rather, that it would tend to heighten the diſguſt of the emperor, and might even induce him to take meaſures for diſappointing his expectations of the imperial crown. The command of the army was, therefore, with the conſent of Ferdinand, intruſted in the hands of the famous count Bucquoy. This general took the field without delay, and, having reduced the town of Teutſbrod, fixed his headquarters in Budovits, the only place of ſtrength that now remained to the emperor in all Bohemia. Count Thorn advanced againſt Bucquoy, reduced Krumlaw, with the ſuburbs of Budovits, and held that city in cloſe blockade. Various ſkirmiſhes happened of courſe between the oppoſite armies; and fortune inclined ſometimes to the one ſide, ſometimes to the other.

Count Bucquoy appointed to the command of the imperial army.

Various ſkirmiſhes between the Imperialiſts and the Bohemians.

WHILST count Thorn was thus employed, in watching the motions of the imperial general, Manſveldt carried on with ſucceſs the ſiege of Pilſen. This city was important for its ſituation,

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as it commanded an extenſive and fertile tract of country along the courſe of a branch of the Mulda; and alſo contained great ſtores and treaſures. For this being the only place in that quarter of the kingdom, where the power of the Catholic predominated over that of the Proteſtant inhabitants, thither the Jeſuits and prieſts, and many of the richeſt citizens of the Bohemian capital had retired, with their moſt valuable effects. The conditions on which the inhabitants of Pilſen ſurrendered, after an obſtinate reſiſtance, were, that they ſhould maintain two companies of evangelical ſoldiers; redeem the city from plunder by ſixty thouſand florins; and take an oath of fidelity and allegiance to the Proteſtant ſtates of Bohemia. Several Catholic ſoldiers as well as citizens, preferred exile with the loſs of all their goods, to this laſt condition. Manſveldt having thrown into the city a ſtrong garriſon of both horſe and foot, continued his route in Bohemia, and took ſeveral places almoſt without reſiſtance. 1619.

The emperor makes overtures for peace.

DURING theſe tranſactions, continual overtures were made on the part of the emperor for peace. Matthias appeared in the ſingular character of a ſuppliant for power. He condeſcended to addreſs many promiſes and flattering expreſſions of regard to individuals (*e*). The evangelical ſtates had at firſt, as had been already obſerved, treated the emperor's advances towards a reconciliation with a contemptuous ſilence; but after he had drawn his ſword, he became a more reſpectable correſpondent, and they deigned to honour him with a letter. This letter contained very ſingular matter. The whole was a bitter complaint of the ravages committed by the imperial troops

(*e*) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy de France, & des principaux Evenements arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du monde.

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in the kingdom of Bohemia. Matthias anſwered, that he was ſorry for what had happened, but that he would be under the neceſſity of ſending more troops among them, if they ſhould refuſe to lay down their arms. The Bohemians at this time endeavoured to incline the emperor to peace, by the mediation of the archdukes his brothers; and it is probable, that could they have obtained the reſtoration of their ancient conſtitution, and the eſtabliſhment of the proteſtant religion, they would have been willing to leave to Matthias, or to Ferdinand, all the power of a feudal king. But neither was the emperor inclined to reſt contented with ſo confined an authority; nor, perhaps, could the difference have been compoſed if he had. All confidence between the contending parties was loſt: and the matter now in diſpute, was, which ſhould retain the power of the ſword? an arduous queſtion, and which an appeal to the ſword itſelf could alone determine.

Death of Matthias, and ſucceſſion of Ferdinand.

MATTHIAS had laboured long under bodily infirmities and anxious cares, when the ſtroke of death laid him at reſt, on the 20th day of March, 1619. Ferdinand, his ſucceſſor, doubtful of his ability to reduce his ſubjects to obedience by force of arms, attempted to gain their confidence and voluntary ſubmiſſion, by argument and perſuaſion, and acts expreſſive of a tender regard for their happineſs. He commanded Bucquoy to ceaſe from all hoſtilities, and gave orders for a general ſuſpenſion of arms throughout all his dominions. To all his revolted ſubjects he offered pardon and oblivion, a full confirmation of their privileges, and a full toleration in matters of religion. He added many expreſſions of goodwill, and earneſtly exhorted them to tread in the paths of peace. The exhortations of Ferdinand, were

were not more ſucceſsful than thoſe of his predeceſſor. Count Thorn having taken Iglaw, a frontier town of Moravia, with ſeveral other places, and being reinforced by troops, not only from the provinces dependent on Bohemia, but alſo from Hungary, at the ſolicitation of ſeveral Auſtrian barons drew near to the Danube. Having been furniſhed with boats by thoſe who favoured his cauſe, he croſſed that river with all his forces, and carried terror into the city of Vienna, as well as all the adjacent country. The whole garriſon of Vienna amounted only to fifteen hundred foot, and two hundred horſe. This ſmall force was under the neceſſity, not only of guarding the city from external attacks, but alſo from internal ſedition: for count Thorn had a numerous party within the walls of Vienna, who had engaged to facilitate its reduction by ſecuring one of the principal gates. Had that commander advanced on the preſent occaſion with his uſual celerity, the poſſeſſion of the Auſtrian capital would, in all probability, have fixed the independency of the Bohemian ſtates, and drawn after it other important revolutions. But truſting to the terror of his arms, and the influence of his partizans, he hoped to reduce Vienna, even without a ſtruggle. He ſummoned that city to ſurrender. But while he lay two days at Fiſchen expecting an anſwer, the univerſity armed five hundred ſtudents, and a reinforcement of ſeveral companies of cuiraſſiers having paſſed under falſe colours through the midſt of the Bohemian ſquadrons, arrived from the grand duke of Tuſcany. At this inſtant ſome zealots were in the act of ſhaking Ferdinand by the doublet, and demanding, with many imprecations, liberty of conſcience. The trampling of horſes and the glittering of ſwords and ſpears relieved the king from the importunities of thoſe rude petitioners, and filled

BOOK VI. 1619.

Book VI. 1619. them in their turn with conſternation and terror (*a*). Count Thorn now drew near the city, with a deſign to beſiege it; but, by this time, his preſence was thought neceſſary in another quarter.

Count Dampierre of Lorrain had raiſed four thouſand men in Hungary, with which he intended to join the army under the command of Bucquoy. Manſveldt, having learned his deſign, immediately reſolved to attack him, before a junction of the Hungarians with the Imperial army ſhould render their united force irreſiſtible. He was on his march for this purpoſe, when count Bucquoy fell upon him from an ambuſcade, and defeated him with great ſlaughter. Manſveldt himſelf was among the wounded, and a great number were taken priſoners. The Bohemian army retreated to Breſlaw, the capital of Sileſia; and on occaſion of this diſaſter it was deemed expedient to recall count Thorn, to oppoſe the progreſs of the victorious enemy. Bucquoy, having reduced ſeveral places, retired to Budovits, where he waited for ſome troops he expected from Flanders (*b*). Count Thorn, having in vain endeavoured to bring the Imperialiſts to an action, but having recovered ſome fortreſſes they had taken, ſet out for Prague, where the reformed of Bohemia, Moravia, Sileſia, and Luſatia were aſſembled.

In this ſituation of affairs the archbiſhop of Mentz, as chancellor of the empire, proclaimed a diet at Frankfort for the election of a king of the Romans. The electors attended either in perſon

(*a*) Gio. Batt. Nani, Hiſtoria della Repub. Veneta d'all an. 1613. Sin' al 1671, lib. iv. 1619.

(*b*) Gonç. de Ceſpides, Hiſt. &c. lib. i. cap. 6. Hiſt. Louis XIII.

perſon or by their proxies, and, on the twenty-eighth day of Auguſt, Ferdinand was adorned with the imperial purple. BOOK VI. 1619.

THE Bohemian ſtates had now been aſſembled for two months, and in the courſe of this period they formed a league offenſive and defenſive with the annexed provinces, and another of the ſame kind with Bethlehem Gabor, who, from the rank of a private gentleman, had been exalted, by the favour of the Porte, to the ſovereignty of Tranſylvania. This prince the Bohemians engaged to ſupport in an effort to mount the throne of Hungary; as he, on his part, promiſed to maintain their right to elect a king of Bohemia. For they had ſolemnly reſolved never to recognize Ferdinand as their king; but to chuſe a Proteſtant for their ſovereign, and to ſhake off for ever the yoke of all the princes of the houſe of Auſtria. They juſtified their renunciation of Ferdinand by ſeveral arguments. "By preſerving the forms of free government, they ſaid, the monarchs of Europe had been enabled to conceal their progreſſions towards abſolute power, and inſenſibly to impoſe the yoke of ſlavery on their unguarded ſubjects. The election of Ferdinand, however formal it might appear, was certainly no other than an act of authority. Matthias, in the fulneſs of his power, had nominated his ſucceſſor on the throne, and no individual had dared to oppoſe his will. Thus it was that the houſe of Auſtria trampled on the liberties of a free people, and abuſed the power which was intruſted in their hands for the public good, for the purpoſe of perpetuating it in their own family. But waving the queſtion concerning the validity of his election, they maintained that Ferdinand had forfeited all title to the crown by violating the privileges of the ſtates, particularly by

The Bohemian ſtates fortify themſelves by new alliances, and reſolve to chuſe a new king.

BOOK VI. 1619. endeavouring to fortify himſelf on the throne, by means of foreign aid; to controul Germans by the arms of Spaniards." Theſe were grave and ſolid reaſons, but they added yet another, which appears very extraordinary, and even ſomewhat ludicrous; they ſaid they had a right to chuſe a new king, becauſe Ferdinand had ſmoothed his way to the crown of Bohemia by means of Spaniſh gold; inſinuating, that if they had ſworn allegiance to that prince, they had been bribed to do ſo (*c*).

SUCH were the reaſons of the Bohemians for depoſing their king. Their motives for electing another were equally cogent. As they had not yet experienced the inconveniencies of an ariſtocracy, the election of a king did not ſeem neceſſary for the purpoſe of internal government, nor were they ſo much attached to regal dignity, as to chooſe a king merely for the pomp and parade of a court. But the vigour of the prince who claimed the throne made it neceſſary for them to form by all means powerful alliances and connexions. They made a tender of their crown firſt to the duke of Savoy. That prince had already given them proofs of his good-will; and his ſuperior genius ſeemed neceſſary to defend them againſt the threatened danger. But the duke declined to accept the crown, though he applauded the generous ſpirit of the Bohemians, and exhorted them to perſevere in the noble courſe on which they had entered. They next caſt their eyes on the elector of Saxony; but the hope of ſucceſſion to the duchy of Cleves reſtrained that prince from oppoſing the houſe of Auſtria. They now made an offer of the Bohemian throne to the elector Palatine. The ſpirit and

(*c*) Harte's Hiſtory of Guſtavus Adolphus.

and zeal of this prince ſeemed not unworthy of a crown; and by his own force, and his connexion with prince Maurice (*d*), and the king of England, they imagined he would be enabled to preſerve it. Frederic, after ſome little heſitation, which was eaſily overcome by his natural ambition, and the incitements of the princeſs his wife, who had great influence over him, accepted the offer, and, having levied an army of ten thouſand foot and two thouſand horſe, marched into Bohemia in ſupport of his new ſubjects.

The elector Palatine accepts the crown of Bohemia.

WHILE the commotions in Germany drew attention from every quarter, and from intereſt, from affection, or from religion, intereſted all nations, a comet appearing towards the North in the heavens, aggravated the general gloom; and the minds of men were agitated at once by the alarms of war, and a ſuperſtitious terror. A belief in aſtrology was at this period univerſal in Europe as well as Aſia. Pamphlets were daily publiſhed, containing interpretations of the comet. While the vulgar conſidered it as ominous of domeſtic and particular events, men of genius and learning, deriding ſuch abſurd comments, ſuppoſed that a general ſympathy pervaded the univerſe; that nature at certain periods was in a kind of commotion; and that, in ſuch a criſis, the minds of men were naturally moved alſo (*e*). And, if the languor of inoccupation be the great curſe of human life (*f*), it may be affirmed that at no time was there ever a greater portion of felicity diffuſed throughout the world.

The nations alarmed at the appearance of a comet.

THE

(*d*) His uncle.

(*e*) Batt. Nan. Hiſt. lib. iv. Wilſon's Hiſtory of King James, ann. 1619. Hume's Hiſt. vol. vi. octavo, p. 155.

(*f*) See L'Abbé du Bois, and Ferguſon's Eſſay on Civil Society.

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THE conteſt between the emperor and the prince Palatine ſeemed at firſt altogether unequal. A ſpirit of diſaffection and reſiſtance had gone forth throughout the whole of Ferdinand's dominions. His crowns tottered on his head, and that of Bohemia ſeemed already fallen. The ſmall army under the command of Bucquoy was all that he had to oppoſe to the different forces of the Palatine, of count Thorn, and of Manſveldt. A new and more terrible enemy advanced upon him from the Eaſt. The prince of Tranſylvania, under the auſpices, and with the promiſe of powerful aid from the Ottoman Porte, marched rapidly into Hungary; reduced the capital; aſſumed the crown, with the title of king; made himſelf maſter of all that was important in the kingdom except Javarrin and Comorrah; formed a junction with count Thorn; and threw a bridge over the Danube, with a reſolution to carry the war into the heart of Auſtria.

The cauſe of Ferdinand ſupported by Spain.

IN this extremity the native courage of Ferdinand was ſupported by the treaſures, the arms, and the authority of Spain. In a cauſe which involved at once the greatneſs of his family, and the ſupport of the Catholic religion, the Spaniſh monarch advanced large ſums of money, and levied a powerful military force. A body of eight thouſand men marched from the Low Countries to reinforce the Imperial army under count Bucquoy. And Spinola, with an army of thirty thouſand, compoſed of Italians, Spaniards, Walloons, and Iriſh, prepared to invade the Palatinate (*g*). The powerful aid of Spain encouraged the electors of Saxony and Bavaria to appear on that ſide which ſeemed now to be ſtrongeſt,

(*g*) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1619. Hiſtoria de Don Felippe, &c. por Gonç. de Ceſpides, lib. i. cap. 9. 11.

eſt, and by adhering to which they might look for the higheſt advantages. The views of Saxony have already been mentioned (*b*). And as to the duke of Bavaria, he was invited by a promiſe of receiving the eſtates as well as the dignity of his kinſman the elector Palatine. The example and influence of the Bavarian, the authority of the whole houſe of Auſtria, and the common intereſts of the Romiſh faith, united all the princes of the Catholic league in a reſolution to ſupport Ferdinand with their lives and fortunes. The pope, beſides his ſpiritual benedictions, contributed a pecuniary ſupply; and ſeveral eccleſiaſtics as well as princes of Italy followed his example. An army was quickly raiſed for the defence of the ancient religion. The command was given to the duke of Bavaria. The protection afforded by the Ottoman empire to Gabor, intereſted the king of Poland alſo in the proſperity of Ferdinand; and in an inſtant ten thouſand Coſſacks, fierce and ſavage auxiliaries, over-run Moravia,

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(*b*) A writer of great reputation ſuppoſes that the duke of Saxony may have been actuated by a jealouſy of Frederic, who of an equal was to become his ſuperior; or, that he may have been afraid leſt the princes of the houſe of Weymar, who were the warmeſt partizans of Frederic, ſhould, by the aſſiſtance of that prince, if victorious, regain the poſſeſſion of Saxony, the ancient inheritance of their family. [Pauli Piaſcii Chronica Geſtorum in Europa ſingularium: apud Amelot de la Houſſaie Diſc. Hiſtor.] It is of no importance to enquire whether theſe conjectures be well founded or no. It is often a difficult matter, it muſt be owned, to aſſign the real motives of the actions of princes, their conduct being often determined by ſecret, and ſometimes trivial cauſes. As to the matter in queſtion, I ſhall only obſerve, that I do not find any hiſtorian who is inclined to give credit to what Saxony himſelf affirmed: which was, that he would ſupport the juſt claim of Ferdinand, in oppoſition to the pretenſions of Frederic; becauſe a contrary conduct would bring a ſtain on the Proteſtant religion. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619.

BOOK VI. Moravia, and join the Imperial army under Bucquoy (*i*).

1620. The conduct of England and France in the preſent conteſt.

THE eyes of all Europe were now turned to the kings of England and France: the firſt intereſted in the fortune of Frederic from the connexion of blood as well as ſympathy of religion; the ſecond bound by the ſtrongeſt ties of policy and ambition to oppoſe the progreſs of a proud and hated rival. But the indolent diſpoſition of James, his reverence for the rights of kings, an eager deſire to effectuate a marriage between the ſecond infanta and the prince of Wales, and a conceit withal that the whole world entertained a profound reſpect for his love of juſtice and great learning; theſe circumſtances inclined him, as uſual, to embrace pacific meaſures; and he ſought to promote the greatneſs of the Palatine, not by the ſword, but by embaſſies and negociations (*k*). Lewis was neither ignorant of the intereſt of France, nor did he want that ſpirit which was neceſſary for purſuing it with vigour. But that prince, who was one of thoſe modeſt characters that are apt to pay a deference to capacities inferior to their own, was at this time under the government of the duke of Luines. That favourite was induced, by the artifices of the Spaniſh ambaſſador, to ſacrifice at once the intereſts of the Palatine and of France to private ambition. The rich heireſs of Pequigny and Chaunes was educated at the court of Bruſſels. It became the policy of Luines, by the favour of the archdukes, to pave the way for a marriage between that lady and his brother Honorius. He entered into a confidential correſpondence with theſe princes, and

(*i*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619.
(*k*) See Hume's Hiſtory of Great Britain, anno 1619.

and eaſily acquired their good graces by engaging to favour, in the preſent critical juncture, the views of the houſe of Auſtria. The veil under which he covered his ſecret deſigns from the eyes of his prince, was, that if the elector Palatine ſhould eſtabliſh himſelf on the throne of Bohemia, he would undoubtedly protect the Hugonots, with whom he maintained a correſpondence through his uncle, the duke of Bouillon. An ambaſſador was diſpatched from France to the city of Ulm, where there was held a diet of the empire. In this aſſembly the Catholic and Proteſtant parties were preſent, and alſo deputies from correſponding ſtates and princes. The ambaſſador declared the reſolution of Lewis to obſerve an exact neutrality in the preſent diſpute, "and expatiated on the miſery and folly of war and bloodſhed, between parties who were not impelled to hoſtilities by any cauſe of mutual animoſity or contention. The only quarrel, he ſaid, was between the emperor and the elector of the Palatinate. Let theſe princes, therefore, fight out their own battles. But if the minds of princes be too ſtrongly agitated by the preſent conjuncture to embrace ſuch moderate and pacific councils, at leaſt let not the ravages and deſolation of war be ſpread over all Germany. On the contrary, let them be confined within the narroweſt poſſible bounds: and, as the kingdom of Bohemia is the only ſubject of contention between the parties principally concerned, ſo let it be the only ſcene of all military operations that may be undertaken in ſupport of their reſpective claims by their friends and allies." A treaty was accordingly framed in which it was ſettled that neither the Evangelical Union, nor the Catholic League ſhould directly or indirectly invade or attack any electorate, principality, province, or city of the empire, Bohemia alone excepted.

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June 1620.

Treaty of Ulm.

THE

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THE emperor was now in a ſituation in which he could act with the utmoſt vigour. The mere good offices of England were a general ſubject of deriſion (*l*). He was ſecure from the attacks of France. The Proteſtant princes and ſtates of Germany were animated indeed with an hearty averſion to Ferdinand; but their aſſembly at Nuremberg had already proved how much they were divided by political jealouſies (*m*) and religious diſputations (*n*), and how little reaſon there was to imagine they would ever unite in any effectual meaſures for the ſupport of Frederic. The treaty of Ulm afforded the emperor a farther pledge of ſecurity from their attacks, and left him at liberty to pour an irreſiſtible force into the kingdom and dependent provinces of Bohemia. Emboldened by theſe circumſtances, he thundered forth againſt his rival the ban of the empire, and committed the execution of that decree to the archduke Albert, and to the dukes of Bavaria and Saxony.

The marquis of Spinola invades the Palatinate. Auguſt.

DON Lewis de Velaſco being left with fifteen thouſand men for the defence of the Auſtrian frontier towards the United Provinces, the marquis of Spinola, with a Spaniſh army, as has already been obſerved, of thirty thouſand men, but theſe under the colours of Albert, marches directly into the Palatinate, and halts at Coblentz, at the confluence of the Rhine and the Moſelle. As this invaſion of Spinola was a manifeſt infraction of the treaty of Ulm, the princes of the Evangelical Union reproached the Catholic party with their perfidy. The elector of Mentz, adding mockery

(*l*) Hume's Hiſtory of Great Britain, Reign of James I. anno 1619, 1620, 1621. 1622.

(*m*) Hiſt. della Rep. Ven. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1619.

(*n*) Hiſt. de Don Felippe, &c. por Gonç. de Ceſpedes, lib. i. cap. 9.

mockery to breach of faith, ſaid, that the houſe of Auſtria was not bound by that treaty, as it was not comprehended in the Catholic League (*o*). The princes of the Union, alarmed at the proceedings of the Auſtrians, and provoked at their inſolence, oppoſed to the marquis of Spinola an army of twenty-four thouſand foot, under the command of the marquis of Anſpach (*p*). This force was joined near Worms, on the firſt day of October, by two thouſand horſe, and four hundred muſketeers, under the command of prince Henry of Naſſau, and by an Engliſh regiment of infantry, conducted by Sir Horatio Vere, conſiſting of two thouſand four hundred veterans (*q*). This ſingle regiment, with ſome ſcanty ſupplies of money, was all that the king of England contributed to the ſupport of his ſon-in-law. Nor is it probable that he would have adventured to ſend out even this ſmall force againſt the Auſtrians, if he had not, from the timidity, or the facility of his nature, deemed it expedient to make a ſhew of correſponding to the zealous attachment of his people to both the perſon (*r*) and the cauſe of Frederic. The Spaniſh ambaſſador at the court of London managed ſo dextrouſly the hopes and fears of James, that for the ſmall aſſiſtance he afforded to the Palatine he made ample compenſation. At the very time the armies of Spain were battering the Engliſh, and the other friends and allies of his ſon-in-law, in Germany, Sir Robert Manſell, vice-admiral of England, was carrying ordinance and naval ſtores to the Spaniſh arſenals, and protection

(*o*) Amelot de la Houſſaie, Diſc. Hiſt.

(*p*) Hiſt. de Don Felippe III. por Gonç. de Ceſp lib. 1. cap. 11.

(*q*) The Hiſtory of King James, by Arthur Wilſon, Eſq.

(*r*) Hume's Hiſtory of Great Britain, anno 1619.

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tection to the Spaniſh trade and coaſts from the rapine of the Turks (*s*).

When the marquis of Spinola arrived at Coblentz, he learnt that Anſpach was encamped at Oppenheim (*t*), a poſt, one of the moſt important that could have been choſen either for the defence or the command of the Palatinate. In order to draw the enemy from this advantageous ſtation, and to pave the way for taking poſſeſſion of it himſelf, the Spaniſh general made ſuch movements and ſuch diſpoſitions as ſeemed at firſt to indicate an intention of making an attack upon Frankfort on the Main, and afterwards, to make it dubious whether his deſign was againſt that city, or againſt Worms. In the courſe of theſe operations he reduced the towns of Creutzenach and Altzeim. The ſtratagem of Spinola had the intended effect. At the earneſt requeſt of the inhabitants of Worms, Anſpach haſtened to their relief with his main army, leaving Oppenheim under the protection of a moderate garriſon. Upon this Spinola, who had ſet his face againſt Worms, wheeled ſuddenly about, and with an amazing rapidity advanced to Oppenheim, which he took by aſſault, together with great quantities of military ſtores and proviſions. In this important place he formed his magazines; and, having ſtrengthened it by a numerous garriſon and new fortifications, threw a bridge over the Rhine, and paſſed over into the Lower Palatinate. In this principality he reduced upwards of thirty towns and caſtles in the courſe of ſix months (*u*).

September 27.

When

(*s*) Hiſtory of King James, by Arthur Wilſon, Eſq.

(*t*) Bat. Nan. Hiſt. &c. lib. iv. 1620.

(*u*) Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. 11. 13. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. cap. 16. 20. Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XI I.

When we conſider that this commander not only reduced, but kept firm poſſeſſion of the greateſt part of the Palatinate, in ſo ſhort a time, and in the face of an army equal in numbers to his own, and, perhaps, not inferior in bravery; we cannot but conclude, either that his capacity muſt have been far above, or that of his adverſary far below the common ſtandard of human nature. All hiſtorians agree, that the conduct of Spinola in this, as in his other campaigns, diſcovered the moſt conſummate military ſkill; yet their accounts of this conduct are, in ſeveral inſtances, materially different, and, perhaps, all of them, in many reſpects, wide of the truth. The evolutions of armies, their marches and counter-marches, and all the various operation of war, are not to be deſcribed with ſufficient accuracy, either from the haſty and partial compilations of the day, or from a compariſon of works better intitled to the name of hiſtories. The general himſelf, or his confidential friends, can alone give an account of his views and deſigns; and, as to the viciſſitudes of an engagement, they are not always known, even to the experienced officer preſent in the field of action. The utmoſt therefore that any other perſon can aſpire to is, to illuſtrate the advantages of vigilance and foreſight; to diſplay the power of diſcipline, of habit, and of opinion, and, perhaps, to point out a few of thoſe cauſes which ſurpriſe the hearts of men, and fill them with the paſſions of courage or of fear.

But, if it is impoſſible, by tracing the deſigns, to do juſtice to the genius of Spinola, it is an eaſy matter to diſcover that he had not a formidable rival in the marquis of Anſpach. As an example has been given of the capacity of the one general, ſo an example ſhall in like manner be

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Incapacity of Anſhach, general of the forces raiſed by the princes of the Union.

be given of the incapacity of the other. On the third day after the arrival of the Dutch and Engliſh troops, the marquis of Anſpach marched, with an intention of ſurpriſing Altzeim, at the head of four thouſand horſe and ſix thouſand foot, with a ſuitable train of artillery. The marquis of Spinola, unwilling that his reputation ſhould be tarniſhed by ſuffering any of the places he had taken to fall again into the hands of the enemy (*w*), haſtened to its relief. Anſpach, informed of the march of Spinola, ſuddenly turned about to give him battle; but Spinola had by this time learned that the army he had deſigned to attack was greatly ſuperior to his own in numbers; he therefore drew his cannon up to the ſummit of a neighbouring hill, from whence it played on the enemy's cavalry, that had begun to preſs him, with ſuch ſucceſs as forced them to retreat. Upon this the princes of the Union alſo drew their artillery up another hill, on the right hand of Spinola. There was a wide valley between the armies, and in the midſt of that valley a third hill, covered with cottages and vineyards. By this hill the hoſtile armies were mutually concealed, and it was only from the ſummit of this, that the one general could review the ſituation and movements of the other. As ſoon as the princes of the Union perceived that the Spaniards were glad to fortify themſelves in a ſtrong poſition, they rightly concluded that the enemy were inferior to themſelves in numbers and ſtrength; and therefore reſolved to attack them. It was agreed on, that the Engliſh ſhould begin the charge. Horatio Vere had for this purpoſe ſelected eighty muſketeers out of every diviſion of the regiment. The whole army, full of ardour, ſtood impatient for an engagement: but the evening

(*w*) Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. 13.

ing approached, and the men ſtill lay on their arms. The Engliſh general, wearied with this delay, rode up the hill of vineyards, accompanied with the earls of Oxford and Eſſex, to ſurvey the poſture of the enemy. They were retreating in good order, and in deep ſilence. The foot marched firſt, the waggons with the baggage proceeded next, in two ranks, as a ſpecies of fortification to the infantry, and the horſe brought up the rear. In this order they marched with all poſſible ſpeed to Oppenheim. Anſpach was poſted nearer to that city than Spinola, and it was in his power either to reduce that important place, or to force the Spaniards, under a mighty diſadvantage, to come to an engagement. The earl of Eſſex flew to the marquis of Anſpach, and entreated him with much emotion and importunity to improve the important and favourable conjuncture. But the marquis replied haſtily, and in an angry tone, "There is a fort between us and Oppenheim, and we cannot paſs to that place without being at the mercy of the enemy's cannon." Sir Horatio Vere exclaimed, "And when ſhall we fight, if we ſhun the cannon (x)?" The ſeaſon of winter had now arrived. It was uncommonly rigorous. The froſt was ſo intenſe, that the Engliſh officers burnt a great many of their waggons: and as to the common ſoldiers, they lay in heaps on the ground, cloſe together, like ſheep covered with a fleece of ſnow. One would naturally imagine that the rigour of the ſeaſon muſt have been ſeverely felt by the Italians and Spaniards. If we may give credit, however, to the authority of a celebrated Spaniſh author, thoſe inhabitants of ſouthern climates

(x) This account of the inglorious conduct of Anſpach is chiefly taken from the Hiſtory of King James, by Mr. Wilſon, who was an eye-witneſs of what he reports.

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bore all the ſeverities of the campaign better than the Germans and the Engliſh (*y*).

Progreſs of the war in Bohemia.

WHILE the affairs of the emperor proſpered in this manner in the Palatinate, they were ſtill more fortunate in Bohemia. That vigilant prince had learnt that Oſman, who now filled the Ottoman throne, had promiſed to occaſion a diverſion of the Auſtrian forces, in favour of the Palatine and Gabor, in the next ſpring, by invading Poland; he, therefore, urged the dukes of Bavaria and Saxony to collect their forces, to advance upon the ſtrength of the enemy, and, by operations equally rapid and deciſive, to determine the iſſue of the war, before time and accidents ſhould turn the tide of fortune, and ſtrengthen the hands of Frederic. Saxony inſtantly took the field with twenty-four thouſand men, poured into Luſatia, laid Budiſſen, the capital, in aſhes, and quickly reduced the whole province under the authority of the emperor. Having accompliſhed this object, he diſpatched fourteen thouſand troops into Sileſia. This force reduced Gloſgaw, a city on the Oder, which, by opening a communication with the Baltic, ſecured a firm footing in a fertile and extenſive country.

IN the mean time, the duke of Bavaria, at the head of twenty thouſand foot and four thouſand horſe, marched into the Auſtrias. The Lower Auſtria immediately returned to its allegiance, and was received into the protection of the emperor. The Higher, at firſt, diſdained to follow this example of ſubmiſſion. A garriſon of two thouſand ſoldiers, thrown into Lintz, the capital, by count Manſveldt, had inſpired the ſtates with a degree of confidence and reſolution, which was not

(*y*) Hiſt. de Don Felippe III. &c. Por Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap 12. 14.

not to be overcome by an apprehenſion of danger, while it was yet diſtant. But the near approach of Bavaria ſtruck them ſo forcibly, that, although their own force was not diminiſhed, nor that of the duke greater than they had all along ſuſpected, they ſent a meſſage deſiring conditions of peace. Bavaria, contemning their late applications, took Lintz by aſſault on the 4th of Auguſt, puniſhed the chief authors of the rebellion with death, impoſed on thoſe he ſpared, the burthen of a ſtrong garriſon, and chaſtiſed the whole country with the ravages of war. As there was not in the whole province any caſtle or fortreſs that was able to withſtand the conqueror of the capital, all the chief men either ſubmitted to the emperor or fled into Bohemia. Having thus reeſtabliſhed peace, together with obedience, in Auſtria, Bavaria paſſed on, in order to join count Bucquoy, who oppoſed, with various fortune, the Bohemian army, whoſe head-quarters at this time was Egleburg (z). The count, according to orders from his prince, marched from Langlovits to Budovits. Here he was joined by the duke of Bavaria: and the two generals having had a ſhort conference, the different armies continued their march, by different routes, towards Prague. On the 10th day of October, they both of them, whether by concert, or by accident, drew near to Pilſen. Hitherto their divided forces had reduced every place that was ſituated in their tracts through which they bent their courſes: and the footſteps of the Coſſacks were every where marked with blood. But Pilſen reſiſted their united power, being defended by the ſubtlety and refinement of Manſveldt. The count being ſummoned to ſurrender to the combined armies of his imperial majeſty and the duke

Count Manſveldt amuſes the imperial generals.

(z) Gonç de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. x. Batt Nan. lib. 10. 1620.

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of Bavaria, demanded a ceſſation of arms, and propoſed a treaty of accommodation. He inſinuated, in a letter which he wrote to the duke and Bucquoy, ſome general complaints of the injuſtice of fortune and of his own hard fate, which had doomed him to ſtruggle with difficulties, and to be rewarded with ingratitude and diſappointment. The commanders to whom theſe hints were addreſſed, conſidered them as an advance on the part of Manſveldt, to ſurrender the town and garriſon of Pilſen, upon thoſe conditions which politicians ſometimes take the liberty of holding out to ſoldiers of fortune. A circumſtance had taken place, which ſhall by and by be mentioned, that enabled them to comprehend, as they imagined, the count's meaning, and which inclined them at the ſame time to give eaſy credit to his ſincerity. They did not heſitate, therefore, a moment, to tranſmit to Manſveldt a very friendly letter, in which they endeavoured to reſtore him to the intereſts of the houſe of Auſtria by the moſt liberal promiſes of preferment and fortune. But Ferdinand had not treaſures ſufficient to bend the inflexible ſpirit of that gallant hero; nor was it in his power to have ſet before his eyes ſo glorious an object at once of ambition and revenge, as that which he now purſued. Manſveldt, however, counterfeited a ſatisfaction in the aſſurances that had been given him: but he declined to ſurrender the place, and the troops he commanded, without ſaving his honour, by making a ſhew of reſiſtance. The imperial generals perceived at laſt that they had been the dupes of artifice (*b*). There was no reaſon to deſpair of being able to reduce Pilſen by force of arms: but the obſtinate valour of Manſveldt, it was probable would render the ſiege

(*b*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620.

ſiege tedious, and, in the preſent criſis, every moment was precious. After being amuſed for thirteen days, they puſhed on towards Prague, and, at Raconits, encountered with the Bohemian army, which was now conducted by the marquis of Anhalt and count Hollach, his lieutenant-general. Theſe men were but little acquainted with military affairs; but they poſſeſſed the ear of the Palatine, who, paſſing by the diſtinguiſhed merit of the counts Thorn and Manſveldt, beſtowed his confidence where he had placed his favour. This was the circumſtance which gave credit to the pretences of Manſveldt, and enabled him to impoſe on his adverſaries at Pilſen.

ADJOINING to Raconits, on the weſt, ſtood a hill, covered from the bottom upwards, to the middle, with a thick and intricate foreſt of pine and fir trees, whoſe cloſe and feathered branches intwined with one another, and reaching to the very ground, formed a ſhade impervious to the rays of the ſun, and a retreat to wild beaſts. In this natural fortreſs, Anhalt reſolved to make a ſtand, and to wait the approach of the enemy. He formed a camp for the infantry on the upper part of the hill, and defended the approaches to the whole, by the cavalry, and five hundred muſketeers. As it would have been dangerous to have advanced to Prague, leaving ſo great a force behind them, the imperaliſts reſolved to aſſault the hill on all hands, and, to provoke the enemy, if poſſible, to an engagement. But, if, in this attempt, they ſhould be unſucceſsful, they hoped al leaſt to derive ſome advantage from that ſpirit which is infuſed by an attack, and from that depreſſion of courage, and loſs of reputation which the Bohemians would ſuffer by declining an action. The moſt deſperate efforts were accordingly made to diſlodge the Palatine, by ſetting fire to the

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the vegetable rampart that protected him, and opening avenues for the aſcent of the imperial troops, by the hatchet. In this attempt, many officers as well as private men fell, and Bucquoy himſelf was grievouſly wounded. On the 5th of November, Anhalt perceived the imperial army in motion. Upon this, he diſpatched count Thorn with a conſiderable force to Prague, to ſtrengthen the city, and to fortify the wavering minds of the inhabitants. He himſelf, followed ſoon after with the main army. He leaves his baggage behind, and, by forced marches, through unfrequented paths, acroſs the mountains, arrives before the imperialiſts, at the Bohemian capital. The vaſt extent of that city, which was open in many places to hoſtile invaſion, determined Anhalt to poſt his army on the Wiſemberg (*c*).

Battle of Prague.

The Wiſemberg, or White Hill, is of no great height or circumference, but, being cut and broken by crags and deep ravines, it is of difficult acceſs, except on that ſide which looks towards Prague, where an inclined plane, of equal fertility and beauty, extends from its ſummit to the walls of the city. The lower part of this declining ſpace was covered with a range of houſes, or rather a ſtraggling village, which formed part of the ſuburbs of Prague; the middlemoſt was an extenſive park, adorned with a wood, and a royal palace, called the Star; the higher overlooked, and in many places commanded the capital. In this ſtrong poſition, the Bohemian general drew up his forces, and here he determined to abide the aſſault of the enemy. The various projections and incurvations of the hill, improved by art, ſeemed to defy the boldeſt aſſailants. And that the men might not be tempted to abandon ſo advantageous

(*c*) Gonç de Ceſp, lib. i. cap. 14. Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620.

vantageous a ſtation, Anhalt ordered the gates of the city to be ſhut, and ſignified what he had done, to every diviſion of the army. Having taken this precaution, he ranged his troops in order of battle, and waited the approach of the enemy (*d*). BOOK VI. 1620.

THE imperialiſts, who had by this time advanced within half a league of Prague, were ſtruck with the advantageous ſituation of the Bohemians, and deliberated, whether or no they ſhould give them battle. But the advanced ſeaſon would not permit them much longer to keep the field; and in the ſpring, thirty thouſand Turks (*e*) would be added to the number of their enemies. All the friends of Ferdinand had already taken an active part in his cauſe, and his whole force was now in exertion. The powers, on the other hand, that formed the natural allies of Frederic, from cauſes that could not be permanent, ſtood many of them aloof, as if indifferent to his fortune, but would aſſuredly join in ſupport of his cauſe, if the ſovereign authority ſhould be confirmed in the hands of that prince by length of time, as well as by actual poſſeſſion. In many caſes it was more prudent to guard againſt diſaſter than to run any great riſque for the ſake of victory. But in caſes of rebellion there was not room for delay, for the loſs of time was equal to misfortune in the field of battle (*f*). The enemy was, indeed, ſtrongly poſted: but the fate of battles depended

(*d*) Hiſt. de Don Fellippe III. por Gonç de Ceſp lib. i. cap. 14.

(*e*) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. Roy de France, et des principaux Evenements arrivez pendant ce Regne dans tous les Pais du Monde.

(*f*) In diſcordiis civilibus nihil feſtinatione tutius, ubi facto magis quam conſulto opus eſt. Nec cunctatione opus, ubi pernicioſior ſit quies, quam temeritas. Tacitus.

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depended on accidents, not to be foreſeen by human prudence; and the ſteady valour of the Imperialiſts, was more likely to bear up under any unforeſeen and adverſe circumſtance, than the tumultuous courage of the undiſciplined Bohemians. There was yet another conſideration, which, of all others, had the greateſt weight in the preſent queſtion. The ſermons of father Dominico, a bare footed Carmelite, who aſſured the army that the Lord of Hoſts would go forth with their ſtandard in his own cauſe, had infuſed into the ſoldiers an impatient ardour to charge the heretics: ſo important, in thoſe days, was the office of a military chaplain (g)! On the whole, it was reſolved to ſtorm the hill: the troops were formed in order of battle; the Imperaliſts on the right hand, and the Bavarians on the left. They advanced upon the enemy by the way of Stratzis, the only way that was practicable. Purſuing this courſe, they were obliged to march in a file over a bridge, and then, before they ſhould arrive at the bottom of the Wiſemberg, a miry valley. The younger Anhalt, ſon of the general, perceived the advantage to be derived from this embarraſſing ſituation, and was all on fire to improve it. He propoſed, after allowing ſuch numbers of the Imperialiſts to paſs the bridge as ſhould greatly weaken the main body of the army on the other ſide, to attack them before they ſhould be formed, and while ſtruggling with the difficulties of marſhy ground. This plan of young Anhalt, which was not leſs prudent than courageous, appeared to Hollach, the lieutenant-general, the effect of youthful impetuoſity. The Imperialiſts were allowed to extricate themſelves from their embarraſſment, without any other inconvenience than what they ſuffered from the Bohe-

(g) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç de Ceſp. lib. i. cap 14

Bohemian artillery. In order to avoid this, they haſtened their march, until the prominencies of the hill afforded them protection. Then, having put themſelves in the beſt order that the time and the nature of the ground would admit, they preſſed up the Wiſemberg with deliberate valour, and made a furious attack upon the enemy. The ſhouting of the ſoldiers, the noiſe of trumpets and drums, and the roaring of artillery, reverberated from the inflexions and cavities of the hill, announced the commencement of the important onſet, and ſhook the country for many leagues around with terror. Prague, as being nearer to the dreadful ſcene, was more ſenſibly ſtruck with its horrors, and trembled in awful expectation of the eventful iſſue. Frederic, on whoſe account the contending armies profuſely ſhed their blood, beheld from the battlements of his palace (*b*), on the one hand the ſpacious capital of Bohemia, and on the other the fierce engagement that was to diſpoſe of the Bohemian crown (*i*). At the beginning of the conflict, fortune ſeemed to ſmile on the Bohemians; for young Anhalt, ſupported by count Slich, repulſed with great ſlaughter the firſt aſſault. This aſſault was made by count Tilly, lieutenant-general to the duke of Bavaria. But the veteran troops, which formed the ſtrength of the Imperial army, ſuſtained this diſaſter with that firmneſs which reſults from diſcipline, and a glorious reputation. On this occaſion the wounded Bucquoy ſignalized his own ſpirit, and re-animated the hearts of the fearful. He had been carried in a litter to his tent in the camp, there to wait the event of the action. But he no ſooner ſaw the Imperialiſts hardly preſſed by the Bohemians, than he jumped

(*b*) In the Star Park already deſcribed.

(*i*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. 14.

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ed out of his carriage, and feveriſh as he was, mounted the firſt horſe he found, put himſelf at the head of his troops, and attacked the Hungarians with ſuch fury, that he left near two thouſand, as was computed, dead on the ſpot (*k*). The Walloons, commanded by William Verdugo, next to Bucquoy, had the honour of reſtoring the battle. They took young Anhalt and count Slich priſoners, and having made themſelves maſters of a redoubt, with three pieces of cannon, turned the artillery with prodigious effect againſt the thick ſquadrons of the enemy. The panic that was ſtruck among undiſciplined troops, by this ſudden reverſe of fortune; the fright and confuſion that had taken place among the Hungarian cavalry, from the yelling of the Coſſacs; together with a ſteady and unremitted fire both of cannon and muſquetry, in ſpite of the exhortations, the threats, and the example of the generals and other officers, threw the whole Bohemian army into irrecoverable diſorder and terror. A general rout enſued. All was loſt, but the honour of having made a brave reſiſtance. Anhalt, having firſt diſpatched a meſſage to the Palatine, provided for his own ſafety. The regiment of count Thorn was the laſt that quitted the field. The Wiſemberg was covered with the arms of the fugitives, and the bodies of the ſlain. Multitudes ſeeking to eſcape from the edge of the ſword, periſhed in the Mulda. Five thouſand Bohemians, that had been poſted in the Star Park, threw down their arms, and caſt themſelves upon the clemency of the victors. The generals were willing to give them quarter; but the Coſſacs remaining equally deaf to the orders of their commander, and to the cries of the flying victims,

(*k*) Hiſt. du Regne de Louis XIII. & des Evenements, &c.

rims, ſheathed the ſword only when the arm was weary with ſhedding blood (*l*). BOOK VI. 1620.

THIS important victory reſtored to Ferdinand the crown of Bohemia, and rendered the authority of Auſtria over that kingdom more abſolute than ever. Whatever privileges and immunities the Bohemian ſtates had formerly enjoyed, whether as their ancient rights, or the conceſſions of their kings, were, by a royal edict, aboliſhed or revoked. The electoral dignity, and afterwards the eſtates of Frederic were, by the mere authority of the emperor, transferred to the duke of Bavaria. His principal adherents were proſcribed; and all thoſe rigours and ſeverities exerciſed againſt the profeſſors of the reformed religion, which were to be expected from a vigorous, unrelenting, and bigotted conqueror. The misfortunes that awaited the elector Palatine were ſingularly affecting; nor, has ever the tragic muſe invented ſcenes more fitted to purge the minds of men with ſympathetic ſorrow. In the ſilence of the night that followed the fatal 9th of November, he fled with his wife and little children into Sileſia, where he met with the common reception of unfortunate princes. His abode among a people, determined to make their peace with his mortal enemy, was as ſhort as it was comfortleſs. He wandered with his family from place to place, ſtill fondly hoping to retrieve his fortune by arms, or by negociation. In the midſt of his peregrinations, two domeſtic events of contrary natures equally diſſolved his ſoul into the tendereſt anguiſh. At Brandenburgh, whither he had retired from Sileſia, he was reminded how much his family had ſuffered from his imprudent ambition, by the birth of a ſon (*m*). The ſame reflection

Important conſequences of the battle of Prague.

(*l*) Batt. Nan. lib. iv. 1620.

(*m*) Hiſt. de Regne de Louis XIII. et des Evenements principaux, &c.

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flection occurred, in all its bitterneſs, ſome years after, on a journey to Amſterdam. As he was paſſing over the Haerlem-mer, in a dark and tempeſtuous night, the light veſſel in which he ſailed foundered on another, againſt which it was driven by the fury of the wind and waves. Before the ſhip ſunk, the Palatine, with ſome other paſſengers, made their eſcape to that other veſſel; but the prince, his ſon, was unfortunately left in the foundered veſſel, which they durſt not approach, though they heard the cries of the boy, calling out for the help of his father. The next day, when the tempeſt abated, they found him frozen to the maſt, which he had embraced as his laſt refuge (*n*). While the unfortunate Frederic was thus wreſtling with adverſity, his friends and allies left him, one after another, and ſought to reconcile themſelves to the emperor. Even the brave and active prince of Tranſylvania, who, after the battle of Prague, had the courage to march his troops to the frontiers of the Lower Auſtria, maintaining his army by the plunder of the Catholic ſubjects of his enemy, even he would have abandoned the common cauſe, and given up the intereſts of his ally, if he could have exchanged the crown for the viceroyalty of Hungary (*o*). Count Manſveldt alone, with a ſmall army, which he ſubſiſted chiefly by pillage and free quarters, ſtill maintained the cauſe of Frederic; and his ſucceſsful boldneſs encouraged duke Chriſtian of Brunſwick, and the marquis of Baden Dourlach, to appear at the head of armies on the ſame ſide. Theſe princes were defeated by the Imperialiſts under count Tilly. But Manſveldt, though much inferior in force to his enemies, ſtill maintained the war, and diſcovered,

Courage and conſtancy of count Manſveldt.

(*n*) Hiſtory of King James, by Arthur Wilſon, Eſq.

(*o*) Bat. Nan. lib. iv. 1620. Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap.

ed, at once, the moſt wonderful caution in ſecuring his own troops, and the greateſt valour in annoying thoſe of the enemy. For the ſpace of two years, he defied, with a ſmall flying army, the whole houſe of Auſtria when in the zenith of its power, and would probably have prolonged the conteſt to a more diſtant period, if the Palatine, at the inſtigation of the king of England, had not, under colour of ſubmiſſion to the emperor, diſmiſſed him from his ſervice. The count withdrew his army into the Low Countries, and there entered into the ſervice of the United Provinces (*p*). 1620.

At the ſame time that the treaſures and arms of Spain were employed, with ſo much ſucceſs, in ſupporting and extending the authority of Ferdinand in Germany, the duke of Feria, by the ſubjection of the Valteline, conſolidated the territories of both branches of the Auſtrian race into one extenſive and mighty empire.

Revolt of the Valteline.

The Valteline extends from the lake of Como, in Milan, winding in an eaſterly direction between two ridges of lofty mountains, to the county of Tirol, and to the vallies of Sol and Munſter, from which regions it is ſeparated by the hills of Braulio, which may be croſſed in the ſpace of ſix or eight hours. On the north, it is bounded by the Alps, and, on the ſouth, by the territores of the Venetian republic. Its length is ſeventy miles; its breadth, if we reckon from the ſummits of the encloſing mountains, forty; but, if from their roots, on a medium, not above ſix. It is watered by the river Adda, and being exceedingly fertile in cattle, corn, and wine, it abounded

(*p*) Hume's Hiſtory of Great Britain. Reign of James I. anno 1622.

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bounded in towns and villages full of people. The inhabitants of this valley are ſaid to have been of a mild and diſpaſſionate temper; their manners to have been uncultivated and ſimple; their language and cuſtoms Italian. The Valteline was in former times a part of the principality of Milan; though by this time it had fallen, through various revolutions, under the dominion of the Griſons: thoſe republicans governed this dependent province with a rod of iron, the antipathy that naturally takes place between a conquering and conquered people, being exaſperated by that of religion. They interdicted their religious rites and uſages, baniſhed the Jeſuits, annihilated the juriſdiction of the ſecular clergy, and converted their churches into places of worſhip for the Proteſtants. Colleges were founded, and profeſſors of divinity were brought from Geneva, at the expence of the king of England. And, as the Griſons tyrannized over the minds of this unfortunate people, ſo they in reality enſlaved their bodies. They deprived them on various pretences of the fruits of their induſtry, and even of the patrimony left them by their anceſtors. All thoſe who were in the ſervice of the leagues (*q*), might commit the greateſt enormities on the Catholics with impunity. The government of the Valteline reſembled that of Turkey, by Paſhas and Janiſſaries; or the dominion which

(*q*) The civil conſtitution of the Griſons is a democracy. A certain number of towns and villages compoſed a community or corporation; ſeveral communities, a league; and three leagues, aſſembled by their deputies in a general diet, poſſeſſed the ſupreme power of the republic. The Griſons are repreſented by writers of thoſe times, but Catholics, as a fierce and intractable people, venal, inconſtant, and delighting in blood; and in all reſpects as the reverſe of the ſimple natives of the Valteline.

which is now exerciſed by European merchants over the princes of Aſia (*r*).

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ANIMATED at once by the reſolution of deſpair, a zeal for religion, and private aſſurances for the moſt effectual ſupport from the governor of Milan, the Catholics of the Valteline, in one day flew to arms, and ſurpriſed and maſſacred the unwary Proteſtants. The magiſtrates, and men of diſtinction and property were, as uſual in all ſimilar commotions, the chief object of their rage. Upwards of three hundred fathers of proſperous families were put to the ſword; and their goods, houſes, cattle, and eſtates, ſeized by the inſurgents. Immediately the Catholics choſe new magiſtrates, and, with the aid of money from Spain, erected ſeveral forts, which were alſo garriſoned by Spaniſh troops. The Griſons, aſſiſted by the wealth of Venice, which enabled them to hire ſome companies of Swiſs, made an effort to regain the Valteline; but were repulſed by the Catholics, ſupported by near five thouſand Spaniſh foot and horſe, with a train of artillery. Thus the conqueſt of the Palatinate by Spinola, having opened a paſſage for the Spaniards through Flanders into the heart of Germany; the Spaniſh territories in Italy being linked to thoſe of Ferdinand by the reduction of the Valteline; and a communication having been already eſtabliſhed between the Milaneſe and Spain, through the ports of Monaco and Final, on the Mediterranean; a chain ſeemed to be formed for holding the faireſt portion of Europe in ſubjection to the houſe of Auſtria.

July.

Immenſe power of the houſe of Auſtria.

AMONG

(*r*) Batt. Nani, lib. iv. 1620. Gonç. de Ceſp. lib. i. cap. 16.

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Rebellious designs of the duke of Oſſuna.

Among the fortunate events of this year, may be ranked the preſervation of Naples from the attempts of the duke of Oſſuna. How ſoon that ſingular man conceived the bold deſign of converting his delegated into ſovereign power, is uncertain. His reſolution was fixed the moment he learnt that the court of Madrid intended to deprive him of his government; but it is probable that fluctuating and tranſient ideas of independency on that court had occupied his mind at an earlier period; for when matters were brought to a criſis, it was only by purſuing his uſual tenour of conduct with unuſual alacrity, that he endeavoured to accompliſh the object of his lofty ambition. It appears that he entertained a hearty contempt for the feeble capacity and temper of his ſovereign (*s*). He characteriſed this prince by an image very natural in the mouth of a military man. Talking of Philip, he was wont to call him, "The great drum of the monarchy;" as if he had been merely an inſtrument for communicating the orders of the duke of Lerma (*t*). This contempt of the king, and the diſtance of Naples from Spain, were perhaps the circumſtances which firſt ſuggeſted to Oſſuna ideas of raiſing himſelf to independent power. Theſe ideas appear to have been uppermoſt in his mind, when he ſcornfully declined to ſolemnize the double marriages, and courted popularity, by diſtributing the money that had been collected for that purpoſe among a number of poor virgins.

The means by which this duke, who paſſed with many for no other than an ingenious madman, endeavoured to bring about his ends were ſo

(*s*) Batt. Nan. lib. iii. anno 1617.
(*t*) Anecdotes du Miniſtere de Conde Duc D'Olivarez.

ſo refined and artful, that a brief account of them will not appear unentertaining to the reader.

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THE order of nobility, accuſtomed to look back, and to reverence antiquity, he reaſoned, would be averſe to innovation, and diſpoſed to ſupport the crown, which they conſidered as the ſource of their own eminence in ſociety. He therefore endeavoured by all means to humble the nobles, and by ſtudied inſults to diminiſh that reſpect which was paid to their rank by the people. He excluded them from all places of power and truſt, and even plundered them occaſionally of their property. His chief friends and confidents were ſtrangers. Wherever he found a man of courage and genius, whom want or crimes had made deſperate, he received him into his boſom, and loaded him with ſuch favours as infallibly attached him to his perſon. On pretence of quelling commotions, which he himſelf had induſtriouſly excited, he introduced a military force compoſed of foreigners, who were entirely devoted to his will, and who acknowledged no other maſter. He had alſo ſhips of war under his command, which roved the ſeas, not under the flag of Spain, but that of the family of Oſſuna. In this manner he propoſed to train up a naval force, that from habit ſhould look up to him as the only power intitled to direct their motions.

THE prizes made by his fleet, and the plunder he raviſhed from the nobility, he employed in bribing the council of Spain to connive at his enormities, and in increaſing his popularity, both in the army and among the great body of the people. Throughout the whole kingdom of Naples he had agents who fomented the natural malignity of the people towards their ſuperiors, and

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aſſured them that the duke of Oſſuna was the only perſon to whom they could look up for protection againſt the tyranny of the court, and the inſolence of the nobles. He it was who would relieve them from oppreſſive taxes, and eaſe them of all their burthens. One day as he paſſed by a place where the officers of the revenues, in order to adjuſt the tax, were weighing certain articles of proviſion, he drew his ſword with great appearance of indignation, and cut through the ropes of the ſcales, ſignifying by that expreſſive action, that the fruits of the earth ought to be as free as thoſe celeſtial influences from whence they ſpring. At the ſame time that he was aſſiduous to gain the favour of the Neapolitan people, he alſo laboured to conciliate the friendſhip and to ſecure the ſupport of foreign nations. This purpoſe he hoped to effect by doing them all the miſchief in his power. For this end he left nothing unattempted that might tend to embroil the Spaniards with all their neighbours, and to render their very name hateful to the world. He endeavoured, as has already been obſerved, to bring the Infidels into Italy, harraſſed the fleets and coaſts of Venice, and committed piracies on the ſhips of almoſt all nations without diſtinction. In the mean time he entered into a ſecret correſpondence with the Venetian ſenate, and the duke of Savoy, and aſſured them that all the hoſtilities he had committed were the effects of the moſt poſitive orders from the court of Madrid. He invited them to join with him in a deſign he had formed of reſtoring the liberty of Italy, by driving the Spaniards beyond the mountains. The republic, averſe to ſuch hazardous exploits, would not ſo much as hear the duke's propoſal. But Charles Emanuel thought it worthy of conſideration, and inſtantly communicated it to the court of France. In conſequence of this, a perſon was ſent

ſent by the mareſchal Leſdiguieres to learn the real ſituation of affairs at Naples (*u*). BOOK VI. 1620.

THE deſigns of Oſſuna did not eſcape the court of Madrid. The council was unanimous that he ought immedately to be recalled: but whether he would ſubmit to their orders they very much doubted. It was therefore reſolved to attempt his removal by ſtratagem. Orders were inſtantly diſpatched to the cardinal Don Gaſpar de Borgia, to haſten from Rome to Naples, to take upon him the government in the room of Oſſuna. The cardinal, agreeably to inſtructions from Madrid, having previouſly ſecured the countenance of the governor of Caſtel Nuovo, introduced himſelf into that fortreſs in the ſilence of the night; and the thunder of the cannon which welcomed the arrival of Borgia, next morning announced the diſgrace of Oſſuna. Defeated.

BUT the duke, even while he ſtood on this precipice, did not reſign his power without a ſtruggle to maintain it. He attempted, by means of his emiſſaries, to rouze an inſurrection both of the populace and ſoldiers. But the poſſeſſion of the caſtle, the conſtant roaring of artillery, expreſſive of the will and authority of Spain, the acquieſcence of the nobility, and thoſe in the civil departments of ſtate; theſe circumſtances operated with irreſiſtible force both on the ſoldiery and the people, and prevailing over their attachment to Oſſuna, maintained their reverence for that power which they had been accuſtomed to obey. The degraded viceroy returned by ſlow journies into Spain. When he went to court,

(*u*) Greg. Let. Hiſt. Oſſon. Batt. Nan. lib. v. 1619. Anecdotes du Miniſtere de Conde Duc d'Olivarez.

Book VI. 1620. Philip withdrew his eyes from him, and turned his back. The high-ſpirited Oſſuna, ſurveying the monarch with contempt, muttered to thoſe who ſtood neareſt him, "The king treats me not as a man but as a child." This diſcountenance was all the puniſhment that was inflicted by the meek and gentle king, on a man who had attempted to deprive him of a kingdom. But, in the firſt year of the ſucceeding reign, he was thrown into priſon, where he died of a dropſy (*w*).

THE brilliant ſucceſſes of this year, which diffuſed through the Spaniſh nation a general joy, made but a feint impreſſion, where it might naturally be imagined it would have made the greateſt. So deep a melancholy had overcaſt the mind of the king that it could not be brightened up by the greateſt national proſperity. In order to revive his ſpirits by a change of air and of objects, by the advice of his new miniſters he ſet out on
April 22. a journey into Portugal, accompanied with the prince and princeſs of Spain, the infanta Maria, ſeveral of the nobility, the gentlemen of his bedchamber, and his confeſſor. The towns through which he paſſed teſtified their joy at his preſence by acclamations and triumphal arches. On the feaſt of St. Peter he made his public entry into Liſbon. The river was covered with all kinds of veſſels, which were gaudily decorated, and exhibited the greateſt profuſion of riches. Thirty-two triumphal arches, adorned with gold and precious ſtones, diſplayed in a manner ſtill more pompous the wealth of the capital of Portugal. Philip, ſtruck witth ſo magnificent a ſpectacle, ſaid, "He never knew before that he was ſo great

(*w*) Hiſt. de Don Felippe IV. por Don Gonçalo de Ceſpides, lib. ſegundo, capitulo ſegundo.

great a king." Having aſſembled the cortes, or eſtates of the kingdom, he received the crown, with the homage of his ſubjects. The king in return, agreeably to ancient cuſtom, ſwore that he would preſerve inviolate the rights and privileges of his people. The cortes alſo ſwore fealty to the prince, as the heir apparent. This they did in conformity to the wiſhes of the king. For that good prince, convinced that his end was approaching, was anxious to eſtabliſh his family in peace and comfort. He remained at Liſbon for ſome months; but, through the infirm ſtate of his health, did not appear much in public. On his return to Madrid he was detained for ſome time by a ſevere fit of his diſtemper at Caſa Rubios. Having ſomewhat recovered he purſued his journey, and employed the ſhort remainder of his life in the ſettlement of his family. The infant Don Ferdinand, his third ſon, at the age of ten years received a cardinal's hat, and with the approbation of the pope, was raiſed by proxy to the ſee of Toledo, the primacy of Spain, and the richeſt benefice in Europe.

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On the twenty-fifth day of November the marriage was conſummated between the prince and princeſs of Spain. And on the fourth of December the prince was introduced to the councils of ſtate, in order to learn the importance, and how to diſcharge the duties of the crown. This meaſure the king adopted in imitation of his father's conduct with regard to himſelf. In imitation of the ſame example he left, for the uſe of his ſon, ſome inſtructions in writing (*x*).

In

(*x*) Hiſt. de Don Felippe, &c. por Gonçales de Ceſpides, lib. i. cap. 7. 16. 18. Anecdotes du Miniſtere de Conde Duc d'Olivarez. Amelot de la Houſſaie.

BOOK VI.

Feb. 23, 1621. Illneſs of Philip.

IN the month of February the king's illneſs returned in all its malignity. Soon after his return from the chapel he was taken with a fever, which continued with various intermiſſions about the ſpace of a month. During all this time his ſpirits were depreſſed with the deepeſt melancholy, and he perſevered, notwithſtanding ſome encouragement from the phyſicians, in expreſſing his full aſſurance that he ſhould die. He deſired that the image of the Holy Virgin of Antiochia ſhould be carried about, which was performed on

March. Sunday the twenty-eighth, in a ſolemn proceſſion, at which the counſellors of Spain and many of the other nobles aſſiſted. In the evening of that day commandment was given to all the churches of Madrid to place the bleſſed ſacrament upon

29th. the altars. On Monday, about four o'clock in the evening, the king grew worſe than ever. He had before been ſeized at different times with a violent vomiting and a diarrhœa. Bliſters now appeared on his limbs and other parts of his body; and the phyſicians feeling his pulſe, ſaid unanimouſly, "That they undoubtedly aſſented to the king in the opinion he entertained of his infirmity." He then, in the preſence of his confeſſor, with other divines, the grandees of Spain, the preſidents of the different councils, and the firſt lord of his bed-chamber, authoriſed the preſident of Caſtile to affix in his name, for his hand ſhook greatly, the royal ſignature to a codicil he dictated in addition to his teſtament, which he had already made at Caſa Rubios. This being done, he gave orders that other preſents, beſides thoſe he had already appointed, ſhould be given to his confeſſor, and to his ſervants. After this, his phyſicians perſuaded him to take ſome food; they alſo adviſed him to compoſe himſelf for ſleep; but he anſwered, "On ſo long a journey, and in ſo ſhort a time for performing it, I muſt not

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Book VI. 1621. bleſſing, he diſmiſſed them with many prayers for their happineſs, both here and hereafter. The bleſſed ſacrament was adminiſtered to him about midnight. He received the extreme unction at two o'clock in the morning. During the whole time of his illneſs he made a conſtant confeſſion of his ſins, and implored divine mercy. He confeſſed to all around him that he had often been guilty of diſſimulation in matters of government; he regretted his ſupine indolence, and blamed himſelf greatly for having devolved the cares of the ſtate on his miniſters; and when he reflected that he had not in all things made the will of God the rule of his government, he trembled, crying out at different times, "Oh! if it ſhould pleaſe heaven to prolong my life, how different ſhould my future be from my paſt conduct!" But in the midſt of his troubled thoughts he found conſolation in the mercies of God; and embracing a crucifix, he expreſſed his hope, that the Redeemer of the world would not leave his ſoul in hell, but that, after many ages of painful purification, he would receive him at laſt into the manſions of the bleſſed. At devotion ſo affecting the ſpectators burſt into tears; and at that inſtant father Jerome of Florence came up to the bed on which the king lay. The father, unwilling to bruiſe a broken reed, held up to the view of the pious monarch the conſolations of religion, and expatiated on the exemplary purity of his life, and that zeal which had appeared throughout the whole of his reign for the Roman catholic religion. The alternate tumults of hope and fear that had ſo long agitated the mind of the king, at laſt ſubſided into a gentle calm, and he died in all the tranquillity of faith, on the laſt day of March, in the

His death.

the forty-third year of his life, and the twenty-third of his reign (*y*). BOOK VI. 1621.

The pliant, mild, and religious diſpoſition of this prince would have well entitled him to the praiſe of *pious and good* *, if the natural benevolence of his temper had not been controlled, in many important inſtances, by the bigotry, and his piety deeply tinctured with the follies of ſuperſtition. His amiable and inoffenſive manners would have adorned a private ſtation; but he was averſe to the trouble, and deſtitute of the talents for governing a great kingdom. And character.

The diſpoſition of the miniſter, upon whom, on his acceſſion to the throne, he devolved the honours and the cares of government, was, like his own, gentle and pacific; and pacific meaſures were neceſſary in the exhauſted ſtate of the empire. But a ſpirit of domination had taken root in the councils of Spain; the confidents and veteran commanders of Philip II. ſtill breathed war; war was the general voice of the nation; and, though peace was the intereſt of the monarchy, its predominant paſſion was the love of glory. The nobles had recovered in the preſent, a conſiderable ſhare of that importance which they had loſt during the two preceding reigns. And if the king was governed by the dukes of Lerma and Uzeda, theſe miniſters were themſelves obliged, in all momentous affairs, to comply with the general bent of the kingdom. The ambitious Review of his reign.

(*y*) A letter from Spain touching the manner of the death of king Philip III. directed to Gondomar, the Spaniſh lieger ambaſſador here in England, A. D. 1621, found among Dr. Birch's Collection of Manuſcripts in the Britiſh Muſeum, No. 4108. Gonçalo de Ceſpedes, lib. i. cap. 18.

* FELIPPE PIO Y BUENO.

Book VI. 1621. ambitious maxims which had been impreſſed on the ductile mind of Philip, from his earlieſt infancy, the bigotry of a falſe religion, and the warlike temper of the nation, prevailed for many years over that love of tranquillity which diſtinguiſhed both the king and his miniſter, and alſo over the intereſts of the nation. The war was proſecuted, but not with ſucceſs. The military diſcipline, valour, and ſkill of the Spaniards were yet undiminiſhed; but vigour and prudence were wanting in their counſels. No attention was paid to the trade and manufactures of the Netherlands, Portugal, or Spain. The chief object with adminiſtration, was to bring home in ſafety the treaſures of America; remittances, which diſtance and the naval power of the enemy rendered infinitely ſlow and precarious, and which paſſed with rapidity, through a thouſand channels, into the hands of their induſtrious enemies. The reſources of war were dried up; the public finances were deficient; yet, even in this ſituation of affairs, plans were formed for exciting a rebellion in France; and an armament was equipped for the conqueſt of Ireland. The attention of the Spaniards was thus diſtracted by different views, and diverted from that which, while they choſe to purſue it, ought to have been its only object.

The attachment to liberty, the enthuſiaſm of religion, laborious induſtry, with public and private œconomy prevailed, but not till after a ſtruggle of near half a century, over the wealth, the reputation, and diſciplined valour of the numerous armies of Spain; and this haughty nation was obliged at laſt to hearken to terms of accommodation. It was indeed in a great meaſure owing to miſconduct and want of vigour on the part of the Spaniſh miniſters, that the war had not

not been attended with greater ſucceſs; but they had judged wiſely in reſolving to bring it to a concluſion. Nor was there any reaſon to doubt that the truce would prove as advantageous to the Spaniards as to the Dutch, if thoſe who held the reins of the Spaniſh government ſhould afterwards conduct themſelves with that prudence, moderation, and wiſe œconomy, which they might have been taught by paſt experience. BOOK VI. 1621.

BUT the world was yet ignorant that domeſtic induſtry is preferable to extended dominion. This doctrine, which is but juſt beginning to influence the cabinets of princes, in the period under review, was ſcarcely thought of; nor has it yet had any viſible influence in the counſels of Spain, after its truth has been proved by the experience of near three centuries. That the ſtrength of any country chiefly conſiſts in the induſtry and number of its inhabitants, is indeed a truth deducible not only from experience, but from reaſon. A kingdom, compact and populous, has a mighty advantage over one thinly inhabited and of great extent. The former reſembles a garriſon within the narrow limits of a well conſtructed fortreſs, which is able to reſiſt the aſſaults of ſuperior numbers without, and often to make ſucceſsful ſallies: the latter, a fortification on too large a ſcale, whoſe extenſive works cannot be defended with effect, againſt all the attacks of a vigilant and active enemy. This important truth is illuſtrated in a very ſtriking manner, by the circumſtances of the Spaniſh monarchy during the reign of Ferdinand of Arragon, contraſted with its ſituation in that of Philip III. In the firſt of theſe periods the dominion of Spain extended over the kingdom of Naples, and all the iſlands of the Mediterranean, from the Streights of Gibraltar to the ſouthern extremity of

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of Italy, beſides Tripoli, Bugia, Oran, Mazalquivir, and other towns on the coaſt of Africa. The ſmall kingdom of Portugal, though governed hitherto by its native princes, it was eaſy to foreſee, would ſooner or later be reduced by policy or by arms, under the power that ſo greatly preponderated in that peninſula, of which it formed a part. The viciſſitudes of fortune had never conſpired more harmoniouſly with the operations of nature to form a mighty and durable empire. The branches were not ſo ponderous, or ſtretched out to ſo great a length, as to fall off and to lacerate the parent ſtock; but, on the contrary, they were ſuch as returned the nouriſhment they drew, with increaſe. The populouſneſs, the induſtry, the martial ſpirit of Spain, rendered it at that period the moſt powerful monarchy in Europe, and formidable to all its neighbours. But in the reign of Philip III. the imperial power of Spain, which extended over a greater part of the globe than that of Rome in the zenith of her power, was foiled in a conteſt with a ſmall territory, peopled with manufacturers and merchants.

The Spaniſh nation, after this mortifying defeat, ſought to conceal its want of power by an increaſe of pomp and ſplendour; and to recover, and even extend its authority by intrigue and negociation. The firſt of theſe arts, in the preſent times, appears ſomewhat frivolous. It ought, however, to be conſidered, that in thoſe days the ancient hoſpitality and magnificence ſtill remained, and were conſidered as very important circumſtances in government (z). As to the ſecond,

(z) Chamberlayne mentions, as a proof of the moderation and œconomy of the elector Palatine, that when he came to England to pay his court to the princeſs Elizabeth, he had a ſmall

cond, never certainly were intrigues and negociations conducted with more addreſs, or crowned with greater ſucceſs. The Spaniſh ambaſſadors generally governed the courts at which they reſided: and it was in the reign of the feeble Philip III. that thoſe chains were forged, which for ſo many years alarmed the nations, and which, if they had not been burſt aſunder by the vigorous arm of Guſtavus Adolphus, and the generals trained up to war under his ſtandard, would have extended the authority of Auſtria over Europe.

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WHILE few nations from the Euxine and the Baltic to the Pyrenean mountains, eſcaped the calamities of war, Spain enjoyed the ſupreme bleſſing of profound peace. The ſucceſs of her arms in Germany retrieved that loſs of reputation which ſhe had ſuffered in the Netherlands. And as it is the prerogative of military renown to dictate many circumſtances of cuſtom and faſhion, the dreſs and manners of Spain were very generally imitated by other nations (*a*). The magnificence of the court was ſupported at an incredible expence; and the Spaniards were ſtill eſteemed the firſt nation in the world. This ſplendid face of things had an impoſing air abroad; but the nation at home, oppreſſed with taxes, ſuffered for all its acquiſitions and triumphs.

ſmall train of ſober well-faſhioned gentlemen, ſervants and all not exceeding one hundred and ſeventy. Birch's Collection of Manuſcripts in the Britiſh Muſeum.

(*a*) As it is common to ſay of a man of faſhion, on his return from the continent, that he is very much Frenchified, ſo in thoſe times travellers generally became very much Spaniſhified. "Mr. Roſſingham, ſays Mr. Chamberlayne, is come home ſo Spaniſhified that I hardly knew him when he ſaluted me." Birch's Collection of Manuſcripts in the Britiſh Muſeum.

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